List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court

Introduction

Recently, the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Smt. Anjana Mukhopadhyay v. State of U.P. and Anr., has held that during the pendency of application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), an order of interim maintenance is not an interlocutory order.

What was the Background of Smt. Anjana Mukhopadhyay v. State of U.P. and Anr Case?

• In this case, the revisionist (wife) was employed earlier as a teacher and was imparting private tuition.
• Subsequently, post Covid, even the private tuition could not be carried out and the revisionist is also suffering from foot cellulitis Rt. leg Varicose veins whereas the opposite party (husband) has retired from Army and after the One Rank One Pension introduced by the Army Authorities, the opposite party was earning into pension in excess of Rs.1,50,000/- per month.
• The Additional Principal Judge, Family Court had awarded interim maintenance of Rs.15,000 per month.
• The revision petition has been filed before the High Court challenging the order passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court.
• Enhancing the interim maintenance, the Court disposed of the appeal.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justice Pankaj Bhatia observed that the power to grant maintenance during the pendency of the proceedings flows from second proviso to section 125(1) of CrPC. The manner in which the said power is to be exercised is ultimately to determine whether the order is interlocutory or not.
• The Court further held that as the order conclusive decides the grant of maintenance during the pendency of application based upon the material facts, it can certainly not be termed as an interlocutory order as it decides the rights of grant of interim maintenance during the pendency of the application.

What is Section 125 of CrPC?

About:

This section deals with the order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. It states that -

(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain -

(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or

(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,

a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct.

Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means.

Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct.

Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person.

Explanation - For the purposes of this Chapter,

(a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 is deemed not to have attained his majority.

(b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.

(2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be.

(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made:

Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due.

Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing.

Explanation. - If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wifes refusal to live with him.

(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.

(5) On proof that any wife in whose favor an order has been made under this section in living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.

Related Case Law

• In K. Vimal v. K. Veeraswamy (1991), the Supreme Court held that Section 125 of the CrPC had been introduced to achieve a social purpose. The aim of this section is the wife's welfare by providing her with the required shelter and food after the separation from her husband.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Justice Abhay S. Oka and Pankaj Mithal have observed that withholding witnesses from the court doesn't always mean that an 'adverse inference' can be drawn against the prosecution.

• The Supreme Court gave this judgment in the case of Maheshwari Yadav v. The State of Bihar.

What is the Background of Maheshwari Yadav v. The State of Bihar Case?

• Three accused persons were convicted of killing the deceased and assaulting prosecution witnesses. The main accused, who shot the bullet at the deceased, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,1860(IPC).
• The other two accused persons (appellants) were convicted for the same provision read with Section 34 of the IPC.
• The appellants preferred separate appeals and accused No. 3 before the Patna High Court. The same were dismissed. The matter travelled to the ‘Apex Court’. The appeal preferred by the accused no. 3 was already dismissed.
• The court noted that accused no. 3 was charged only under Section 302 of the IPC, and Section 34 was not applied and to convict accused no. 3, the application of Section 34 was unnecessary.
• However, Section 34 was required to punish the appellants as they shared common intention with accused no. 3.
• The court upheld their sentences and asked them to surrender before the Trial Court.
  • The court also mentioned that when the appellants qualify for consideration for a grant of permanent remission, their case can be considered by the State Government. The same shall be per the applicable remission policy.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• When independent witnesses are available who are not connected with the rival parties, and the prosecution omits to examine them by confining its case to examining related witnesses, an adverse inference can undoubtedly be drawn against the prosecution.
• When the evidence of the eyewitnesses is of sterling quality, an adverse inference need not be drawn. Quality is more important than quantity.
• To bring a case within Section 34, it is not necessary to prove prior conspiracy or pre­meditation. It is possible to form a common intention just before or during the occurrence.

What is the concept of ‘Common Intention’?

