List of Current Affairs

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh held that adolescents should be allowed to engage in romantic and consensual relationships without the fear of criminalization. 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of State v. Hitesh (2025). 

What was the Background of State v. Hitesh Case?   

• On 10^th December 2014 at 12:25 AM, a father filed a complaint regarding his missing daughter who was studying in Class 12th. 
• The daughter (prosecutrix) had gone for tuition but did not return home. The father expressed suspicion about a person named Hitesh who was also missing from his house. 
• Two days later both the prosecutrix and Hitesh were found at Dharuhera and brought back to Delhi. 
• The prosecutrix underwent a medical examination and her statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 
• Hitesh (defendant) was arrested and on 6th August 2015, charges were framed against him under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. 
• The prosecution presented 12 witnesses during the trial. The defendant, in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, claimed innocence and alleged false implication by the prosecutrix and her parents. 
• There was a dispute regarding the prosecutrix's age: 
  • School records showed her date of birth as 20th January 1998. 
  • The prosecutrix and her mother testified that her date of birth as 22nd December 1998. 
  • The school admission was based on an affidavit from her uncle stating the date as January 20, 1998. 
• During her testimony, the prosecutrix stated that she had accompanied Hitesh willingly and any physical relations were consensual. 
• The medical examination report (MLC) showed no injuries indicating resistance to any sexual act. 
• The trial Court applied the principle of benefit of doubt in favor of the accused and acquitted the accused under Section 4 of POCSO Act 
• The same has been appealed before the Delhi High Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Delhi High court applied Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act 2015 (JJ Act) for age determination, which requires specific documentary evidence in order of priority: 
  • School/matriculation certificates. 
  • Birth certificates from municipal authorities. 
  • Medical age determination tests. 
• The Delhi High Court applied the principles of age determination as:  
  • Prosecution must conclusively prove victim's minority. 
  • Stringent proof required when alleged age is close to 18. 
  • Benefit of doubt applies when age proof is inconclusive. 
  • Different standards may apply for victims clearly under 14-15 years. 
• The Delhi High Court also considered various evidence for determining the consent as: 
  • Prosecutrix consistently maintained consent in Section 164 CrPC statement. 
  • Court testimony confirmed consensual relations. 
  • Medical examination showed no resistance injuries. 
  • Prosecutrix drove the motorcycle with accused as pillion rider. 
  • She expressed no desire for complaint or action against accused. 
• The Delhi High Court established: 
  • Need for contextual interpretation of age of majority. 
  • Importance of considering victim's maturity and wishes. 
  • Requirement for definitive age proof in POCSO cases. 
  • Balance between protection and personal liberty. 
• The Delhi High Court held that: 
  • Prosecution failed to prove minority beyond reasonable doubt. 
  • The relationship was consensual based on clear evidence. 
  • The trial court judgment was well-reasoned. 
  • Appeal dismissed on merits. 
• This judgment significantly contributes to jurisprudence on handling cases involving relationships between young people where one partner is close to the age of majority. 

What are the Procedures for Determination of Age? 

• Section 94 of the JJ Act states the procedure for determination of age of a person who appears before the Committee or Board, ensuring consistency and fairness in age determination processes as: 
  • Direct Age Assessment: 
    • If a person's physical appearance clearly shows they are a child, the Committee or Board can record this observation with an approximate age. 
    • They can then proceed with their inquiry without waiting for additional age confirmation. 
  • Age Determination Process:  
    • If there is reasonable doubt about whether the person is a child, the Committee or Board must determine age through evidence. 
  • The evidence must be collected in the following strict order of priority:  
    • School date of birth certificate or matriculation certificate from examination board. 
    • Birth certificate from corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat. 
    • Only if above documents are unavailable, medical age determination tests like ossification test. 
  • Medical Test Requirements:  
    • Any medical age determination test must be completed within 15 days from the date it is ordered. 
    • Medical tests can only be ordered if both school records and birth certificates are unavailable. 
  • Legal Status of Age Determination:  
    • Once the Committee or Board records an age, this becomes the legally recognized age of the person for all purposes under this Act. 
  • There is a clear hierarchy of evidence for determining age. 
    • Documentary evidence takes precedence over medical tests. 
    • Physical appearance can be sufficient if the person is clearly a child. 
• The law sets specific timelines for medical age determination. 
• The age determination by the Committee or Board is considered final and binding under the Act.

What are the Landmark Judgements related to it? 

