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Source: Punjab and Haryana High Court

Why in News?

Recently the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor, but what is more important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and un-premeditated, and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger.

What was the Background of Mandeep v. State of Haryana Case?

• In this case the complaint was made by the Mange Ram father of Mohinder Singh.
• According to the complainant, on 25^th March 2010 his son goes for watering the plants in the field.
• His father followed him, Mohinder reached near the electric pole adjoining the field.
• Mandeep asked Mohinder to go there, and he replied that he would come after watering the plants.
• Mohinder and Mandeep started scuffling with each other. Sompal and Rohtash brothers of Mandeep and Karam Singh (Karmu) father of Mandeep also came in the field.
• Mohinder ran to save himself, but he was caught by all the accused. And Mandeep stabbed him in the stomach
• The complainant (Mohinder’s father) was also reached at the place of occurrence to save his son, but Sompal gave a lathi blow to him.
• The grandson of the Complainant was also present there and all the villagers coming towards the place of occurrence, but all the accused were fled away.
• The complainant, with the help of villagers shifted Mohinder to his house. He was severely injured. On reaching home he dies because of injuries caused by a knife.
• On the statement of the complainant the First Information Report (FIR) was registered. During investigation, Sompal, Karmu and Mandeep were arrested, and a knife was recovered from Mandeep’s possession.
• The trial court framed charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) against Mandeep (appellant) and other accused.
• The defence of the appellant was that the appellant and Mohinder were close friends and used to sit together to have meals. On the day of incident suddenly there was a scuffle over a mobile phone and the appellant asked him to return mobile, Mohinder had caused injuries to the appellant and at the spur of the moment, the appellant inflicted a single injury with knife.
• His contention was that this is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which is punishable under Section 304 Part II of IPC as the case of the appellant fell within the Exception No.4 of Section 300 of IPC.
• The trial court passed a judgment and convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. And acquitted two other accused (Sompal and Karmu) as they got the benefit of doubt.
• Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court against the trial court order.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The High Court held that the cause of quarrel is not relevant, nor it is relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. Of course, the offender must not have taken in any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
• The court observed that there was no history of enmity between both the parties. It is apparent that by causing an injury with a knife (used in kitchen to cutting vegetables etc.), the present appellant had no intention to commit the murder of Mohinder, deceased.
• However, this knife was used with such a force that the person had met his death; knowledge has to be imputed to the appellant and in that situation, the present case would fall in Part II of Section 304 IPC.
• The court held that the appellant had admittedly not acted in a cruel or unusual manner and it was a fight, which had taken place at the spur of the moment. It can be safely concluded that the appellant had committed the offence under Section 304 Part-II of IPC and not under Section 302 of IPC.
• The High court set aside the judgment of the trial court.

What is the Legal Provision Involved in this Case?

Section 304 of IPC and Section 103 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 covers: Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. —

Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,

or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

What are the Landmark Judgments Cited in this Case?

• Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2002)
  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that all the fatal injuries resulting in death could not termed as cruel or unusual for the purposes of Exception No.4 of Section 300 IPC.
  • In cases, where after the injured had fallen down, the appellant did not inflict any further injury when he was in a helpless position, it may indicate that he had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
• Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012)
  • The Apex court held that for punishment under Section 304 Part I of IPC, the prosecution must prove: the death of the person in question; that such death was caused by the act of the accused and that the accused intended by such act to cause death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.
  • As regards punishment for Section 304 Part II of IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question; that such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his was likely to cause death.

Source: Madras High Court

Why in News?

Recently a bench of Justice GR Swaminathan held that Section 22-A (1) of the Registration Act, 1908, which allows the registering officer to refuse registration of certain documents, does not apply to church properties.

• The Madras High Court gave this observation in the case of Shalin v. The District Registrar and Another.

What was the Background of Shalin v. The District Registrar and Another Case?

• The petitioner purchased the property from one Vijaya vide sale deed dated 28th March 2023.
• The second respondent (Sub-Registrar) refused to register the sale deed and issued a refusal check slip.
• The refusal was based on an interim order dated 04^th May 2017 of the Madras High Court's Division Bench, which directed that properties endowed in favor of TELC (Tamil Evangelical Lutheran Church) should not be registered without the High Court's permission.
• The Inspector General of Registration had also issued a circular based on the High Court's interim order.
• Vijaya acquired the property through a deed of settlement from M. Premkumar Prithviraj, who bought it from TELC through a registered sale deed.
• Aggrieved by the second respondent's refusal to register the sale deed, the petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the impugned refusal check slip.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court observed that the interim order of the High Court had become ineffective as the main writ petition was disposed of, and there was no restraint order in force regarding TELC properties.
• The Court held that Section 22-A (1) of the Registration Act, 1908 is not applicable to church properties as it covers only properties belonging to or endowed for Hindu religious institutions under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, and Wakf properties under the superintendence of the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board.
• The Court observed that while the Registration Act, 1908 protects Hindu and Islamic religious endowments, it does not provide similar protection for church properties, and it is time to include church properties within the scope of Section 22-A (1).
• The Court set aside the impugned order of the Sub-Registrar and directed the petitioner to re-present the sale deed for registration, subject to payment of requisite stamp duty and registration charges.

