List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

The Supreme Court of India has recommended that the Parliament should amend the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,2012 (POCSO) to replace the term "child pornography" with "child sexual exploitative and abuse material" (CSEAM).  

• The Court stated that the term "child pornography" trivializes the gravity of the crime, as it suggests consent and voluntary acts, whereas CSEAM accurately reflects the exploitation and abuse of children.  
• The Court directed all judicial bodies to use CSEAM in their rulings to highlight the seriousness of these offenses. 
• Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justice JB Pardiwala  held in the matter of Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish     

What was the Background of Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish Case? 

• On 29th January 2020, the All-Women's Police Station in Ambattur, Chennai received information from the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police regarding a Cyber Tipline Report from the National Crimes Record Bureau (NCRB). 
• The report alleged that the respondent no. 1 was an active consumer of child pornography and had downloaded such material on his mobile phone. 
• An FIR was registered on the same day against the respondent no. 1 for offenses under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) and Section 14(1) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). 
• During the investigation, the respondent's mobile phone was seized and sent for forensic analysis. 
• The respondent admitted to regularly viewing pornography while in college when questioned by investigators. 
• The Computer Forensic Analysis Report dated 22nd August 2020, revealed two video files related to child pornography on the respondent's phone, along with over a hundred other pornographic video files. 
• Upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed on 19th September 2023, against the respondent for offenses under Section 67B of the IT Act and Section 15(1) of POCSO. 
  • The charge under POCSO was changed from Section 14(1) to 15(1) based on the evidence collected. 
• The respondent filed a Criminal Original Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, seeking to quash the charge sheet. 
• The High Court of Madras allowed the petition and quashed the chargesheet on 11th January 2024, effectively terminating the criminal proceedings against the respondent. 
• The appellants, who were not parties to the original proceedings, sought leave from the Supreme Court to challenge the High Court's judgment, citing the serious issue of public importance involved in the matter. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• High Court of Madras:  
  • The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the respondent, ruling that merely possessing or watching child pornography in private, without publishing or transmitting it, does not constitute an offense under Section 14(1) of the POCSO Act or Section 67B of the IT Act. 
  • The High Court held that to make out an offense under these laws, there must be evidence that the accused used a child for pornographic purposes or published/transmitted the material, which was not established in this case. 
• Supreme Court: 
  • The Court directed the Parliament to consider amending the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO) to replace the term "child pornography" with "child sexual exploitative and abuse material" (CSEAM). 
    • The Court suggested that the Union of India consider bringing about this amendment through an ordinance in the interim. 
  • The Court instructed all courts to refrain from using the term "child pornography" in any judicial order or judgment, and instead endorse the term "child sexual exploitative and abuse material" (CSEAM). 
  • The Court emphasized that the term "child pornography" fails to capture the full extent of the crime and may trivialize the offense, as pornography is often associated with consensual acts between adults. 
  • The Court noted that the term CSEAM more accurately reflects the reality that such materials are records of incidents where a child has been sexually exploited and abused. 
  • The Court stated that using the term CSEAM appropriately emphasizes the exploitation and abuse of the child, highlighting the criminal nature of the act and the need for a serious response. 
  • The Court found that the High Court had committed an egregious error in its judgment and consequently set aside the impugned judgment and order. 

What does Section 67B of the IT Act Address? 

• Covers publishing, transmitting, creating, collecting, browsing, downloading, advertising, promoting, exchanging, or distributing child pornography in electronic form 
• Includes cultivating or enticing children into online relationships for sexually explicit acts 
• Punishable with 5 years imprisonment and fine up to 10 lakh rupees for first conviction 
• Subsequent convictions: Up to 7 years imprisonment and fine up to 10 lakh rupees 

