List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma has held that there is no concept of deemed sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another (2025). 

What was the Background of Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another Case? 

• Ms. Suneeti Toteja (appellant) is an employee of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) who was posted on deputation to the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) from 27th April 2016, to 25th July 2019. 
• The case originated from a sexual harassment complaint filed by Dr. Manisha Narayan (Respondent No. 2) against Dr. S.S. Ghonkrokta, the Enforcement Director at FSSAI. 
• Dr. Narayan claimed she was sexually harassed on multiple occasions during her tenure as Associate Director at FSSAI, New Delhi. 
• Following these allegations, Dr. Narayan's mother filed a complaint before FSSAI for action under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). 
• An Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted to investigate the allegations. The enquiry was referred to the ICC on 4th December 2014. 
• The ICC submitted its report to the Chief Executive Officer of FSSAI on 22nd June 2015, finding Dr. Ghonkrokta guilty of the alleged offences. 
• Dr. Ghonkrokta later challenged the ICC report before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) in New Delhi by filing Original Application. 
• The appellant was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the ICC at FSSAI on 12th May 2016, after the investigation was complete and the report was submitted. 
• In her capacity as Presiding Officer of the ICC, the appellant filed a counter affidavit on 16th January 2017, in the CAT proceedings on behalf of FSSAI representatives and supposedly the complainant. 
• Dr. Narayan later claimed she never authorized the appellant to file the counter affidavit on her behalf and that it was filed without her knowledge and consent. 
• Subsequently, FSSAI filed a Miscellaneous Application seeking amendment of the counter affidavit, acknowledging that Dr. Narayan wished to represent herself independently. 
• Later, another FIR filed by Dr. Narayan regarding offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, where the appellant was not named in this FIR. 
• The appellant's name first appeared during Dr. Narayan's statement given under Section 164 of CrPC nearly two years after the FIR was filed. 
• In her statement, Dr. Narayan alleged that the appellant had wrongfully represented her before the Tribunal without authorization and had threatened her regarding a transfer from Delhi to Chennai. 
• Based on these allegations, Chargesheet was filed, naming the accused (Accused No. 4) for offences under various sections of the IPC. 
• The investigating authorities claimed they had sought sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the CrPC but proceeded with the chargesheet when sanction was not granted within the stipulated time period. 
• The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, took cognizance of the chargesheet and issued summons against the accused persons. 
• The appellant along with two co-accused, filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court, seeking quashing of the chargesheet and the summoning order. 
• The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, dismissed appellant’s petition on 16th November 2022, but directed the trial court to release her on bail. 
• BIS, appellant’s parent department, later issued a letter explicitly refusing sanction for her prosecution after reviewing the case materials. 
• Aggrieved by the decisions of the High court the present appeal has been filed before the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that the appellant was acting in her official capacity as Presiding Officer of the ICC when she filed the counter affidavit and interacted with the complainant. 
• It held that prior sanction from the competent authority (BIS) was necessary before the Magistrate could take cognizance against her under Section 197 of CrPC. 
• The Court noted that the concept of "deemed sanction" is not contemplated under Section 197 of CrPC, rejecting the prosecution's reliance on the Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy judgments. 
• It observed that the letter requesting sanction was incorrectly sent to FSSAI instead of BIS, causing delay in the competent authority receiving the request. 
• The Court emphasized that BIS had expressly refused sanction for prosecution after reviewing the case materials, finding the appellant "in no way related to the allegations." 
• The Supreme Court concluded that the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance without proper sanction, and the High Court erred in not considering this fatal procedural defect. 
• It ruled that lack of necessary sanction "vitiated the very initiation of the criminal proceeding" against the appellant. 
• The Court determined that a public servant's actions must be directly connected to official duties to require sanction, and this protection is a condition precedent to cognizance of cases against them. 
• It ultimately allowed the appeal and quashed the chargesheet, summoning order, and any consequent steps taken by the trial court against her. 

What is Section 197 of CrPC?  

About: 

• Provisions for Prosecuting Judges, Magistrates, and Public Servants, the same has now been covered under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)  
• This section helps to:   
  • Protects public servants from frivolous prosecutions.   
  • Ensures administrative oversight in legal proceedings.  
  • Balances accountability with protection of official duties. 

Scope of Protection: 

• Applies to Judges, Magistrates, and Public Servants.  
• Covers offences committed while acting in an official capacity.  
• General Prohibition:  
  • No Court shall take cognizance of offences without previous sanction.  
  • Protects public servants from arbitrary prosecution. 
• Sanction Authorities: 
  • Central Government Jurisdiction:  
    • For persons employed in Union/Central Government affairs.  
    • Applies to offences related to Central Government employees. 
  • State Government Jurisdiction:  
    • For persons employed in State Government affairs.  
    • Covers offences related to State Government employees.  

Special Provisions for Armed Forces: 

• Armed Forces Prosecution:  
  • No Court shall take cognizance of offences committed by Armed Forces members.  
  • Requires previous sanction from Central Government.  
• State-Level Forces Provision:  
  • State Government can notify specific public order maintenance forces.  
  • Can direct that Central Government sanction provisions apply to state forces.  

