List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Kerala High Court in the matter of Vishnu K.B. v. State of Kerala & Anr., held that a notarized affidavit signed by the complainants could not be taken in isolation by the Court so as to discharge the accused.

Background

• The petitioner submitted that the offences alleged in this case are punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 326, 308 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• According to the petitioner, he had not committed any of the offences.
• The complainants were aware of the same and they had intimated this fact to the police authorities.
• However, the investigating authorities did not take that into consideration and arbitrarily retained the petitioner in the array of the accused.
• The complainants have no objection in discharging the petitioner from the array of the accused. They have filed an affidavit before a Notary Public for the same.
• The Sessions Court dismissed the petitioner's application for discharge.
• It is against the same that the present revision petition has been filed before the HC of Kerala.
• The petition was dismissed by the HC.

Court’s Observations

• Justice N. Nagaresh observed that a notarized affidavit signed by the complainants exonerating the accused person cannot be taken in isolation to discharge the accused.
• The Court further explained that to discharge an accused person under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Court ought to determine if there are sufficient grounds to proceed against them. If such grounds are found, an order of discharge cannot be passed, and the accused would have to face trial.

Legal Provisions

Section 227 of CrPC

• This Section contains provisions in relation to discharge of an accused. It states that-
  • If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
• The purpose of this section is to ensure that the Court should be satisfied that the accusations made against the accused are not frivolous and that there is some material for proceeding against the accused.
• In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA (2019), the Supreme Court held that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected that the Trial Judge to exercise his judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. The Court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

• Section 143:
  • This Section deals with the punishment for being a member of unlawful Assembly.
  • It states that whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
    • Unlawful Assembly is defined under Section 141 of IPC.
• Section 341:
  • This Section states that whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
• Section 326:
  • It states that whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to re­ceive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be pun­ished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
• Section 308:
  • This Section deals with the attempt to commit culpable homicide. It states that whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

The division bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah dismissed an appeal preferred by Axis Bank against condonation of delay in a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process by the State Bank of India (SBI).

• The Supreme Court gave this observation in the matter of Axis Bank Ltd. v. Naren Seth.

Background

• The Axis Bank (appellant) filed an appeal against Naren Seth (Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor) as respondent 1 and SBI as respondent 2.
• The account of Shreem Corporation Limited (corporate debtor) was declared Non-Performing Asset (NPA) in year 2013.
• And as SBI provided credit facilities and term loans to the corporate debtor, it initiated proceedings under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), securing an order for the physical possession of assets of corporate debtor in 2017.
  • The corporate debtor had debt liabilities against the SBI.
• SBI applied for CIRP under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) against the default of corporate debtor however the application by SBI was filed after delay of 1392 days.
  • Hence, SBI also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requesting a condonation of delay.
• The Adjudicating Authority considered the condonation of delay by SBI considering its responsibilities towards the interest of the community as a Public Section Undertaking (PSU).
• Axis Bank was not a party in the application under Section 7 IBC filed by SBI, however, it still filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) challenging the order in favor of SBI.
• NCLAT upheld the order of Adjudicating Authority, hence Axis Bank preferred this appeal before SC against the order of NCLAT.

NCLAT’s Observations Regarding the Condonation of Delay

The SC while dismissing the appeal considered the following observations of NCLAT:

• The NCLAT observed that “When the Government is an Applicant, considerable delay is caused due to procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision. The SBI also being a statutory body, under the control of the Government, the process of making decisions consumes considerable time is a known feature”.
• NCLAT further held that it cannot be said that discretion exercised by Adjudicating Authority in condoning the delay is perverse or against any provisions of law or violates any principle of law for determining the ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • The NCLAT did not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority condoning the delay in filing the Application under Section 7 of the IBC by the SBI.

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP)

• Introduction:
  • The CIRP in India, governed by IBC, is a time-bound process aimed at resolving the financial distress of a corporate debtor while maximizing the value of its assets.
  • The primary objective of the procedure is to ensure the revival of a financially distressed company.
  • And in cases where the revival of the company is not possible it ensures an orderly liquidation of the assets of the distressed company that has been declared as a corporate debtor.
• Initiation of Process:
  • The CIRP is initiated by the filing of a plea before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), which acts as the adjudicating authority in these matters.
  • The plea may be initiated by a Financial Creditor, Operational Creditor, Corporate Debtor or on suo moto cognizance by NCLT.
  • However, an application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7 of the IBC can only be filed by financial creditors which can be banks or financial institutions.
• Time Limit:
  • Under Section 12 of the IBC, CIRP should be completed within 180 days or within the extended period of 90 days and mandatorily be completed within 330 days including any extension granted by NCLT.
• Moratorium Period:
  • Once the CIRP is initiated, a moratorium period comes into effect.
    • The period of moratorium prohibits the creditors of that distressed debtor company from taking any legal actions against it, and the management of the corporate debtor is placed under the control of an Insolvency Resolution Professional (IRP).
• Conclusion:
  • The interested companies get an invitation to propose their resolution plan to the IRP outlining a structure to revive the debtor.
  • In case any resolution plan does not get approval during CIRP, the company’s assets go for liquidation.