• Court On Its Own Motion (Lajja Devi) v. State (Delhi), (2012): 
  • The Court in this case determined the following principles in this case: 
    • The courts must give appropriate weight to the statements of girls above 16 years regarding their consent in relationship matters. 
    • Assessment of maturity should not be based solely on age but must consider the overall understanding and development of the individual. 
    • Courts cannot apply a uniform formula to all cases and must evaluate each situation based on its unique circumstances. 
    • The personal liberty of the girl must be given paramount importance while making any decisions affecting her life. 
    • Courts must recognize and consider social realities like inter-religious and inter-caste relationships while making decisions. 
    • Special homes should not become places of detention, and the freedom of mature minors should not be unduly restricted. 
    • The voice and wishes of mature minors must be respected and given due consideration in legal proceedings.
• Mahesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023): 
  • In this case the court made the following observations as: 
    • Courts must make a clear distinction between exploitative relationships and consensual romantic relationships between young people. 
    • The law should be interpreted compassionately in cases involving genuine romantic relationships between young people. 
    • The emotional maturity of both parties should be considered while evaluating the nature of the relationship. 
    • The absence of coercion or exploitation must be carefully verified through evidence and testimony.
• Rajak Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018): 
  • In this case the court determined the following principles: 
    • Courts must maintain high standards of proof in age determination, especially in cases where the alleged age is close to the legal threshold. 
    • The benefit of doubt should be given to the accused in cases where age proof is not conclusive. 
    • The severe punishments under POCSO Act require careful application and should not be imposed mechanically. 
• Alamelu & Another v. State (2011): 
  • The following observations were made by the court in this case as: 
    • Age determination must follow a clear hierarchy of documentary evidence as prescribed by law. 
    • School records alone are not sufficient to prove age unless supported by other corroborating evidence. 
    • The person who provided the original age information must be examined to establish the authenticity of age-related documents.
• Court on its own motion v. State of NCT of Delhi (2024): 
  • The following principles were highlighted in this case: 
    • Courts must balance the need to protect minors from exploitation while respecting genuine romantic relationships. 
    • Social and cultural contexts must be considered while making decisions in cases involving young relationships. 
    • The right to personal choice and dignity must be protected while ensuring adequate safeguards against exploitation. 
    • Evidence must be carefully scrutinized and verified before reaching conclusions about age or consent. 
    • Procedural guidelines for age determination and consent verification must be strictly followed. 
    • Family dynamics and cultural contexts should be considered while evaluating relationship cases. 
    • Courts must ensure that protection of minors does not lead to injustice or undue harassment in genuine relationship cases.

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan has clarified the distinction between Sections 34 (common intention) and 149 (common object) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr v. The State of Karnataka (2025). 

What was the Background of Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr v. The State of Karnataka Case? 

• This case involves a matrimonial dispute resulting in the death of Geetha, who was married to Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale (Appellant No. 1) for approximately 8 years at the time of the incident. 
• According to the prosecution, after one year of marriage, Geetha's husband and his family members began harassing her regarding dowry and household work. 
• On the date of the incident, around 8:00 p.m., while Geetha was at her matrimonial home, her mother-in-law (Appellant No. 2) allegedly poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. 
• Neighbours rushed to the scene and transported Geetha to the hospital, where she succumbed to her burn injuries after one week. The cause of death was determined to be septicemia. 
• Geetha's mother, Tippavva Chandru Patil, filed an FIR on 3rd January, 2013, which was registered as Crime No. 2 of 2013 at Mudalagi Police Station, Mudalagi Circle, District Belagavi, Karnataka. 
• The FIR alleged that the accused had treated Geetha cordially for one year after marriage, but subsequently ill-treated her physically and mentally, forcing her to wake up early to perform household chores and work in others' homes. 
• The FIR further alleged that the accused pressured Geetha to bring Rs. 5,000 from her maternal home, and when she failed to do so, they allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. 
• Following the FIR registration, the Tehsildar recorded Geetha's dying declaration (Exhibit-46) at the hospital within four hours of the incident. 
• The police charged the husband and mother-in-law for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302, and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
• The trial court acquitted both accused, finding that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 
• The State appealed to the High Court, which reversed the acquittal and sentenced both accused to life imprisonment with a fine. 
• The matter was then appealed to the Supreme Court by the husband and mother-in-law. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court examined the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar, in which Geetha stated that her mother-in-law Jaitunabi Sanavale poured kerosene on her and set her on fire during an argument regarding her children. 
• The Court noted that according to Geetha's statement, when she was going to the bathroom, her mother-in-law lit a matchstick and threw it on her, while her husband Vasant tried to extinguish the fire by splashing water on her. 
• The Court observed that the Tehsildar's testimony was not effectively challenged during cross-examination, and nothing substantial was elicited to disbelieve that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a dying declaration. 
• The Court examined Dr. Gopal Ramu Wagamude's  testimony, which confirmed Geetha's statement that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, and that Geetha had sustained 90% burn injuries. 
• The Court noted that there was no cross-examination of Dr. Wagamude to disbelieve the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before him. 
• The Court states that in neither the oral dying declaration to the doctor nor in the declaration to the Tehsildar did the husband figure as a participant in the crime. 
• The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning that the husband was guilty by virtue of Section 34 IPC (common intention) based on his alleged failure to take his wife to the hospital. 
• The Court explained that for Section 34 IPC to apply, there must be participation in the criminal act and sharing of common intention by all parties involved. 
• The Court clarified that Section 34 IPC requires a pre-arranged plan and presupposes prior concert, necessitating a meeting of minds between the parties. 
• The Court rejected the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, noting that while the crime occurred inside the house, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the husband shared common intention with his mother. 
• The Court observed that the husband's attempt to extinguish the fire by pouring water on his wife contradicted the allegation of common intention. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court correctly held the mother-in-law guilty of the offence but erred in convicting the husband under Section 34 IPC without sufficient evidence of his participation or common intention. 