Emergency Provisions: 

• State Emergency Cognizance:  
  • During President's Rule (Article 356 of the Constitution of India,1950).  
  • Special restrictions on prosecuting public order maintenance forces.  
  • Requires Central Government sanction.  
• Historical Sanction Validation:  
  • Invalidates sanctions given during specific historical periods.  
  • Empowers Central Government to accord fresh sanctions.  

Prosecution Management: 

• Prosecution Determination:  
  • Central or State Government can:  
    • Determine the prosecuting person.  
    • Specify prosecution manner.  
    • Define specific offences for prosecution.  
    • Select the trial court. 

Landmark Judgments 

Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998):  

• This landmark case, also known as the "Hawala Case," addressed the independence of investigating agencies like the CBI and established guidelines for their functioning. 
  • The Supreme Court established time limits for various stages of criminal proceedings, including a three-month limit (extendable by three more months for special reasons) for granting sanction for prosecution. 
  • The judgment emphasized that these time limits must be strictly adhered to in order to prevent delays in prosecution, especially in cases involving high-ranking officials. 
  • The Court established a monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with its directives regarding investigation and prosecution. 

Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012) 

• This case dealt with the issue of sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA) in relation to the 2G spectrum allocation case. 
• Justice G.S. Singhvi, in his separate but concurring opinion, suggested guidelines for Parliament to consider, including a provision that if no decision on sanction is taken within the extended time limit, sanction would be deemed granted. 
• The judgment emphasized that sanction should be granted or refused within a reasonable time frame to prevent unnecessary delays in prosecution of corrupt public officials. 
• The Court recommended that the competent authority should take a decision on sanction within three months of the request being made. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice N Kotiswar Singh laid down the law on “bonafide requirement” for eviction of tenants under the Rent Control Act. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Kanhaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehsan & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Kanhaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehsan & Ors. Case?   

• The Appellant is the owner and landlord of a house in Chatra Municipality, Jharkhand. 
• The Appellant filed Eviction suit against the respondents-tenant on grounds of: 
  • Default in payment of rent 
  • Personal need of the premises to install an ultrasound machine for his two unemployed sons 
• The court of first instance decreed the suit on 15th July, 2006, accepting the landlord's claim of bona fide need but dismissed it on the ground of default in payment of rent. 
• The First Appellate Court reversed this judgment, which was affirmed by the High Court of Jharkhand in Second Appeal No.317/2006. 
• The appellant-landlord has not challenged the dismissal on grounds of rent default but has confined his appeal only to the bona fide need aspect. 
• The appellant claims he has proven: 
  • His capability to purchase an ultrasound machine 
  • An annual income of Rs.4,00,000/- 
  • The suitability of the premises (adjacent to a medical clinic and pathology center) 
• In a previous case, there was a partial eviction from the same property, and the landlord re-let that portion to another person. 
• The respondents-tenant argue that: 
  • A previous compromise agreement allows them to occupy three pucca rooms as "tenant in perpetuity" 
  • The landlord has sufficient alternative accommodation available 
  • The landlord misused the previous partial eviction by letting the vacated premises to someone else at higher rent 
• The appeal is now before a higher court for consideration. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that the eviction of tenant from the suit premises in the present facts is based on bonafide requirement. 
  • The need under bonafide requirement in this case has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to get the premises vacated. 
  • The landlord is the best judge to decide which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. 
  • The tenant has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for eviction. 
• Further, the Court held that the the appellant-landlord may be having some other properties under tenancy of various persons but once he has decided to get the suit premises vacated for the bona fide need of establishing an ultrasound machine for his two unemployed sons, he cannot be forced to initiate such a proceeding against the other tenants. 
• Further, the Court held that the suit premises are the most suitable accommodation for establishing an ultrasound machine. 
  • The reason being that it is situated adjacent to a medical clinic and a pathological centre and is the most appropriate place for establishing any medical machine. 
  • Moreover, the appellant-landlord has also proved his capacity to invest in purchasing/establishing an ultrasound machine and that his two sons are unemployed and as such the suit premises is required to establish them in business and to augment the family’s income. Therefore, the bona fide need of the appellant-landlord in the facts of the case stands duly established. 
• Further, a point was put forward that the two unemployed sons have no expertise/training to run ultrasound machine. 
  • The Court held with regard to this that it is common knowledge that these days medical devices such as ultrasound machines are installed and established and are ordinarily run by the technicians or the medical experts who are engaged for the said purpose. 
  • The person establishing such devices or ultrasound machines himself need not have any expertise in running the same. 
• Further, the party also took note of the compromise entered into between them which provided that the appellant landlord had agreed that the respondents-tenant shall continue to be a tenant of the appellant with respect to three pucca rooms which have been re-constructed by the appellant-landlord after demolishing the portion under tenancy.   
• With regard to the above compromise the Court held that there is no clause in the compromise deed which provides that the appellant landlord will not initiate any proceeding for eviction against the respondent-tenant in the future. 
• Therefore, the Court held that it cannot be said that the above proceedings are not maintainable. 
• Thus, the Court held that the appellant- landlord has proved his bona fide need for suit premises.

