List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Allahabad High Court in the matter of XXX v. State of U.P. has held that the present case where the allegations were of sexual assault and molestation directing the police for making preliminary inquiry and relying on the police report in favor of the accused is neither desired nor lawful. 

What was the Background of XXX v. State of U.P Case?  

• In the present case the applicant (victim) filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 
• The victim alleged that the time when she was moving towards her office after finishing her teaching work at school suddenly the opposite party abused her and also acted in obscene manner. 
• The opposite party tried to touch her inappropriately and molested her and hence outraged her modesty. 
• On hearing her shierks her husband reached on the spot while the opposite party tried escaping and also threatened the victim’s husband with life. 
• This was a very routine act of the opposite party towards the victim, the same was also registered to the police but no actions were taken. 
• An application was moved towards the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) under Section 156(3) of CrPC. 
• Based on the preliminary inquiry report the CJM dismissed the application stating that: 
  • The application has been made due to the personal animosity of the applicant and her husband with the opposite party. 
  • The reports hold no evidence against the opposite party. 
  • The act does not amount to any cognizable offence. 
• Aggrieved by the decision of the CJM the present revision application is made to the Allahabad High Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Allahabad High Court observed that: 
  • Based on the precedent the scope of preliminary inquiry is to ascertain if the information received reveals any cognizable offence and not to check the veracity. 
  • The preliminary inquiry is conducted based on the facts and circumstances of the case. 
  • On further referring to the precedents it was observed that on an application under Section 156(3) of CrPC the Magistrate before the initiation of criminal prosecution may direct for a preliminary inquiry. 
  • The magistrate requires to apply minds and while passing any order. 
  • The case should be dealt keeping in mind the allegations made, time of incident and if any cognizable offence is made out remotely. 
  • The Magistrate must take steps to verify the nature of allegations of the case and preliminary inquiry in the cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases, or cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution have been permitted. (the list is not exhaustive). 
• It was held that in the present case where the allegations were of sexual assault and molestation directing the police for making preliminary inquiry and relying on the police report in favor of the accused is neither desired nor lawful. 
• Based on the above observations the Allahabad High Court set aside the order passed by the CJM and remanded the matter to him and directed the CJM to provide the applicant an opportunity of hearing in compliance with the precedents set by the Supreme Court. 

What is Section 175(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)? 

• About: 
  • Section 175(3) of BNSS states that a Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance under Section 210 of Sanhita may order investigation for the cognizable offence. 
  • An application under section 175(3) of BNSS discloses the cognizable offence, then it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to direct registration of the FIR, which is to be investigated by the Investigation Agency, in accordance with law. 
  • If the information received does not disclose the commission of cognizable offence apparently, but indicates necessity for inquiry, the preliminary inquiry may be conducted in order to ascertain whether the cognizable offence is disclosed or not. 
  • Any judicial magistrate may order an investigation under Section 175(3) of CrPC before taking notice of the offence. 
• Essential Elements 
  • The power to order police investigation under Section 175 (3) is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage. 
  • The power under Section 175 (3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence. 
  • An order made under sub-section (3) of Section 175, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation. 

Case Laws 

• Har Prasad v. State of UP (2006)  
  • The Supreme Court held that if the application under Section 156(3) CrPC. discloses the commission of cognizable offence and at the stage of Section 156(3) CrPC, which is the cognizable stage, once the cognizable offence is disclosed through an application, it was the duty of the concerned Court to order for registration and investigation of the offences, as crime detection and crime prevention are the foremost duty of the police and not of the Court. 
• Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of UP (2014) 
  • The Supreme Court held that if the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. 
• Priyanka Srivastava and Ors v. State of UP and Ors (2015) 
  • The Supreme Court held that a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

The Supreme Court, in a 7:2 majority ruling clarified that not all private properties qualify as "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The Court overruled the 1983 Sanjeev Coke case, which had allowed the State to redistribute all private properties for the common good, also states that only properties meeting specific criteria as "material resources" and "of the community" can be subject to redistribution. This decision limits the scope of state intervention in private property. 

What was the Background of Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra case ? 

• The case originated from Mumbai's persistent problem of old, dilapidated buildings, with over 16,000 structures constructed before 1940 still being inhabited despite safety concerns. 
• Mumbai's coastal location and monsoon conditions accelerate building deterioration, leading to frequent collapses and loss of life despite regular warnings from the Mumbai Building Repair and Reconstruction Board. 
• Historical context traces back to Mumbai's textile industry boom in the early 20th century, when rapid worker immigration led to massive housing construction, followed by World War II housing shortages and rent control laws. 
• To address deteriorating buildings, Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act (MHADA) in 1976, which consolidated various housing and building repair laws. 
• In 1986, Chapter VIII-A was added to MHADA through an amendment, allowing the state to acquire old buildings if 70% of occupants formed a cooperative society and paid 100 times the monthly rent. 
• The amendment included Section 1A, explicitly declaring that the Act was meant to implement Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India,1950, which deals with distribution of community resources for common good. 
• Property owners challenged Chapter VIII-A's constitutionality before the Bombay High Court, arguing it violated Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution by arbitrarily depriving them of property rights. 
• The case involves interpretation of whether "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) includes privately owned resources or is limited to public resources. 
• The matter has significant implications for property rights and state acquisition powers, particularly in urban renewal contexts, affecting thousands of old buildings and their occupants in Mumbai. 
• The case intersects with broader constitutional questions about private property rights, state acquisition powers, and the scope of directive principles of state policy. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