What are the Differences Between Section 34 (Common Intention) and Section 149 (Common Object) of the IPC? 

• Section 34 IPC (Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) 
  • Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals with Common Intention. 
  • Intention Requirement: Requires common intention shared by all participants. Each person must individually share the intention. 
  • Participation Requirement: Actual participation in the criminal act is essential. Each person must contribute to the act, even if minimally. 
  • Physical Presence: Requires physical presence at the scene of crime, though not necessarily in the exact same room (could be standing guard outside, etc.). 
  • Individual Liability: Balances individual and group aspects - focuses on both the individual's role and the group's common purpose. 
  • Nature of Participation: Participation can be through any act, gesture, word, conduct (active or passive) that supports the common design. 
• Section 149 IPC (Common object of unlawful assembly) 
  • Section 190 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals with Common object 
  • Intention vs. Object: Focuses on common object of the assembly rather than individual intentions. 
  • Disregard of Individual Intention: Disregards the intention of individual members and concentrates on the common object of the assembly as a whole. 
  • Liability Without Participation: A person can be guilty even without direct participation in the act. 
  • Membership Requirement: Mere membership in the unlawful assembly at the time of offence is sufficient. 
  • Liability Despite Contrary Intention: A person might be found guilty even if the crime was committed contrary to their own individual intention. 
• The judgment specifically that Section 34 is more restricted than Section 149, as it requires both mental sharing (common intention) and physical participation in the criminal act, while Section 149 can make a person liable based solely on membership in an unlawful assembly with a common object. 

What are the Differences between Section 34 IPC and Section 120B IPC By the Supreme Court? 

• The Supreme Court's explanation in the key differences between Section 34 and Section 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code are: 
  • Requirement for action vs. agreement:  
    • Section 34 requires actual participation in a criminal act beyond mere agreement. 
    • Section 120B requires only an agreement to commit an illegal act (a "bare agreement" is sufficient). 
  • Participation requirement:  
    • Section 34 necessitates some form of participation in the criminal act itself. 
    • Section 120B does not require the person to participate in the actual commission of the crime. 
  • When liability is established:  
    • Under Section 34, liability arises only when a criminal act is done and the accused participated in it. 
    • Under Section 120B, liability for conspiracy to commit an offence arises as soon as the agreement is made, with no overt act necessary beyond the agreement itself. 
  • Nature of involvement:  
    • Section 34 focuses on participation at the execution/commission stage. 
    • Section 120B focuses on the planning/agreement stage prior to execution. 
• As the judgment states that under Section 34, IPC, a mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of Section 34, IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common intention and the accused himself has in some way or the other participated in the commission of the said act. 
• The court states that Section 34 requires moving beyond the planning stage to actual commission with participation, while conspiracy is complete at the agreement stage. 

How do the Supreme Court's Illustrations Clarify the Concept of Common Intention under Section 34 IPC? 

• The Supreme Court provided several illustrations to explain the concept of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with "acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention." 
• The illustrations mentioned in the judgment include: 
  • Two people beating a person simultaneously - where both perform similar acts at the same time with a common intention. 
  • Two jailers conspiring to starve a prisoner to death - where acts consist of successive omissions rather than simultaneous actions. 
  • Two people forging different parts of a document at different times - where acts occur with an interval between them. 
  • Two people conspiring to kill someone where one person identifies the victim and the other commits the actual killing - demonstrating how mere presence can be meaningful participation. 
  • A sentinel (guard) who deliberately allows a murderer to enter a room - showing how an omission can contribute to a crime as effectively as a direct action. 
  • Two people conspiring to commit theft where one distracts the shopkeeper while the other steals - illustrating how diverse acts can still constitute participation in the same crime. 
• These illustrations were used to demonstrate that participation in a criminal act under Section 34 IPC can take many forms - including actions, omissions, gestures, or conduct of any kind - as long as they support a common criminal design. 

