List of Current Affairs

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Urmila Joshi-Phalke has held that a false promise of marriage, made with deceitful intent, amounts to a 'misconception of fact' that vitiates consent, upholding the accused's rape conviction. 

• The Bombay High Court held this in the matter of Rupchand Shende v. State of Maharashtra (2025). 

What was the Background of Rupchand Shende v. State of Maharashtra Case? 

• The case involves a 16-year-old girl who lodged a report at Bhandara Police Station on 11th May 2019, against the accused Rupchand Shende. 
• The victim was working at "Komal Fruit Centre" while the accused ran a fruit shop and visited the centre to purchase stock, which is how they became acquainted. 
• In June 2017, the accused repeatedly asked for the victim's mobile number, which she eventually provided, leading them to start communicating until her mother took away her phone. 
• On 7th October 2018, while the victim was returning home, the accused allegedly restrained her, demanded sexual favors, and took her to a house where he allegedly sexually assaulted her after promising marriage. 
• The victim alleged that multiple incidents of sexual assault occurred thereafter, resulting in her pregnancy, which she discovered when she missed her menstrual period. 
• When informed about the pregnancy, the accused allegedly provided pills to the victim, but they were ineffective, and she eventually delivered a baby on 21st August 2019. 
• The accused refused to marry the victim despite his promises, which led her to file the police report. 
• Medical examinations confirmed the victim's pregnancy, and DNA testing established that the accused was the biological father of the child. 
• The accused was charged with offences under Section 376(2)(h) of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Bombay High Court upheld the conviction of the accused under charges of rape and provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, affirming the ten-year sentence imposed by the special POCSO court. 
• The Court held that when a promise to marry is made with no intention to abide by it but to deceive a girl to engage in sexual relations, it creates a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the girl's consent. 
• Justice Urmila Joshi-Phalke determined that the accused's engagement with the victim by promising marriage appeared to be mala fide from the beginning, as he completely misled her to obtain sexual intercourse under total misconception. 
• The Court observed that the victim, being under sixteen years of age at the time of the incident, could not provide legally valid consent, rendering the question of consent irrelevant. 
• DNA evidence conclusively established that the accused was the biological father of the child born to the victim, corroborating the victim's testimony regarding the sexual relationship. 
• The Court distinguished between mere breach of promise and a false promise made with the sole intention to seduce, categorizing the present case as the latter where the offence of rape was established. 
• The Court noted that the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act,2012 regarding culpable mental state, which includes intention, motive, knowledge of fact and belief. 
• The appellate court found no grounds to interfere with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit. 

What is Provision Related to False Promise to Marry under Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)? 

• BNS has a separate provision punishing the act of false promise to marry. 
  • Section 69 of BNS provides punishment for Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc. 
  • It states that whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. 
  • Explanation— “deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity. 

What is Section 64 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)? 

• Section 64 in the BNS provides punishment for rape . 
• Earlier it was dealt with under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code,1860 
• Section 64(1) establishes the general punishment for rape as rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, which may extend to life imprisonment, along with a fine. 
• Section 64(2) provides enhanced or aggravated forms of rape with more severe punishments. 
• Section 64(2)(h) specifically deals with a situation where a person "commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant." 
• The punishment prescribed for offences under Section 64(2)(h) is rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, which may extend to imprisonment for life (meaning the remainder of the person's natural life), along with a fine. 
• This provision considers rape of a pregnant woman as an aggravated form of sexual assault, recognizing the additional vulnerability of pregnant victims and potential harm to both the woman and her unborn child. 
• Section 64(2)(h) is one of several circumstances listed in Section 64(2) where the law imposes more severe punishments due to the particularly egregious nature of the offence. 
• This section recognizes that committing rape with the knowledge that the victim is pregnant demonstrates heightened culpability warranting enhanced punishment. 
• The classification of this offence under Section 64(2) rather than 64(1) reflects the legislature's intent to treat such cases with greater severity. 

What are the Relevant Provisions of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012? 

