List of Current Affairs

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of X and Ors. v The State and Anr.  has held that maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV) is not linked with the ability or inability of the wife to maintain herself unlike Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 

What was the Background of the X and Ors. v The State and Anr. Case? 

• In the present case, Respondent No.2(wife) preferred the application under Section 12 of DV Act against the petitioner (husband and his kins) 
• The trial court observed that: 
  • the parties were the spouses, and the Domestic Incident Report (DIR) prima facie shows that Respondent No.2 was a victim of domestic violence and entitled to monetary compensation under the DV Act. 
  • While Petitioner No.1 was claiming that he was drawing a meagre salary from his father’s partnership firm, however, he was driving a Duster Car and receiving profit from the firm as well.  
  • The Trial Court granted an interim maintenance of ₹15,000/- along with ₹10,000/- towards rent to Respondent No.2. After assessing the income of the petitioner. 
• The petitioner filed an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) stating that: 
  • he is earning merely around Rs. 15,000/- per month and the business belongs to his father (Petitioner No. 1). 
  • the father has been taking care of the children of the parties for more than three years and Respondent No.2 has made no attempt to even meet them. 
  • sudden drop in his income after filing the application by the respondent against him. 
• The ASJ held that Petitioner No.1 could not take the excuse of the Covid-19 pandemic as the drop in his income and is liable to pay the maintenance amount assessed by the Trial Court. 
• Aggrieved by the decisions of the trial court and the ASJ the present petition is filed by the Petitioner before the Delhi High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of CrPC.  

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Delhi High Court observed that based on the order of the Trial Courts and the appellate court it can be explicitly made out that the Respondent was the victim of domestic violence. 
• The Delhi High Court further observed that the images showing injury marks were also attached by the respondent. 
• The Delhi High Court also confirmed the observations made by the Trial court that unlike Section 125 of CrPC maintenance under the DV Act is not tethered on the inability of the wife/ victim to maintain herself. 
• The Delhi High Court also referred to the case of Annurita Vohra v. Sandeep Vohra (2004)  
• The Delhi High Court dismissed the plea and order the Trial court to make independent observation irrespective of the observations made by the Additional Sessions Judge by taking into consideration the evidences 

Which Case Was Referred by the Delhi High Court in the Case of X and Ors. v the State and Anr? 

• Annurita Vohra v. Sandeep Vohra (2004): 
  • In this case the court held that the collective income forms the Family Resource Cake, which is then distributed among the family members.  
  • The allocation of this "cake" should align with the financial needs of each family member, and an equitable approach would involve dividing the Family Resource Cake into two portions for the Husband, acknowledging his additional expenses incurred in earning, and one portion each for the other members. 

What is the Difference between Maintenance Under BNSS and DV Act? 

Maintenance Under DV Act 

• Section 12: Application to Magistrate 
  • Under Section 12, an application can be made to the Magistrate by the aggrieved person or Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person. 
• Section 20: Monetary Reliefs 
  • Section 20 of the Domestic Violence Act empowers the court to issue orders for monetary relief aimed at covering expenses and losses incurred by the aggrieved person and any children due to domestic violence. 
  • Monetary reliefs which can be granted by the Magistrate under Section 20 of the DV Act includes giving of the relief in respect of the loss of earnings, the medical expenses, the loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person and the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any. 
  • This relief may encompass expenses associated with medical treatment, loss of earnings, damage to property, and other consequential costs arising from the violence. 
  • Section 20(1)(d) state that the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force. 
• Section 23: Power to grant interim and ex parte orders 
  • Section 23 vests the Magistrate with the power to grant interim ex parte orders. It is, thus, clear that various kinds of reliefs which can be obtained by the aggrieved person are of civil nature. 

Maintenance Under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 

Section 144: Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. 

• This section was earlier covered under section 125 of CrPC. 
• Essential Condition of Maintenance under this section: 
  • If a person with sufficient means has neglected or refuses to maintain his wife, children or parents, maintenance can be claimed by applying a Judicial Magistrate of first class.   
• Maintenance of wife: 
  • As per the explanation in the section "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. 
  • A wife shall not be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, from her husband under this section if  
    • she is living in adultery 
    • if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband,  
    • if they are living separately by mutual consent 
• Purpose of this Section: 
  • In K. Vimal v. K. Veeraswamy (1991), the Supreme Court where it was held that Section 125 of the CrPC (now Section 144 of BNSS) had been introduced for achieving a social purpose. The aim of this section is the welfare of the wife by providing her with the required shelter and food after the separation from the husband. 

Overlap Between Section 144 of BNSS and DV Act 

• Nikhil Danani v. Tanya Banon Danani (2019):  
  • Delhi High Court held that Section 125 of CrPC (now covered under Section 144 of BNSS) states only about the order of maintenance while Section 20 of the DV Act includes giving of the relief in respect of the loss of earnings, the medical expenses, the loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person and the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any. 
• Juveria Abdul Majid Khan Patni v. Atif Iqbal Musoori (2014):  
  • The Supreme Court in this case held that Section 125 of CrPC (now covered under Section 144 of BNSS) empowers to give maintenance order while Section 20 of the DV Act can be used in addition to the Section 125 of CrPC for giving monetary relief.

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Pankaj Mithal held that a co-owner is not competent to transfer the entire property without getting his share determined and demarcated so as to bind the other co-owners.                       

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of SK Golam Lalchand v. Nnadu Lal Shaw @ Nandu Lal Keshari @ Nandu Lal Bayes & Ors. 

What is the Background of SK Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal Shaw @ Nandu Lal Keshari @ Nandu Lal Bayes & Ors. Case? 

• The suit property was purchased by two brothers namely, late Sita Ram and late Salik Ram in 1959 from one Sahdori Dasi. 
• Both of them had equal rights in the property. 
• It is alleged that one of the two brothers late Salik Ram gifted his share in the suit property to his brother late Sita Ram who allegedly became the absolute owner of the entire property. 
• Late Sita Ram died intestate leaving behind his son Brij Mohan. Consequently, a sale deed was executed by Brij Mohan in favour of his tenants,  
• It is the case of the plaintiff that gift deed alleged above has not been executed. 
• Therefore, it is the case of the plaintiff that Brij Mohan had no right to transfer the whole of property in favour of one of the tenants.  
• Thus, a suit was filed by the Plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction. 
•  This suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance but in appeal the decree was reversed holding that there was no partition of property. 
• This judgment was affirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal. 
• Thus, an appeal was preferred in the Supreme Court.  

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that there is no controversy on the fact that the property was equally owned by Late Salik Ram and Late Sita Ram and the property had always remained joint and undivided between the co-owners. 
• The Court further observed that it could not be proved in the Court clearly that the gift deed was executed in favour of Late Sita Ram. 
• Thus, it was held that Brij Mohan was not competent alone to execute the sale of entire property that too without it’s partition by metes and bounds. 
• It was further observed that the sale deed may be a valid document in accordance with Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 1(TPA) to the extent of the share of Brij Mohan in the property. 
• Accordingly, the Court answered the issue as follows: 
  • Brij Mohan alone was not competent to transfer the entire property without getting his share determined and demarcated so as to bind other co-owners. 
  • Accordingly, the defendant was restrained by the decree of injunction in acting in derogation of the propriety rights of co-owners until and unless the partition takes place.

What is the Law on Transfer by and to the Co-Owners? 

Why are the Judgments on Transfer of Property by Co-Owners? 

• Durgapada Pai v. Debidas Mukherjee (1973) 
  • The Court held that a dwelling house connotes to some extent a permanent abode of the undivided family where such family resides or intends to reside generally and not a house for stray short or temporary residence for specified purpose. 
• Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sarob Warden (1990) 
  • The Supreme Court restrained a suit for partition filed by the buyer of an undivided share because the circumstances showed that irreparable damage would have been caused to the family if an outsider found entry into the house. 
• Sri Ram v. Ram Kishan (2010) 
  • The Court held that, when any member of a joint family sells his portion of the family property which has not been marked out by partition or otherwise, the purchaser can file a suit for partition and delivery of possession of the portion to which the selling member is entitled. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently the Supreme Court observed that candidates within the same academic cohort cannot be discriminated against based on their admission date when determining eligibility for job appointments. This ruling raised the issue that the Rajasthan authorities' 2017 Teacher Grade III Level II recruitment notification set different graduation marks criteria based on the timing of candidates' B.Ed course admission. 

• Justices BR Gavai and KV Viswanathan held in the matter of Manilal v. the State of Rajasthan & Ors. 

What was the Background of Manilal v. the State of Rajasthan & Ors. Case? 

