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Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice BR Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta held that the circumstance regarding the identification of place of incident is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police.       

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Allarakha Habib Memon v. Sate of Gujarat. 

What is the Background of Allarakhna Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat Case? 

• There was some issue regarding the supply of water in the locality where the accused was residing. 
• On the basis of this issue an altercation flared up between the accused and the victim. 
• The accused persons entered into a conspiracy and acting in it’s furtherance assaulted the victim with sharp edged weapons, causing injuries on his head and chest. 
• On the basis of the above First Information Report (FIR) was filed by the first informant.  
• The trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
• The appeal was filed in the Supreme Court against the order of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The issue before the Court was whether the accused persons should be liable under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC. 
• The Court firstly, pointed towards the inconsistencies between the several statements made by the witnesses. 
• Apart from that, heavy reliance was made by the prosecution on confessions made by the accused to the Medical Officer. 
  • With regard to the confession made to the medical officer the Court held that the accused person was presented at the hospital by the police officer after being arrested thus, the statement would be hit by Section 26 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA)    
• Further, the prosecution also relied on the disclosure made under Section 27 of IEA. This was also not accepted by the Court. 
  • The Court held that the place of incident was already known to the accused therefore the disclosure is irrelevant.   
• Resultantly, the Court in this case acquitted the accused by giving them the benefit of doubt.

What is a Disclosure Statement? 

• About: 
  • Disclosure Statement is provided for under Section 27 of IEA.  
  • This section is based on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events – a fact is actually discovered as a consequence of the information given, which results in recovery of a physical object.
• Section 27 of IEA: 
  • This is in the form of proviso to other provisions  
  • The fact should be discovered in consequence of information received from the person accused of any offence 
  • The Accused should be in the custody of police 
  • So much information as it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. 
  • This is irrespective of whether the statement amounts to confession or not. 
  • In the case of Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (1947), Sir John Beaumont held that Section 27 is proviso to only Section 26 of IEA.  
  • However, in the recent times in the case of Jafarudheen v. State of Kerela (2022), the Supreme Court has held that Section 27 is an exception to preceding Sections particularly, Section 25 and Section 26.
• Requisite Essentials to Invoke Section 27 of IEA: 
  • This was laid down in the case of Preumal Raja @ Perumal v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police (2023) where the Court held the following: 
    • Firstly, there should be discovery of fact. The facts should be relevant in consequence of information received from the accused person. 
    • Secondly, the discovery of such a fact must be deposed to. This means that the fact should not already be known to the police. 
    • Thirdly, at the time of receipt of information the accused should be in the custody of the police. 
    • Lastly, only so much information as relates distinctly to fact thereby discovered is admissible. 
  • This words fact discovered would include the following:  
    • The “place” from where the object is produced; and 
    • The knowledge of the accused as to this.
• The presence of Witnesses Necessary while Making Disclosure Statements:  
  • In the case of State of Himachal Pradseh v. Jeet Singh (1999) the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that the witnesses should be present at the time discovery statement is made. 
  • This was reiterated in the case of Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011).
• What part of the statement of Disclosure Statement is admissible? 
  • This aspect was explained by the Privy Council in the case of Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (1947). 
  • The Court held that if the statement is “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house with which I stabbed A”. 
  • Here, the Court held that the words “I will produce the knife concealed in the roof of my house” will fall under Section 27. However, the words “with which I stabbed A” is not admissible since they do not relate to the discovery. 
  • Therefore, the information should relate “distinctly to the fact thereby discovered”.
• Custody under Section 27:  
  • This point was recently discussed in the case of Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State Rep. By the Inspector of Police (2023). 
  • The Court in this case held that the word “custody” under Section 27 does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restraint, restriction or even surveillance by the police. 
  • Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information the accused ought to be deemed for all practical purposes in the custody of police. 
  • Further, in the case of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court has held that for the ban to be effective the accused need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession.
• Will the Discovery Statement become Inadmissible if the Police already knew where the Objects were Hidden? 
  • In the case of Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1934), the Supreme Court by a three-judge bench held that if the police had knowledge about the place of concealment otherwise than through accused there is no discovery of fact.
• Can Disclosure Statement be made the Sole Basis of Conviction? 
  • In the case of Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2023), the Supreme Court held that disclosure statement is a significant contributing factor for conviction, but it cannot be the sole basis of conviction.

Comparison between Section 27 of IEA and Section 23 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)?

• It is to be noted that Section 23 of Bharatiya Sakshaya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), is an amalgamation of Section 25, Section 26 and Section 27 of IEA. 
• Section 27 of IEA can now be seen as a Proviso to Section 23 (2) of BSA. 
• It is to be noted that there are no changes made in this regard in BSA. 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of Sundari Gautam v. State of NCT of Delhi has held that the offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POCSO) are not restricted to male offenders only. 

What was the Background of the Sundari Gautam v. State of NCT of Delhi   Case? 

• In the present case, First Information Report (FIR) was filed against the petitioner under Section 6 of the POCSO Act four years after the alleged incident. 
• The case was filed against the women exceeding the scope of Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 
• The Trial Court framed charges against the petitioner as per Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 
• The petitioner filed a revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC) before the Delhi High Court. 
  • The petitioner argued that there was a delay in filing FIR of four years. 
  • The petitioner also argued that through investigation it has not been concluded that the petitioner had any intent to commit any sexual act against the child. 
  • It was also argued that Section 3 of POCSO Act has no application to a woman, section 5 of the POCSO Act which refers only to an aggravated form of the offence under section 3, can also apply only to a man and not to a woman. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Delhi High Court stated that based on the gravity of the offence committed the delay in filing FIR cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings. 
• The Delhi High Court observed that definition of aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5 of the POCSO Act is a consequence of the definition of penetrative sexual assault defined under Section 3 of the POCSO Act. 
• The court also noted that the POCSO Act was enacted to provide protection to children from sexual offences regardless of whether an offence is committed upon a child by a man or a woman, the court must not interpret any provision of the statute that derogates from the legislative intent and purpose. 
• The Delhi High Court clearly held that pronoun “he” appearing in section 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) of the POCSO Act must not be so interpreted as to restrict the offence engrafted in those sections only to a “man.” 
  • It would therefore be completely illogical to say that the offence contemplated in those provisions refers only to penetration by a penis. 
  • It was also held by the Delhi High Court that the definition of penetrative sexual assault under section 3 and of aggravated penetrative sexual assault in section 5 of the POCSO Act is not limited to the offence of rape. 
  • The opening line of section 375 of Indian Penal Code which defines rape specifically refers to a “man” whereas the opening line of section 3 of the POCSO Act refers to a “person”. 
• The Delhi High stated that the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault can be charged against the petitioner, even though she is a woman. 

What is Penetrative Sexual Assault under POCSO? 

About: 

• POCSO Act was enacted on 19th June 2012 and enforced on 14^th  November 2012 to specifically deal with sexual crimes against children in India. 
• It defines different forms of sexual assault, prescribes stringent punishments, and outlines child-friendly procedures for reporting, investigation and trial of such offenses. 
• One of the most serious offences covered under POCSO is Penetrative Sexual Assault against children. 

Penetrative Sexual Assault: 

• Section 3 of the POCSO Act defines Penetrative Sexual Assault. 
• It includes inserting any object or body part into the vagina, urethra, anus or mouth of a child, or applying mouth to the same body parts of the child. 
• It also covers making the child perform such acts on the offender or another person. Any form of penetration, however slight, is considered Penetrative Sexual Assault. 

Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault: 

• Section 5 lists out certain situations that make a Penetrative Sexual Assault an "aggravated" offence attracting even higher punishments: 
  • Assault by a police officer, member of armed forces, public servant, staff of a children's home/hospital. 
  • Assault on a child under 12 years of age. 
  • Assault resulting in physical/mental incapacitation, pregnancy, sexually transmitted disease. 
  • Repeated assaults on the same child. 
  • Assault committed by a member of the child's family/relative/person in a position of trust. 
  • Use of deadly weapons, burns, acid attack etc. during the assault.  

