List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta has held that A simple verbal spat at workplace did not make the appellant liable for the offence of Intentional Insult.  

• The Supreme Court held in the case of B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana and Another (2025). 

What was the Background of the B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana and Another Case? 

• Dr. B.V. Ram Kumar (appellant) was serving as the Officiating Director at the National Institute for Empowerment of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities in Secunderabad. 
• On 2nd February 2022 he called an Assistant Professor of Pediatrics (the complainant) to his chamber through his attendant. 
• The complainant had recently recovered from COVID-19 and was experiencing ongoing medical issues at the time. 
• According to the complainant, when she entered his chamber, appellant began speaking to her in a raised voice, questioning her about filing complaints against him to higher authorities. 
• The complainant protested about his loud voice, citing her recent COVID-19 recovery and medical issues. She began experiencing physical symptoms (trembling hands and sweating) and left the chamber, saying she would submit a written reply. 
• The complainant filed a police complaint the same day, leading to an FIR being registered on 5th February 2022, at Police Station Bowenpalli, Hyderabad. 
• The initial FIR included charges under Sections 269, 270, 504, and 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).  
• During investigation, the police also found allegations that the appellant had failed to provide adequate PPE kits and gloves at the institute, potentially risking the spread of COVID-19. 
• After investigation, the police filed a chargesheet on 27th September, 2022, dropping Section 354 but maintaining charges under Sections 269, 270, and 504 of the IPC. 
• The complainant alleged that the appellant had been mentally harassing her at the workplace since October 2021, including interfering with internal complaints and sending memos during her medical leave. 
• Two witnesses from the institute (a Hindi Translator and a Data Entry Operator) provided statements saying there was no shortage of PPE kits, masks, or sanitizers at the institute. 
• The incident occurred in the context of existing complaints from students' parents about the complainant's alleged unavailability during duty hours, which were pending with Dr. Ram Kumar as Director. 
• The Trial Court (XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad) took cognizance of the offences under Sections 269, 270, and 504 IPC based on the chargesheet. 
• Appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in the High Court of Telangana seeking to quash the charge sheet which was dismissed by the High Court. 
• Aggrieved by the decisions of the High Court the present appeal has been filed before the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• Supreme Court made the following Observations: 
  • The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court and allowed the appeal. 
  • Key observations by the Supreme Court:  
    • The allegations in the chargesheet were purely conjectural. 
    • The allegations did not constitute ingredients of offences under Sections 269 and 270 IPC. 
    • The investigating officer appeared unduly influenced by the sensitive COVID-19 situation. 
    • The allegation about PPE kit shortage was refuted by witness statements. 
    • A simple verbal spat did not make the appellant liable under Section 504 IPC. 
    • As Director, it was reasonable for the appellant to have high expectations from his juniors. 
    • Reprimanding subordinates to maintain discipline cannot be treated as 'intentional insult.' 
    • Allowing criminal charges against a director for trying to maintain discipline could have disastrous consequences. 
    • The necessary ingredients constituting the offences were not present. 
• Based on the above observations the Supreme Court quashed the charge sheet filed against the appellant. 

What is Section 504 of IPC? 

• This section deals with the intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. 
• This section states that whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
• It is a non-cognizable, compoundable and bailable offence and is triable by any magistrate. 
• The same section has been covered under Section 352 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and P.K. Mishra has held that filing a substitution application under Order XXII Rule 4 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 inherently includes a request to set aside abatement, eliminating the need for a separate application. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lallowa  (Now Deceased) v. Satish Chandra (2025). 
• The case arose after the High Court refused to restore a second appeal without a distinct application to set aside abatement. The ruling clarifies procedural requirements, ensuring justice isn't delayed due to technicalities. 

What was the Background of Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased) ? 

• The matter pertains to a second appeal that had abated due to non-substitution of legal heirs upon the death of the original Applicant. 
• The legal representatives (LRs) of the deceased Applicant filed an application before the High Court, notifying the death of the Applicant and providing details of heirs for substitution under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). 
• The said application did not explicitly contain a separate prayer for setting aside the abatement of the appeal. 
• The High Court had initially restored the second appeal but subsequently recalled its restoration order. 
• The High Court's reasoning for recall was predicated on the procedural requirement that the appeal could not have been restored without a separate and specific application to set aside the abatement. 
• The High Court declined to consider the substitution application filed by the LRs, maintaining that a discrete application for setting aside the abatement was mandatory. 
• Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the matter was brought before the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that a justice-oriented approach must be adopted in matters concerning abatement and substitution of legal representatives. 
• The Court held that an application for substitution of legal heirs inherently encompasses the prayer for setting aside abatement, even if not explicitly stated. 
• The Court observed that the mere act of filing an application for bringing legal representatives on record effectively constitutes a prayer for setting aside abatement. 
• Drawing from the precedent established in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini (2003), the Court reiterated that a substitution application inherently carries the prayer for setting aside abatement. 
• The Court states that the relief of setting aside abatement need not be specifically prayed for in exact words, as it is necessarily implied in the prayer for substitution. 
• The Court determined that adherence to strict procedural requirements should not override the interests of justice in such matters. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court erred in insisting upon a separate application for setting aside abatement when a substitution application was already on record. 
• The Supreme Court definitively established that for the ends of justice, an application under Order XXII Rule 4 of CPC for substitution effectively satisfies the requirement for setting aside abatement. 

What is Order XXII Rule 4 of CPC? 

• The rule mandates that upon the death of a sole defendant or one of multiple defendants, where the right to sue survives, an application must be filed before the court to bring the legal representative(s) of the deceased defendant on record to proceed with the suit. 
• Upon receiving a proper application for substitution, the court is duty-bound to ensure that the legal representative(s) of the deceased defendant are made parties to the suit, provided the right to sue survives against such legal representative(s). 
• Any person who is brought on record as a legal representative possesses the right to present defenses that are appropriate and relevant to their character as the legal representative of the deceased defendant. 
• Failure to file an application for substitution within the prescribed limitation period results in automatic abatement of the suit against the deceased defendant, operating as a matter of law without requiring any specific order. 
• The court possesses discretionary power to exempt plaintiffs from the requirement of substituting legal representatives in cases where the deceased defendant either failed to file a written statement or, having filed it, failed to appear and contest the suit. 
• In cases where the court exercises its discretionary power of exemption, any judgment pronounced against the deceased defendant shall carry the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced before the death occurred. 
• The rule provides specific relief for plaintiffs who were ignorant of the defendant's death and consequently could not file the substitution application within the limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 (LA). 
• Where a suit has abated due to the plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's death, the plaintiff may file an application after the limitation period for both setting aside the abatement and seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the LA. 
• The court, while considering applications under Section 5 of the LA for condonation of delay, must give due consideration to the proven fact of the plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's death as a sufficient cause for delay. 
• The rule establishes a comprehensive procedural framework balancing the plaintiff's right to pursue the suit, the rights of the deceased defendant's legal representatives, and the court's power to prevent unnecessary termination of suits due to procedural technicalities. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Abhay S Oka, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Augustine George Masih held that  “Calling a woman an “illegitimate wife” or “faithful mistress” will amount to a violation of the fundamental rights of that woman under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur (2025). 

What was the Background of Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur Case?   

• There were two issues that the Court considered in this case: 
  • Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent Court under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Act (HMA) is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of HMA? 
  • Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of HMA, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of HMA? 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that Section 25 of HMA confers power on the matrimonial Court to grant permanent alimony “at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto”.  
• A cause of action arises for the spouses to apply for permanent alimony and maintenance when any decree is passed by any court exercising its jurisdiction under the HMA. 
• The entitlement under Section 25 of HMA does not depend on whether the bigamous marriage is moral or immoral. 
• Further, the Court held that the grant of decree under Section 25 of HMA is discretionary and the Court can always turn down the prayer for grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of HMA. 
• Further, with regard to grant of maintenance pedente lite the Court held that the conditions for applicability of Section 24 of HMA are as follows: 
  • There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and 
  • The court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding. 
• Finally, the following conclusions were made by the Court: 
  • A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of HMA is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and 
  • Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the HMA, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied. 
  • While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.

What is Void Marriage under HMA? 

• When Section 5 of HMA is read in conjunction with Section 11 of HMA the following categories of marriages are void: 
  • If one or both the parties to the marriage have a spouse living at the time of marriage;  
  • The parties to the marriage are within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two and  
  • The parties are sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two. 
• Section 11 of HMA provides for the grant of a declaration of a marriage as null and void. 
• Such marriages are void ab initio. Marriages falling in the above categories do not exist in the eyes of law at all. 

How Were the Earlier Decisions Interpreted in this Case? 

• Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Anr (1988) 
  • The Court in this case held that when the marriage is a nullity under Section 25 of HMA, the spouse of such a marriage is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). 
• The Court held in the present case i.e. Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur (2025)  that Section 125 of CrPC operates on a totally different field. It is a quick and efficacious remedy made available to the wife and children. 
  • The proceedings under Section 125 of CrPC are summary in nature. 
  • The Court made differentiation between remedy under Section 25 of HMA and Section 125 of CrPC: 
    • The remedy under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is completely different from the remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC. 
    • Section 25 of HMA confers rights on the spouses of the marriage declared as void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act to claim maintenance from the other spouse. The remedy is available to both husband and wife. 
    • The principles which apply to Section 125 CrPC cannot be applied to Section 25 of HMA. 
    • Further, the relief under Section 125 CrPC cannot be granted to husband. 
• Bhausaheb @ Sandhu s/o Raghuji Magar v. Leelabai w/o Bhausaheb Magar (2004) 
  • The Full bench of Bombay High Court in the para 18 of this judgment called the wife of a marriage declared as void as “illegitimate wife”. 
  • In fact in Para 24 the Court called such a wife “faithful mistress”. 
  • The Court held in the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur (2025) that calling the wife of a void marriage as “illegitimate” is very inappropriate. 
    • The Court observed that calling such a wife “illegitimate wife” or “faithful mistress” will amount to violation of rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI). 
    • The Court observed that use of such a language is misogynistic. 
    • It was observed that noone can use such adjectives while referring to a woman who is party to a void marriage.