List of Current Affairs

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of Shantanu v. The State held that for the offence of penetrative sexual assault under the provisions of Section 3(c) of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), a simple act of touch cannot be considered as manipulation.

What was the Background of Shantanu v. The State Case?

• On 5^th August 2016, when the six-year-old victim had gone for tuition, the appellant, who is the brother of her tuition teacher, touched her anus with his finger, and it caused her severe pain. The victim informed her mother about the incident at the tuition and the resulting pain.
• The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for the offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 6 of the POCSO.
• Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the High Court of Delhi.
• The appeal is partially allowed, and the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that instead of Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the appellant stands convicted under Section 10 of the POCSO.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justice Amit Bansal observed that a simple act of touch cannot be considered to be manipulation under Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act. It is relevant to note that under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, touch is a separate offence.
• The Court further held that Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act shows that for an act to be a penetrative sexual assault, the accused must manipulate any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration. There is nothing in the present case to show that there was any manipulation on any part of the body of the victim so as to cause penetration.

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involved in it?

• Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act:
  • This Section states that a person is said to commit penetrative sexual assault if he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person.
  • Sexual Assault has been defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.
    • Section 7 of this Act states that whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault.
• Section 6 of the POCSO Act:
  • Section 6 of this Act deals with the punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. It states that -

(1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death.

(2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.

• Section 6 of this Act defines Aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
• Section 10 of the POCSO Act:
• Section 10 deals with the punishment for aggravated sexual assault.
• It states that whoever commits aggravated sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
• Section 9 of this Act defines aggravated sexual assault.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

The Supreme Court (SC) has held that there is no strict requirement that a convicted individual must serve a specific duration of their sentence before they can apply to have it suspended in the matter of Vishnubhai Ganpatbhai Patel and another v. State of Gujarat.

What is the Background of the Vishnubhai Ganpatbhai Patel and another v. State of Gujarat Case?

• The appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Sections 114, 506(2) and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • The maximum substantive sentence for the provided offences is rigorous imprisonment for 10 years.
• The appellants have already undergone the sentence for approximately 04 years.
• An appeal was made to the High Court (HC), during the pendency of appeal an application for suspension of sentence was made and rejected.
  • Before the HC, a submission was made on behalf of the state that sentence undergone post-conviction should only be considered.
  • A further submission was made that the appellants had undergone only 05 months and 27 days.
  • The HC accepted the said submission by recording that the appellants have not even completed 01 year of sentence.
• Hence, the matter was presented before the SC, and it was stated that the appeal is of the year 2023 which is unlikely to be heard before the entire period of sentence of the appellants is over.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• A bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Pankaj Mithal observed that the HC should have positively reviewed the request for suspending the sentence, especially in cases where the convicted person has no prior criminal record and has already served more than 40% of their sentence.
• The court further held that there is no hard and fast rule which requires an accused to undergo sentence for a particular period before his prayer for suspension of sentence is considered.

What are the Legal Provisions Involved?

• Suspension of Sentence:
  • It refers to a temporary or conditional halt or postponement of the execution of a criminal sentence.
  • This further means that the person convicted of a crime is not immediately required to serve their sentence in prison, and instead, the sentence may be deferred or temporarily set aside under certain conditions or for a specific period.
  • The provision related suspension during appeal is provided under Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973:
• Section 389 - Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail -

(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond:

Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release: Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.

(2) The power conferred by this section on a Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto.

(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall —

(i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or

(ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1); and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended.

(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced.