List of Current Affairs

Source: Bombay High Court  

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan and Justice BP Colabawalla held that by virtue of Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act, 1963 the Limitation Act will not apply when the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 itself provides for specific period of limitation for filing appeals.                   

• The Bombay High Court held this in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Anusaya Devrukhkar & Ors. (2024).

What was the Background of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar & Ors. Case?  

• Two appeals were filed by the Appellant, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) against orders dated 13th February 2024 by the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Authority, Nagpur. 
• These orders enhanced compensation for the Respondents (Original Claimants) under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR Act, 2013). 
• Thereafter, the Appeals were delayed, so the Appellant filed applications for condonation of delay. 
• Section 74 (1) of LARR Act, 2013 allows filing an appeal within 60 days, with a possible extension of another 60 days for valid reasons. 
• The following appeals were filed: 
  • Appeal No. 24058 of 2024: This was lodged on 21st August 2024, 128 days after the original deadline (68 days beyond the extended period). 
  • Appeal No. 25983 of 2024: This was lodged on 6th September 2024, 144 days after the original deadline (84 days beyond the extended period). 
• Respondents argued the High Court cannot condone delays beyond the maximum 120 days (60 days initial + 60 days extension) as per Section 74(1) of the LARR Act.  
• The Court has to examine if it has the power to condone delays beyond 120 days.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Section 74 (1) of the LARR Act stipulates that the appeal should be filed within 120 days (60 days initial and 60 days extension). 
• MCGM made the following arguments: 
  • It was argued that the LARR Act, 2013 is a general law and therefore, Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (LA) which applies to special/local law would not apply to it. 
  • Section 105 of the LARR Act, 2013 (along with the Fourth Schedule) exempts specific land acquisition laws, supporting their claim that the 2013 Act is a general law.  
• Court made the following observations on general and Special Laws: 
  • Whether a law is "general" or "special" depends on the context and subject matter. 
  • The Court held that a law can be a general law on some matters but still have special provisions (e.g., on limitation). 
  • Section 74 of LARR Act, 2013 prescribes a specific limitation period for appeals. 
  • This makes Section 74 a special law for limitation purposes, even if the 2013 Act is generally a general law. 
• The Court finally rejected the applicability of Section 5 of LA on the following grounds: 
  • The Court ruled that Section 74 excludes Section 5 of the LA. 
  • The proviso to Section 74(1) explicitly limits delay condonation to a maximum of 60 additional days. 
  • This is an express exclusion of Section 5, as allowing it would override the clear limitation set by Section 74.

What is Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ? 

• The 2013 Act replaced the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act) and provides for higher compensation to those deprived of land by the government for both public and private sector projects. 
  • It also mandates consent of a majority of land-owners and contains provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement. 
• The LARR Act is intended to shelter a legal guarantee for the civil rights of project affected, and authorization of larger transparency in the land acquisition process.  
• The objective of the Act is to ensure balance of aspirations and needs of those whose livelihoods are directly and indirectly dependent on the acquired land and also see the side of development and smooth facilitation of land acquisition for various public purposes. 
• The LARR Act, 2013 has shaped a distinguished land acquisition management categorized by market-linked reimbursement, socio- economic appraisal and proper rehabilitation and resettlement ways for affected people

What is Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act, 1963 ?

• Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 (LA) provides for savings clause. 
• The special features of Section 29 (2) of LA are as follows: 
  • Special/Local Law vs. Schedule: 
    • If a special or local law specifies a different period of limitation than the general Limitation Act schedule, it overrides the schedule for that suit, appeal, or application. 
  • Application of Section 3: 
    • Section 3 of the LA (which mandates dismissal of cases filed beyond the limitation period) applies to the period specified by the special or local law. 
  • Applicability of Sections 4–24: 
    • Sections 4 to 24 of the LA (dealing with exclusions, extensions, and condonation of delays) apply to the special/local law only if not expressly excluded by that law. 
  • Express Exclusion: 
    • If the special or local law expressly excludes certain provisions (like condonation of delay), those provisions of the Limitation Act will not apply. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

The Supreme Court invoked its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to an accused, in line with the benefit granted to another accused in a cross-case. This decision followed a settlement reached between the parties and the absence of any prior criminal antecedents or adverse conduct of the appellant. 

• The case stemmed from violent clashes between two groups of a family, which led to separate criminal trials and differing outcomes. 
• Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held in the matter of Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan. 

What was the Background of Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan ? 

• The case involves two family groups who had a running feud that resulted in violent clashes on 1st January 1993, between 6-7 AM in the morning. 
• Two separate FIRs were filed at Gadhmora Police Station on the same day. 
• FIR No. 1/1993 was filed against Ramesh (appellant) and five others: Khiladi, Shambhu, Shalla alias Suresh, Janki, and Rupi. 
• FIR No. 9/1993 was filed as a counter-complaint by the other group against five persons: Chhotu, Kamal, Hanso, Safedi, and Ramhari. 
• Both FIRs led to separate criminal trials - Session Case No. 31/93 and Criminal Case No. 584/1998 (33/1993). 
• The complainant in Session Case No. 31/93 was Chhotu, who was also an accused in the cross-case (Criminal Case No. 584/1998). 
• The complainant in Criminal Case No. 584/1998 was Jankidevi, who belonged to the appellant Ramesh's group. 
• During the incident, Ramesh allegedly suffered injuries and fainted when he came to rescue the complainant Ramkhiladi (son of Janaki). 
• Both cases involved similar charges including sections related to rioting, causing hurt, criminal trespass, and assault. 
• The accused in both cases were members of the same extended family who had been involved in long-standing disputes. 
• During the pendency of Criminal Case No. 584/1998, both groups reached an amicable settlement and filed a formal agreement before the court. 
• The appellant Ramesh, who is now approximately 70 years old, has no previous criminal record or antecedents. 
• The entire legal proceedings in these cross-cases have continued for about 25-30 years, from 1993 to the present date. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The High Court noted that while these were cross-cases arising from the same incident, they were tried and disposed of at different times by different courts, contrary to the established principle that cross-cases should ideally be tried by the same court. 
• The Court observed that despite a settlement being reached between the parties in Criminal Case No. 584/1998, no such formal compromise was filed before the court in Session Case No. 31/93 either by the complainant or any of the injured parties. 
• The High Court took cognizance of the fact that the parties were closely related to each other but had maintained animosity for more than 27 years at the time of deposition. 
• The Court observed that while considering the case of Ramesh, though the period of trial and prolonged pendency of appeal were noted, the nature of injuries and sentencing provisions under Section 326 IPC warranted substantive punishment. 
• The Supreme Court observed that both criminal cases were in reality cross-cases filed by two groups of the same family, with the genesis traced to a single clash occurring on January 1, 1993. 
• The Supreme Court noted that no adverse material against the conduct of the appellant or criminal antecedents had been brought to its notice during the proceedings. 
• The Court recognized that extending similar benefits under the Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant as given to the accused in the cross-case would be appropriate, given the settlement between parties and the appellant's advanced age. 
• The Supreme Court observed that since the more serious charge under Section 307 IPC against the appellant had been set aside by the High Court, the remaining charges warranted consideration for probation benefits. 

Probation of Offences Act, 1958 

• Section 4 - "Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct" 
  • Allows courts to release offenders on probation instead of sentencing for offenses not punishable with death or life imprisonment 
  • Requires offenders to enter into a bond, with or without sureties 
  • Period of probation not to exceed three years 
• Section 5 - "Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs" 
  • Courts can order offenders to pay reasonable compensation for loss/injury 
  • Costs of proceedings can be imposed 
  • Amount can be recovered as fine under CrPC sections 386 and 387 
• Section 7 - "Report of probation officer to be confidential" 
  • Probation officer's reports must be treated as confidential 
  • Court may communicate substance to offender 
  • Offender may be given opportunity to produce evidence on matters in report 
• Section 8 - "Variation of conditions of probation" 
  • Courts can vary bond conditions on probation officer's application 
  • Duration can be extended up to 3 years from original order 
  • New conditions can be added with hearing opportunity to offender and sureties 
• Section 11 - "Courts competent to make order under the Act, appeal and revision and powers of courts in appeal and revision" 
  • Any court empowered to try and sentence offenders can make orders under this Act 
  • High Court or other courts can make orders during appeal or revision 
  • Appellate courts cannot impose greater punishment than trial court 
• Section 12 - "Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction" 
  • Person dealt with under Sections 3 or 4 shall not suffer disqualification attached to conviction 
  • Exception: If person is subsequently sentenced for original offense after release under Section 4 
• Section 14 - "Duties of probation officers" 
  • Required to inquire into circumstances of accused persons 
  • Supervise probationers and assist in finding employment 
  • Help offenders pay court-ordered compensation 
  • Submit reports to court as directed 

Source: Orissa High Court 

Why in News?

Recently, the Orissa High Court in the matter of Doyel Dey v. The Judge, Family Court Balasore & Anr. has held that Consent for divorce can be unilaterally withdrawn by A party even after conclusion of arguments.   

What was the Background of the Doyel Dey v. The Judge, Family Court Balasore & Anr. Case?  

• The case involves a matrimonial dispute between Doyel Dey (wife/petitioner) and the second opposite party (husband).  
• Their marriage was solemnized according to Hindu customs on 12th February 2018. After their marriage, the couple lived together for some time. 
• Due to developing differences between them, both parties jointly filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).  
• This petition was filed before the Family Court in Balasore. 
• The court-in itiated conciliation proceedings between the parties as required by law. While the matter was pending, and after the completion of arguments but before the final decree, the wife unilaterally withdrew her consent for the mutual divorce. 
• Despite the withdrawal of consent by the wife, the Family Court, Balasore proceeded to pass a judgment on dissolving the marriage between the parties under Section 13-B of the HMA. 
• Aggrieved by this decision, the wife filed a writ petition before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, challenging the Family Court's judgment.  
• The essential dispute centers around whether a divorce decree on mutual consent can be granted when one party withdraws their consent before the passing of the final decree, even if such withdrawal occurs after the completion of arguments and when the judgment is reserved. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Orissa High Court made the following observations:  
  • It established the key undisputed facts that a joint petition was filed for mutual divorce, and the wife withdrew her consent just four days before the decree was passed.  
  • The High Court then relied heavily on the Supreme Court's precedent in the case of Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1992).   
    • Based on this precedent, the High Court found the trial court's decision to be both erroneous and legally unsustainable.   
    • The High Court emphasized that consent is the essence of a mutual divorce decree, and its withdrawal by either party before the final decree must be respected, regardless of the stage of proceedings. 

Landmark Case 

• Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1992) 
  • The Supreme Court had established several crucial principles in the Sureshta Devi cas e that became binding on all lower courts: 
    • The court must hear both parties in a mutual consent divorce. 
    • If either party withdraws consent by stating "I have withdrawn my consent" or "I am not a willing party to the divorce," the court cannot proceed with the divorce decree. 
    • The Supreme Court explicitly held that mutual consent is a "sine qua non" (essential condition) for passing a decree under Section 13-B of HMA. 
    • Most importantly, the Supreme Court established that mutual consent must continue until the divorce decree is passed - it cannot be based solely on the initial petition. 

Divorce By Mutual Consent  

• Divorce by mutual consent falls under no fault theory where the parties do not have to prove fault on the part of another person.  
• Under Hindu Law divorce by mutual consent was added by Section 13B which was included by way of Amendment by the Marriage law (Amendment) Act, 1976 and it came into force from 25th May 1976.    

Section 13 B of HMA 

• For the purposes of divorce by mutual consent two petitions must be jointly filed by the parties.  
• As per Section 13B (1):  
  • A joint petition for dissolution of marriage shall be presented before the District Court.  
  • Whether the marriage was solemnized before or after commencement of Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976.  
  • The parties should have been living separately for a period of one year or more.  
  • The petition should provide that they have not been able to live together, and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.  
• Section 13 B (2) provides for second motion:  
  • When should it be filed?  
    • Not earlier than six months after the presentation of the first motion and not later than eighteen months after the said.  
    • If the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime.  
  • How is the decree of divorce passed?  
    • After hearing the parties and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit  
    • That the marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true  
    • Pass a decree declaring marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of decree  
• The purpose of prescribing the above procedure is to give parties some period of togetherness before separation.  
• Marriage is a very important part of any individual’s life and therefore before the marriage is dissolved by mutual consent the parties must be given some reasonable time to reflect on their move to dissolve the marriage.  

Withdrawal of Consent Under Section 13 B  

• Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011):  
  • The Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties to be dissolved if the following conditions are met:  
    • A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under subsection (1) and not later than 18 months  
    • After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and  
    • The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree;  
• Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya (2009):  
  • It is only on continued mutual consent of the parties that a decree of divorce under Section 13 B can be passed.  
  • The court has to be satisfied about the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent.