Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal & Ors. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 17.05.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan  

Case In Brief: 

• The case pertains to land acquisition process initiated by the Delhi Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
• Between 1957-2006, various notifications were issued for acquiring lands and awards passed fixing compensation. 
• In some cases compensation amounts were deposited in treasury and in some cases possession could not be taken by Government entities as landowners challenged the proceedings and obtained a stay. 
• Later 1894 Act was replaced by the 2013 Act, this Act introduced Section 24 which provided that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the earlier regime would be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases, including when compensation had not been paid or possession had not been taken.  
• Section 24 was interpreted in several judgments like Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harak Chand Mistrimal Solanki (2014), Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015), Indore Development Authoriy v. Shailendra (2018) and Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020). 
• In the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) a 5-judge bench overruled Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harak Chand Mistrimal Solanki (2014). 
• As a consequence of this decision, Delhi Government entities (DDC, DMRC) filed appeals against orders of the Delhi High Court which declared acquisition proceedings as lapsed based on Pune Municipal Corporation and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association.   
• As most of the cases were filed after expiration of the period of limitation, the issue before the Court was whether condonation of delay can be allowed on the basis of subsequent change of law. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court firstly observed that the law of limitation is basec on the maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt i.e. the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights. 
• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (LA) vests the Court with the discretion to extend the period of limitation if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or application within the prescribed period. 
• Section 5 requires analyses of two ingredients: (a) whether sufficient cause has been made out; (b) whether such cause has been shown for not filing the appeal/application “within the prescribed period”. 
• The Court did not allow the condonation of delay on the following grounds: 
  • Firstly, the Court observed that the appellant are required to prove that they were diligent during the prescribed period and could not file appeal because of a “sufficient cause” arising within the prescribed period. 
    • Instead of showing a sufficient cause arising within the period of limitation, they are using an event after the expiry of such period to justify the delay. 
  • Secondly, the Court observed that a party cannot be allowed to take advantage of it’s deliberate inaction during the limitation period. 
  • Thirdly, the Court observed that if subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora’s box. 
    • This is because it will result in petitioners approaching the Court in all cases where the judgment relied on was subsequently overruled. 
    • The petitioners would approach the Court and would seek the relief based on new interpretation of law. 
    • Also, there would be no finality to the proceedings and the cases might be reopened.     
  • Fourthy, the Court observed that when a case is overruled it is only binding nature of the precedent that is taken away and the lis between the parties is still deemed to have been settled by an overruled case. 
• The Court, however, finally allowed condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act on the ground of public interest but did not accept other arguments.  

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 5 of The Limitation Act (TLA) - Condonation of delay  –  
  • Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— 

Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. 

[Original Judgment] 

Ankur Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh 

Date of Judgement/Order – 08.06.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice K.V. Viswanathan 

Case In Brief: 

• The petitioner in this case was in custody since last two years in connection with FIR registered under Section 8 read with Sections 22 and 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS). 
• The petition was filed before the Court for bail. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court observed that failure to conclude trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
• The Supreme Court also observed that the panch witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and on the facts the Court was not inclined to consider Investigating Officer as a panch witness. 
• Hence, bail was granted in this case. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Article 21 of Constitution of India, 1950 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty- 
  • No person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty. 

[Original Judgement] 

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr

Date of Judgement/Order – 17.05.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief: 

• The case pertained to the land acquisition process initiated by the Delhi Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for planned development of Delhi. 
• Subsequently, the 1894 Act was replaced by the 2013 Act, which brought reforms and amended Section 24. 
• Section 24 was interpreted in several Supreme Court judgments. The Delhi High Court allowed writ petitions of certain affected landowners and declared as lapsed land aquisition proceedings pertaining to them.  
• The High Court judgments were carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. This "first round" of litigation resulted in different outcomes, including dismissal of some civil appeals. 
• Four years later in 2020 the Court overturned the decision laid down in previous judgments and laid down the law in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020).  
  • It was held that acquisition proceedings could be declared as lapsed only when both conditions ie, non-payment of compensation to the landowners and failure of the State to take physical possession of the acquired lands, were met. 
• As a consequence Delhi Government sought reconsideration of the Delhi High Court decisions, which declared acquisition proceedings as lapsed   
• The SLP’S/Appeals/M.A.’s moved at this stage constituted “second round” of litigation. 
• The Court in this case discussed the applicability of two important concepts of  doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of merger. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court in this case observed that res judicata is a technical principle that operated to prevent the same parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been determined. 
  • The Court however held that the rule of res judicata does not apply hard and fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake.  
• The Court further dealt with the concept of doctrine of merger. 
  • It was held that the doctrine of merger is not of universal or unlimited application. 
  •  The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. 
  • The Exception carved out with respect to doctrine if merger is the exercise of extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 
• Taking into account the concept of public interest the Court held that if the doctrine of merger is applied mechanically it will result in irreversible consequences. 
• The Court in this case did not apply the doctrine of merger by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution.  