Landmark Cases

• Collector, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji (1987):
  • The SC explained the flexibility of applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 in case of ‘sufficient cause”.
  • The Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature in this Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningfull manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.
• Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy (2020):
  • The SC widened the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 in case of application under Section 7 of IBC.
  • The SC held that an application under Section 7 of the IBC would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of three years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as NPA, if there were an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of three years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of three years.

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News?

The division bench of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed that under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 (HMA) no maintenance can be granted to a highly qualified and earning wife and is inclined to truthfully disclose her true income.

• The Delhi High Court gave this observation in the matter of X v. Y.

Background

• The appellant (wife) had got married to the respondent (husband), but on account of incompatibility and differences, they were not able to continue in their matrimonial relationship leading to the filing of a Divorce Petition under Section 13 (1) (ia) of HMA by the respondent/husband.
• The appellant was working till then, but after the filing of the Divorce Petition she resigned from her job.
• The matter was amicably settled, and the Divorce Petition was withdrawn.
• However, a police complaint was filed by the appellant thereby reflecting that the parties were unable to settle in their matrimonial relationship.
• The Respondent filed the second Divorce Petition under Section 13 (1) (ia) of HMA against the appellant.
• During the trial the appellant filed an application under Section 24 of HMA which was dismissed by the Trial Court, twice.
  • It was first dismissed during trial and then re-adjudication by Family Court.
• Aggrieved from the dismissal the appellant preferred this appeal before the Delhi HC.

Court’s Observation

• The Delhi HC held “We find that in the present case it is not only that the appellant is highly qualified and has an earning capacity, but in fact she has been earning, though has not been inclined to truthfully disclose her true income. Such a person cannot be held entitled to maintenance”.

Maintenance Under Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA)

• Section 24 of the HMA deals with the provision for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings.
  • The term "pendente lite" means “pending the litigation” or “during the pendency of the case”.
• The said section governs interim maintenance to support livelihood and necessary expenses of any proceeding under HMA in case of insufficient or no independent income.
• The provision provides a gender-neutral right to apply this remedy to both husbands and wives, as the case may be.
• The Court may order on an application of the wife or husband, the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding or expenses necessary for his/her survival, monthly.
• The court may order the maintenance under this Section only after adjudging petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent and finding the application reasonable.
• The proviso of this Section states that, the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during the proceeding, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the wife or the husband.

Fundamentals of the Section 24

• Expenses of Proceedings:
  • Section 24 governs the expenses occurring during the pendency of the proceedings under HMA.
  • These expenses include the fees of lawyers, court fees, stamp duties, traveling expenses and other related expenditures.
  • The objective is to ensure that the financially weaker spouse can effectively participate in the legal process without being burdened by the associated costs.
• Discretion of the Court:
  • The power to grant maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings is merely a discretionary power vested in the Court.
  • This discretion allows the court to consider the individual circumstances of the case and make a fair and just determination regarding the amount of maintenance and expenses to be awarded.
  • The court adjudges the sufficiency of income, assets, and needs of both parties while granting the maintenance under this Section.
• Temporary Nature:
  • It is important to note that the maintenance awarded under Section 24 is temporary in nature.
  • It is intended to provide financial support only during the pendency of the legal proceedings.
  • The Court has the discretion to decide on granting final maintenance while concluding the case.

Landmark Cases

• Mamta Jaiswal v. Rajesh Jaiswal (2000):
  • The HC while declining maintenance to a highly qualified wife held that Section 24 has been enacted for the purpose of providing monetary assistance to either spouse who is incapable of supporting himself or herself in spite of sincere efforts.
    • However, the law does not expect persons engaged in the legal battles to remain idle solely with the objective of squeezing out money from the opposite party.
  • The court further said that “Section 24 of HMA is not meant to create an Army of idle people waiting for a dole to be awarded by the other spouse”.
• Rupali Gupta v. Rajat Gupta (2016):
  • The division bench of Delhi HC deprecated the claim of maintenance under Section 24 of HMA by a well-qualified spouse having an earning capacity.