Punishments Under POCSO: 

• For Penetrative Sexual Assault, Section 4 of the POCSO Act prescribes rigorous imprisonment of not less than 10 years which may extend to life imprisonment, along with fine. 
• In case of Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault, Section 6 prescribes the minimum punishment is increased to rigorous imprisonment of 20 years which may extend to life imprisonment. 

Legal Provisions of POCSO Act:

• Section 3: Penetrative Sexual Assault 
  • A person is said to commit “penetrative sexual assault” if—  
    • He penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person. 
    • He inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person. 
    • He manipulates any part of the child's body to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of the child's body or makes the child do so with him or anyone else. 
    • He applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person. 
• Section 5: Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault 
  • Whoever, being a police officer, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child — 
    • Within the limits of the police station or premises at which he is appointed. 
    • In the premises of any station house, whether or not situated in the police station, to which he is appointed 
    • In the course of his duties or otherwise. 
    • Where he is known as, or identified as, a police officer. 
  • Whoever being a member of the armed forces or security forces commits penetrative sexual assault on a child—  
    • Within the limits of the area to which the person is deployed. 
    • In any areas under the command of the forces or armed forces. 
    • In the course of his duties or otherwise. 
    • Where the said person is known or identified as a member of the security or armed forces. 
  • Whoever being a public servant commits penetrative sexual assault on a child. 
  • Whoever being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, or other place of custody or care and protection established by or under any law for the time being in force, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, being inmate of such jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, or other place of custody or care and protection; or  
  • Whoever being on the management or staff of a hospital, whether Government or private, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child in that hospital. 
  • Whoever being on the management or staff of an educational institution or religious institution, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child in that institution. 
  • Whoever commits gang penetrative sexual assault on a child.  
  • Explanation.—When a child is subjected to sexual assault by one or more persons of a group in furtherance of their common intention, each of such persons shall be deemed to have committed gang penetrative sexual assault within the meaning of this clause and each of such person shall be liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 
  • Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or corrosive substance. 
  • Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child. 
  • Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, which—  
    • Physically incapacitates the child or causes the child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (l) of section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987) or causes impairment of any kind so as to render the child unable to perform regular tasks, temporarily or permanently. 
    • In the case of female child, makes the child pregnant as a consequence of sexual assault 
    • Inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency Virus or any other life threatening disease or Infection which may either temporarily or permanently impair the child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or mentally ill to perform regular tasks 
    • Causes death of the child. 

Source:  Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

The Bombay High Court recently highlighted that delays and laches can impact the admissibility of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). In a case where petitioners sought cancellation of land allotment and an inquiry into alleged irregularities, the court stressed that without an explaining the delay in filing the PIL, it could refuse to exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).This emphasizes the importance of timely filing and the court's discretion in PIL matters. 

• A division bench of Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Amit Borkar was held in Govind Kondiba Tanpure & ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & ors. 

What was the Background of Govind Kondiba Tanpure & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.? 

• The case concerns land in Gat No. 237 in village Dhangawadi, Taluka Bhor, District Pune, measuring 14 hectares and 35 acres. 
• In 1993-1994, portions of this land were reserved for a Muslim burial ground and allotted to the Divisional Engineer, Telephones.  
• In December 1994, the District Collector approved a scheme reserving 2 hectares 92 acres for Scheduled Castes and Tribes under a Village Extension Scheme.  
  • 110 plots were demarcated in 1995 but not handed over. 
• In May 1994, respondent No. 4(Anantrao N. Thopate) applied for allotment of the land for educational purposes.  
  • This was initially rejected. 
• In June 1999, the State Government allotted 2 hectares 90 acres to respondent No. 5 (an educational trust) for educational purposes at a nominal rent. 
• In 2008, the land use was modified to include Engineering and Management studies.  
  • An additional 5 hectares 40 acres was allotted in November 2008. 
• Respondent No. 5(Rajgad Dnyanpeeth) constructed educational buildings on the land after taking possession in 2000 and 2009. 
• The petitioners filed a Right to Information application and then filed this public interest litigation in August 2013, challenging the allotments.  
• The petition was registered in March 2015 and first circulated in court in January 2018. 
• The petitioners alleged irregularities in the allotment process and breach of lease conditions by respondent No. 5 mortgaging the land. 
• Petitioner filled the current PIL for the same.  