What is the Provision for Eviction Under Rent Control Act? 

• Section 19 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 provides for eviction of tenant. 
• A tenant cannot be evicted except by Controller's order, despite any contrary contract or law. 
• Valid grounds for eviction include: 
  • Breach of tenancy conditions 
  • Unauthorized subletting 
  • Ceasing employment (if occupying as employee) 
  • Material deterioration of building due to tenant's negligence 
  • Landlord reasonably requiring building for personal/beneficiary occupation (Bonafide Requirement) 
• Controller may allow partial eviction if: 
  • Reasonable requirement can be satisfied by partial eviction 
  • Tenant agrees to this arrangement 
  • Standard rent will be proportionately fixed for remaining portion 
• Important clarifications: 
  • "Landlord" does not include agents 
  • When multiple buildings are involved, landlord has right to choose which building they prefer, and tenants cannot challenge this preference 
• These provisions are subject to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 31. 

Source:  Karnataka High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna has overturned suspension of a Kalyan Karnataka Road Transport constable penalized for sleeping on duty. 

• The Karnataka High Court held in the matter of Sri. Chandrashekhar v. The Divisional Controller (2025). 

What was the Background of Sri. Chandrashekhar v. The Divisional Controller Case? 

• Chandrashekhar, a Karnataka State Transport (KST) constable appointed on 13th May 2016, was transferred to work at the Kalyan Karnataka Road Transport Corporation due to shortage of staff. 
• On 23rd April 2024, a vigilance report alleged that Chandrashekhar was found sleeping while on duty, which was video recorded and circulated on social media platforms. 
• When questioned, Chandrashekhar stated that he had taken medicine as per doctor's advice and had taken a power nap of ten minutes as he was on continuous duty in second and third shifts. 
• The Vigilance Department submitted a report stating that there were only three KST constables in the depot, the workload on existing staff was extremely high, and suggested appointing two more constables. 
• Despite the Vigilance Department's findings regarding staff shortage, Chandrashekhar was placed under suspension on 01st July 2024 for sleeping on duty. 
• The Corporation contended that Chandrashekhar's act of sleeping while on duty, which was video recorded and circulated on social media, brought disrepute to the Corporation. 
• It was an admitted fact that Chandrashekhar was made to work double shifts of 16 hours per day continuously for approximately 60 days without break due to staff shortage. 
• Chandrashekhar filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court challenging the suspension order and seeking reinstatement to his previous post.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court observed that if a person is asked to work beyond their capacity, the body sometimes compels the person to sleep, as sleep and work-life balance are necessary in contemporary times. 
• Referring to Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Court emphasized that everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
• The Court noted that the covenants in the International Labour Organization, to which India is a signatory, recognize work-life balance and stipulate that working hours should not exceed 48 hours in a week and 8 hours in a day, except in exceptional circumstances. 
• The Court observed that while sleeping on duty during a single shift would undoubtedly constitute misconduct, no fault could be found with the petitioner sleeping during duty hours in the peculiar facts of this case. 
• The Court held that employees in any organization, particularly those working on shifts, must have work-life balance, and placing the petitioner under suspension for the respondent's own folly demonstrated a lack of bonafides. 
• The Court determined that the suspension order was unsustainable and deserved to be set aside, with the petitioner entitled to all consequential benefits including continuity of service and salary for the suspension period. 

Does Sleeping on Duty Constitute Misconduct?  

• Right to rest and leisure as recognized in Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) , which includes reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
• International Labour Organization covenants that establish standards for work hours (not exceeding 48 hours weekly and 8 hours daily except in exceptional circumstances). 
• The distinction between misconduct (sleeping during a regular single shift) versus excusable behavior (sleeping when forced to work excessive hours over prolonged periods). 
• The principle of work-life balance as a necessary element for employees, particularly those working in shift-based roles. 
• The concept of "bonafides" in administrative actions, suggesting that employer actions must be undertaken in good faith, particularly when disciplining employees. 
• The legal authority of the court to quash suspension orders that lack reasonable basis or demonstrate arbitrary exercise of power. 
• The principle of consequential benefits following the quashing of an improper suspension, including continuity of service and back wages for the suspension period 

What is Article 24 of UDHR? 

• The Court specifically referenced Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: "Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." 
• This provision establishes several legal principles: 
  • The universal right to rest and leisure as a fundamental human right 
  • The necessity of reasonable limitations on working hours as an essential component of this right 
  • The requirement for periodic holidays with pay as part of ensuring this right 
• The Court used this international human rights standard as a foundational basis for its reasoning that excessive work hours (16 hours daily for 60 continuous days) violated the petitioner's basic rights.  
• The Court states that this right is not merely aspirational but has practical implications for employment practices and workplace regulations, particularly when determining what constitutes reasonable grounds for disciplinary action.