• Section 34 of IPC: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
  • When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
  • Section 34 makes no mention of any specific offence. It establishes the rule of evidence that if two or more people commit a crime for the same purpose, they will be found jointly accountable.
• Case Law:
  • Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (1925):
    • In this case two people demanded money from a postman as he was counting the money, and when they shot from a handgun at the postmaster, he died on the spot.
    • All of the suspects fled without taking any money. In this instance, Barendra Kumar claimed that he did not shoot the gun and was only standing by, but the courts rejected his appeal and found him guilty of murder under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC.
    • The Bombay High Court further held that it is not required that all participants participate equally. It is possible to accomplish more or less. However, this does not mean that the individual who did less should be exempt from blame. His legal responsibility is the same.
  • Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad (1955):
    • The SC held that a person cannot be held vicariously accountable for the actions of another if their purpose to commit the crime was not common.
    • It is not a common intention if their conduct is independent of the act of another. It will be known for the same purpose.
  • Mahboob Shah v. Emperor (1945):
    • The appellant Mahboob Shah was found guilty of the murder of Allah Dad by the Sessions Judge. He was found guilty and condemned to death by the Session tribunal.
    • The death penalty was also affirmed by the HC of Justice. The murder conviction and death sentence were reversed on appeal to the Lordship.
    • The Bombay HC held that when Allahdad and Hamidullah sought to flee, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah came next to them and fired, and therefore there was proof on the spur of the moment that they formed a common intention.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Justice Hima Kohli and Rajesh Bindal has observed that a master-servant relationship continues during the period of suspension and the workman is under obligation to follow all the rules governing his post during that period.

• The Supreme Court gave this judgment in the case of U.P. Singh v. Punjab National Bank.

What is the Background of U.P. Singh v. Punjab National Bank Case?

• The Petitioner was a workman in the Respondent Bank who had joined as a Clerk-cum-Cashier in June 1977. Due to disorderly behaviour, he was suspended on 14^th June 1982.
• An enquiry was conducted which found him guilty of charges and awarded the punishment of stoppage of two graded increments was advised to report for duty to the Manager at another branch office of the bank.
• On failure to join duty, the petitioner vide order dated 5th December 1984 was deemed to have voluntarily retired from the service as per Clause XVI (Voluntary Cessation of Employment by Employees) of the Bipartite Agreement between Indian Bank's Association and Workmen Unions.
• The petitioner raised a dispute regarding his alleged deemed retirement before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, only after six years.
• The single judge in the writ petition filed by respondents reversed the decision. This was concurrently upheld by the division bench in an intra-court appeal.
• With respect to the delay of six years in filing the dispute on the legality of the transfer, the court held that a person sitting at home cannot by himself decide that the order is illegal and that he is not bound to comply with the same.
• There was no error with orders passed by the High Court, the bench dismissed the appeal.

What was the Court’s Observation?

• Failure to avail of any remedy also would mean that the petitioner had accepted the order and was duty-bound to comply with the same.
• At a later stage, he could not take a plea that the order being erroneous, no consequence would follow for its non-compliance.

What is the Concept of ‘Vicarious Liability’?

• Meaning:
  • ‘Vicarious liability’ deals with master and servant relationships. It means that it is based on two Latin maxims.
  • Firstly, the principle of qui facit per se alium facit per se, which means, He who does an act through another is deemed in law to do it himself and the other one is ‘Respondent Superior’ which means, a principle must answer for the facts of his subordinate.
  • Generally, a person is liable for his own wrongful acts, and one does not incur any liability for the acts done by others.
  • In certain cases, however, vicarious liability, that is the liability of one person for the act of another person, may arise.
  • In order that the liability of A for the act done by B can arise, it is necessary that there should be a certain kind of relationship between A and B, and the wrongful act should be, in certain way, connected with that relationship. Thus, employers are vicariously liable for the tort which their employees commit during the course of employment.
• There are various examples of liability, i.e.,
  • Liability of Principal and Agent.
  • Liability of Master and Servant.
  • Liability of Partners in each other tort.
• Related Case Law:
  • Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and Or. V. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (1977):
    • SC in its judgement overruled the judgement of the High Court and held that from the facts of the case it was clear that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the manager who was driving the vehicle in the course of his employment and therefore, the respondent company was liable for his negligent act.