List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah. has held that its judgments are generally retrospective unless explicitly stated otherwise, clarifying the distinction between legislative and judicial lawmaking. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Kaniskh Sinha v. State of West Bengal case (2025). 

What was the Background of Kaniskh Sinha v. State of West Bengal case ? 

• The appellants in this case are a husband and wife who filed appeals against an order dated 27th June 2024 passed by a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. 
• The appellants were accused in two separate criminal cases registered as First Information Reports (FIRs) at Bhowanipur Police Station, Kolkata. 
• The first FIR (No. 179 of 2010) was registered on 27th April 2010 under Sections 120B, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,(IPC) read with Section 66A (a)(b)(c) of the Information Technology Act,(IT) 2000. The complainant in this case was Keyur Majumder. 
• The second FIR (No. 298 of 2011) was registered on 08th June 2011 following a complaint made to a Magistrate who directed its registration under Section 190 read with 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). This FIR was registered under Sections 466, 469, 471 read with 120B of the IPC. The complainant was Supriti Bandopadhyay. 
• Both FIRs contained similar allegations against the appellants related to forgery, fraud, deception, cheating, damage to reputation, unlawful extraction of money, threat, misrepresentation, and criminal conspiracy. 
• Charge sheets had been filed in both cases at the time of the Supreme Court hearing.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

High Court 

• The High Court dismissed the criminal revisions filed by the appellants. 
• The High Court held that the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) (requiring affidavits with Section 156(3) complaints) would operate prospectively and not have retrospective application. 
• The High Court determined that these directions would not be applicable to complaints lodged against the appellants in 2010-2011, as they predated the Priyanka Srivastava judgment of 2015. 

Supreme Court 

• The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between legislative and judicial pronouncements regarding retrospective application:  
  • Laws made by the legislature are always prospective unless specifically stated otherwise, while judgments of Constitutional Courts are retrospective unless specifically stated to be prospective. 
• The Court observed that prospective operation of a judgment is normally implemented to avoid unnecessary burden or undue hardships to persons who acted in good faith based on the law as it existed at the relevant time. 
• The Court noted that prospective application also prevents unsettling long-settled matters, which could cause widespread injustice. 
• Regarding the Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) judgment, the Supreme Court observed that the language used in that judgment ("a stage has come in this country") clearly indicated prospective application. 
• The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court was correct in holding that the direction requiring complaints to be accompanied by affidavits would operate prospectively. 
• The Court further noted that if charges had not yet been framed, the appellants would be at liberty to move an application for their discharge, which would be considered according to law. 

What are the Legal Provisions Provided? 

• Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) - This provision was a central focus of the case, which allows Magistrates to direct police to register an FIR and investigate a complaint. 
• Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - This was mentioned in conjunction with Section 156(3), as the Magistrate exercised powers under these sections to direct registration of the second FIR. 
• Sections 120B, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - These were the offences alleged in the first FIR against the appellants, relating to criminal conspiracy, cheating, forgery, and using forged documents. 
• Section 66A (a)(b)(c) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 - This was included in the first FIR along with the IPC provisions. 
• Sections 466, 469, 471 read with 120B of IPC - These were the offences  relating to forgery and criminal conspiracy. 
• Article 226 of the Constitution of India - This was referenced in the Supreme Court's quotation from the Priyanka Srivastava judgment, noting that statutory provisions can be challenged under this Article. 
• The case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015)  This precedent established the requirement that applications under Section 156(3) CrPC must be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. 

What is Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 

• About: 
  • This section empowers a Magistrate to direct the police to conduct an investigation into a cognizable offence. 
• Cognizable Offences: 
  • Cognizable offences are defined under Section 2(c) of CrPC they are those for which a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant. These offences are usually more serious in nature. 
• Application by a Complainant: 
  • If a person makes an application to the Magistrate and satisfies the Magistrate that an offence has been committed, the Magistrate can order the police to investigate the matter. 
• Judicial Discretion: 
  • The Magistrate has the discretion to determine whether a case merits a police investigation based on the facts presented. 
• Purpose: 
  • The initiation of criminal proceedings typically begins with the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) with the police. However, there may be situations where an individual, aggrieved by the commission of an offence, seeks the intervention of the judiciary to ensure a proper and unbiased investigation. 
  • Section 156(3) comes into play when a Magistrate, who has the authority to take cognizance of an offence under section 190, is approached with a complaint or an application requesting the initiation of an investigation. 
  • The provision empowers the Magistrate to direct the police or any other competent authority to conduct an investigation into the matter. 

What are the Safeguards Introduced by Section 175 of BNSS?  

• The following are the new changes which are introduced in the form of safeguards to prevent abuse of process of law:  
  • Firstly, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).  
  • Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing the registration of FIR.  
  • Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).  
• It is to be noted that Section 175 (3) of BNSS is a result of law laid down by the judicial decisions over the years.  
• In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015) the Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. the applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3).  
  • It was further observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3) of the CrPC must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant.  
  • The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) of the CrPC were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the accused by registration of FIR. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan held that mere use of the word ‘irrevocable’ in Power of Attorney does not make it ‘irrevocable’.  

