List of Current Affairs

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices Vibha Kankanwadi and Rohit Joshi has held that demand of money from a woman to cohabit with her husband would not amount to mental or physical harassment. 

• The Bombay High Court held in the case of MM v. State of Maharashtra (2025). 

What was the Background of the MM v. State of Maharashtra Case? 

• Mohammad Muddassar Mohammad Akhtar Quadri (Applicant) married Aaysha Mohammad Muddasar Kadri (Respondent) on 24th June 2022, according to Muslim rites. 
• The marriage involved several family members as co-applicants (seven). 
• On 24th July 2023, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered against all seven applicants. 
• The FIR alleged offenses under: 
  • Section 498-A (Cruelty to married woman). 
  • Section 323 (Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt). 
  • Section 504 (Intentional insult). 
  • Section 506 (Criminal intimidation). 
  • Section 34 (Common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).  
• The wife's allegations in the FIR included: 
  • After three months of marriage, she was taunted for being from a village and inability to cook. 
  • A demand was made for Rs. 5,00,000/- to secure her husband's permanent employment with Nagar Parishad. 
  • When she expressed inability to pay, she was allegedly told not to return for cohabitation. 
  • She informed her father, who along with relatives attempted mediation, but no settlement was reached. 
  • The husband allegedly went to her parental home and abused her. 
  • Other family members allegedly instigated against her cohabitation with her husband. 
  • Threats were allegedly made regarding her life if she failed to bring the money. 
• The case proceeded to become pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class.  
• The applicants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) seeking to quash both the FIR and subsequent court proceedings. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Bombay High Court made several significant observations regarding the case: 
  • The Court first noted problems with the allegations' specificity.  
    • While the wife claimed mental and physical harassment, she did not provide specific details beyond general taunting.  
    • The Court found it implausible that all seven accused persons could have taunted her simultaneously. 
    • The Court questioned the residential arrangements presented in the complaint. It found it unusual that the married sister-in-law and her husband were alleged to be living in the same house as the complainant, when records showed they actually lived in a different locality in Aurangabad.  
    • The same was true for the cousin brother. 
  • Regarding the demand for Rs. 5,00,000, the Court observed that the complaint lacked critical temporal details.  
    • The wife did not specify when this demand was made or for how long it persisted.  
    • The Court noted that merely stating she should not return for cohabitation without any corresponding action would not constitute mental and physical harassment. 
  • The Court found serious issues with the investigation process. It criticized the police for: 
    • Recording witness statements that appeared to be "copy-paste" versions, showing identical paragraphs, punctuation, and fonts. 
    • Failing to show proper sensitivity in investigating such cases. 
    • Not interviewing neighbors from the matrimonial home. 
    • Only recording statements from the wife's relatives and her parents' neighbors. 
    • Not considering other available evidence or possibilities. 
    • Unnecessarily taking photographs and panchnama of the husband's house.  
  • The Court also made an important observation about charging all named accused persons.  
    • It stated that investigating officers should use their discretion to file charges only against those with strong evidence against them, particularly when accused persons live far away.  
    • The Court emphasized that unnecessary harassment and false implications should be avoided. 
  • The most crucial observation was regarding the FIR itself. 
    • The Court found it "as vague as possible" and determined that it failed to disclose the basic ingredients of the offenses under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC.  
• Based on the above observations the Bombay High Court led to their conclusion that this was a fit case for exercising powers under Section 482 of the CrPC to prevent an unjust trial, resulting in the quashing of both the FIR and the pending court proceedings. 

What Are the Provisions Related to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023(BNS)? 

• Section 85 of BNS states: 
  • Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. 
    • Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
  •  This provision was earlier covered under Section 498A of IPC. 
• Section 3(5) of BNS states: 
  • When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 
  • This provision was earlier covered under Section 34 of IPC. 

Source: Bombay High Court  

Why in News? 

The Bombay High Court ruled that service of a signed arbitration award on an unauthorized employee, such as a clerk, does not constitute valid service under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The judgment observed that each party to an arbitration agreement must receive a signed copy of the award for the limitation period under Section 34(3) to commence.  

• Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh S. Patil held in the matter of Health Care, Medical & General Stores v. Amulya Investment (2025) . 

What was the Background of Health Care, Medical & General Stores v. Amulya Investment? 

• Health Care, Medical & General Stores (Partnership Firm) and Amulya Investment (Proprietary Firm) had business dealings, governed by letters dated 15th January, 2016, and 7th February, 2016, containing an arbitration clause. 
• The Partnership Firm consisted of three partners: 
  • Sitaram Govind Narkar,  
  • Swapnil Vijay Shetye, and  
  • Dayanand Vidyadhar Shetye. 
• Disputes arose between the parties, leading Amulya Investment to invoke the arbitration clause and initiate proceedings before the Sole Arbitrator, Mr. Chirag J. Shah. 
• The Arbitrator passed an award on 1st July, 2017, granting various reliefs to Amulya Investment as the Claimant. 
• According to paragraph 51 of the award, the Arbitrator signed and issued two stamped original copies, one for each party, while retaining one copy. 
• The Partnership Firm and its partners claimed they were never served in the arbitration proceedings or with the award. 
• On 5th August, 2023, the counsel for the Partnership Firm requested certified copies of the proceedings from the Arbitrator. 
• The Arbitrator, in his reply dated 10 August 2023, informed that he had returned all papers to the Claimant and did not have custody of them10th August 2023, informed that he had returned all papers to the Claimant and did not have custody of the same. 
• Subsequently, the Partnership Firm filed an Arbitration Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act) on 7th September 2023.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court noted that Section 2(1)(h) of the A & C Act defines "party" as a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement, and this definition is not qualified to include agents or representatives. 
• The Court observed that Section 31(5) mandatorily requires delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party, making it impossible to satisfy this requirement with only two signed copies for five parties. 
• The Court found that acknowledgment by Mr. Botekar, an employee of the Partnership Firm, did not constitute valid service under Section 31(5) of the Act, as service on an employee holds a lower status than service on an agent. 
• The Court observed that the postal acknowledgment for the third appellant bore no signature whatsoever, clearly indicating absence of service. 
• The Court noted that the Single Judge had not adequately examined the aspect of non-compliance with Section 31(5) requirements. 
• The Court observed that treating only the Claimant and Partnership Firm as parties, while ignoring individual partners, violated the statutory requirement of serving each party. 
• The Court determined that the limitation period for challenging the award should commence from 10th August, 2023, when the Arbitrator denied issuing a copy of the award. 
• The Court observed that service of arbitral award is not a mere formality but a matter of substance affecting parties' rights and limitation periods. 

What is Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ? 

• Form of Award: The award must be in written form and signed by the arbitral tribunal members. 
• Multiple Arbitrators: In cases with multiple arbitrators, majority signatures suffice if reasons for omitted signatures are stated. 
• Reasoned Award: The award must state the reasons on which it is based, unless:  
  • Parties agree that no reasons are needed, or 
  • It is an award on agreed terms under Section 30 
• Essential Details: The award must specify:  
  • Date of the award 
  • Place of arbitration (as per Section 20) 
  • The award is deemed made at that place 
• Service Requirement: After making the award, a signed copy must be delivered to each party. 
• Interim Awards: The tribunal can make interim awards during proceedings on matters eligible for final award. 
• Interest Component:  
  • The tribunal may include interest at reasonable rates from cause of action to award date 
  • Post-award interest at 2% higher than current rate from award date to payment date 
  • Current rate refers to Interest Act, 1978 definition 
• Cost Determination: The arbitral tribunal shall fix costs as per Section 31A. 

What is Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ? 

• Section 34 
  • Section 34 is a crucial provision that governs the process of challenging an arbitral award, providing the sole remedy for parties seeking to set aside an award. 
  • It provides specific grounds under which a court can set aside an arbitral award, including incapacity of parties, invalid arbitration agreement, improper notice, awards exceeding scope, and procedural irregularities. 
  • The provision includes both domestic and international commercial arbitration awards, with additional grounds for domestic awards under Section 34(2A) regarding patent illegality. 
  • The section emphasizes that awards can be challenged if they conflict with public policy of India, which includes fraud, corruption, contravention of fundamental policy, or conflict with basic notions of morality or justice. 
• Section 34(3)  
  • Section 34(3) sets a strict limitation period of three months for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award, starting from the date of receipt of the award by the challenging party. 
  • If a request for correction or interpretation is made under Section 33, the three-month period begins from the date of disposal of such request by the tribunal. 
  • The proviso to Section 34(3) allows courts to extend the limitation period by up to 30 days (but not beyond) if satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the initial three months. 
  • The provision establishes an absolute bar on entertaining any application after the expiry of the three months plus the additional 30 days, making it a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement. 
  • This strict timeline reflects the legislative intent to ensure finality of arbitral awards and prevent prolonged challenges, promoting efficiency in arbitration proceedings. 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice C Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul has ruled against the usage of trademark BHARAT GATE as it is deceptively similar to the trademark INDIA GATE.           

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of KRBL Limited v. Praveen Kumar Buyyani & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of KRBL Limited v. Praveen Kumar Buyyani & Ors. Case?  

• The appellant in this case was the registered owner of the trademark INDIA GATE, which has been in use for rice since 1993. 
• The respondents also started dealing with rice under the name BHARAT GATE. 
• The appellant approached the Commercial Court seeking permanent and mandatory injunction against the respondents using the trademark BHARAT GATE. 
• It was the case of the appellant there was infringement of trademark under Section 29 of the Trademark Act, 1999 (TMA). The plaint was accompanied with application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) seeking interlocutory injunction. 
• On 9th October 2020, the Commercial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favor of the appellants and against respondents.  
• The order passed on 9th January 2024 finally adjudicated the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 and vacated the injunction granted. 
• It is against this order that the appellant moved to the Delhi High Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations?  

• The test for infringement of trademark is well settled i.e. the possibility of likelihood of confusion from the perspective of a customer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. 
• Thus, the Court held that infringement is made out where there is deceptive phonetic, visual, or idea similarity between the marks. 
• The Court held that in the present facts the respondent besides using word mark which is phonetically similar and representing the same idea as the appellant’s mark, also copied the essential features of the appellant’s mark. 
• Even in cases where there is no visual similarity the Supreme Court held that there would be infringement because of phonetic similarity. 
• The Court held that in the present case the respondent has deliberately attempted to capitalize on the goodwill of the appellant.  
• Further, the Court held that the mark INDIA GATE cannot be dissected as laid down under Section 17 of TMA. 
• The Court finally in this case set aside the order of the Commercial Court. 

How can Deceptive Similarity be Ascertained? 

• Deceptive similarity in trademark law refers to a situation where one trademark closely resembles another, creating a likelihood of misleading or confusing the public. 
• This concept applies even if the two marks are not identical, as their similarity in appearance, sound, or meaning may lead consumers to wrongly associate them with one another. 
• The possibility of likelihood of confusion has to be assessed from the perspective of a customer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection 
• “Confusion”, again, need not extrapolate, in every case, to the consumer mistaking one mark for the other. 
• It is enough – as Section 29(4) of TMA itself clarifies – if the similarity between the marks conveys an impression of “association” between them, to the mind of such a consumer. 
• If on seeing the defendant’s mark some time after the first, the consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection is likely to pause, even if for the fraction of a minute, and ponder as to whether it was not the same, or at was not associated with, the plaintiff’s mark which he had seen earlier, the tort of infringement stands, ipso facto, committed by the defendant. 
• The infringement is made out where there is deceptive phonetic, visual or idea similarity between the marks. The presence of any one element, as is sufficient to confuse the consumer, would be sufficient. All other features of distinction would, then, pale into insignificance. 
• The marks, moreover, have to be compared as wholes, taking into account the essential features of the appellant’s mark.

What are the Landmark Cases on Deceptive Similarity? 

• Parle Products (P) Ltd v. JP and Co. (1972) 
  • It is, therefore, clear that in order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the two are to be considered. 
  • They should not be placed side by side to find out if there are any differences in the design and if so, whether they are of such character as to prevent one design from being mistaken for the other 
  • It would be enough if the impugned mark bears such an overall similarity to the registered mark as would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other if offered to him 
• Reckitt & Colman Ltd v. Borden Inc (1990) 
  • The Court in this case postulated the “trinity” or “triple identity test”, which deems infringement to exist where identical (or deceptively similar) marks are used for more or less identical products, having a common market. 
  • Similarity of marks, identity/similarity of the goods on which the marks are used, and commonality of market, therefore, predicate a legitimate inference of infringement. 
• KR Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal & Co. (1969) 
  • In this case the Supreme Court was dealing with the marks “SRI AMBAL” and “SRI ANDAL”, used for snuff in both cases. 
  • The Court held that there was no visual resemblance between the two marks, however, the resemblance between the two marks must be considered with reference to the ear as well as the eye.