Major opinion  

• The Supreme Court held that Article 31C, to the extent validated in Kesavananda Bharati, continues to remain operative in the Constitution, providing constitutional protection to laws giving effect to Article 39(b). 
• The Court clarified that the majority judgment in Ranganatha Reddy had explicitly distanced itself from Justice Krishna Iyer's minority interpretation of Article 39(b), and therefore, the subsequent reliance on this minority view by a co-equal bench in Sanjeev Coke was erroneous. 
• The Court determined that the observation in Mafatlal regarding "material resources of the community" including privately owned resources was obiter dicta and not ratio decidendi, thus not binding on future benches. 
• While acknowledging that "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) may theoretically include private resources, the Court rejected the expansive interpretation that all private resources meeting material needs automatically qualify as community resources. 
• The Court established that determining whether a resource falls within Article 39(b)'s ambit requires a context-specific inquiry based on multiple factors including:
  • The nature and characteristics of the resource 
  • Its impact on community well-being 
  • Resource scarcity 
• Consequences of private concentration 
• The Court recognized that the Public Trust Doctrine can serve as a guiding principle in identifying resources that constitute "material resources of the community." 
• The Court held that the term 'distribution' under Article 39(b) should be given a wide interpretation, encompassing various forms including state vesting and nationalization, provided such distribution "subserves the common good." 
• The Court observed that certain privately owned resources inherently affecting ecology or community well-being (such as forests, wetlands, spectrum, minerals) may fall within Article 39(b)'s scope. 
• The Court noted that the Constitution framers intentionally avoided binding the country to any specific economic ideology, rejecting the ideologically driven interpretations previously advanced. 

Justice BV Nagarathna's views 

• Material resources are fundamentally categorized into two types - state-owned resources (held in public trust) and privately-owned resources, with a clear exclusion of personal effects and belongings from the definition of material resources. 
• Personal effects (like clothing, household articles, personal jewelry, and daily use items) are specifically carved out as exceptions from material resources, recognizing the intimate and personal nature of such belongings. 
• The justice advocates for a comprehensive interpretation where all resources, except personal effects, whether public or private, fall within the scope of "material resources," showing a balanced approach between private ownership and public interest. 
• She stated five specific legal mechanisms through which private resources can be transformed into community resources -  
  • nationalization 
  • acquisition 
  • operation of law 
  • state purchase 
  • voluntary conversion by owners. 
• Her interpretation observed that while private ownership is respected, there are established legal pathways to convert private resources into community resources when necessary for public good. 
• The justice's view reflects a nuanced understanding of property rights, balancing individual ownership with community needs while providing clear legal frameworks for resource transformation. 

Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia's views 

• He acknowledges that while India's social and economic context has evolved since the incorporation of Articles 38 and 39(b) and (c), the fundamental problem of inequality persists, referencing Dr. Ambedkar's prescient warning about continuing social and economic disparities despite political and legal equality. 
• The Justice Sudhanshu observed that despite the passage of time and changing circumstances, the significant gap between rich and poor remains a pressing concern, making these constitutional provisions as relevant today as they were when enacted. 
• He strongly advocates for retaining the principles underlying Articles 38 and 39, viewing them as essential foundations that informed key judgments like the Three Judge opinion in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke. 
• The Justice particularly endorses the broad and inclusive interpretation of "material resources of the community" provided by Justices Krishna Iyer and Chinnappa Reddy in their respective judgments (Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke). 
• He contends that these earlier judicial interpretations remain jurisprudentially valuable and relevant, suggesting they continue to resonate with those who appreciate these constitutional values. 
• Justice Dhulia's views reflect a progressive constitutional interpretation that emphasizes the continuing importance of addressing economic inequality through legal frameworks, even as socio-economic conditions evolve.

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Chief Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra upheld the constitutional validity of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madrassa Education Act, 2004.          

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Anjum Kadari and Another v. Union of India and others. 

What is the Background of Anjum Kadari and Another v. Union of India and others. Case? 