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice PV Kunhi Krishnan held that when there is ambiguity in the statute whether actual or assumed the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the accused person since liberty is at stake. 

• The Kerala High Court held this in the case of Mohammed Sajjid v. State of Kerala (2025).

What was the Background of Mohammed Sajjid v. State of Kerala Case?   

• The petitioner in the present facts is accused of offence under Section 22 (b) of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS).  
• The police allegedly seized 2.28 grams of MDMA from Room No.304 at Noa's Arch Hotel on 11th November 2024. 
• Thereafter the Petitioner was arrested. 
• Petitioner's counsel argues he is entitled to statutory bail under Section 187(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
• Petitioner filed an application before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam, which was allegedly not considered.  
• The offence under Section 22(b) of NDPS Act carries maximum punishment of ten years, which counsel argues qualifies petitioner for Section 187(3) of BNSS benefit. 
• The Public Prosecutor opposes bail application, arguing that the petitioner is not eligible for release under Section 187(3) of BNSS. 
•  Thus, the matter was before the Kerala High Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that there is a difference between the phrases used in Section 167 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) and Section 187 of BNSS. 
• Section 187 (3) (i) uses the phrase “for a term of 10 years or more” in contradistinction to Section 167 (2) (a) (i) which uses the phrase “not less than 10 years”. 
• The Court observed that there is not much difference between the words “for a term of 10 years or more” mentioned in BNSS and “not less than 10 years” mentioned in CrPC. 
• The Court took help of the rule of interpretation that when there is ambiguity in the statue whether actual or assumed the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the accused person since liberty is at stake. 
• Thus, an interpretation that favors the liberty of the accused should be adopted. 
• The Court observed that in the present facts that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in dismissing the application of the accused merely on the ground that the petitioner has antecedents. 
• Simply because the petitioner has antecedents or he is a habitual offender the statutory bail under Section 187 (3) of BNSS cannot be rejected. 
• The Court therefore allowed the bail application but imposed several conditions on the accused. 

What is Section 187 (3) of BNSS? 

• Section 187 of BNSS provides for the procedure when the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. 
• It is to be noted that as per Section 187 (1) of BNSS whenever an accused person is arrested, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours (and there are grounds for believing that the accusation is well founded) the police officer shall forthwith transmit the accused to the nearest Magistrate. 
• It is to be noted that Section 187 (2) of BNSS is newly introduced and provides for the time period during which an accused can be committed to police custody. 
• Section 187 (2) provides that: 
  • The Magistrate may authorize detention of an accused person for up to 15 days total (continuously or in parts) during the initial period of 40 or 60 days out of the total detention period of 60 or 90 days. 
  • This authorization applies regardless of whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction to try the case. 
  • The Magistrate must consider whether the accused has been denied bail or had bail cancelled before authorizing detention. 
  • If the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction and considers further detention unnecessary, they may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate with proper jurisdiction. 
• Section 187 (3) of BNSS is the provision from which default bail emanates. A comparative analysis of Section 167(2) of CrPC and Section 187 (3) of BNSS is as follows:

• The Karnataka High Court recently gave an important interpretation with regard to Section 187 (3) of BNSS in the case of State of Karnataka by Kavoor Police Station v. Kalandar Shafi (2024). The summary of the findings in this case are as follows: 
  • A slight tweak in the new regime qua 187(3) of BNSS in juxtaposition to Section 167(2) of the earlier regime -the CrPC. has not changed the purpose of the provision. 
  • The phraseology of the words 'ten years or more' found in sub-clause (i) of Section 187(3) of the BNSS would mean, the minimum threshold punishment imposable on an offence under the BNS should be ten years. 
  • The offence in the case at hand, does not bear a minimum threshold sentence of ten years, but is extendable or to an extent of ten years, which would mean, discretion available to the concerned Court to impose punishment up to ten years. Therefore, the minimum threshold is not ten years. 
  • Completion of investigation in a punishment which is up to ten years is undoubtedly 60 days. Rest of the other offences, be it death, life imprisonment of ten years and more, would be 90 days. 
  • If the investigation is to be completed within 60 days, the period of police custody would run from day one day forty of registration of the crime. If it is 90 days, it would run from day one to day 60, maximum period in both the cases is 15 days of police custody. 
  • In case the offence is punishable upto 10 years the police custody is only from day one to forty.