What is Section 22 (A) of the Registration Act, 1908?

Refusal to register certain documents: -

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the registering officer shall refuse to register any of the following documents, namely: -

(1) instrument relating to the transfer of immovable properties by way of sale, gift, mortgage, exchange or lease, -

(i) belonging to the State Government or the local authority or Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority established under Section 9-A of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1972);

(ii) belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any religious institution to which the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) is applicable;

(iii) donated for Bhoodan Yagna and vested in the Tamil Nadu State Bhoodan Yagna Board established under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act XV of 1958) ; or

(iv) of Wakfs which are under the superintendence of the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board established under the Wakf Act, 1995 (Central Act 43 of 1995),

unless a sanction in this regard issued by the competent authority as provided under the relevant Act or in the absence of any such authority, an authority so authorized by the State Government for this purpose, is produced before the registering officer.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court in the matter of S. Shivraj Reddy(died) v. Raghuraj Reddy and Ors., has emphasized on the importance of adhering to the prescribed limitation period for filing suits, even if the defence of limitation isn't raised initially.

• The case underscores the significance of Section 3 of the Limitation Act,1963 and highlights the need for timely legal action in matters concerning partnership dissolution and rendition of accounts.

What was the Background of S. Shivraj Reddy(died) v. Raghuraj Reddy and Ors. Case?

• Partnership firm "M/s Shivraj Reddy & Brothers" was formed on 15^th August 1978, engaged in construction contracts with government and municipalities.
• S. Raghuraj Reddy filed application seeking dissolution of the firm and accounts.
• Trial court decreed in favor of S. Raghuraj Reddy ordering dissolution and accounts from 1979 to 1998.
• M/s Shivraj Reddy & Brothers and Anr. appealed to High Court, citing limitations due to a partner's death in 1984; a Single Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that application was barred by limitation as one of the partners in subsisting partnership firm, Shri M. Balraj Reddy expired in 1984, therefore the firm stood dissolved immediately on the death of the partner. Since the original suit was filed in 1996, it was barred by limitation.
• S. Raghuraj Reddy appealed to the Supreme Court, Division Bench, arguing limitation plea wasn't raised initially.
• The court allowed the appeal and restored the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Supreme Court relied on the case of V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and Another (2005) to render this case
• It was emphasized that according to Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the court must dismiss any lawsuit filed after the specified limitation period, even if the issue of limitation hasn't been raised as a defence.
• The period of limitation for filing a suit for rendition of account is three years from the date of dissolution.
• In the present case, the firm dissolved in year 1984 by virtue of death of Shri M. Balraj Reddy (deceased partner) and thus, the suit could only have been instituted within a period of three years from that event.
• Indisputably, the suit came to be filed in the year 1996 and was clearly time-barred
• Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act, 1932 state that the partnership firm automatically dissolves upon the death of a partner.
• Any suit filed beyond the limitation period would not be maintainable due to the enforcement of a specific bar to entertain the time-barred suit under the Limitation Act.

What is Time Barred in Limitation Act?

• The law of limitation finds its roots in the maxim “Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” which means that in the interest of the state as a whole there should be a limit to litigation and vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt which means the law will assist only those who are vigilant with their rights and not those who sleep upon it.
• The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes different periods of limitation for filing of suits, appeals or applications.
• In the Limitation Act, a "time-barred" claim refers to a legal action that cannot be pursued in court because it has exceeded the time limit set by the relevant statute of limitations.
• Once the prescribed period for initiating legal proceedings has elapsed, the claim becomes time-barred, meaning that the plaintiff loses the right to seek judicial remedy for that matter.
• Section 3 of the Limitation Act lays down the general rule that if any suit, appeal or application is brought before the court after the expiry of the prescribed time then the court shall dismiss such suit, appeal or application as time barred.

What is the Bar of Limitation Under Section 3?

Section 3 of the Act provides that any suit, appeal, or application must be made within the limitation period specified in the Limitation Act.

• If any suit, appeal or application is made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is the duty of the Court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been set up as a defence or not.
• The provisions of Section 3 are mandatory, and the Court can suo motu take note of question of limitation.
• The question whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of presentation of the plaint. It is a vital section upon which the whole Limitation Act depends for its efficacy.
• The effect of Section 3 is not to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction. Therefore, decision of a Court allowing a suit which had been instituted after the period prescribed is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. A decree passed in a time barred suit is not a nullity.

What are the Major Case Laws related to Time Barred?

• Craft Centre v. Koncherry Coir Factories (1990):
  • It was held by the Kerala High Court that the plaintiff's duty is to convince the Court that his suit is within time.
  • If it is out of time and the plaintiff relies on acknowledgments to save the limitations, he must plead or prove them, if denied.
  • The Court further held that, provision of Section 3 is absolute and mandatory and if a suit is barred by the time, the court is under a duty to dismiss the suit even at the appellate stage though the issue of limitation may not have been raised.
• Punjab National Bank and Ors v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (1992):
  • The Supreme Court held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. Section 3 only bars the remedy but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to.