List of Current Affairs

Source: Madhya Pradesh High Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh held that unnatural sex by a husband with his legally wedded wife is not an unnatural offence.

What was the Background of X v. Y?

• A First Information Report (FIR) was registered against the petitioners under Sections 377 (unnatural offences), 498-A (cruelty by husband or relatives of husband), 294 (obscene acts), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• The complainant alleged that the petitioner no. 1 (husband) committed unnatural sex with her due to which she got a mouth infection.
• The complainant also alleged that the petitioners forced her to abort her pregnancy and demanded a dowry of Rs. 20 lakhs, subjecting her to verbal and physical torture.
• The petitioners filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in the High Court, seeking quashment of the FIR and consequential proceedings.
• The petitioners contended that the allegations were false and leveled against them to give a criminal angle to a matrimonial dispute.
  • They argued that unnatural sex by a husband with his legally wedded wife is not an offence under Section 377, as per previous judgments of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
• The respondents (complainant and the State) opposed the petition, arguing that unnatural sex with one's wife is an offence under Section 377 and that there were specific allegations of harassment, torture, and forced abortion.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The High Court relied on the amended definition of "rape" under Section 375 of the IPC, which includes acts like insertion of the penis into the mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman.
• The court held that since the complainant (wife) was residing with her husband during the subsistence of their marriage, and any sexual act by a husband with his wife above the age of 15 is not considered rape under Section 375, the husband's consent is immaterial. Therefore, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute an offence under Section 377 against petitioner no. 1 (husband).
  • The court also quashed the offences under Sections 294 (obscene acts) and 506 (criminal intimidation) against the petitioners, citing a lack of prima facie evidence.
• However, the court found that prima facie offences under Section 498-A (cruelty by husband or relatives) were made out against the petitioners based on the allegations of dowry demands and harassment.
• Consequently, the petition was partly allowed, quashing the offences under Sections 377, 294, and 506, but not the offence under Section 498-A against the petitioners.

What are the Laws Related to Unnatural Offences?

• About:
  • Section 377 of the IPC, deals with "unnatural offences," defining it as voluntary carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal.
  • This archaic provision effectively criminalized consensual homosexual acts between adults in private.
  • The section's vague language and lack of clear definition of "against the order of nature" have led to much debate and interpretation by the judiciary.
• Essentials of Unnatural Offences:
  • A person had carnal (sexual) intercourse with a man, woman, or animal.
  • Such intercourse was against the natural order.
  • The act was done voluntarily.
• Types of Unnatural Offences:
  • Lesbianism (female homosexuality)
  • Bestiality (sexual intercourse with animals),
  • Sodomy/buggery (anal intercourse with a man or woman).

What are Landmark Cases on Unnatural Offence?

• Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009):
  • The Delhi High Court decriminalized consensual homosexual acts between adults, stating that Section 377 violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution regarding equality, non-discrimination, and personal liberty.
• Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014):
  • The Supreme Court overturned the Delhi High Court's decision, stating that the right to privacy under Article 21 does not extend to homosexuality.
• National legal Service Authority v. Union of India (2014):
  • The Supreme Court recognized transgender individuals as the third gender and upheld their fundamental rights under various Articles of the Constitution.
• Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI (2018):
  • In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court decriminalized all consensual sex among adults in private, partially striking down Section 377 as unconstitutional.

What are the Landmark Judgments on Unnatural Offence between Husband and Wife?

• Umang Singhar v. State of M.P. (2022):
  • This MP High Court held that in view of the amended definition of rape under Section 375 IPC, which includes various sexual acts between a man and woman, the offense of unnatural sex under Section 377 IPC between a husband and wife has no place.
  • It held that the relationship between a husband and wife cannot be confined only to procreation, and sexual pleasure is an integral part of their bond.
• Manish Sahu v. State of M.P. (2023):
  • Endorsing the Navtej Singh Johar judgment, MP High Court held that if a wife is residing with her husband during the subsistence of a valid marriage, then any sexual intercourse or sexual act by the husband with his wife not below 15 years of age will not constitute rape.
  • Therefore, the absence of the wife's consent for an unnatural act loses importance, as marital rape is not recognized.

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News?

The Delhi High Court recently indicated that a single judge may have made a prima facie error by declining to provide interim relief to Forest Essentials, an Ayurvedic cosmetics company, in a trademark conflict with Baby Forest, a company specializing in Ayurvedic baby care products.

• The Delhi High Court gave this observation in the case of Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited v. Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited & Ors.

What was the Background of Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited v. Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited & Ors.?