• On 11^th September 2017, Rajasthan authorities issued an advertisement for Teacher Grade III Level II positions in the Scheduled Area (TSP). 
• The advertisement provides different educational qualifications for candidates based on when they took admission to B.Ed courses: 
  • Those admitted before 31^st August 2009 needed a minimum of 45% marks in graduation. 
  • Those admitted after 31^st August 2009 needed a minimum of 50% marks in graduation. 
• The appellant had 44.58% marks in his graduation and secured admission to a B.Ed course on 23^rd October 2009. 
• The appellant from a reserved category met the qualifying percentage (40% marks) required for admission to the B.Ed Course at the time of his admission. 
• Despite scoring above the cut-off marks in the recruitment exam, the appellant's name did not appear in the provisional list of selected candidates. 
• The appellant was informed that his candidature was rejected because he had secured less than 45% marks in his graduation. 
• Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Rajasthan High Court. 
  • The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition on 27th November 2018. 
  • The appellant then filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. 
• On 13^th November 2019, the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) issued a clarification stating that the minimum percentage requirement in graduation would not apply to candidates who had taken admission to B.Ed courses prior to 29th  July 2011. 
  • The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal on 27^th April, 2022. 
  • The appellant was initially appointed to the post pursuant to an interim order of the High Court dated 23^rd October 2021. 
• After the dismissal of his appeal, the appellant's appointment was cancelled on 7^th June 2022. 
• The appellant then approached the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court's decision. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that it would be improper to discriminate inter se among a homogenous group of students admitted for the academic session 2009-10. 
• The Court held that it would be discriminatory if students admitted in the first round of counselling were eligible with less than 50% marks in graduation, while others admitted in subsequent rounds were not. 
• The Court emphasized the principle of equality.  
• The Court took note of the NCTE notification dated 13th November 2019, which stated that minimum percentage of marks in graduation shall not be applicable to those who had taken admission to B.Ed courses prior to 29th July 2011. 
• The Court found that treating candidates differently based solely on their date of admission, when they were part of the same academic session and admission process, was not sustainable. 
• The Court determined that the High Court's judgment was not in consonance with the principles of equality and non-discrimination as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI). 
• The Court held that applying disparate qualifying criteria to candidates within the same academic cohort based solely on their round of admission would constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. 
• The Court concluded that the appellant should not be disadvantaged merely because his admission was completed in a subsequent round of counselling. 

What is Reasonable Classification Under Article 14 of the COI? 

• Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. 
  • This does not mean that all laws must apply uniformly to all persons.  
  • The principle recognizes that different classes of people may require different treatment due to varying needs, circumstances, and societal factors. 
• Reasonable classification is an exception to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
• The doctrine of reasonable classification permits the State to make laws that treat different classes of persons differently, provided there is a rational basis for such classification. 
  • For a classification to be considered reasonable and not violative of Article 14, it must satisfy two essential tests as per State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952): 
  • The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped from others left out of the group.  
  • The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 
• If the classification satisfies the test laid down in propositions, the law will be declared constitutional. 
  • The classification must not be arbitrary, artificial, or evasive.  
• It should be based on substantial distinctions and real differences. 
• The courts have consistently held that legislative wisdom in making classifications should be presumed, and the burden of proving unreasonableness lies on the person challenging the classification. 
• The differentia which is the basis of the classification, and the object of the Act are two distinct things. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act which makes the classification. 
• Even if a law discriminates, it can be upheld if there is a reasonable basis for the discrimination. 
• The principle of reasonable classification is not a substitute for the doctrine of classification.  
  • It is only one of the principles underlying the guarantee of equal protection of laws embodied in Article 14. 
• Prohibition of Class Legislation: Class legislation, which confers privileges on an arbitrarily selected group from a larger homogenous group, is forbidden.  
  • There must be a reasonable justification for including some and excluding others from the benefits or burdens of a law. 
• Substantial Difference: For a classification to be valid, there must be a substantial difference between those included and excluded from a particular law or privilege. This difference should justify the differential treatment. 
• Relation to the Object of the Law: The classification must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. 
• Equal Treatment in Unequal Circumstances: Identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. Therefore, differential treatment may sometimes be necessary to achieve true equality. 
• Legislative Discretion: The legislature has broad powers to classify persons and things upon which laws operate, given the diverse problems arising from various human relations. 
• Arbitrary Selection: A classification that arbitrarily selects a group for special treatment without any reasonable basis for distinction from others similarly situated would violate Article 14. 

What are Grounds for Reasonable Classification? 

• There are some important grounds for reasonable classification.  
  • Age  
  • Gender  
  • Geographical or territorial basis  
  • Nature of business or profession  
  • Nature of the source of authority  
  • Nature of offences and offenders  
  • Basis under tax laws  
  • State of Government  
  • Single individual or body as a class