Analysis of Section 67B of the IT Act  

• Section 67B(a): Dissemination of Child Pornography  
  • Penalizes publication or transmission of material involving a child in sexually explicit acts 
  • Requires actual publication/transmission and involvement of the accused in the process 
• Section 67B(b): Creation, Collection, and Engagement with Child Pornographic Material  
  • Covers creation of text or image-based content depicting children in obscene/indecent/sexually explicit manner 
  • Penalizes collection, browsing, downloading, advertising, promotion, exchange, or distribution of such material 
  • More expansive than 67B(a), including creation and engagement with material 
• Section 67B(c): Enticement of Children for Sexual Acts  
  • Penalizes inducing or enticing a child to participate in sexually explicit acts using computer resources 
  • Actual inducement/enticement is sufficient; child's participation not necessary for offense 
• Section 67B(d): Facilitation of Online Child Abuse  
  • Penalizes any form of facilitation of online child abuse 
  • No specific intention required; act must have the likelihood to aid or enable online child abuse 
• Section 67B(e): Recording of Sexual Acts Involving Children  
  • Penalizes recording of sexually explicit acts with or in the presence of a child 
  • Child need not be physically present; exposure to such acts (e.g., through video) is sufficient 

What is the Legislative History and Intent of the POCSO Act? 

• Enacted to address inadequacies in existing laws regarding sexual offenses against children 
• Aims to provide a comprehensive framework for protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation 
• Designed to be child-friendly in terms of evidence recording, investigation, and trial procedures 

Analysis of Section 15 of POCSO 

• Definition of "Child Pornography" under POCSO: 
  • Section 2(1)(d) of POCSO defines "child" as any person below the age of eighteen years. 
  • The definition is gender-neutral and gender-fluid. 
  • Section 2(1)(da) defines "child pornography" as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child 
  • Includes photographs, videos, digital/computer-generated images indistinguishable from an actual child 
  • Also covers images created, adapted, or modified to appear to depict a child 
• Determination of "Child" in Pornographic Material: 
  • Prima facie appearance test: Material must appear to involve a child to an ordinary person of prudent mind 
  • Subjective satisfaction criteria applied, rather than objective age determination 
  • Rationale: Practical difficulties in conclusively establishing age in pornographic material 
• Three Distinct Offenses under Section 15: 
  • Section 15(1): Storing/possessing child pornography without deleting/destroying/reporting, with intent to share/transmit 
  • Section 15(2): Storing/possessing for transmitting, displaying, propagating, or distributing 
  • Section 15(3): Storing/possessing for commercial purposes 
• Concept of Possession: 
  • 2019 Amendment added "possession" alongside "storage" in all subsections of Section 15 
  • Includes concept of constructive possession: power and intention to control, even without immediate physical possession 
• Presumption of Culpable Mental State (Section 30 of POCSO): 
  • Special Court shall presume existence of culpable mental state in prosecutions under POCSO 
  • Accused may rebut this presumption by proving lack of such mental state 
  • Standard of proof for rebuttal: beyond reasonable doubt 
  • "Culpable mental state" includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact, and belief in or reason to believe a fact 

What are the Supreme Court suggestions to the Union of India regarding child sexual abuse and exploitation material (CSEAM)? 

• Consider amending the POCSO Act to replace the term "child pornography" with "child sexual exploitative and abuse material" (CSEAM) to more accurately reflect the nature of these offenses. This could be done via an amendment or ordinance. 
• Implement comprehensive sex education programs that include information about the legal and ethical ramifications of CSEAM to help deter potential offenders. 
• Provide support services for victims and rehabilitation programs for offenders, including psychological counseling, therapeutic interventions, and educational support. 
• Conduct public awareness campaigns about the realities of CSEAM and its consequences to help reduce its prevalence. 
• Implement early identification and intervention strategies for youth with problematic sexual behaviors (PSB), including training for educators, healthcare professionals and law enforcement to recognize warning signs. 
• Implement school-based programs to educate students about healthy relationships, consent, and appropriate behavior to help prevent PSB. 
• Consider constituting an Expert Committee to devise a comprehensive program for health and sex education, as well as raising awareness about POCSO among children from an early age. 
• Courts should use the term "child sexual exploitative and abuse material" (CSEAM) instead of "child pornography" in all judicial orders and judgments.

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice BR Gavai, Justice Prashant Kumar Misra and Justice KV Viswanathan commuted the death penalty of an appellant to 20 years imprisonment.                 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Rabbu @ Sarvesh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh. 

What was the Background of Rabbu @ Sarvesh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh Case? 

