List of Current Affairs

Source: Karnataka High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the High Court of Karnataka in the matter of Anupam Singh Tomar v. State by Kothanur Police & Anr., has held that in situations of non-compliance with the visitation rights, a father attempting to visit daughter does not amount to a House Trespass.

What was the Background of Anupam Singh Tomar v. State by Kothanur Police & Anr. Case?

• The petitioner and the complainant got married, and their relationship turned sour.
  • The two dissolved their marriage by mutual consent.
• The term of compromise for divorce by mutual consent was that the parties would agree with the right of the husband to visit the daughter on every Saturday from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. either at the residence of the wife or at a neutral place like the activity zone, or mall.
• The custody of the daughter was with the wife.
• The wife communicates a mail to the husband rescheduling the visitation to 27th August 2022. The petitioner confirms of having received the communication as having noted.
• But, despite rescheduling, the petitioner enters the wife’s building on 20th August 2022 and despite being denied permission three times on my gate app, he tries to get through other modes to meet his daughter.
• The crime is registered for the offence punishable under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition before the High Court.
• Allowing the petition, the court quashed all criminal proceedings against the petitioner.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• A single judge bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna observed that Section 448 of the IPC deals with punishment for house trespass, the Court held that whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with an intention to commit an offence is said to be committing criminal trespass and that in the present scenario, the ingredients of the offence cannot be applied.
• The Court further held that the husband had a valid visitation right on the day that he wanted to visit the daughter, by an order of the competent Court.

What is Section 448 of IPC?

• This Section of IPC deals with the punishment for house-trespass. It states that whoever commits house-tres­pass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
• The offence of house trespass has been defined under section 442 of the IPC. This section states that whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit house-trespass.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Justice Hrishikesh Roy and Pankaj Mithal has observed that the non-obstante clause in both Section 109A (3) of the Companies Act, 1956 & Byelaw 9.11.7 of the Depositories Act, 1996, does not exclude the legal heirs from their rightful claim over the securities, against the nominee.

• The Supreme Court gave this judgment in the case of Shakti Yezdani & Anr. v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar & Ors.

What is the Background of Shakti Yezdani & Anr. v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar & Ors.?

• Mr. Jayant Shivram Salgaonkar (Testator) executed a will for the devolution of his estates upon the successors. The Appellants and Respondent No. 1 to 9 are legal heirs and representatives of the testator.
  • In the will, the testator had certain mutual fund investments (MFs) in respect of which appellants and respondent No. 9 were made nominees.
  • The testator passed away on 20^th August 2013.
• In 2014, the respondent no. 1 filed a suit, praying for declaration that the Testator's properties be administered under the court's supervision; seeking absolute power to administer the same; and seeking permanent injunction against all respondents and appellants from creating third party rights on testator's properties.
  • The appellants opposed the suit and argued that they are sole nominees of the MFs and thus absolutely vested with securities after testator's death.
• The single judge of High Court while relying on Kokate judgment, rejected the claim of appellants.
• In appeal, on 1^st December 2016, the Division Bench of HC set aside the single bench order, while holding that the provisions of act 1956 do not deal with succession at all and the Kokate judgment was per incurium.
  • The appellant filed an appeal before the SC against order dated 1^st December 2016.
• The bench rejected the contention and held that vesting of the shares/securities in the nominee under the Companies Act, 1956 and the Depositories Act, 1996 is only for a limited purpose.
  • The vesting enables the company to deal with the securities in the immediate aftermath of the shareholder's death, to avoid uncertainty as to the holder of the securities, which could hamper the smooth functioning of the company's affairs.
• It was held that the nomination process under the Companies Act, 1956 (pari materia Companies Act, 2013) does not override succession laws.
  • The order of Division Bench of HC has been upheld and appeal has been dismissed.

What was the Court’s Observation?

• The vesting of securities in favour of the nominee contemplated under Section 109A of the Companies Act 1956 (pari materia S. 72 of Companies Act, 2013) & Bye-Law 9.11.1 of Depositories Act, 1996 is for a limited purpose i.e., to ensure that there exists no confusion pertaining to legal formalities that are to be undertaken upon the death of the holder and by extension, to protect the subject matter of nomination from any protracted litigation until the legal representatives of the deceased holder are able to take appropriate steps.
• The object of introduction of nomination facility vide the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1999 was only to provide an impetus to the investment climate and ease the cumbersome process of obtaining various letters of succession, from different authorities upon the shareholder's death.

What is Section 109A of Companies Act, 1956:

• Section 109A: Nomination of Shares:
  • (1) Every holder of shares in, or holder of debentures of, a company may, at any time, nominate, in the prescribed manner, a person to whom his shares in, or debentures of the company shall vest in the event of his death.
  • (2) Where the shares in, or debentures of, a company are held by more than one person jointly, the joint holders may together nominate, in the prescribed manner, a person to whom all the rights in the shares or debentures of the company shall vest in the event of death of all the joint holders.
  • (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such shares in, or debentures of the company, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to vest the shares in or debentures of the company, the nominee shall, on the death of the shareholder or holder of debentures of the company or, as the case may be, on the death of the joint holders become entitled to all the rights in the shares or debentures of the company or, as the case may be, all the joint holders in relation to such shares in, or debentures of the company to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.
  • (4) Where the nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the holder of the shares, or holder of debentures, to make the nomination to appoint in the prescribed manner any person to become entitled to shares in or debentures of the company, in the event of his death, during the minority.

What is the Landmark Judgment Cited in the Case?

• Harsha Nitin Kokate v. The Saraswat Co-operative Bank Ltd and Ors., (2010):
  • The Bombay High Court had held that the legal heirs of deceased would get ownership rights of share certificates and not the nominees.

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of Kundan Singh v. The State Govt. Of NCT Delhi, has held that convict has a fundamental right to parenthood and procreation.

What was the Background of Kundan Singh v. The State Govt. Of NCT Delhi Case?

• The petitioner is presently confined in Tihar Jail, New Delhi and is serving a life sentence.
• The petitioner was convicted for the offences punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and was awarded rigorous imprisonment for life by the learned Trial Court.
• The petitioner has already spent more than 14 years in prison, excluding the period of remission.
• A plea was moved by the petitioner seeking his release on parole on the ground that he had been married for the last three years and does not have a child so far. He wanted to undergo certain medical tests as he and his wife wanted to have a child through IVF procedure.
• The High Court granted parole for four weeks.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma observed that though the human right of personal liberty of a convict has to be surrendered in favor of the safety of the State and for establishing rule of law, the convict cannot be denied the protection of fundamental right to life, which will also include right to have a child, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case.
• The Court also observed that the right to procreation and parenthood is a fundamental right of a convict and protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).
• The Court further held that the right to procreation is not absolute and necessitates a contextual examination. By taking into account factors such as the prisoner's parental status and age, a fair and just approach can be adopted to preserve the delicate equilibrium between individual rights and broader societal considerations.

What is Article 21 of the COI?

About:

• This Article states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law.
• This fundamental right is available to every person, citizens and foreigners alike.
• The Supreme Court of India has described this right as the Heart of Fundamental Rights.
• This right has been provided against the State only.
• Article 21 secures two rights:
  • Right to life
  • Right to personal liberty

Case Laws

• In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator (1981), Justice P. Bhagwati said that Article 21 of the COI embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in a democratic society.
• In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963), the Supreme Court held that by the term life, something more is meant than mere animal existence.
  • The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.
  • The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by amputation of an armored leg or the pulling out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world.