List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently, a bench of Justices B R Gavai, K V Vishwanathan and Sandeep Mehta decided the case of remission of an accused convicted for murder.

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala.

What was the Background of Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala Case?

• The prosecution alleged that the accused had previously engaged in an illicit relationship with Latha, leading to pregnancy and subsequent termination.
• After Latha distanced herself, tensions arose, culminating in the tragic events of 3rd November 2005.
• On the aforementioned night, the accused allegedly trespassed into the victims' house armed with knives and an iron rod, resulting in the deaths of the victims and injuries to a person named Karthiayani Amma.
• The next morning, domestic help discovered the gruesome scene, prompting neighbors to alert the police.
• The police arrived at the scene, finding evidence of forced entry and discovering the deceased victims.
• Following investigation and trial, the accused's version of events was deemed implausible, leading to his conviction primarily based on circumstantial evidence.
• Upon confirmation before the High Court, the conviction was upheld but the sentence was modified.
  • The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment with a direction that the accused shall not be released for 30 years, including the period already served.
• The accused approached the Supreme Court after being aggrieved by the judgment issued by the High Court.
  • The accused pleaded that the sentence of 30 years without remission is excessive and prayed that the sentence may be appropriately tailored to meet the ends of justice.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The court did not interfere with the sentence imposed on the accused
• The court agreed with the High Court's application of the principle established in the case of Swamy Shraddananda.
• However, the court decided to modify the sentence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) imposed by the High Court.
  • Instead of 30 years imprisonment without remission, the court reduced it to 25 years imprisonment without remission, including the period already undergone by the appellant.

What were the Landmark Judgments cited in the Case?

• Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980):
  • The Supreme Court established the principle of sentencing in cases where the death penalty is not warranted by classifying crimes into the "rarest of the rare" category.
  • It held that the death penalty should be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases and laid down guidelines for the application of the death penalty, considering both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
• Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983):
  • This case further elaborated on the principles laid down in Bachan Singh regarding the imposition of the death penalty, emphasizing the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
• Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008):
  • In this case, the Supreme Court held that to avoid a sentence of death, it is possible for the courts to devise a graver form of sentence of imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years.
  • The purpose of such a sentence is to ensure that the society is insulated from the criminal for such a period as the court may specify, including, if warranted by the facts, the entire rest of his life.
• Haru Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2009):
  • The court, while commuting the death penalty, imposed a sentence of 35 years of actual jail sentence without remission, considering factors such as the lack of premeditation and the accused being the sole bread earner for his family.
• Mulla & Another v. State of U.P., (2010):
  • The court reduced the sentence from death to life imprisonment for full life, subject to any remission by the Government for good reasons, considering the socioeconomic background of the appellants.
• Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others, (2016):
  • The court affirmed the principle established in Swamy Shraddananda and emphasized the necessity of considering a sentence between fourteen years of imprisonment and the death penalty in cases that fall short of the "rarest of the rare" category but where a mere sentence of fourteen years may be grossly disproportionate.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., has held that for applying Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential.

What was the Background of Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.?

• In this case, the complainant had formed a trust by the name, Savara Foundation of which he is the founder and also the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.
• The complainant had planned a foundation stone laying ceremony of Matra Ashraya-A collection museum to be done by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Uttarakhand. The event was scheduled for 20^th March 2020.
• In order to blackmail the complainant, the appellant published a news article in the e-newspaper Parvatjan, edition dated 17^th March 2020 wherein it was portrayed that the land on which the foundation stone was proposed to be laid was Government land which had been unlawfully occupied/encroached upon by the complainant. The complainant alleged that even his invitation was published in the defamatory news article.
• The appellant filed Criminal Writ Petition in the High Court of Uttarakhand claiming to be completely innocent and taking a plea that the allegations made in the FIR for the offences punishable under Section 153A of the IPC,did not disclose commission of any cognizable offence.
• The High Court proceeded to dismiss the criminal writ petition filed by the appellant.
• Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court which was later allowed by the Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Bench Comprising Justices BR Gavai and Sandeep Mehta observed that from a bare reading of the language of Section 153A of IPC, it is clear that in order to constitute such offence, the prosecution must come out with a case that the words 'spoken' or 'written' attributed to the accused, created enmity or bad blood between different groups on the ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., or that the acts so alleged were prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony.
• It was further held that for applying Section 153A of IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential, whereas in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article.

What is Section 153A of IPC?

About:

• Section 153A of the IPC penalizes promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.
• The provision was not in the original penal code and was introduced in 1898.

Legal Provision:

• This Section states that—

(1) Whoever—

(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racials, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or

(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquility, or

(c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Objective:

• The purpose of this Section is to punish persons who indulge in wanton vilification or attacks upon the religion, race, place of birth, residence, language etc. of any particular group or class or upon the founders and prophets of a religion.

Section 196 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS):

• Section 196 of BNS addresses the same concerns as addressed under Section 153A of IPC but extends to include electronic communication as a means of promotion, covering a broader spectrum of communication methods.

Source: Madras High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Madras High Court in the matter of S Menaka v. KSK Nepolian Socraties, has held that the orders of interim maintenance passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) is interlocutory in nature and can only be reviewed and not appealed.

What was the Background of S Menaka v. KSK Nepolian Socraties Case?

• The High Court of Madras was hearing a batch of petitions during which the question for discussion arose of whether statutory appeals under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 are maintainable as against the impugned order owing to the expression “not being an interlocutory order”, in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act 1984.
• This question was dovetailed with another question of whether a statutory appeal under Section 28 of the HMA will lie against an order of interim maintenance/pendente lite maintenance made under Section 24 of HMA.
• The High Court gave liberty to the parties to seek withdrawal of the same and file revision petitions with respect to the appeals already pending against orders of interim maintenance, the court gave liberty.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The bench comprising of Justices M Sundar and Govindarajan Thilakavadi observed that the orders of interim maintenance passed under Section 24 of HMA are only interlocutory orders and thus, an appeal against such orders will not lie either under Section 28 of the HMA or under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
• The Court further added that a revision against the order of interim maintenance is maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) irrespective of whether it was made by a regular civil court or a Family Court.

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involved in it?

Section 24 of HMA

• This Section deals with the maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. It states that -

Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable.

Provided that the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during the proceeding, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the wife or the husband, as the case may be.

Section 28 of HMA

• This Section deals with appeals from decrees and orders. It states that-

(1) All decrees made by the court in any proceeding under this Act shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.

(2) Orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act under section 25 or section 26 shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable if they are not interim orders, and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.

(3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the subject of costs only.

(4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the decree or order.

Section 19 of Family Courts Act, 1984

• This Section deals with appeal. It states that -

(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.

(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991.

(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court.

(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding.

(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court.