List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta have ruled that the higher punishment under either the POCSO Act or IPC must be imposed, rejecting pleas for lesser punishment under POCSO. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2025).

What was the Background of Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P Case? 

• The case involves Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh, who was accused of sexually assaulting his minor daughter, approximately 9 years old at the time of the incident. 
• On 28th October 2015, an FIR was lodged by Smt. Rajani (wife of the appellant) at Police Station Chandpur, District Fatehpur. 
• According to the FIR, Rajani had gone to her parental home approximately two months prior with her youngest son Krishna (aged 2), leaving her minor daughter (the victim) and son Vishnu (aged 4) in the custody of her husband. 
• The incident allegedly occurred on 22nd October 2015 at approximately 8:00 p.m., when the appellant enticed his minor daughter, took her to the rooftop, and committed sexual assault upon her. 
• The victim was reportedly detained on the roof through threats and was only able to come down in the morning, at which point she narrated the incident to her grandfather, Ram Naresh Singh (PW-3). 
• Ram Naresh Singh telephonically informed the victim's mother (the informant) about the occurrence, after which the appellant allegedly absconded. 
• The informant initially did not go to her matrimonial home due to fear but later approached the police station with her father Ranjeet Singh, father-in-law Ram Naresh Singh, and the victim to file the FIR. 
• The investigation was undertaken by Rajesh Kumar Singh (PW-7), and the minor victim was subjected to medical examination by Dr. Manisha Shukla (PW-4). 
• The medical examination revealed redness present over the labia minora in the victim's vagina, though her hymen was intact. Forensic material was collected for pathological examination, DNA mapping, and examination for the presence of spermatozoa. 
• The victim's birth certificate was collected from school, and she was examined under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (CrPC) wherein she made emphatic allegations of penetrative sexual assault against her father. 
• The appellant was charged with offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Sections 3/4/5 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO).  
• When questioned under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant denied the allegations, claiming he had been falsely implicated because he had previously lodged an FIR against his wife and his father (PW-3). He contended that at the time of the incident, the child was residing with his sister.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court addressed the appellant's contention regarding the application of Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which the appellant argued should override the provisions of the IPC due to its status as a special law. 
• The Court observed that Sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act operate in completely different spheres. Section 42 specifically addresses the quantum of punishment when an act constitutes an offence under both the POCSO Act and the IPC. 
• The Court noted that Section 42 mandates that when a particular act or omission constitutes an offence under both the POCSO Act and the IPC or Information Technology Act, 2000, the offender shall be liable to punishment under whichever law provides for a greater degree of punishment. 
• The Court observed that Section 42A, in contrast, deals with procedural aspects and gives overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law where the two acts are inconsistent with each other. 
• The Court observed that Section 42A cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be interpreted to override the scope and ambit of the enabling provision, i.e., Section 42 of the POCSO Act. 
• The Court observed that since Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC provide for higher punishment compared to Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to award punishment in accordance with Section 42 of the POCSO Act. 
• Regarding the enhancement of sentence by the High Court, the Court observed that under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, courts have discretion to award a term sentence of minimum 10 years or imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life. 
• The Court observed that there is no mandate that under these provisions, a convict must be awarded life imprisonment. The trial Court had exercised its discretion to award life imprisonment without specifying it would be for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. 
• The Court observed that the High Court, while deciding the appeal against conviction, had increased the rigour of punishment by directing that the life imprisonment would extend to the remainder of the appellant's natural life, which effectively eliminated any possibility of early release. 
• The Court referred to precedents including Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka and Navas v. State of Kerala, which established that constitutional courts could impose modified or fixed-term sentences in cases where life imprisonment is warranted but may fall short of the "rarest of rare" category. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court erred in enhancing the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially in the absence of an appeal for enhancement by the State. 

What are the Legal Provisions Referred? 

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 

• Before it was covered under Section 376 of IPC. 
• Now Section 64 of BNS deals with whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
• (f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; 
• (i)commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent. 

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 

Section 3: Penetrative Sexual Assault 

• This section defines what constitutes "penetrative sexual assault" of a child. It includes four scenarios: 
  • Penile penetration into a child's vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus. 
  • Insertion of any object or body part (other than penis) into a child's vagina, urethra, or anus. 
  • Manipulation of a child's body to cause penetration. 
  • Application of mouth to a child's genitals or making a child do this. 

Section 4: Punishment for Penetrative Sexual Assault 

• This section details the penalties for penetrative sexual assault: 
  • A minimum imprisonment of 10 years, which may extend to life imprisonment, plus fine. 
  • For victims under 16 years, a minimum imprisonment of 20 years, which may extend to imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life, plus fine. 
  • The fine is meant to cover the victim's medical expenses and rehabilitation. 

Section 5: Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault 

• This section defines "aggravated" cases of penetrative sexual assault, which include situations where: 
  • The offender is a police officer, armed forces member, public servant, or in a position of authority. 
  • The assault occurs in institutional settings (jails, hospitals, schools, religious institutions). 
  • Gang sexual assault occurs. 
  • Weapons, fire, or corrosive substances are used. 
  • The assault causes grievous harm or permanent injury. 
  • The victim is made pregnant or infected with HIV. 
  • The assault causes death. 
  • The victim has mental or physical disabilities. 
  • The assault is repeated. 
  • The victim is under 12 years of age. 
  • The offender is related to the child. 
  • The assault occurs during communal violence or natural calamities. 

Section 42: Alternate Punishment 

• This section addresses situations where an offence is punishable under both POCSO and other laws (like the Indian Penal Code or Information Technology Act). It establishes that the offender shall be punished under whichever law provides the greater punishment. 

Section 42A: Act Not in Derogation of Any Other Law 

• This section clarifies that POCSO provisions are supplemental to other laws, not replacements. In cases of inconsistency with other laws, POCSO's provisions override them to the extent of that inconsistency. 
• These sections collectively define sexual offences against children, establish severe punishments, and ensure that POCSO takes precedence when it offers stronger protections than other laws. 

Source: Allahabad High Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Vipin Chandra Dixit has observed that a company complying with rules and regulations established by the various Ministries and public regulators would not by itself suffice for bringing it within the definition of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).  

• The Allahabad High Court observed this in the matter of M/s Manoj Petroleum and another v. Union of India & Ors.  

What was the Background of M/s Manoj Petroleum and another v. Union of India & Ors. Case? 

• Petitioner no.1 is a partnership firm registered through a partnership deed dated October 2, 2018, between Smt. Sangeeta Pathak and Smt. Sonam Singhal (Petitioner no.2), with the business focus on the sale of petroleum products, grease, distilled water, and other items. 
• Nayara Energy Limited (formerly Essar Oil Limited) received authorization from the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas to distribute franchises for petroleum products. Respondent no.3 issued a letter of appointment to Petitioner no.1 on November 5, 2019, for the sale of Motor Speed Petrol and High-Speed Diesel lubes at a retail outlet located in Bulandshahar, Uttar Pradesh. A franchise agreement was signed on January 6, 2020. 
• On August 18, 2021, respondent no.3 conducted an inspection at the retail outlet and collected samples for testing. The samples were sent to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), which reported on August 21, 2021, that the samples failed to meet specifications. 
• Following the BPCL report, respondent no.3 issued a show cause notice on August 26, 2021, alleging violations in the franchise agreement. Petitioner no.1 responded on September 9, 2021, raising concerns about discrepancies in product delivery and issues with the unendorsed samples, casting doubt on the validity of the test report. 
• Despite the explanation provided, respondent no.3 terminated the franchise agreement on December 28, 2021, citing unsatisfactory responses from the petitioner. 
• In response to the termination, petitioner no.1 approached the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) on January 31, 2022, alleging misuse of power and unlawful termination of the franchise agreement. Petitioner sent a reminder on March 4, 2022, after receiving no response from CVC. 
• Due to inaction from the CVC and other authorities, petitioner no.1 filed a writ petition before the court seeking relief and redressal of grievances. 
• Respondent no.3 raised a preliminary objection on the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that the dispute is between a private firm and respondent no.3, and should not be adjudicated under the writ jurisdiction as respondent no.3 is not a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 
• This petition has been filed in response to the termination of the franchise agreement and the failure to address the grievances raised by petitioner no.1. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Allahabad High Court has established the following legal principles: 
  • A company or body will be considered a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution if there is substantial financial, functional, and administrative control by the Government. If such control is established, the company will be amenable to writ jurisdiction. 
  • Even if a private institution performs a public function (such as the sale of essential commodities like petroleum products), it does not automatically bring every dispute involving the institution under writ jurisdiction. The nature of the dispute matters—disputes rooted in private law are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. 
  • The issuance of a writ of mandamus is limited to enforcing public duties. If the duty is purely private in nature, even if it is related to public functions, a writ cannot be issued to enforce it. 
  • Breaches of mutual contracts, without any public law element, cannot be resolved through writ petitions under Article 226. 
• The writ petition was found to be not maintainable as the dispute between the petitioner and respondent no.3 arises out of a private contract, and the respondent is not a ‘State’ under Article 12. 
• The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the franchise agreement, such as grievance redressal or arbitration. 