• The Uttar Pradesh Board of Madrassa Education Act, 2004 (Madarsa Act) was passed and it’s constitutionality was challenged. 
• The Madarsa Act established the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education, to regulate, among other things, the standards of education, qualifications for teachers, and conduct of examinations in Madarsas in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 
• The High Court of Allahabad held that the Act was unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the principle of secularism and Article 14 and 21A of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI). 
• The present appeal has been filed against the above decision before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• Principle of Secularism: 
  • The Court held that although the term ‘secular’ has been introduced by way of 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, the amendment has merely made explicit what was already implicit according to the scheme of the Constitution. 
  • It was observed by the Court that secularism is one the facets of right to equality. 
  • The equality code provides that all persons irrespective of their religion should have equal access to participate in the society and at the same time prohibits the State from mixing religion with any secular activity. 
  • Also, the equality code imposes obligation on the State to provide equal treatment to all persons irrespective of their religion, faith or beliefs. 
• Basic Structure Doctrine and Ordinary statute: 
  • The Court held that there are two grounds on which a statute can held to be ultra vires: 
    • It is beyond the ambit of legislative competence of the Legislature. 
    • It violates Part III or any other provision of the COI. 
  • The Court held that the Constitution does not provide that the legislation is subject to any other constitutional limitation and if the basic structure doctrine is applied to test the validity of any statute it would amount to rewriting the Constitution.
  • The reason why a statute cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of basic structure has been enunciated by the Court as follows: 
    • The concepts like democracy, federalism and secularism are undefined concepts. 
    • Allowing courts to strike down legislation for violation of such concepts will introduce an element of uncertainty in our constitutional adjudication. 
• Regulation of Minority Institutions 
  • The Court held that the Madrasa Act furthers substantive equality for the minority community. 
  • It was further held that it is i9n the interest of the State to maintain the standard of education in minority educational institutions. 
  • The Court held that the Madarsa Act secures the interests of the minority community in Uttar Pradesh because: 
    • it regulates the standard of education imparted by the recognised Madarsas 
    • it conducts examinations and confers certificates to students, allowing them the opportunity to pursue higher education. 
  • The Act ensures that students studying in the recognised Madarsas attain a minimum level of competency which will allow them to effectively participate in society and earn a living.  
• Interplay between Article 21A and Article 30 of COI 
  • Article 21-A and the Right to Education Act, 2009 have to be read consistently with the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
  • The Board with the approval of the State government can enact regulations to ensure that religious minority institutions impart secular education of a requisite standard without destroying their minority character 
• It was held that although most of the provisions were constitutionally valid there are certain provisions which pertain to regulation of higher education and conferment of degrees which should not be held as constitutional as the State Legislature lacks legislative competency in this regard.  
• Thus, the Court held that the above provision that are beyond the competency of the State Legislature must be severed from rest of the provisions and the rest of the legislation must be upheld as constitutional. 

What is the Madarsa Act? 

• Overview of the Act: 
  • The Act aimed to regulate and govern the functioning of madrasas (Islamic educational institutions) in the state of Uttar Pradesh. 
    • It provided a framework for the establishment, recognition, curriculum, and administration of madrasas across Uttar Pradesh. 
• Under this Act, the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education was established to oversee and supervise the activities of madrasas in the state. 
• Concerns Regarding the Act: 
  • Constitutional Violation: 
    • The act has been deemed unconstitutional by the Allahabad HC, as it promotes education segregated along religious lines, contradicting the principle of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution and fundamental rights. 
    • The Act's provisions were criticised for failing to ensure quality compulsory education up to the age of 14 years, as mandated by Article 21 A of the Constitution. 
    • Concerns were raised regarding the exclusion of madrasas from the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009 potentially depriving students of universal and quality school education. 
  • Limited Curriculum: 
    • Upon examination of madrasa syllabi, the court noted a curriculum heavily focused on Islamic studies, with limited emphasis on modern subjects. 
    • Students were required to study Islam and its doctrines to progress, with modern subjects often included as optional or offered minimally. 
  • Conflict with Higher Education Standards: 
    • The Act was deemed to conflict with Section 22 of the University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956, raising questions about its compatibility with higher education standards. 

What are the Grounds on which a Legislation can be Struck Down ? 

• Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 
  • Chief Justice AN Ray in this case held that the constitutional validity of a statute depends entirely on the existence of the legislative power and the express provision in Article 13. 
  • Since the legislation is not subject to any other constitutional limitation, applying the basic structure doctrine to test the validity of a statute will amount to “rewriting the Constitution.  
• Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006): 
  • A Constitution bench in this case held that legislation cannot be challenged on the grounds that it violates the basic structure of the Constitution.  
  • Statutes can only be challenged when they violate the provisions of the Constitution.  
• Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 
  • The Court in this case was deciding the constitutionality of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014. 
  • Justice JS Kehar in this case held that a challenge to ordinary legislation for violation of basic structure would only be a technical flaw.