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 11 CPC – Res Judicata –  
  • No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. 
    • Explanation I.-- The expression former suit shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to a suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. 
    • Explanation II.-- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. 
    • Explanation III.--The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. 
    • Explanation IV.-- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. 
    • Explanation V.-- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. 
    • Explanation VI.-- Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating . 
    • 1[Explanation VII.-- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. 
    • Explanation VIII.-- An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised. 

[Original Judgement] 

XYZ v. State of Karnataka 

Date of Judgement/Order – 10.06.2023 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice PV Sanjay Kumar and Augustine George Masih. 

Case In Brief: 

• Respondent no. 2 stands accused of sexually assaulting a minor (victim). 
• The Karnataka High Court had previously stayed a notice requiring respondent no. 2 to undergo medical examination, 
• The medical report indicating sexual intercourse and the victim's statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, implicating the accused, 
• Court orders the stay granted by the Karnataka High Court is vacated,  
•  Respondent no. 2 is directed to appear before the Investigating Officer to undergo medical examination concerning the ongoing investigation. 
• The Investigating Officer is instructed to conduct said examination in accordance with established procedures and with due regard to the accused's rights. 
• This order supersedes any prior contradictory directives issued by lower courts in this matter. 

Verdict: 

• The bench observed that in any event, his clear statement to the effect that he did not want to be subjected to medical examination shows that he is not willing to cooperate with the investigation. 
• It was further stated that respondent no.2 must comply with Section 41-A of the CrPC notice and subject himself to medical examination as directed by the Investigating Officer. He cannot voice apprehensions about the medical facility he is being referred to without any tenable basis. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 41A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Notice of appearance before police officer. 

(1) The police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. 

(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. 

(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. 

(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice. 

[Original Judgement] 

Kasthuripandian v. RBL Bank Limited 

Date of Judgement/Order – 24.06.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S Oka and Rajesh Bindal   

Case In Brief: 

• A complaint was lodged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, alleging dishonour of cheques. 
• The accused, Kasthuripandian, petitioned this Court for transfer of the aforementioned complaint to an alternative judicial forum. 
• This Court recognizes the right of an accused in a cheque dishonour case to seek such transfer. 
• The Court must now examine the merits of Kasthuripandian's petition to determine its validity and whether the requested transfer should be granted. 

Verdict: 

• The transfer petition filed by the accused is dismissed. 
• The Court observed that an accused in a cheque dishonour case lacks the locus standi to seek transfer of the complaint to an alternative forum. 
• The Court states that the power to transfer such cases does not extend to requests made by the accused, as the choice of forum in cheque dishonour cases is primarily vested with the complainant. 
  • The accused retains the right to seek exemption from personal appearance. 
• Any application for such exemption shall be made to and adjudicated by the court of original jurisdiction where the complaint is filed. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 138: Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. 

• Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— 
  • (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; 
  • (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, 5 [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and 
  • (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 
  • Explanation — For the purposes of this section, “debt of other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 

[Original Judgement] 

Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta & Anr. v. High Court of Gujarat & Ors. 

Keywords: Constitution of India, 1950 (COI), Supreme Court 

Date of Judgement/Order – 17.05.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra 

Case In Brief: 

• All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (2002) emphasized merit-based criteria for promotions in Higher Judicial Service, advocating for 'Merit-cum-Seniority' in appointments to the position of District Judge. 
• The High Court of Gujarat announced 68 vacancies for District Judges from Civil Judges (Senior Division) under a 65% quota. The promotion process included a Suitability Test per Rule 5(1)(I) of the 2005 Rules. 
• A list of 205 senior-most Civil Judges (Senior Division), not exceeding three times the vacancies, formed the 'Zone of Consideration' for the promotion. 
• Suitability of candidates in the zone was evaluated through a Written Test (Objective Type – MCQs), Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the last five years, Average Disposal Rate over five years, and Evaluation of Judgments delivered in the last year. 
• Candidates needed to score at least 40% in each component and a minimum aggregate of 50% across all four to qualify for promotion. 
• Following the Written Test, 175 candidates cleared the initial stage. Subsequently, evaluations of ACRs, judgments, and disposal rates resulted in 149 candidates meeting the eligibility criteria. 
• The High Court finalized the Select List, promoting the senior-most 68 eligible candidates from the pool of 149 to the position of District Judge. 
• Petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. 

Verdict: 

• Supreme Court observes that Government employees have no inherent right to demand promotion; judicial review is limited to ensuring compliance with Article 16's equality provision. 
• the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Gujarat High Court's 2023 promotion recommendations for Senior Civil Judges to District Judges under the 65% quota, emphasizing merit-cum-seniority principles. 
• The Constitution does not define promotion criteria, leaving decisions to the legislature or executive, with courts intervening only on grounds of Article 16 violations. 
• Petitioners challenged the High Court of Gujarat's Select List for District Judge promotion, citing Article 14 violations and discrepancies with Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005, Rule 5. 

Relevant Provision: 

Article 16 of Indian Constitution,1950: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. 

• (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.  
• (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.  
• (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.  
• (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.  
• (4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. 
• (4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent. reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.  
• (5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.  
• (6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent. of the posts in each category 

[Original Judgement]