What is Article 12 of Constitution of India? 

About 

• Article 12 lays down that unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. 
• The definition of State is inclusive and provides that State includes the following: 
  • Government and Parliament of India i.e., the Executive and Legislature of the Union. 
  • Government and Legislature of each State i.e., the Executive and Legislature of the various States of India. 
  • All local or other authorities within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India. 

Local or Other Authorities Within the Territory of India 

• The expression local authorities is defined in Section 3(31) of the General Clause Act, 1897 as local Authority shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of commissioner or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government within the control or management of a municipal or local fund. 
• The expression local authorities usually refer to authorities such as municipalities, District Boards, Panchayats, mining settlement boards, etc. Anybody functioning under the state; owned; controlled and managed by the State and carrying out a public function is a local authority and comes within the definition of the state. 
• The term other authorities have nowhere been defined. Therefore, its interpretation has caused a good deal of difficulty, and judicial opinion has undergone changes over time. 
• The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. R.C. Jain (1981) laid down the test for determining which bodies would be considered as a local authority under the definition of State enshrined under Article 12 of the COI. The Court held that if an authority: 
  • Has a separate legal existence 
  • Functions in a defined area 
  • Has the power to raise funds on its own 
  • Enjoys autonomy i.e., self-rule 
  • Is entrusted by statute with functions which are usually entrusted to municipalities, then such authorities would come under ‘local authorities’ and hence would be State under Article 12 of the COI. 

Whether a Body falls Under Article 12 or Not? 

• In R.D Shetty v. Airport Authority of India (1979) Justice P.N Bhagwati gave 5 Point test. This is a test to determine whether a body is an agency or instrumentality of the State and goes as follows – 
  • Financial resources of the State, where the State is the chief funding source i.e. the entire share capital is held by the government. 
  • Deep and pervasive control of the State. 
  • The functional character being Governmental in its essence, meaning thereby that its functions have public importance or are of a governmental character. 
  • A department of Government transferred to a corporation. 
  • Enjoys monopoly status which State conferred or is protected by it. 
  • This was elucidated with the statement that the test is only illustrative and not conclusive in its nature and is to be approached with great care and caution. 

Case Laws  

• University of Madras v. Shanta Bai (1950), the Madras High Court evolved the principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ i.e., of the like nature. It means that only those authorities are covered under the expression ‘other authorities’ which perform governmental or sovereign functions. Further, it cannot include persons, natural or juristic, for example, Unaided universities. 
• Ujjammabai v. the State of UP (1961), the Supreme Court rejected the above restrictive scope and held that the ‘ejusdem generis’ rule could not be resorted to in interpreting other authorities. The bodies named under Article 12 have no common genus running through them and they cannot be placed in one single category on any rational basis.