List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of B.R. Gavai and Augustine George Masih has held that to convict under Section 34 IPC (common intention), prior planning and shared intent must be proven. It allowed constables' appeal against their murder conviction, stating that mere presence is insufficient for liability. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand. (2025). 
• The case involved police firing at a suspected smuggler's car, leading to a passenger's death.  
• The High Court had reversed acquittals, prompting the appeal. 

What was the Background of Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand? 

• The case originated from an incident on 15th November, 2004, when police personnel received information about illegal liquor being smuggled in a Maruti Car (Registration No. DL2CR4766). 
• Head Constable Jagdish Singh, along with three other police personnel - Constable Surendra Singh, Constable Surat Singh, and Constable Driver Ashad Singh - proceeded in a silver Indica car to intercept the suspected vehicle. 
• At approximately 8:30 PM near IDPL Gate, the police personnel attempted to stop a Maruti car by overtaking it and signaling the driver to halt. 
• Upon the driver's non-compliance, Head Constable Jagdish Singh discharged his 0.38 bore revolver, resulting in a fatal injury to the co-passenger. 
• The deceased victim was identified as Manisha, wife of the complainant Sanjeev Chauhan, who was driving the vehicle with their daughter and his sister as other occupants. 
• A First Information Report (Crime No. 455 of 2004) was registered against Head Constable Jagdish Singh and other unknown police constables under Section 302 IPC. 
• Post-mortem examination confirmed cranio-cerebral damage from bullet injury as the cause of death. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that interference with an acquittal order requires fulfillment of specific conditions:  
  • The judgment must exhibit patent perversity 
  • There must be misreading or omission of material evidence 
  • Only one reasonable conclusion pointing to guilt must be possible 
• The Court held that for invoking Section 34 IPC (common intention), the prosecution must establish:  
  • Prior meeting of minds among the accused 
  • Preplanning of the criminal act 
  • Shared common intention to commit the specific crime 
  • The criminal act must be in furtherance of the common intention 
• The Court observed that mere presence in the same vehicle does not constitute sufficient grounds for establishing common intention under Section 34 IPC. 
• The Court noted that the Trial Court's acquittal was based on material considerations:  
  • Hierarchical command structure among the accused 
  • Limited witness identification 
  • Absence of evidence establishing shared intention 
  • Insufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt regarding mental involvement 
• The Court determined that the High Court's reversal of acquittal solely on the basis of co-presence in the vehicle was legally unsustainable. 

What is the Concept of ‘Common Intention’? 

• Section 34 of IPC: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. 
• Now Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) deals with common intention. 
  • When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 
  • Section 3(5) BNS,2023 makes no mention of any specific offence. It establishes the rule of evidence that if two or more people commit a crime for the same purpose, they will be found jointly accountable. 
• Essentials of Common Intention Under 3(5) BNS,2023 
  • Prior Meeting of Minds 
    • There must be a pre-arranged plan or meeting of minds between the accused persons 
    • The common intention may form just before commission of offense 
    • There need not be a formal agreement, but shared understanding must exist 
    • Mere presence at crime scene is insufficient to prove common intention 
  • Mental Element 
    • Each accused must be aware of and mentally concur with the intended criminal act 
    • There must be active mental participation towards the common goal 
    • The state of mind and intention must be proved through evidence 
    • Prosecution must establish prior knowledge of likely consequences 
  • Active Participation 
    • Each accused must participate in some manner in the criminal act 
    • Participation can be direct or indirect but must contribute to crime 
    • Physical presence alone without participation is insufficient 
    • Nature and extent of participation may vary between accused 
  • Causative Link 
    • Clear nexus must exist between common intention and criminal act 
    • Act must be done in furtherance of shared objective 
    • Criminal act must flow from pre-arranged plan 
    • Random or independent acts not covered 
  • Burden of Proof 
    • Prosecution must prove common intention beyond reasonable doubt 
    • Circumstantial evidence can establish common intention 
    • Conduct before, during and after crime relevant 
    • Mere suspicion of common intention not sufficient 
  • Contemporaneous Formation 
    • Common intention may form instantly before crime 
    • No long premeditation necessary 
    • But intention must exist when crime committed 
    • Post-facto approval does not constitute common intention 
• Case Law: 
  • Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (1925): 
    • In this case two people demanded money from a postman as he was counting the money, and when they shot from a handgun at the postmaster, he died on the spot. 
    • All of the suspects fled without taking any money. In this instance, Barendra Kumar claimed that he did not shoot the gun and was only standing by, but the courts rejected his appeal and found him guilty of murder under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC. 
    • The Bombay High Court further held that it is not required that all participants participate equally. It is possible to accomplish more or less. However, this does not mean that the individual who did less should be exempt from blame. His legal responsibility is the same. 
  • Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad (1955): 
    • The SC held that a person cannot be held vicariously accountable for the actions of another if their purpose to commit the crime was not common. 
    • It is not a common intention if their conduct is independent of the act of another. It will be known for the same purpose. 
  • Mahboob Shah v. Emperor (1945): 
    • The appellant Mahboob Shah was found guilty of the murder of Allah Dad by the Sessions Judge. He was found guilty and condemned to death by the Session tribunal. 
    • The death penalty was also affirmed by the HC of Justice. The murder conviction and death sentence were reversed on appeal to the Lordship. 
    • The Bombay HC held that when Allahdad and Hamidullah sought to flee, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah came next to them and fired, and therefore there was proof on the spur of the moment that they formed a common intention. 

Source: Allahabad High Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Arun Kumar Deshwal has held that in many domestic violence cases, relatives who never lived in the shared household are falsely implicated to harass the husband's family 

• The Allahabad High Court held this in the matter of Krishnawati Devi And 06 Others v. State of U.P. and Another (2025). 
• It observed that courts must verify whether the accused ever resided with the aggrieved party before issuing notices under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. 

What was the Background of Krishnawati Devi And 06 Others v. State of U.P. and Another? 

• The case involves a matrimonial dispute between Rajiv Kumar Srivastava (applicant no. 7) and Smrita Srivastava (opposite party no. 2), who were married on 2nd June, 2011. 
• Following matrimonial discord, Smrita Srivastava filed a complaint (Case No. 59 of 2016) under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 
• The complaint named seven respondents - the husband, his mother (applicant no. 1), four married sisters of the husband (applicant nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5), and the husband of one of the sisters (applicant no. 6). 
• The applicants filed an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the entire proceedings in the domestic violence case. 
• Applicant nos. 2 to 6 contended that they resided separately at different locations and had never shared a household with the complainant. 
• The complainant alleged harassment for dowry demands and threats of eviction from the shared household, particularly against the mother-in-law (applicant no. 1). 
• The application had previously been rejected for applicant no. 7 (husband) through an order dated 16.04.2019. 
• The case was pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonbhadra. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The court observed that domestic relationship under Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) requires parties to live or have lived together in a shared household, being related by consanguinity, marriage, adoption, or as family members of a joint family. 
• Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Hiral P. Harsora and Others Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others, (2016) the court noted that while the term "respondent" is gender-neutral, the requirement of shared household remains crucial. 
• The court observed a concerning pattern where aggrieved parties implicate relatives merely to harass the husband's family, even when such relatives never shared a household with the complainant. 
• The court established that for liability under Section 3 of the DV Act, the respondent must both be related to the aggrieved person as per Section 2(f) and have lived together in a shared household. 
• The court directed that lower courts must verify these conditions from the application, Protection Officer's report, and available records before issuing notices under Section 12 of the DV Act. 
• The court states that mere relation by marriage or blood is insufficient; actual shared living arrangements must be established for maintaining proceedings under the DV Act. 

What is Section2 (f) of DV Act? 

• A domestic relationship exists when two individuals have shared living arrangements (either currently or at any point in the past) in the same household, AND they must be connected in one of these ways: blood relation (consanguinity), marriage, marriage-like relationship, adoption, or as members of a joint family. 
• This means that merely being relatives is not enough - there must be proof of shared living arrangements, either present or past, to establish a domestic relationship under the law. For instance, a sister-in-law who has never lived in the same household as the complainant would not qualify as having a domestic relationship despite being related by marriage. 

What is Section 3 of DV Act? 

• Domestic violence occurs when a respondent's acts, omissions, or conduct:
  • Harms or endangers the physical or mental well-being of the aggrieved person 
  • Involves physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, or economic abuse 
  • Harasses or endangers to extract dowry or property demands 
  • Creates threatening situations for the aggrieved person or related persons 
  • Causes any physical or mental harm to the aggrieved person 
• Physical abuse encompasses:  
  • Acts causing bodily pain or harm 
  • Conduct endangering life, limb, or health 
  • Actions impairing health or development 
  • Assault, criminal intimidation, and criminal force 
• Sexual abuse covers any conduct that:  
  • Is sexual in nature 
  • Abuses or humiliates 
  • Degrades or violates a woman's dignity 
• Verbal and emotional abuse includes:  
  • Insults, ridicule, and humiliation 
  • Name-calling, especially regarding childlessness or not having a male child 
  • Repeated threats of physical harm to persons of interest to the aggrieved 
• Economic abuse encompasses:  
  • Deprivation of financial resources legally entitled to the aggrieved 
  • Denial of household necessities, stridhan, or jointly owned property 
  • Disposal of household effects or alienation of assets 
  • Restriction of access to shared household or facilities 
• The determination of domestic violence requires:  
  • Consideration of overall facts and circumstances 
  • Evaluation of the cumulative effect of acts, omissions, or conduct 
  • Assessment of impact on the aggrieved person's well-being 
• Protection extends beyond direct abuse to include:  
  • Threats to related persons 
  • Coercive behavior for unlawful demands 
  • Interference with property rights and access to resources 
  • Restriction of legally entitled maintenance and financial support 

What is Section 12 of DV Act? 

• An application seeking relief under the Act can be filed by:  
  • The aggrieved person directly 
  • A Protection Officer 
  • Any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person And the Magistrate must consider any domestic incident report from the Protection Officer or service provider before passing orders. 
• The applicant can seek compensation/damages without prejudicing the right to file a separate civil suit, with a provision for set-off between amounts awarded under different proceedings to avoid double compensation. 
• The application must follow the prescribed format and contain the required particulars as specified under the Act, ensuring proper documentation of the complaint. 
• The Act mandates specific timelines:  
  • First hearing must be scheduled within three days of receiving the application 
  • The Magistrate should strive to dispose of the application within sixty days from the first hearing. 
    • This ensures speedy resolution of domestic violence cases. 

Source: Delhi High Court  

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Mini Pushkarna held that the copyright in a cinematograph film which includes the soundtrack of the film vests in the producer of the film.               

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of Saregama India Limited v. Vels Film International Limited & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Saregama India Limited v. Vels Film International Limited Case?  

• The plaintiff is engaged in acquiring copyrights in sound recordings and literary, musical, and dramatic works, as well as distributing, selling, and exploiting them through various mediums. 
• The plaintiff was formerly known as "The Gramophone Company of India Limited" and was also known as "HMV" (His Master’s Voice). 
• The plaintiff operates in the music entertainment industry, having produced or acquired numerous sound recordings, along with the musical and dramatic works contained in them. 
• The plaintiff owns an extensive catalogue of film and non-film music, including works in Tamil and other regional languages, and enters into licensing agreements with third parties for the use of its works. 
• On 25th February 1980, the producer of the cinematograph film Moodu Pani, Raja Cine Arts, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff (then The Gramophone Company of India Limited), through the plaintiff’s agent, Saraswati Stores. 
• As per this agreement, the plaintiff owns the copyright in the sound recordings, musical, and literary works of the film Moodu Pani, including the song En Iniya Pon Nilave. 
• On 9th January 2025, the plaintiff discovered a teaser for the film Aghathiyaa on various social media platforms, where defendants 1 and 2 announced the release of a sound recording on 10th January 2025, described as a "recreation" of the song En Iniya Pon Nilave. 
• Upon learning of this, the plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice to defendants 1 and 2 on 10th January 2025, directing them to stop using or exploiting the plaintiff’s copyrighted works and to refrain from publishing the infringing song. 
• Despite receiving the legal notice, defendants 1 and 2 proceeded to publish the allegedly infringing song on multiple streaming platforms. 
• On 11th January 2025, defendant 1 responded to the legal notice via email, claiming that they had obtained a license to adapt, record/recreate, and synchronize the original song En Iniya Pon Nilave from defendant 3, whom they claimed to be the owner of the copyright in the song and its underlying works. 
• Consequently, the plaintiff has filed the present suit, alleging copyright infringement of the song by the defendants. 

What were the Court’s Observations?  

• Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines what would constitute copyright. 
• The Court observed that Section 13 (4) of the Copyright Act, 1957 provides that copyright in a cinematograph film or a record, shall not affect the separate copyright in any work in respect of which, or a substantial part of which, the film, as the case may be, the record. 
• It was further reiterated that under the scheme of the Copyright Act, 1957 the copyright in the cinematograph film vests with the producer of the film, which includes, the soundtrack of the cinematograph film. 
• Thus, as per Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 the producer of a cinematograph film or a sound recording, is the first owner of the copyright in the sound recordings, literary works, musical works and other works, which form a part of the said cinematograph film 
• Further, it was observed that Proviso to Section 17 was added by way of amendment in 2012. This protects the right of a music composer in a cinematographic film. 
• Accordingly, after the amendment of 2012, only if the music composer enters into a specific agreement with the producer of the film, that his rights shall be transferred to the producer of the cinematograph film. The present case however, pertains to a work before the 2012 amendment, and therefore, the said amendment is not applicable to the present case.  
• Also, the Court observed that the music composer cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered to be in possession of copyright over the lyrics of the song in question. 
• Thus, it was held by the Court that the owner of the song was the plaintiff (i.e. Saregama) and the music composer had no right to assign the rights in the song. 
• Therefore, the Court considering the facts of the case granted relief in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, an injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff. 

Who is the Author of a Cinematograph Film and the Musical Work? 

• Section 2 (d) of the Copyright Act, 1957 defines “author”. 
  • As per this Section in relation to a cinematograph film or a sound recording the producer of the work is the owner of the work. 
• Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 provides that in case a cinematograph film is made for consideration at the instance of any person, such person shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein. 
• Thus, as per Section 17 of the CA, the producer of a cinematograph film or a sound recording, is the first owner of the copyright in the sound recordings, literary works, musical works and other works, which form a part of the said cinematograph film. 
• Further, Section 13 (4) of the Copyright Act, 1957 provides that the copyright in a cinematograph film or a sound recording shall not affect the separate copyright in any work in respect of which or a substantial part of which, the film, or, as the case may be, the sound recording is made. 
• Therefore, the right of the composer of the music shall be safeguarded in terms of Section 13(4) and 14(1) of the Copyright Act, otherwise than as a part of the cinematograph film. 
• Additionally in the year 2012 a proviso was added in Section 17 which provided that  in case of a work incorporated in the cinematographic film the rights of the author shall not be affected. 
• The result of the amendment is that only if the music composer enters into a specific agreement with the producer of the film, that his rights shall be transferred to the producer of the cinematograph film.

What are the Landmark Judgments on this Issue?  

• Indian Performing Right Society Ltd v. Eastern Indian Motion Pictures Association and Others (1977) 
  • The Court held in this case that the producer of a cinematographic film can defeat the right of a composer of music by engaging him. 
  • It has been held that when a cinematograph film producer commissions a composer of music for valuable consideration for the purpose of making his cinematograph film or composing music, the sounds for incorporation or absorption in the soundtrack associated with the film, are included in a cinematograph film 
  • In such case, the producer of the cinematograph film, becomes the first owner of the copyright therein and no copyright subsists in the composer of the music so composed, unless there is a contract to the contrary between the composer of the music and producer of the cinematograph film.
• Music Broadcast Private Limited v. Indian Performing Right Society Limited (2011) 
  • The Bombay High Court in this case held that the first owner of the copyright in a literary work and a musical work are the author of the literary work and the composer of the musical work respectively.