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Criminal Law

Entitlement to Anticipatory Bail

 10-Apr-2025

Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda 

“If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences.” 

Justices Bela M. Trivedi and PB Varale

 Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and PB Varale held that an accused who evades the law or obstructs the execution of warrants is not entitled to the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases involving serious economic or heinous offences. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the matter of  Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda (2025).

What was the Background of Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda Case? 

  • The Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), a statutory body constituted under Section 211 of the Companies Act 2013, was directed by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to investigate the affairs of 125 Companies of Adarsh Group. 
  • Adarsh Credit Cooperative Society Limited (ACCSL), a Multi-State Credit Cooperative Society founded by Mukesh Modi, had 800+ branches, 20 lakh members, 3.7 lakh advisors, and Rs.9253 crores of outstanding deposits as of May 2018. 
  • Upon investigation, SFIO found that funds amounting to Rs.1700 crores were illegally loaned by ACCSL to 70 Adarsh Group Companies controlled by Mukesh Modi, Rahul Modi, and their associates. 
  • These illegal loans were contrary to the established position that companies cannot be members of a multi-state credit cooperative society and therefore cannot receive loans from such societies. 
  • The investigation revealed that the total outstanding balance of such illegal loans was Rs.4120 crores as of March 2018. 
  • These loans were allegedly obtained on the basis of forged financial documents submitted by the directors of the Companies belonging to the Adarsh Group. 
  • SFIO filed a Criminal Complaint (COMA/5/2019) against 181 accused in the Special Court at Gurugram for various offences under the Companies Act and the Indian Penal Code. 
  • The Special Court took cognizance of all the alleged offences and issued bailable warrants against all the accused including the respondents. 
  • The respondents-accused allegedly evaded the execution of warrants by hiding themselves and not making themselves available at their given addresses, leading the Special Court to issue non-bailable warrants and initiate proclamation proceedings against them. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Supreme Court observed that when a person creates hindrances in the execution of warrants or conceals themselves, they are not entitled to the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court has found them prima facie involved in serious economic offences. 
  • The Court noted that the High Court had granted anticipatory bail to the respondents in utter disregard of the mandatory conditions contained in Section 212(6) of the Companies Act and ignoring the conduct of the respondents-accused. 
  • The Supreme Court emphasized that every person must abide by the law, respect the law, and follow due process, stating that "the law aids only the abiding and certainly not its resistant's." 
  • The Court observed that judicial time of every court, including Magistrate's Courts, is as precious and valuable as that of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. 
  • It held that avoiding execution of summons or warrants, disobeying court orders, and delaying proceedings amounts to interfering with and causing obstruction in the administration of justice. 
  • The Court found that the High Court failed to consider the proceedings conducted and the detailed orders passed by the Special Court for securing the presence of the Respondents-Accused. 
  • The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's orders were perverse and untenable at law, as they ignored well-settled legal positions regarding anticipatory bail in cases of serious economic offences. 

What is Section 482 of  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. (BNSS)?  

  • Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 provides for anticipatory bail, allowing a person who fears arrest for a non-bailable offence to apply to the High Court or Court of Session for pre-arrest bail. 
  • This provision replaced Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) when the BNSS came into effect on July 1, 2024. 
  • Under Section 482(2), courts may impose conditions including mandatory availability for police interrogation, prohibition against influencing witnesses, and restriction on leaving India without court permission. 
  • The concept of anticipatory bail evolved from the 41st Law Commission Report, which recognized the need to protect individuals from false implication and disgracement through detention. 
  • While Section 482 of BNSS retains the essential framework for anticipatory bail, it omits the factors that courts were previously required to consider under Section 438 of CrPC. 
  • Clauses (1A) and (1B) of the former Section 438, which contained special provisions regarding sexual offences, have been omitted in the BNSS framework. 
  • Clauses (2), (3), and (4) from the original provision in CrPC have been retained substantially in the same form in Section 482 of BNSS. 
  • Under Section 482(3), if a person granted anticipatory bail is arrested without warrant, they shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate decides to issue a warrant, it must be a bailable warrant in conformity with the court's direction. 