• Section 6(1) prescribes punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault with rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than twenty years, extendable to imprisonment for life (meaning the remainder of natural life), along with fine, or with death. 
• Section 6(2) mandates that the fine imposed under Section 6(1) shall be just and reasonable, paid directly to the victim to meet medical expenses and rehabilitation costs. 
• Section 29 creates a statutory presumption whereby when a person is prosecuted for committing, abetting, or attempting to commit any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7, and 9 of the POCSO Act, the Special Court shall presume that the accused has committed the offence unless proven otherwise. 
• The presumption under Section 29 places the burden of proof on the accused to establish their innocence, effectively reversing the traditional criminal law principle of "innocent until proven guilty" for specified POCSO offences. 
• Section 30(1) establishes a presumption of culpable mental state in POCSO prosecutions, requiring the accused to prove the absence of such mental state as a defense. 
• Section 30(2) sets a high standard for rebutting the presumption, specifying that a fact is proved only when the Special Court believes it exists "beyond reasonable doubt" rather than by mere "preponderance of probability." 
• The Explanation to Section 30 defines "culpable mental state" broadly to include intention, motive, knowledge of a fact, and belief in or reason to believe a fact. 
• These provisions collectively create a stringent legal framework that significantly strengthens the prosecution's position in POCSO cases, recognizing the vulnerability of child victims and the difficulty in producing evidence in such sensitive cases. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News?

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra laid down the principles to be considered while recording the testimony of the child witness. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh (2025). 

What was the Background of The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh Case?

• On 15th July, 2003, around midnight, Bhoora Singh alias Yashpal and his father Bharat Singh heard screams of Virendra Kumari (the deceased) coming from the house of Balveer Singh Yadav (the accused). 
• After the screams stopped, around 3:00 AM, they observed Balveer and his family members cremating Virendra Kumari's body in their field. 
• The complainants went to Indar Police Station at around 9:00 AM on 16th July 2003, and lodged an unnatural death report under Section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). 
• ASI Mahendra Singh Chauhan conducted an enquiry which revealed that the accused had killed his wife by throwing her to the ground in the porch on the first floor and then choking her neck with his leg. 
• On 20th July 2003, FIR No. 142/2003 was registered against Balveer Singh Yadav and his sister Jatan Bai for offenses under Sections 302, 201 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
• During investigation, police recorded statements of witnesses, prepared a site plan, and seized bones and burnt bangles from the cremation site, along with a plastic diesel can. 
• The accused was arrested, and a charge sheet was filed. 
• On 3rd August 2003, police recorded the statement of Rani, the daughter of the accused and the deceased, who was a child witness. 
• The co-accused Jatan Bai was found to be a juvenile, so her trial was separated. 
• The case against Balveer Singh Yadav was committed to the Court of Session as S.T. No. 197 of 2003, where charges were framed by the Additional Sessions Judge, to which the accused pleaded not guilty. 
• The Trial Court laid down the following: 
  • The Trial Court convicted the accused Balveer Singh Yadav under Sections 302, 201 read with 34 IPC, based primarily on the testimony of PW6 Rani (7–8-year-old daughter of the accused and deceased), who witnessed her father press his leg on her mother's neck, causing her death. 
  • The court found the clandestine cremation of the deceased at night without informing family members, the accused's flight from the scene, and the strained relations between the accused and deceased (including prior maintenance cases) to be incriminating circumstances. 
  • Despite a delay in recording PW6's statement under Section 161 CrPC., the court found her testimony reliable, natural, and corroborated by other witnesses who heard the deceased's screams stop, and by physical evidence like burnt bangles found at the cremation site. 
  • The accused was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 1,000 for murder (Section 302 IPC) and four years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000 for destroying evidence (Section 201 IPC). 
• The High Court held the following against which the case came to the Supreme Court: 
  • The High Court acquitted the accused Balveer Singh Yadav, reversing the Trial Court's conviction, primarily due to concerns about the reliability of PW6 Rani's testimony, noting an 18-day delay in recording her statement under Section 161 CrPC. 
  • The court found it suspicious that the accused was arrested only after PW6's statement was recorded, suggesting there was insufficient evidence before that and implying that her earlier morgue inquiry statement (which was not produced in court) may have been unfavorable to the prosecution. 
  • The High Court identified contradictions in complainant PW3 Bhoora's testimony, including his denial of statements attributed to him in the morgue report about visiting the accused's house at 3:00 AM, and noted his admission that villagers were present during cremation, which undermined claims of a clandestine disposal. 
  • Based on testimony from independent witnesses PW1 and PW2, the court found it implausible that PW3 could have heard the deceased's screams from 4-5 furlongs away and noted that cremation in fields was a normal practice in the village since there was no dedicated cremation ground. 

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court held that Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), now contained in Section 124 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), provides that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease - whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind.  
• A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. 
• On the aspect of credibility of child witness the Court laid down the following points: 
  • The evidence of the child witness is on the same footing as any other witness as any other witness as long as the child is competent to testify. 
  • The only precaution which the court should take while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that such a witness must be a reliable one due to the susceptibility of children by their falling prey to tutoring. 
  • However, this in no manner means that the evidence of a child must be rejected outrightly at the slightest of discrepancy, rather what is required is that the same is evaluated with great circumspection 
  • Further, while appreciating the testimony of the child witness the courts are required to assess whether the evidence of such witness is its voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others and whether the testimony inspires confidence. 
  • Also, there is no rule requiring corroboration of the child witness before any reliance is placed on it. 
  • The insistence of corroboration is only a measure of caution and prudence that the courts may exercise if deemed necessary in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 
• The Court also laid down in this case the law on tutored testimony: 
  • The Court held that where there has been tutoring the same can be done in two ways: (i) improvisation and (ii) fabrication. 
  • With regard to (i) the Court held that in order to contradict the witness the help of Section 162 of CrPC read with Section 145 of IEA must be taken. 
  • With regard to (ii) the Court held that where allegation pertains to tutoring the following twin requirements must be proved  
    • The possibility or opportunity of the witness being tutored. 
    • The reasonable likelihood of the tutoring. 
• In the facts of the present case the Court held that there is no evidence to suggest that the child witness was tutored. 
• Further, the Court held that the offence was committed within the four walls of the house and in such a scenario Section 106 of IEA can be invoked if it is shown that there is a prima facie case in favor of the accused. 
• The Court held that the factors like the following would create a “prima facie” case on the basis of which Section 106 of IEA can be invoked-  
  • Respondent did not dispute his presence in the house. 
  • Failure on the part of the accused to inform about the death of the deceased to her parents. 
  • The conduct of the accused in absconding. 
  • The untimely death of the deceased in suspicious circumstances. 
  • The failure of the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him. 
• Thus, the Court in the facts of the case allowed the appeal and restored the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court.

What are the Principles Laid Down by the Court on the Testimony of Child Witness?

• Competency of Child Witness: There is no minimum age for a witness; a child witness is competent unless proven otherwise. 
• Preliminary Examination: The Trial Court must assess the child’s ability to understand the sanctity of testimony before recording evidence. 
• Opinion of the Court: The court must record its satisfaction that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth. 
• Recording Examination Details: The questions asked, and the child’s responses must be documented for review by appellate courts. 
• Admissibility of Testimony: A child’s testimony is admissible if coherent and rational. 
• Demeanor & Influence: The court must ensure the testimony is voluntary and not influenced by others. 
• Corroboration Not Mandatory: A credible child witness can be relied upon without corroboration. 
• Caution in Corroboration: Courts may seek corroboration if the testimony appears tutored or inconsistent. 
• Risk of Tutoring: Courts must carefully scrutinize testimony to rule out external influence. 
• Tutoring Indicators: If a witness’s statement is altered or fabricated, it must be evaluated and tested against prior statements. 
• Assessing Tutoring: A child’s testimony may be discarded if proven to be influenced, with evidence showing opportunity and likelihood of tutoring. 
• Partial Credibility: Even if parts of a child’s testimony are tutored, the court may rely on the untutored portion if credible.