List of Current Affairs

Source: Patna High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the High Court of Patna in the matter of Naresh Pandit v. The State of Bihar and Anr., has observed if the husband demands money from wife’s parents for the maintenance of the newly born child, then such demand does not fall under the purview of Section 2 (i) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

What was the Background of Naresh Pandit v. The State of Bihar and Anr. Case?

• In this case, the marriage of the petitioner (husband) was solemnized with the opposite party (wife) in the year 1994.
• Out of the wedlock, the wife gave birth to three children (2 sons and 1 daughter).
• The wife alleged that three years after their daughter's birth, the petitioner and his relatives demanded Rs.10,000 from her father to support and care for the girl child.
• It was also alleged that the wife was tortured for nonfulfillment of the demand of the petitioner and the other marital relations.
• Thereafter, the wife filed a complaint against the petitioner and other matrimonial relations.
• The Trial Court convicted and sentenced the petitioner and two other accused.
• Challenging his conviction, the Husband moved the Patna High Court wherein his counsel argued that the allegation made by the wife against the petitioner and other accused persons is general and omnibus in nature.
• The High Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justice Bibek Chaudhuri observed that if the husband demands money from the paternal home of the wife for rearing and maintenance of the newly born child, such demand does not come within the fold of the definition of dowry as per Section 2 (i) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
• It was further held that the essential element of dowry is payment or demand of money, property or valuable security given or agreed to be given as consideration of marriage.

What is Section 2(i) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961?

• Dowry is defined under Section 2(i) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
• It states that dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) By one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) By the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage or in connection with the marriage of the said parties.

• It does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
• The expression valuable security has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently a bench of Justices Bela M Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal held that “Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence”.

• The court gave this observation in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs and Ors v. Special Deputy Collector.

What was the Background of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs and Ors v. Special Deputy Collector Case?

• The case revolves around land acquisition in Gandluru village, Andhra Pradesh, in 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project.
• Sixteen claimants contested compensation, but some died during proceedings, with no substitution of heirs.
• After over five years, only heirs of one deceased claimant sought to appeal, facing a 5659-day delay.
• They cited lack of awareness due to living away. Other claimants or their heirs did not contest.
• The High Court, citing undue delay, dismissed the appeal.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The court held that there is no occasion for the court to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded.
  • First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal.
  • Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision of the reference court.
  • Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision, they could have applied for procedural review which they never did.
• Thus, there was apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter. Accordingly, the court’s opinion, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

What are Principles Laid Down by Court for Condoning Delay under Limitation Act?

On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

• Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
• A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
• The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
• In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
• Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
• Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
• Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
• Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

What are Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

• Section 3: Bar of limitation:
  • Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
  • For the purposes of this Act —
    • a suit is instituted —
      • in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
      • in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
      • in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;
    • any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted —
      • in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
      • in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;
    • an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.
• Section 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:
  • Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
  • Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was missed by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Supreme Court held that approaching the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, 1950(COI) for the release of the seized vehicle would not be a proper remedy without approaching the magistrate under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).

• The aforesaid observation was made in the matter of Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat.

What was the Background of Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat Case?

• In this case, the vehicle of the appellant was seized, and FIR was registered against the accused Lakhabhai Khengarbhai (the son of the present appellant), and others.
• The driver of the said vehicle was carrying English Liquor worth of rupees 7 lakhs in the said vehicle without any pass or permit.
• The appellant without approaching the magistrate under Section 451 of CrPC directly approached the High Court of Gujarat by exercising its writ jurisdiction for the purpose of releasing the said vehicle.
• The said Application had been dismissed by the High Court.
• Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed before the Supreme Court which was later dismissed by the Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Bench Comprising Justices Bela M Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal observed that when there is a specific statutory provision contained in the CrPC empowering the criminal court to pass appropriate order for the proper custody and disposal of the property pending the inquiry or trial, the appellant could not have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the COI seeking release of his vehicle.
• The Court further stated that when the seized property/vehicle is produced before the concerned Criminal Court, it is incumbent on the part of the concerned Court to pass appropriate orders for keeping the vehicle in proper custody pending the trial.

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involved in it?

Article 226 of the COI

About:

• This Article deals with the power of High Courts to issue certain writs. It states that —

(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without—

(a) Furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and

(b) Giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.

Case Law:

• Jagdish Prasad Shastri v. the State of Uttar Pradesh (1970), the Supreme Court held that if a writ petition involves an erroneous factual matrix and High Court deems it inappropriate for resolution through a petition seeking a high prerogative writ under Article 226, it retains the authority to decline addressing such matters.

Article 227 of the COI

• This Article deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. It states that -

(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may—

(a) call for returns from such courts;

(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts;

(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court power of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

Section 451 of CrPC

• Section 451 of CrPC deals with the order for custody and disposal of property pending during trial in certain cases. It states that -

When any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to do, the Court may, after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section," property" includes-

(a) property of any kind or document which is produced before the Court or which is in its custody,

(b) any property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence.