List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice N Kotiswar Singh held that a duty is enjoined on the Magistrate to ascertain whether the compliance with Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) has been made. The reason for the same is that due to non-compliance the arrest is rendered illegal and therefore the arrestee cannot be remanded after the arrest is rendered illegal. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. Case?   

• The appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 30th August 2024, passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 
• The appellant was arrested in connection with FIR No. 121 of 2023, registered on 25th March 2023, for offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
• According to the appellant, he was arrested on 10th June 2024 at 10:30 a.m. at his office in HUDA City Centre, Gurugram, Haryana, and taken to DLF Police Station, Section 29, Gurugram. 
• The appellant was allegedly produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate (in charge) at Gurgaon on 11th June 2024 at 3:30 p.m., leading to claims of violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). 
• The appellant claims that neither the remand report nor the order dated 11th June 2024 mentioned the time of arrest. 
• The 1st respondent, however, asserts that the appellant was arrested at 6:00 p.m. on 10th June 2024, ensuring compliance with Article 22(2). 
• The order dated 4th October 2024 records that the appellant was hospitalized at PGIMS, Rohtak, after his arrest. 
• The appellant’s counsel submitted photographs showing that he was handcuffed and chained to his hospital bed while admitted. 
• As a result, a notice was issued on 4th October 2024 to the Medical Superintendent of PGIMS, asking for an affidavit on whether the appellant was handcuffed and chained. 
• The order dated 21st October 2024 records the Medical Superintendent’s admission that the appellant was indeed handcuffed and chained. 
• On 24th October 2024, Shri Abhimanyu, HPS, Assistant Commissioner of Police, EOW I and II, Gurugram, Haryana, filed an affidavit confirming that the officers escorting the appellant to PGIMS had been suspended. 
• A departmental inquiry was initiated against the suspended officers by the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 23rd October 2024. 
• Therefore, a writ petition was filed wherein it was asserted that the appellant was not informed of the grounds of arrest or the reasons for arrest. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that it follows from Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) that the grounds of arrest should be effectively and fully communicated to the arrestee in the manner. 
• Also, the grounds of arrest must be communicated in a language which the arrestee understands. 
• Further, the Court observed that the requirement of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. 
• It is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible.  
• When a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well. 
• If there is a failure to comply with the requirement of informing the grounds of arrest as soon as possible the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second. 
• Once the arrest is held unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1) the arrest itself is vitiated and the continued custody of such person based on orders of remand is also vitiated.  
• The Court made a very important observation that filing of chargesheet and taking of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se unconstitutional being violative of Article 21 and 22 of the COI. 
• Further, the Court clarified that the person can be arrested again. 
• Also, when an arrestee pleads before a Court that grounds of arrest were not communicated, the burden to prove the compliance of Article 22(1) is on the police. 
• Further, the Court held that a duty is enjoined on the Magistrate to ascertain whether the compliance with Article 22 (1) has been made. The reason for the same is that due to non-compliance the arrest is rendered illegal and therefore the arrestee cannot be remanded after the arrest is rendered illegal. 
• It is the duty of the Court to uphold the fundamental rights. 
• Further, the Court clarified in this case that communication of the grounds of arrest to the wife is not a valid compliance of Article 22 (1) of the COI. 
• Therefore, the Court held that in the facts of the case, the Court has no hesitation in holding that the arrest of the appellant was rendered illegal on account of failure to communicate the grounds of arrest to the appellant as mandated by Article 22(1) of the COI.

What are the Rights Granted under Article 22 (1) of COI?

• Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950, provides a fundamental right, guaranteeing an arrested person the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest. 
• It states that anyone arrested and detained must be informed of the grounds for their arrest and the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. 
• This provision ensures transparency and fairness in arrest and detention, preventing arbitrary or unlawful detainment. 
• Further Section 50 of CrPC provides that a person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail. 
• Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) reiterates what is provided under Section 50 of CrPC.

What are the Important Points on Article 22 of COI held by the Court in this Case? 

• The important points on Article 22 of the COI laid down in this case are: 
  • The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1) of COI. 
  • The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved. 
  • When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1). 
  • Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused.  
    • Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial.  
    • But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1). 
  • When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and 
  • When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.

What are the Landmark Cases on Article 22 (1) of COI? 

• Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024): 
  • Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. 
  • This being the fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose.
• Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024): 
  • The Court held that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. 
  • Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice PB Varale held that that new Act that repeals the old Act does not require the assent of the President. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of M/S SRS Travels by it’s Proprietor KT Rajashekhar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors (2025). 

What was the Background of M/S SRS Travels by it’s Proprietor KT Rajashekhar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors. Case?   

• The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (KCCA Act) was enacted to acquire privately operated contract carriages, bring them under public control, and transfer them to State-owned Road Transport Corporations, including KSRTC. 
• The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the KCCA Act in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1978) and later reaffirmed it in Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (1990), holding that the Act was in line with Directive Principles under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
• The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) was later enacted, defining “Contract Carriage” and “Stage Carriage” while also establishing the State and Regional Transport Authorities (STA & RTA) with powers over transport regulation. 
• The Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 authorized the STA and RTA to delegate powers, including contract carriage permit issuance, to their secretaries. 
• Due to increasing demand for public transport and limitations on private carriages, the KCCA Act was repealed through the Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003 (2003 Repeal Act) to liberalize public transport and allow private operators. 
• After the repeal, private bus operators applied for contract carriage permits, and some permits were granted by the Secretaries of the STA and RTA. 
• KSRTC and its employees challenged the 2003 Repeal Act and the delegation of permit-granting powers, arguing that repealing the KCCA Act required fresh Presidential assent and that permit issuance should remain with multi-member bodies. 
• On 17^th November 2004, a Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court ruled that the 2003 Repeal Act was unconstitutional and that Rules 55 and 56 of the KMV Rules were ultra vires as they allowed permit issuance by the Secretary instead of the statutory authority. 
• The matter was referred to a Division Bench, which on 28th March 2011, upheld the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act, ruling that the Legislature had the power to repeal the 1976 Act without fresh Presidential assent. 
• However, the Division Bench struck down the delegation of permit-granting power to the Secretary, STA/RTA, stating that such power is quasi-judicial and requires collective adjudication. 
• Aggrieved by the Division Bench’s order, multiple Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were filed in the Supreme Court by private bus operators, the Karnataka STA, and KSRTC: 
  • Private bus operators (SLP (C) Nos. 27833-27834 of 2011) challenged the ruling that disallowed delegation of permit-granting powers but accepted the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act. 
  • Karnataka STA (SLP (C) Nos. 32499-525 of 2011) also challenged the restriction on delegation while supporting the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act. 
  • KSRTC (SLP (C) Nos. 25787-956 of 2012) contested the ruling upholding the 2003 Repeal Act, seeking its invalidation, but agreed that the Secretary, STA/RTA, should not have permit-granting powers.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• KSRTC argued that repealing the KCCA Act was unconstitutional because it allegedly overruled the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ranganatha Reddy v. Ranganatha Reddy (1978) and Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (1990). 
• The Court rejected this argument, stating that Supreme Court rulings only affirmed the validity of the KCCA Act at the time of enactment and did not prevent the Legislature from later modifying or repealing it in response to policy changes. 
• The Court held that fresh Presidential assent was not required for the repeal because a repeal statute does not create a new legal framework but merely nullifies the provisions of the old law. 
• The repeal was enacted under Entry 57 of List II (Taxation), where the State has independent legislative competence, while the original KCCA Act was enacted under Entry 42 (Acquisition and Requisition of Property). 
• The repeal was a policy decision aimed at creating a more flexible transport system, rather than an attempt to override judicial rulings on the KCCA Act. 
• The Court concluded that Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which repealed the KCCA Act, was constitutional. 
• KSRTC failed to prove any legislative defect in the repeal, and the Court upheld the State Legislature’s power to repeal the KCCA Act.

What are the Legislative Powers of the Parliament and the State Legislature? 

• Article 246 of the COI is found under the heading ‘Distribution of legislative Powers’ in the Constitution. 
• It enunciates the subject matters on which the Legislative Assemblies and the Parliament have power to make laws. 
• Article 246 (1) provides that notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List”). This would include entries like defence, foreign affairs, railways, banking etc. 
• Article 246 (2) provides that notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). 
  • The Concurrent list serves as a tool to loosen the excessive rigidity of two-fold distribution. 
  • As per the report of the Sarkaria Commission concurrent list subjects are neither exclusively of national concern or of local concern and hence occupy a constitutional grey area. 
• Article 246 (3) provides that subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”). 
• Thus, the seventh Schedule provides for three lists that enumerate the subject matters on which the Parliament or the State Legislature has power to make laws.

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Mini Pushkarna held that PETER ENGLAND met all the criteria under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (TMA), warranting its declaration as a well-known trademark. 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Limited v. Friends Inc & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Limited v. Friends Inc & Anr. Case?   

• Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Limited filed a lawsuit against Friends Inc and another defendant regarding the trademark "PETER ENGLAND."  
• The PETER ENGLAND brand has a long history, originally created in 1889 by Carrington Viyella Garments Limited in England.  
• The brand entered the Indian market in 1997 and was acquired by the Aditya Birla group in 2000 through a formal assignment deed. 
• The plaintiff, Aditya Birla Fashion, has built a substantial presence in India with 382 stores across more than 180 towns and cities.  
• They hold multiple trademark registrations for PETER ENGLAND across different classes and have secured copyright registrations for the artistic presentation of their brand name. 
• The brand has gained significant market recognition through extensive marketing, including endorsements by celebrities like Ayushman Khurrana and the Chennai Super Kings Cricket Team.  
• Their stores follow a specific design pattern with a prominent display of their trademarked artistic work.  
• The company has achieved considerable sales success, with a turnover of approximately INR 1289 Crores for 2023-2024, supported by significant advertising expenditure of around INR 31 Crores in the same period. 
• The defendants, Friends Inc and their manager Amandeep Singh, were using the PETER ENGLAND mark on their signboard and business materials.  
• This led Aditya Birla Fashion to seek a permanent injunction against the defendants to stop them from using the trademark and artistic work associated with PETER ENGLAND. 
• The plaintiff has demonstrated extensive market presence through various channels, including a registered domain name (peterengland.com) since 1997, widespread retail operations, and significant brand recognition.  
• The company has also received various awards and recognition for the PETER ENGLAND brand, establishing it as a significant player in the Indian fashion retail sector. 

What were the Court’s Observations?   

• The Court first noted the compliance history, observing that the defendants had already removed the PETER ENGLAND signboard from their shop and stopped using the mark on their invoices and other business materials.  
• The defendants filed a formal affidavit confirming these actions and undertaking not to use the trademark in the future without the plaintiff's permission. 
• Regarding the well-known status of the trademark, the Court made several significant observations: 
  • The Court acknowledged the historical significance of the PETER ENGLAND mark, noting its century-old origins from 1889 and its established presence in India since 1997.  
  • The Court recognized that Aditya Birla Fashion had properly acquired the rights through a formal assignment in 2000. 
  • On market presence, the Court observed that the brand's extensive network of 380 outlets across 180 cities demonstrated significant geographical reach.  
  • The Court particularly noted that this widespread presence had made the mark recognizable to customers throughout India. 
  • The Court paid special attention to the brand's financial performance, noting sales figures in the crores since 2010 and specifically highlighting the INR 1289 Crores turnover for 2023-2024.  
  • The substantial advertising expenditure of INR 31 Crores for the same period was seen as evidence of significant brand investment.  
  • Regarding brand protection, the Court observed that the plaintiff had secured multiple trademark registrations across different classes and maintained these registrations for over two decades.  
  • The Court also noted the company's proactive approach in protecting its intellectual property rights. 
  • The Court made specific observations about the brand's distinctiveness, noting that PETER ENGLAND had acquired secondary significance in relation to the plaintiff's business.  
  • The Court found that the purchasing public, trade, and industry clearly identified the mark exclusively with the plaintiff. 
  • In determining the well-known status, the Court referenced the principles from the Tata Sons Ltd. v. Manoj Dodia case (2011), considering factors such as public knowledge, duration of use, extent of products and services, advertising efforts, geographical reach, and successful enforcement of rights. 
• Based on these comprehensive observations, the Court concluded that PETER ENGLAND met all the criteria under Section 2(1)(zg) of the TMA warranting its declaration as a well-known trademark. 
• This observation was particularly significant as it elevated the legal protection available to the mark. 

What is a Well-Known Trademark? 

• Section 2 (1) (zg) of TMA states the definition of a well known trademark. 
• It states that “well known trade mark”, in relation to any goods or services, means a mark which has become so to the substantial segment of the public which uses such goods or receives such services that the use of such mark in relation to other goods or services would be likely to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade or rendering of services between those goods or services and a person using the mark in relation to the first-mentioned goods or services.