List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Kerala High Court in the matter of Suo Moto v. State of Kerala has held that the right to privacy of adopted children cannot be violated at any stage of their growth regardless of whether they were born to rape survivors.

• The High Court further laid down the guidelines for the collection of DNA samples from children who were born to rape survivors and were subsequently adopted by other couples.

What was the Background of Suo Moto v. State of Kerala Case?

• Before the Kerala High Court, a criminal miscellaneous case has been registered Suo Motu based on the report of the Project Co-ordinator, Victims Rights Centre, the Kerala State Legal Services Authority.
• The report of the Project Co-ordinator points to the glaring conflicts of law relating to a sensitive and vulnerable issue touching the privacy of the children given in adoption.
• The report pointed out that the court orders to collect the DNA of children born to rape survivors were in conflict with Regulation 48 of the Adoption Regulations, 2022 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act).
• Thereafter, the High Court issued guidelines for the collection of DNA samples from children who were born to rape survivors.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justice K Babu observed that in some cases, adopted parents would not have even divulged the fact of adoption to the child. The child would have blended so well with the adopted family that a sudden revelation that he/she is an adopted child and that too of a rape victim can imbalance his/her emotional status and can result in them exhibiting behavioral disorders and aberrations. This exercise of subjecting the child to DNA test will only defeat the purpose of the divine concept of adoption.
• It was further observed that the provisions dealing with rape in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) do not demand that the paternity of children born to rape survivors be proved to establish the offence.

Guidelines Issued by the Court

• The Court issued the following guidelines for the collection of DNA samples from children who were born to rape survivors and were subsequently adopted by other couples:
  • Courts shall not entertain applications seeking DNA examination of children given in adoption.
  • The Child Welfare Committee shall see that the DNA samples of children given in adoption are taken before the completion of the process of adoption.
  • All agencies or authorities involved in the adoption process shall ensure that the confidentiality of adoption records is maintained except as permitted under any other law for the time being in force.
  • Even in cases where the children were not given in adoption the Court shall consider the request for a DNA test of the children of the victim only after assessing the principle of eminent need and doctrine of proportionality.

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involved in it?

Regulation 48 of the Adoption Regulations, 2022

• This regulation deals with the confidentiality of adoption records.
• It states that all agencies or authorities involved in the adoption process shall ensure that confidentiality of adoption records is maintained, except as permitted under any other law for the time being in force and for such purpose, the adoption order may not be displayed on any public portal.

JJ Act

• The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 came into force on 15^th January 2016.
• It repealed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
• This Act seeks to achieve the objectives of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children as ratified by India on December 11, 1992.
• It specifies 58+rocedural safeguards in cases of children in conflict with law.
• It seeks to address challenges in the existing Act such as delays in adoption processes, high pendency of cases, accountability of institutions, etc.
• The Act further seeks to address children in the 16-18 age group, in conflict with law, as an increased incidence of crimes committed by them have been reported over the past few years
• According to Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Amendment Act, 2021, crimes against children which are mentioned in the chapter “Other Offences Against Children” of the JJ Act, 2015 and that allows imprisonment between three and seven years will be deemed “non-cognizable”.
• As per Section 2(35) of this Act, juvenile means a child below the age of eighteen years.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently, a bench consisting of Justices B.R Gavai and Sandeep Mehta again took note of the principles related to reversal of an acquittal.

• The Supreme Court gave this observation in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka.

What was the Background of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka Case?

• The complainant, Chanagouda (PW-1), owned agricultural lands and a house in Babanagar village, Bijapur, Karnataka.
• On 19^th September 2001, Chanagouda's son Malagounda went to their field along with laborers Revappa (PW-2), Siddappa (PW-3), Hiragappa (PW-4), and Suresh (PW-5) to build a bund.
• Around 4 pm, the accused persons A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 confronted Malagounda and the others, accusing them of murdering someone named Sangound and threatened revenge.
• A-1 was carrying a jambai (curved sword), A-2 an axe, A-3 a sickle, and A-4 an axe.
  • They attacked and killed Malagounda. Chanagouda fled and hid in bushes.
• Chanagouda filed a complaint at Tikota Police Station on 20^th September 2001, at 4 am, leading to the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) against the accused.
• After investigation, the accused A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6 were charged with offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• The trial court acquitted all the accused.
• The High Court of Karnataka partially allowed the state's appeal, convicting and sentencing A-1, A-2, and A-3 to life imprisonment while upholding the acquittal of A-5 and A-6. The appeal against A-4 abated due to his death.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment of the High Court convicting the accused (A-1, A-2 and A-3). The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favor of the accused.
• The Supreme Court held that the judgment of the High Court causing interference with the acquittal of the accused by the trial court is contrary to the established legal principles governing appeals against acquittal.
• The court held that the view taken by the trial court in acquitting the accused is a plausible and justifiable view based on the evidence on record. The trial court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity or perversity.
  • The High Court was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused.
• The court acquitted the accused.

What were the Landmark Cases Cited in this Case?

• Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another (2022):
  • The Supreme Court pulled out general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal from this case.
  • The court held that,
    • An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
    • The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
    • Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power to review the evidence.
    • An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favor of the accused - the presumption of innocence under criminal jurisprudence, and the presumption reinforced by the trial court's acquittal.
    • If two reasonable conclusions are possible based on the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal finding recorded by the trial court.
• H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023):
  • This case summarized the following principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC
    • The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
    • The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
    • The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
    • If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and
    • The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.
• State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1960):
  • In this case the court laid down that in a statement under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) the confessional part is inadmissible and only the part distinctly leading to discovery of fact is admissible.
• Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1983):
  • This case ruled that when proving a disclosure statement under Section 27 of IEA the investigating officer must state the exact words used by the accused leading to the discovery.
• Subramanya v. State of Karnataka (2022):
  • This case explained the procedure to be followed by the investigating officer in drawing up a proper discovery panchnama under Section 27 of IEA.
• Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022):
  • This case held that mere exhibiting of a memorandum cannot prove its contents, and the investigating officer must narrate the sequence of events leading to the disclosure statement.

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of Delhi State Legal Services Authority v. Annwesha Deb has held that an advocate empanelled with a legal services authority is not an employee and, therefore, is not entitled to maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.

What was the Background of Delhi State Legal Services Authority v. Annwesha Deb Case?

• In this case, the respondent was appointed in the Juvenile Justice Board-I, Sewa Kutir, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi as a Legal Services Advocate.
• During the period, of her appointment, in April 2017, she conceived a child and hence applied for maternity leave of seven months.
• A letter was also served upon the Member Secretary of the Authority by the respondent regarding her claim for grant of maternity benefits.
• The respondent received an email from the Authority, rejecting her request for maternity benefits, as there is no provision for the grant of same to Legal Services Advocate.
• The respondent, feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Authority approached the Learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court.
• The Single Judge ordered the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) to release medical, monetary and other benefits to its empanelled legal aid advocate.
• DSLSA challenged this judgment before the Division bench of the High Court by filing an appeal.
• Allowing the appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment of the Single Judge.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• A Bench of Justices V Kameswar Rao and Saurabh Banerjee observed that an advocate empanelled with a legal services authority is not an ‘employee’ and, therefore, is not entitled to maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
• It was further held there cannot be a comparison between an advocate who continues to act as such and an employee who is appointed as per the recruitment rules and the learned Single Judge has erred in extending the benefits of the Act to the respondent, more particularly, given the nature of her appointment.

What is the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961?

• About:
  • The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 is legislation that benefits the employment of women during the time of their maternity.
  • It ensures the women employee of ‘maternity benefits’, which is getting their salary paid during their absence from work to take care of the newborn child.
  • This applies to any establishment employing more than 10 employees. This act was further amended under the Maternity Amendment Bill, 2017.
  • The act is an important piece of legislation that protects the dignity of motherhood.
  • It also helps ensure that working women are able to provide proper care for their children. In addition to protecting the rights of women, maternity benefits also help women with their finances.
• Eligibility:
  • To be entitled to access the benefits under the act, the employee (women) must be employed with the establishment for a period of 80 odd days in the past twelve months.
• Case Law:
  • In the case of Satakshi Mishra v. State of UP (2022), Allahabad High Court held that the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 does not contain any such stipulation regarding the time difference between the first and second child for the grant of maternity benefits.