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Home / Code of Criminal Procedure

Criminal Law

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92

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 15-Nov-2023

Introduction

In this case scope and extent of powers of the Court to arraign any person as an accused during inquiry under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).

Facts

  • In this case, the appellant was engaged in running a coaching center.
  • He was arrested on certain allegation and taken to the police custody where he was handcuffed by the police without any reason.
  • He was tortured during the trial and the treatment of the police in custody was not reasonable.
  • The dignity and reputation of the accused was harmed because of delay in trial.
  • He filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution that prosecution purposefully caused delay in trial.

Issues Involved

  • What is the stage at which power under Section 319 can be exercised?
  • Whether the evidence word used under Section 319 of the CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination, or it can be exercised on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief?

Observations

  • The Court said that the constitution mandates to provide a protected umbrella under Article 20 and 21 for smooth administrative justice and for efficacious and fair trial.
  • For the empowerment of the Court to ensure that the administration of the criminal courts works properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified by the legislature under the CrPC.
  • The Court further said the Section 319 of the CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex damantur cum nocens absolvitur (judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine can be explained by the enactment under Section 319.
  • When the investigating agency for any reason doesn’t array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial.
  • The Court said the word evidence under Section 319 of the Crpc must be broadly understood and not literally I.e. as evidence brought during a trial.

Conclusion

  • The Court held that the power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the stage of completion of examination-in-chief and the court does not need to wait till the said evidence is tested on cross-examination for it is the satisfaction of the court which can be gathered from the reasons recorded by the court, in respect of complicity of some other person(s), not facing the trial in the offence.

Notes

CrPC

Section 319 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence -

(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.

(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.

(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then— (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.

Constitution of India, 1950

Article 226 - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs —

(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including 4 [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without— (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.