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The principle of denial of relief on grounds of laches is equally applicable to public interest litigation, and unexplained delay or laches can render even PILs liable to dismissal. 
• The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary, and the Court may decline to exercise this jurisdiction if a petitioner approaches after an unexplained delay. 
• The Court is not obligated to consider the sufficiency of an explanation to condone delay and laches in the absence of any explanation provided by the petitioners. 
• In cases where intervening would be inequitable and unjust due to actions taken during the period of delay, the Court may refuse relief even if the petitioners had a strong case on merits. 
• The Court must consider the length of delay and the nature of acts done during the interval when evaluating the balance of justice in granting or denying relief. 
• Where a party's conduct or neglect has placed the other party in a situation where it would be unreasonable to revert them to their original position, lapse of time and delay become material considerations in denying relief. 

What is the Principle of Denying Relief? 

• Courts of equity may deny relief to a plaintiff who has unreasonably delayed in asserting their rights, where such delay has prejudiced the opposing party. 
• This principle is founded on the maxim that “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” 
• The court may refuse to grant equitable remedies where the plaintiff's delay in seeking relief has resulted in a change of circumstances that would render the requested relief unjust or inequitable. 
• The denial of relief is predicated on the notion that parties should not be permitted to profit from their own negligence or inaction. 
• This principle protects defendants from unfair prejudice that may arise from the prosecution of stale claims. 
• The court's discretion to deny relief based on laches is exercised in consideration of the totality of circumstances, including the length of delay, reasons for delay, and potential harm to the defendant. 
• This principle's application is not solely dependent on time passage but on the equitable assessment of the parties' conduct and the potential for injustice. 
• In exercising this principle, courts aim to maintain the integrity of the legal process and discourage parties from sitting on their rights to the detriment of others. 

What is the Doctrine of Laches? 

About:

• The doctrine of laches is a legal principle that bars a party from seeking equitable relief if they have unreasonably delayed in asserting their rights, causing prejudice to the opposing party. 
• It bars relief when a claimant has unreasonably delayed in asserting their rights. 
• The delay must have prejudiced the opposing party. 
• Courts apply this doctrine to promote fairness and prevent injustice resulting from stale claims. 
• Unlike statutes of limitations, laches is a flexible doctrine applied at the court's discretion. 
• The doctrine is commonly invoked in cases seeking equitable remedies, though its application has expanded in some jurisdictions. 

Meaning of Doctrine of Laches:  

• The doctrine of laches, derived from the Latin term 'laxare,' signifying 'to lose,' traditionally denotes the negligent failure to fulfill one's legal obligations. 
• In jurisprudence, laches is defined as the failure to assert or exercise a legal right or privilege within a reasonable timeframe. 
• The doctrine is predicated upon the Latin maxim "Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Aequitas Subvenit," which translates to "Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." 
• This principle establishes that courts of equity shall not grant relief to parties who have demonstrated negligence in pursuing their legal claims, instead favoring those who exhibit diligence in safeguarding their rights. 
• A litigant may be deemed guilty of laches when they seek judicial intervention to enforce their rights after an unreasonable or prejudicial delay in initiating legal proceedings. 
• The application of the laches doctrine serves to promote timely resolution of disputes and prevent the pursuit of stale claims, thereby maintaining the integrity of the legal system. 

Purpose of the Doctrine of Laches:  

• This doctrine aims to ensure that an unreasonable delay in filing a suit cannot be justified. The petitioner must provide a reasonable statement for the delay. Nonetheless, even after the delay, the petitioner can approach the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) but the same does not restrict the decision of a judge to grant the relief. 
• This doctrine helps the defendant case when evidence disappears, witness departs etc., by shifting the burden of proof upon petitioner. 
• This doctrine aims to put an end to applicants' unreasonable delays in filling out forms. 

What are the Differences between Doctrine of Leaches and Statute of Limitation?