List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Justice Abhay S. Oka and Sanjay Karol have observed that where an offense would attract the penal provisions under both the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA), as well as the Food Safety and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the provisions of the FSSA, will prevail over the PFA.

• The Supreme Court gave this judgment in the case of Manik Hiru Jhangiani v. The State of Madhya Pradesh.

What is the Background of Manik Hiru Jhangiani v. The State of Madhya Pradesh Case?

• The appellant was, at the relevant time, a Director of M/s. Bharti Retail Limited.
• A company that is engaged in the business of operating retail stores under the name of 'Easy Day,' having its outlets all over the country.
• A Food Inspector appointed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA) visited a shop in Indore and purchased certain biscuit packets from the shop. The samples were sent to the State Food Laboratory and the report was received.
• On 5^th August 2011, the PFA was repealed. The same was notified under subsection (1) of Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA).
• However, sub-section (4) of Section 97 of the act provided that notwithstanding the repeal of the PFA, cognizance of the offence committed under the PFA can be taken within three years from the date of commencement of the FSSA.
• The Food Inspector filed a charge sheet on 12^th August 2011. The cognizance of the offence, under PFA, was taken against the appellant.
• The appellant approached the High Court to quash the proceedings. The HC dismissed its plea noting that in view of sub-section (4) of Section 97 of FSSA, cognizance can be taken for an offence under PFA. The matter approached the SC.
• The court noted that the alleged offence is punishable under Section 16(1)(a) of the PFA, which prescribes imprisonment for a term that may not be less than six months and in a corresponding provision (Section 52) under FSSA, the punishment was in terms of penalty and not imprisonment.
• The Court noted that though the PFA was repealed with effect from 5th August 2011, Section 3 of the FSSA which defines 'misbranded food' came into force on 28th May 2008.
• Thus, the offender could have been either sentenced to imprisonment under Section 16 of the PFA or under the FSSA, he could have been directed to pay the penalty.
• The apex court quashed the pending criminal proceedings against the appellants and clarified that this judgment will not prevent the authorities under the FSSA from taking recourse to the provisions of Section 52 following the law.

What was the Court’s Observation?

• When it comes to the consequences of misbranding, the same has been provided under both the enactments, and there is inconsistency in the enactments as regards the penal consequences of misbranding.
• Thus, in a case where after coming into force of Section 52 of the FSSA, if an act of misbranding is committed by anyone, which is an offence punishable under Section 16 of PFA and which attracts penalty under Section 52 of the FSSA, Section 52 of the FSSA will override the provisions of PFA.

What is the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA)?

• The act provides the protection from adulteration / contamination of food that may lead to the health risk of consumers.
• The act deals with the frauds also that can be perpetrated by the dealers by supplying cheaper or adulterated foods.

What is the Food Safety and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA)?

• The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) is a statutory body under the administration of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India.
• It regulates the manufacture, storage, distribution, sale, and import of food articles, while also establishing standards to ensure food safety.

What are the Legal Provisions Involved?

• Section 272 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Adulteration of Food or Drinks intended for Sale.
  • Any person who commits an offence of adulteration of food or drink is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or both.
• Section 273 of IPC: Sale of noxious food or drink
  • Whoever sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or drink, any article which has been rendered or has become noxious, or is in a state unfit for food or drink, knowing or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
• Case Law:
  • Parle Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Thakore Kacharaji (1987):
    • The Gujarat High Court laid down that:
      • Section 272 and Section 273 of IPC are not a ‘corresponding law’ to the provisions of PFA ACT, 1954 since Section 16 of the act provides for stricter punishment whereas under Section 272 of IPC, the punishment is less severe. Also, to constitute an offence under Section 272, mens rea is an important element which can be missing when the offence is brought under the PFA ACT.
      • The provisions of IPC are not repugnant or inconsistent with the provisions of PFA Act, so no question of repeal arises under Section 25 of PFA act.
      • Both the PFA Act and Section 272 or Section 273 of IPC have applicability for the offence of adulteration, but it must be seen that the offender is not punished twice.

Source: Kerala High Court

Why in News?