• The appellant in this case was convicted by the Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur for offences punishable under Section 450, 376 (2) (i), 376D, 376A and 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5 (g)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO)., 
• The appellant was awarded death penalty under Section 376A and 302 and life imprisonment under Section 376D and rigorous imprisonment of 10 years under Section 450 of IPC. 
• The present appeal was filed against the above order and judgment. 
• The counsel for the Appellant has set up the following points in favour of appellant: 
  • The case rests on dying declarations and as the time progressed there were improvements in dying declaration and hence the conviction cannot be based on the dying declarations. 
  • Further, it was the case of the appellant that the present case does not fall within the ambit of rarest of rare case to warrant death penalty. 
  • In the event the Court refuses to interfere with the finding of conviction the Court must consider factors like socio-economic background of appellant, the age of the appellant at the time of commission of offence and also his conduct and behavior that would entitle him for commutation of sentence.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court first of all observed that the dying declaration was reliable and trustworthy and hence the Court held that there was no error in finding of conviction by the Courts. 
• The only question that the Court had to consider now was whether the present case fall in the category of ‘rarest of rare case’ to confirm death penalty or the sentence could be commuted. 
• The Court while allowing the commutation considered the following factors: 
  • The psychological assessment of the Appellant and the report of the Senior Probation Welfare Officer does not point anything against the behavior of the Appellant. 
  • His conduct in the prison is found to be satisfactory. 
  • The Appellant lost his mother at the age of 8 years and his elder brother at the age of 10 years and was brought up by his father as a single parent. 
  • Although the age of the appellant at the time of commission of crime solely cannot be taken into consideration, the age of the appellant at the time of commission of crime along with other factors can certainly be taken into consideration. The Appellant was 22 years at the time of commission of offence. 
  • Further, the appellant comes from a socio-economic backward stratum of society. 
  • The Appellant and his family members do not have any criminal background.  
  • It cannot be said that the Appellant is a hardened criminal who cannot be reformed.    
• Thus, considering the factors above the Court held that it cannot be said that the confirmation of death penalty would be justified. 
• However, at the same time we also find that the ordinary sentence of life i.e. 14 years imprisonment with remission would not meet the ends of justice. 
• Thus, the present case is the one that would fall in the middle path. 
• Therefore, the Court held that the death penalty should be commuted to fixed imprisonment without remission for a period of 20 years. 
• Finally, the Court maintained the conviction and commuted death penalty to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years.

What are the Provisions Related to Commutation of Sentence? 

• Section 5 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) provides for commutation of sentence. 
  • This provision provides that the “Appropriate Government” may without the consent of the offender commute the punishment under this Sanhita to any other punishment in accordance with Section 474 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
  • The term “appropriate Government” would mean:

• Section 474 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) provides for power to commute sentence. 
  • The Appropriate Government may without the consent of the person sentenced, commute:

• Section 475 of BNSS provides for restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases. 
  • This provision provides that: 
    • Where a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law; or 
    • Where death sentence has been commuted under Section 474 into one of life imprisonment. 
    • In both the above cases the person shall not be released from prison unless he has served at least 14 years of imprisonment.   
• Section 476 of BNSS provides that the powers conferred by Section 473 and Section 474 upon the State Government may in cases of sentences of death also be exercised by the Central Government. 
• Section 477 of BNSS provides that there are certain cases in which the State Government should act in concurrence with the Central Government.

What are the Landmark Cases on Commutation?

• Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerela (2024): 
  • The fundamental underpinning in the cases of commutation is the principle of proportionality. 
  • The aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. 
  • Some of the factors that the Courts bear in mind are: 
    • The number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their age and gender. 
    • The nature of injuries including sexual assault if any. 
    • The motive for which the offence was committed. 
    • Whether the offence was committed when the convict was on bail in another case. 
    • The premeditated nature of the offence. 
    • The relationship between the offender and the victim. 
    • The abuse of trust if any. 
    • The criminal antecedents; and whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society. 
• Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2008): 
  • This case resolved the dilemma of a judge while commuting the sentence of death. 
  • Often it happens that a case that falls short of the rarest of the rare category may also be one where a mere sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. 
  • The Court may find that while death penalty may not be warranted keeping in mind the overall circumstances, a proportionate penalty would be to fix the period between 14 years and for the imprisonment till rest of the life without remission 

When can Death Penalty be Granted? 