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr v. J Manjula Etc (2025). 

What was the Background of M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr v. J Manjula Etc (2025) Case?   

• The dispute involves a property (Site No. 10, out of Sy. No. 55/1, in Chunchaghatta Village, Bangalore) originally owned by Muniyappa @ Ruttappa. 
• On 4th April, 1986, Muniyappa allegedly executed an irrevocable power of attorney (POA) and an unregistered agreement to sell in favor of A. Saraswathi for Rs. 10,250/-. 
• The original owner (Muniyappa) died on January 30, 1997. 
• On 1st April, 1998 (after the original owner's death), A. Saraswathi executed a registered sale deed in favor of her son (appellant no. 2) for Rs. 84,000/-. 
• On 21st March, 2003, the legal heirs of the original owner sold the same property to respondent no. 7 for Rs. 76,000/-. 
• Respondent no. 7 sold the property to respondent no. 8 on 29th September, 2003, for Rs. 90,000/-. 
• On 6th December, 2004, respondent no. 8 executed a registered gift deed in favor of her daughter (the answering respondent). 
• On 2nd January, 2007, appellant no. 1 (father of appellant no. 2) visited the property and found strangers in possession, leading to a police complaint. 
• The answering respondent filed O.S. No. 133/2007 seeking permanent injunction against appellant no. 2 from interfering with her possession. 
• Appellant no. 2 filed O.S. No. 4045/2008 seeking declaration that the sale deeds of 2003 and the gift deed of 2004 were null and void. 
• The Trial Court decreed in favor of the answering respondent and dismissed appellant's suit on the grounds that: 
  • The answering respondent was in possession of the property 
  • The sale deed executed by the POA holder after the original owner's death was invalid 
  • The registered sale deeds and gift deed in favor of the answering respondent were legal 
  • The suit filed by appellants was barred by limitation (should have been filed within 3 years) 
• The matter went to the High Court and it was held by the High Court that: 
  • The answering respondent had lawful ownership and possession of the property through valid registered documents (sale deeds dated 21st March 2003 and 29th September 2003, and gift deed dated 06th December 2004) 
  • The sale deed executed by A. Saraswathi (POA holder) on 01st  April 1998 was invalid as it was executed after the death of the original owner (Muniyappa), and Section 202 of the Contract Act did not apply since the POA did not create any interest in favor of the holder. 
• The matter was subsequently before the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• There were two issues that the Court determined in this case: 
  • Whether the agent, A. Saraswathi, by virtue of being a holder of the General Power of Attorney along with Agreement to Sell had any right, title or interest in the subject-matter of the agency, to execute the registered sale deed dated 01st April 1998 in favour of her son i.e., the appellant no. 2, after the death of the principal, on 30th January 1997? 
  • Whether it was obligatory for the answering respondent to challenge the execution and validity of the General Power of Attorney and the Agreement to Sell dated 04.04.1986 and a further prayer to declare that the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 is invalid, non-est factum or illegal in O.S. 133/2007? 
• It was the case of the party that the power of attorney executed in this case was an irrevocable power of attorney.  
  • It was submitted that the two documents agreement to sell and the power of attorney were executed on the same day in the favour of the same person and hence must be read harmoniously.  
  • Thus, as per Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) the power of attorney executed in this case is irrevocable. 
• The Court laid down a very important principle that where a power of attorney is coupled with an interest it metamorphoses to an irrevocable agency unless expressly stated otherwise. 
• Further, it was observed by the Court that it is important to determine if the power of attorney is general or special. 
  • In order to determine the same the Court is endowed with the duty to see the contents of the documents and the intention of the parties can be gathered from the terms of the document and the circumstances in which it was entered into by the parties.  
  • The import of the word “general” in a POA refers to the power granted concerning the subject matter. 
  • The test to determine the nature of POA is the subject matter for which it has been executed.  
  • The nomenclature of the POA does not determine its nature. Even a POA termed as a ‘general power of attorney’ may confer powers that are special in relation to the subject matter 
  • Likewise, a ‘special power of attorney’ may confer powers that are general in nature concerning the subject matter.  
  • The essence lies in the power and not in the subject-matter. 
• The Court held that in the present facts the power of attorney executed is not irrevocable. The holder of the POA could not be said to have interest in the facts of the present case. 
• The Court held that an agreement to sell does not create an interest or confer ownership right or title. 
• Thus, even though the General Power of Attorney and the agreement to sell were contemporaneous documents executed by the original owner in favour of the same beneficiary, this cannot be the sole factor to conclude that she had an interest in the subject-matter. 
• The Supreme Court therefore upheld what was laid down by the High Court. 

What is the Power of Attorney? 