Justice Devan Ramachandran has observed that a Magistrate cannot be prosecuted under Section 228-A of Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) on an inadvertent omission to anonymize the name and details of the victims based on an analysis of Section 228-A and the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.

• The Kerala High Court gave this judgment in the case of XXX v. State of Kerala.

What is the Background of XXX v. State of Kerala?

• The petitioner was a victim of a sexual offence committed by a police officer. The accused in that case was granted bail.
• The victim filed an application for cancellation of his bail which was dismissed but her name and details were shown in the judgment due to an obvious omission from the side of the Magistrate Court.
• The petitioner approached the High Court to anonymize her details from the official records as well as sought for an action to be taken against the Magistrate under Section 228-A IPC.
• The court observed that Section 228-A IPC operates only against persons who print or publish names and details of victims to reveal their identity and stated that action cannot be taken against judicial officers who were considering applications or petitions filed by victims for an inadvertent omission to anonymize details from proceedings of the court or orders.
• The court stated that the explanation in Section 228A provides that no action shall lie against the High Court and Supreme Court under this Section.
• Further, the court also stated that cause titles of judgments were prepared by court officers and only the judgments were corrected and verified by judicial officers.
• The court directed the registry to circulate a copy of the judgment to all the judicial officers as well as to the Director of the Kerala Judicial Academy for taking action and compliance and directed the Magistrate to anonymize the name and details of the petitioner from all proceedings and orders within two weeks.

What was the Court’s Observation?

• For initiation of action against the learned Magistrate under Section 228 A of the IPC, to be worthy of grant, specifically within the ambit of the said section, read with the provisions of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.
• The protection offered to judicial officers under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 was plenary and protects them from any action initiated qua an act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him/her during the discharge of their official or judicial duties.

What is Section 228 A of IPC?

• Section 228 A: Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc.

(1) Whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an [offence under section 376, [section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB] or section 376E] is alleged or found to have been committed (hereafter in this section referred to as the victim) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publication of the name or any matter which may make known the identity of the victim if such printing or publication is-

(a) by or under the order in writing of the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation into such offence acting in good faith for the purposes of such investigation; or

(b) by, or with the authorization in writing of, the victim; or

(c) where the victim is dead or minor or of unsound mind, by, or with the authorization in writing of, the next of kin of the victim: Provided that no such authorization shall be given by the next of kin to anybody other than the chairman or the secretary, by whatever name called, of any recognized welfare institution or organization.

Explanation -For the purposes of this sub-section, “recognised welfare institution or organisation” means a social welfare institution or organization recognised in this behalf by the Central or State Government.

(3) Whoever prints or publishes any matter in relation to any proceeding before a court with respect to an offence referred to in sub-section (1) without the previous permission of such court shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation-The printing or publication of the judgment of any HC or the SC does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Sushma Shivkumar Daga v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj, has held that the cancellation of a deed is an action in personam and hence it is arbitrable.

What was the Background of Sushma Shivkumar Daga v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj Case?

• The appellants were the plaintiffs in a civil suit, filed in the year 2021, seeking declaration that the Conveyance Deed dated 17^th December 2019 to be declared null and void, and that the registered Development Agreements dated stand validly terminated.
• The respondents moved an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) for referring the matter to arbitration.
• The Trial Court allowed the application of the defendant and referred the matter for arbitration.
• This order was challenged in writ petition by the appellants before the Bombay High Court, which was dismissed.
• Aggrieved by these two orders, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court which was later dismissed by the Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sudhanshu Dhulia observed that the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the broad language of the arbitration clause in the agreements would cover the dispute raised by the appellants before the Civil Court, and hence the case has been rightly referred for arbitration.
• The court held that whether it is a suit for cancellation of a deed or a declaration of rights arising from the deed, it would only be an action in personam and not in rem and it would be arbitrable.

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involves in it?

Section 8 of A&C Act

• This section deals with the power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. It states that -

(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued, and an arbitral award made.

Right in Rem

• This right is available to the person against the whole world and so a person is given protection against the whole world.
• These rights are available to all. E.g., Constitutional Rights.

Right in Personam

• This right is available against a particular person only.
• This right is available only to the people who enter into such transaction, which gives them a right against another person. E.g., Contractual Rights