• Forest Essentials, a company in operation since 2000 with extensive sales and marketing efforts, holds trademarks for "FOREST ESSENTIALS" in various classes, including Class 3.
• They have a significant presence both domestically and internationally, supplying numerous hotel chains and exporting to 120 countries.
• Forest Essentials has been selling baby care products since 2006 under their brand, with substantial annual sales and endorsements from notable entities like the Ministry of External Affairs.
• Instances such as emails from hotels and comments on social media suggest consumer confusion between Forest Essentials and the defendant, Baby Forest.
• Forest Essentials has filed for a trademark for “FOREST ESSENTIALS BABY”, which is opposed by Baby Forest, further indicating recognition of potential confusion by the defendants.
• Baby Forest's adoption of a similar name and logo, along with their marketing strategies and store locations mirroring Forest Essentials', suggest an attempt to benefit from the plaintiff's reputation.
• Both companies target similar consumers with similar products, amplifying the potential for confusion.
• Plaintiff emphasizes their long-standing reputation, while highlighting instances of similarity and potential safety concerns due to the nature of baby products.
• The learned Single Judge Court observed that Forest Essentials could not claim exclusivity over the term "forest" without separate registration.
  • It also noted dissimilarities in packaging and logos, rejecting claims of deceptive similarity.
  • Social media references were deemed insufficient to prove widespread confusion, and Google search suggestions were considered inadequate evidence of confusion due to the complexity of Google's algorithms.
• Then the appellant has moved to the Division Bench in appeal for impugning an order passed by the learned Single Judge

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Division Bench, comprising Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tara Vitasta Ganju, addressed the Prima facie, finding that the learned Single Judge has erred in its interpretation of the doctrine of ‘initial interest confusion’ to entail persistence of confusion till a stage that the transaction is consummated.
  • The doctrine of ‘initial interest confusion’ entails that there is confusion only at the initial stage and there is no confusion when the transaction for sale and purchase is completed.
  • The customers are in no doubt about the product they are buying when the sale is completed. The confusion is only at the initial stage.

What is a Trademark?

• A trademark serves as a unique identifier for goods and services, representing the brand and its reputation.
• Infringement of trademarks not only undermines the value of intellectual property but also poses a threat to businesses by allowing unauthorized parties to benefit from the goodwill associated with a brand.

What is the Doctrine of Initial interest Confusion under Trademark?

• About
  • 'Initial interest confusion' is a concept in trademark law where confusion may arise initially when a consumer encounters a product or service bearing a similar trademark to another, even if this confusion dissipates before purchase.
  • Essentially, it refers to a situation where a consumer's initial interest in a product or service is attracted due to a similarity with a known trademark, leading to potential confusion, even if that confusion is later resolved.
  • This doctrine aims to protect trademark owners from the diversion of potential customers' initial interest or attention due to confusingly similar trademarks, regardless of whether an actual sale is made.
• Origin
  • The initial interest theory stems from judicial interpretations across various jurisdictions worldwide.
  • While consumer interest in a product due to its inherent qualities and goodwill is not legally problematic, interest stemming from the unlawful use of trademarks, goodwill, or product names constitutes infringement, as established in numerous cases globally.
  • Initial interest confusion pertains to confusion occurring before the actual purchase, distinct from confusion at the point of purchase.
  • It arises when a consumer has decided on a product but has yet to arrive at the purchasing location.
  • It does not apply when a consumer becomes confused after reaching the point of purchase and encountering similar trademarks.
• Legal Provision Related to Doctrine
  • Section 29(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 stipulates that trademark similarity must result in a likelihood of confusion to establish infringement.
  • In cases of such confusion, it typically occurs at the point of purchase, where the infringing party capitalizes on the established reputation of the trademark.
  • Conversely, in instances of initial interest confusion, confusion arises before the purchase, but the consumer still develops a preference for the product despite realizing the disparity before completing the transaction.
  • This can occur through various means, such as the use of another's trademark as a meta tag. Courts have consistently recognized this as infringement in several judgments.

What are the Major Case Laws related to Doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion?

• In Consim Info Pvt. Ltd v. Google India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (2010):
  • The court discussed the concept of 'initial interest confusion,' highlighting its relevance in cases involving unauthorized use of trademarks in metatags.
  • This doctrine suggests that trademark infringement occurs when consumer confusion arises before the purchase.
  • However, typically, confusion arises at the time of purchase. Courts globally have grappled with this issue, particularly in the internet context, where users seeking a trademark owner's website are redirected by similar domain names or unauthorized use of trademarks in advertisements by competitors.