• Capital punishment, also called the death penalty, is the execution of an offender sentenced to death after conviction by a court of law of a criminal offence. It is the highest penalty awardable to an accused. 
• While awarding death penalty the test to be employed is that of rarest of rare case. 
• The expression rarest of rare cases was coined by the Supreme Court in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) and since then, life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty the exception as in India it is awarded only in the gravest of cases. 
• Commutation means substitution of one form of punishment with a lighter form of punishment. 
• Article 72 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) empowers the President to grant pardon to any person who has been awarded death sentence.

Source: Madras High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Madras High Court in the matter of Ramesh Flowers Private Limited v. Mr. Sumit Srimal has held the Trial Court cannot on its own extent the time limit beyond 30 days for filing of the written statement and the parties must file for condonation for seeking extension of time limits. The same would be contrary to Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). 

• The Madras High Court further added that the court has the discretion for accepting condonation of delay, but reasons must be recorded in writing for such acceptance. 

What was the Background of Ramesh Flowers Private Limited v. Mr. Sumit Srimal Case? 

• In the present case, the defendant was the former employee of the plaintiff. 
• The plaintiff alleges that the defendant is engaged in acts that are detrimental to its interests and therefore he was terminated from his post. 
• The plaintiff filed for an interim injunction to restrain defendant from continuing the same before the Trial Court. 
• The trial court issued only notice without granting ex-parte interim order. 
• Aggrieved by the decision of the Trial Court the petitioner filed where the interim injunction was granted. 
• Following the dispose of the interim injunction order, the defendant filed his written statement before the trial court against the order of interim injunction. 
• The Trial Court excepted the written statement, and the copy of the order attached by the defendant. 
• The petitioner filed an application rejecting the written statement which was dismissed by the court. 
• Aggrieved by the decision the Petitioner filed a revision petition before the Madras High Court questioning the acceptance of defendant’s written statement. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Madras High Court observed that: 
  • The mistake of court should not be taken as an advantage by the party. 
  • The statute has given time limits for filing of the written statements and the parties must adhere to it. 
  • The parties must provide sufficient cause for seeking condonation of delay. 
  • Order VII of CPC only provides for rejection of plaint and not for rejection of written statement therefore the request of rejection of written statement cannot be admitted. 
• The Madras High Court held that: 
  • The Trial Court cannot on its own, extent the time limit beyond 30 days for filing of the written statement and the parties must file for condonation seeking extension of time limits. 
  • Reasons must be recorded by the Court for granting condonation of delay. 
  • The Court gave the defendant liberty to file for fresh written statement along with an application seeking condonation of delay. 

What is a Written Statement? 

About: 

• A written statement ordinarily means a reply to the plaint filed by the plaintiff. It is the pleading of the defendant. Order VIII of CPC contains provisions in relation to the written statement. 
• The written statement should address all material facts alleged in the plaint, either admitting or denying them specifically. 
• It may also include any counterclaims the defendant wishes to make against the plaintiff. 
• The statement should be verified by the defendant or their authorized representative. 

Order VIII of CPC: 

• Rule 1 of Order VIII deals with written statements. It states that -
  • Time Limit: 
    • The Defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defense. 
  • Extension of Time Limit by 90 Days: 
    • The defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court. 
    • Reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.
  • Extension of Time Limit by 120 Days: 
    • Where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court. 
    • Reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons. 
    • After expiry of such a time limit the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. 

Landmark Judgements:

• Federal Brands Ltd. v. Cosmos Premises Pvt. (2024):  
  • The Bombay High Court held that CPC does not account for the time a miscellaneous application is pending when calculating the delay in filing a written statement.  
  • This ruling impacts how courts handle delays in civil cases and ensures strict adherence to procedural deadlines. 
• Shibjee Pd. Singh v. Manju Devi & Ors. (2024):  
  • The Patna High Court has held that in its deliberation on the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, the defendant is barred from belatedly amending pleadings to fill up lacunae when confronted with the document recorded in evidence. 
• Kailash v. Nankhu (2005): 
  • The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII of CPC is directory and permissive and not mandatory and imperative. 
• Salem Advocate Bar Assn. V. Union of India (2005): 
  • The Supreme Court clarified that under Rule 10 of Order VIII of CPC, the court has wide powers to ‘make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.’ 
  • The order extending the time to file a written statement cannot be made routinely. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases.