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Criminal Law

Grant of Bail

 02-Nov-2023

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Munshi Sah v. The State of Bihar & Anr., held that the question of grant of bail to a co-accused person cannot made dependent upon surrender of another accused who is described as the main accused person in the case.

What was the Background of Munshi Sah v. The State of Bihar & Anr. Case?

  • The appellant is the brother of the husband who is an accused in a dowry death case.
  • The appellant being the co-accused has filed a bail plea before the SC.
  • The present appeals arise out of a case of unnatural death of a lady for which proceeding has been started under Sections 304-B and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
  • The husband has been absconding and the trial had begun without him being arrested.
  • The SC allowed the bail plea.

What were the Court’s Observations?

  • The Bench of Justices Aniruddha Bose and Bela M. Trivedi question of grant of bail to a co-accused person cannot made dependent upon surrender of another accused who is described as the main accused person in this case.
  • The Court further noted that the imposition and subsequent adhering to the condition of surrender of the husband of the deceased/ co-accused would not be necessary for grant of bail to the appellant.

What is the Important Legal Provision Involved in it?

Indian Penal Code, 1860

  • Section 304 -B, IPC: Dowry Death
    • (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
    • Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

    • (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
  • Dowry death is a cognizable and non-bailable offence.
  • In the case of Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana (2011), the SC held that any demand for property or valued security that is in any way related to marriage constitutes dowry demand.
  • In the case of Devender Singh & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand (2022), the SC held that the phrase 'soon before her death’ used in Section 304B IPC must be interpreted as proximately before the wife's death and not immediately prior to such death.

What is Section 120-B of IPC?

  • This Section deals with the punishment of criminal conspiracy. It states that-
    • (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
    • (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
  • Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy. It states that when two or more per­sons agree to do, or cause to be done, —
    • (1) an illegal act, or
    • (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agree­ment is designated a criminal conspiracy.
    • Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.

    Civil Law

    Section 47 of CPC

     02-Nov-2023

    Source: Supreme Court

    Why in News?

    The Supreme Court (SC) has expressed its concern over the protracted time it takes to enforce decrees in court in accordance with Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) in the matter of Pradeep Mehra v. Harijivan J. Jethwa.

    What is the Background of the Pradeep Mehra v. Harijivan J. Jethwa Case?

    • The appellant is the landlord (decree holder) and the respondents are the tenants (judgement debtors) in a premises situated in Mumbai.
    • The landlord, aged more than 70 years as of now, had filed a suit for eviction which ultimately resulted in a consent decree being passed in 2005.
      • It was stipulated that in case the judgment debtors fail to pay the rent for two consecutive months, they could be evicted as the decree would become liable for execution.
    • Tenants thereafter committed a default in payment of rent, and on an application moved by the decree holder, the court allowed the application holding that the decree holder is entitled to execute the decree of eviction in 2013.
    • Meanwhile, for one reason or another, the proceedings before the executing court were delayed.
    • About four years after the order, the judgment debtors moved an application before the executing court challenging the order allowing the execution and was objected to by the appellant regarding its maintainability.
      • The executing court vide its order allowed the objections of the appellant and held that under the garb of the provisions of Section 47 CPC, the respondents were actually challenging the order of the court which had attained finality.
    • It was challenged by the respondents in revision, where it was set aside.
    • The landlord presented a writ petition before the Bombay High Court against the above order which was dismissed.
    • Therefore, the present petition is presented before SC.

    What were the Court’s Observations?

    • Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Sudhanshu Dhulia held that the executing court is restricted from addressing matters directly related to the execution of the decree and is precluded from delving into the merits of the decree itself.
    • The SC while expressing its concern about the difficulties encountered by a decree-holder in carrying out the decree held that “Under Section 47, CPC the executing court cannot examine the validity of the order of the court which had allowed the execution of the decree in 2013, unless the court’s order is itself without jurisdiction.”

    Who is a Decree Holder?

    • The term is defined under Section 2(3) of CPC as any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made.

    Who is a Judgement Debtor?

    • The term judgement debtor is defined under Section 2(10) of CPC as any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made.

    What is the Legal Provision under CPC Regarding Execution?

    • Section 38 - Court by which decree may be executed - A decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution.
    • Section 39 - Transfer of decree -
      • (1) The Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree holder, send it for execution to another Court of competent jurisdiction -
        • (a) if the person against whom the decree is passed actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or
        • (b) if such person has not property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree sufficient to satisfy such decree and has property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or
        • (c) if the decree directs the sale or delivery of immovable property situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it, or
        • (d) if the Court which passed the decree considers for any other reason, which it shall record in writing, that the decree should be executed by such other Court.
      • (2) The Court which passed a decree may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction.
      • (3) For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be a Court of competent jurisdiction if, at the time of making the application for the transfer of decree to it, such Court would have jurisdiction to try the suit in which such decree was passed.
      • (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise the Court which passed a decree to execute such decree against any person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction.
    • Section 40 - Transfer of decree to Court in another State - Where a decree is sent for execution in another State, it shall be sent to such Court and executed in such manner as may be prescribed by rules in force in that State.
    • Section 47 - Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree -
      • (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.
      • (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit.
      • Explanation II.—(a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.

    Family Law

    Section 19 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

     02-Nov-2023

    Source: Allahabad High Court

    Why in News?

    Recently, the High Court of Allahabad in the matter of Smt. Adity Rastogi v. Anubhav Verma, has observed that the term residing used in Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is not defined under this Act, and so a casual visit to a place will not grant jurisdiction to the Court in that area to adjudicate upon divorce proceedings.

    What was the Background of Smt. Adity Rastogi v. Anubhav Verma Case?

    • The appellant who is residing in Australia have instituted the divorce proceedings on her short visit to India.
    • Before the Family Court, the appellant filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).
    • The Family Court rejected the application as the proceedings instituted by the present appellant as lacking in territorial jurisdiction.
    • Thereafter, the present appeal was filed before the Allahabad High Court which was later dismissed by the Court.

    What were the Court’s Observations?

    • The bench comprising of Justices Saumitra Dayal Singh and Syed Aftab Husain Rizvi observed that the term residing though not defined under HMA, clearly denotes more than a casual visit to a place falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court where a divorce proceeding may be instituted.
    • The Court further noted that once it is admitted to the appellant that she is continuing to reside in Australia though under force of circumstance, it has to be maintained in law that she is not residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court.

    What is Section 19 of HMA?

    • This Section contains provision in relation to the Courts in which petition shall be presented. It states that -
      • Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction:
        • (i) the marriage was solemnized, or
        • (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or
        • (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or
        • (iiia) in case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition;
        • (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive.
    • Section 19 of Hindu Marriage Act is quite a liberal provision as it enables both the parties to have convenience for contesting the matrimonial petition.
    • The term resides used in clause (ii) of this section represents actual place of residence and not a legal or constructing residence.
    • In the case of Mahadevi v. N.N. Sirathia (1973), Allahabad High Court observed that Section 19 of HMA does not deal with the length of residence. Even a short residence may be sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain petition. If the husband and wife had lived together in the same residence, then they must be deemed to have resided together. Thus, the factum of residence and not the purpose of residence that is material.