• A power of attorney derives its basic principles from Chapter X of the ICA which provides for “Agency” along with Sections 1A and 2 respectively of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882. 
• Agency is a fiduciary relationship between two persons, where one explicitly or implicitly agrees that the other will act on their behalf to influence their legal relations with third parties, and the other similarly agrees to act in this capacity or does so based on an agreement. 
• The relationship between the executant of a general power of attorney and the holder of the power is one of principal and agent.  
• A principal is bound by the acts done by an agent or the contracts made by him on behalf of the principal.  
• Likewise, power of attorney in the nature of contract of agency authorizes the holder to do acts specified by the executant, or represent the executant in dealings with third persons. 
• Section 201 of ICA: Termination of Agency 
  • The ways in which agency can end are: 
    • Principal withdraws authorization 
    • Agent abandons responsibilities 
    • Completion of designated tasks 
    • Death of either party 
    • Mental incapacity of either party 
    • Principal's bankruptcy declaration under applicable statutes 
• Section 202 of ICA: Termination of agency where agent has an interest in subject matter: 
  • Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest 
• The Essentials of Section 202 of ICA: 
  • first, there shall be a relationship in the capacity of ‘principal and agent’ between the parties and 
  • secondly, there shall be agent’s interest in the subject-matter of the agency. If both the conditions are fulfilled the agency becomes irrevocable and cannot be terminated unilaterally at the behest of the principal 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan have held that arbitral agreements and awards are enforceable by or against legal representatives. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Rahul Verma and others v. Rampat Lal Verma and others (2025). 

What was the Background of Rahul Verma and others v. Rampat Lal Verma and others Case? 

• The case involves a dispute between legal heirs of deceased partners and a surviving partner of a partnership firm. 
• The partnership firm originally consisted of three partners. Two of the partners passed away. 
• The partnership deed contained an arbitration clause (Clause 15) which stated that any disputes regarding partnership affairs, dissolution, or discontinuance would be referred to arbitration. 
• The partnership deed also contained a specific clause (Clause 2) addressing the continuation of the partnership after a partner's death, stating that the partnership would continue between the surviving partners and potentially one heir of the deceased partner if agreed upon. 
• The respondents (original defendants) filed a petition under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act) in the Commercial Court at Dibrugarh, seeking dismissal of the commercial suit and requesting reference to arbitration. 
• The petition was based on the arbitration clause contained in the partnership deed. 
• The Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Dibrugarh dismissed this petition. 
• The respondents then filed an appeal under Section 37(1)(a) of A & C Act before the Gauhati High Court. 
  • The High Court concluded that legal heirs of the deceased partner are entitled to invoke the arbitration clause, and the surviving partner can also invoke the arbitration clause against the legal heirs. 
• Special Leave Petition has been filed before the Supreme Court by the petitioner. 
• The dispute centers on whether the legal heirs of deceased partners can be bound by the arbitration agreement in the partnership deed despite not being signatories, and whether they can invoke the arbitration clause for the rendition of accounts. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court made the following observations: 
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition, upholding the High Court's judgment. 
  • The Court identified two major questions:  
    • Whether legal heirs of a deceased partner, being non-signatories to the partnership deed, can be bound by the arbitration agreement? 
    • Whether the right to sue for rendition of accounts survives to the legal heirs, entitling them to invoke the arbitration clause? 
  • The Court cited the case of Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel & Anr. (2008), stating it "squarely covers the facts of the present case." 
  • The Court observed that an arbitration agreement does not cease to exist upon the death of any party and can be enforced by or against the legal representatives of the deceased. 
  • It emphasized the definition of 'legal representative' under Section 2(1)(g) of A & C Act noting that arbitral agreements and awards are enforceable by or against legal representatives. 
  • The Court referenced Section 40 of A & C Act, affirming that death does not discharge an arbitration agreement. 
  • It concluded that the term 'partners' extends to and includes legal heirs, representatives, assigns, or legatees. 
  • The Court held that since the legal heirs had "stepped into the shoes of the deceased," clause 15 of the partnership agreement binds both the petitioners and respondents. 

Who are the Legal Representatives as per the A & C Act? 

• Under Section 2 (1) (g) the legal representatives are defined as: 
  • A person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased, and, where a party acts in a representative character, the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so acting. 

What is the Effect of Death on Arbitration Agreement? 

• As per section 40 the A & C Act, an arbitration agreement not to be discharged by death of party thereto: 
  • Clause (1) states that an arbitration agreement shall not be discharged by the death of any party thereto either as respects the deceased or as respects any other party, but shall in such event been forceable by or against the legal representative of the deceased.  
  • Clause (2) states that the mandate of an arbitrator shall not be terminated by the death of any party by whom he was appointed.  
  • Clause (3) states that nothing in this section shall affect the operation of any law by virtue of which any right of action is extinguished by the death of a person. 

Landmark Judgement 

• Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel & Anr. (2008) 
  • The Supreme Court in this case established the important principle that arbitration clauses in partnership agreements survive the death of partners and can be invoked by or against their legal representatives.