Civil Law

Guidelines for Interpretation of Deeds and Contracts

 10-Apr-2025

Annaya Kocha Shetty (Dead) through LRs v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose since Deceased through LRs 

“The construction of a deed is “generally speaking, a matter of law.” However, when there is an ambiguity in the deed, determining its meaning is a mixed question of fact and law.” 

Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice SVN Bhatti 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice SVN Bhatti laid down guidelines for construction of deeds and contracts. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of Annaya Kocha Shetty (Dead) through LRs v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose since Deceased through LRs (2025). 

What was the Background of Annaya Kocha Shetty (Dead) through LRs v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose since Deceased through LRs (2025) Case?   

  • This case involves a civil appeal arising from an order dated 16th July 2018 in Civil Revision Application No. 247 of 2016. 
  • The plaintiff sought declaration as a deemed tenant/protected licensee of defendant no. 1 under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act for shop nos. 5 and 6 at Shri Samarthashraya Vishranti Graha. 
  • The plaintiff and defendant no. 1 entered into an agreement dated 16th August 1967, which is the core document in the dispute. 
  • Defendant no. 1 was the landlady running a hotel business, while defendant no. 2 was the actual owner of the premises. 
  • On 28th February 1997, defendant no. 1 served notice to the plaintiff to vacate the premises. 
  • Trial Court Findings: 
    • The Court held that the plaintiff was a licensee, not merely a conductor of defendant no. 1's business. 
    • The Trial Court found that despite being styled as a "conducting agreement," the actual relationship established was that of leave and license. 
    • The Court determined the relationship was based on the nature of occupation rather than the nomenclature of the agreement. 
    • Noted that clauses in the agreement indicated the plaintiff had exclusive possession and control:  
      • Plaintiff paid Rs. 1000/month for use and occupation. 
      • Plaintiff bore all operational costs (electricity, water, wages, license fees). 
      • Plaintiff assumed all business risks. 
      • Plaintiff was responsible for paying workers. 
    • The Court concluded that the plaintiff qualified as a deemed tenant under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. 
  • The matter went to the Appellate Court and the Court held that the arrangement was merely to conduct a business and not a license of the premises. 
  • The High Court also confirmed the view of the Appellate Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Court in this case summarized the guidelines on construction of deeds and contracts: 
    • The contract is first constructed in its plain, ordinary and literal meaning. This is also known as the literal rule of construction. 
    • If there is an absurdity created by literally reading the contract, a shift from literal rule may be allowed. This construction is generally called the golden rule of construction. 
    • Lastly, the contract may be purposively constructed in light of its object and context to determine the purpose of the contract. This approach must be used cautiously. 
  • The Court also held that construction of a deed is “generally speaking a matter of law”. However, when there is an ambiguity in the deed, determining its meaning is a mixed question of fact and law. 
  • The law for construction of deeds is encapsulated in Section 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA). 
  • It was concluded by the Court that by looking at the deed it can be held that the agreement talked about in the present facts is one for conducting the business of first defendant. Also, the oral evidence was not considered as there are no circumstances that would make the case fall under the provisos of Section 92. 
  • Thus, the Court concluded that it was in agreement with the views of the Appellate Court and High Court.   

What is Section 91 and Section 92 of IEA? 

  • Section 91 of IEA denotes that a deed constitutes the primary evidence of the terms to which the parties are to adhere. 
  • Whereas section 92 of IEA forbids any contradictions or variations in a written document by extrinsic evidence. 
  • However, there are exceptions outlined in the proviso to section 92, that allow variations from this general rule. 
  • It is to be noted that these provisions are contained in Section 94 and 95 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). 
  • Section 91 of IEA: Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduce to form of document. 
    • When any agreement, property transfer, or legally required matter is documented:  
      • The actual document itself must serve as evidence. 
      • Verbal testimony cannot substitute for the document's contents. 
    • This rule has two exceptions:  
      • Public officers: If someone has been acting as a public officer, their written appointment need not be produced. 
      • Wills: Wills already approved in India can be proven using the probate document. 
    • Important clarifications:  
      • This rule applies whether the agreement is in one document or spread across multiple documents. 
      • If multiple original copies exist, only one original needs to be provided. 
      • The rule only blocks verbal evidence about the specific terms of the agreement or grant - verbal evidence about other facts mentioned in the document remains admissible. 
    • In essence: When important matters are documented in official form, the document itself must be presented as evidence - not recollections or claims about its contents. 
  • Section 92 of IEA: Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement 
    • The main body of Section 92 of IEA provides that once a written document has been presented as evidence, no oral testimony can be admitted that contradicts, changes, adds to, or takes away from the document's terms. 
    • The six exceptions to this rule are as follows: 
      • Facts that would invalidate the document can be proven, such as:  
        • Fraud 
        • Intimidation 
        • Illegality 
        • Improper execution 
        • Lack of capacity of a party 
        • Lack or failure of consideration 
        • Mistake in fact or law 
      • A separate oral agreement about matters not mentioned in the document may be proven, if it doesn't contradict the document's terms. The court considers the document's formality when applying this exception. 
      • An oral agreement that establishes a condition that must be met before any obligations under the document become effective may be proven. 
      • A later oral agreement that cancels or modifies the document may be proven, unless the law requires such modifications to be in writing or registered. 
      • Customary practices that are typically included in similar contracts may be proven, provided they don't conflict with the document's express terms. 
      • Facts that show how the document's language relates to existing circumstances may be proven. 

Family Law

Presumption Under Section 16 of HAMA

 10-Apr-2025

Nivritti Pandurang Nale v. Uttam Ganu Nale & Anr.  

“Only because the adoption deed is a registered document it cannot be accepted as having presumptive value under Section 16. The presumption under Section 16 is applicable only if the document records the particulars of the adoption made and it is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption. ” 

Justice Gauri Godse   

Source: Bombay High Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Gauri Godse  held that mere registration of an adoption deed does not by itself attract the presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA).  

  • For the presumption to apply, the deed must clearly record the particulars of the adoption and be signed by both the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption. 
  • The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Nivritti Pandurang Nale v. Uttam Ganu Nale & Anr (2025).

What was the Background of Nivritti Pandurang Nale v. Uttam Ganu Nale & Anr (2025) Case? 

  • The case revolves around a property dispute between plaintiffs (sons and wife of one Ganu) and defendant no. 2 (Nivrutti), who claimed to be the adopted son of Pandurang (Ganu's brother) and defendant no. 1 (Pandurang's wife). 
  • Gopala had two sons, Ganu and Pandurang. Ganu died on December 25, 1953, while Pandurang died on March 26, 1978. 
  • Plaintiff no. 3 was Ganu's wife, and plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 along with defendant no. 2 (Nivrutti) were the biological sons of Ganu and plaintiff no. 3. 
  • Defendant no. 2 claimed that Pandurang and defendant no. 1 had adopted him, making him the exclusive heir to Pandurang's property after defendant no. 1's death. 
  • The adoption deed relied upon by defendant no. 2 was dated 18th July, 1985, executed by defendant no. 1 after Pandurang's death, stating that the adoption had taken place 25 years prior (around 1960). 
  • The trial court accepted defendant no. 2's claim of adoption and dismissed the partition suit filed by the plaintiffs. 
  • The first Appellate Court reversed this finding, declaring that plaintiff nos. 1 to 3 and defendant no. 2 each had a 1/4th share in the suit property. 
  • Defendant no. 2 filed a second appeal before the Bombay High Court challenging the first Appellate Court's judgment and seeking recognition as the exclusive heir to the property based on his claimed adoption.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The High Court observed that for a valid adoption, there must be proof of "giving and taking" of the child by the biological parents and adoptive parents respectively, which was lacking in this case. 
  • The Court noted that according to the adoption deed, the adoption supposedly took place around 1960, but Ganu (biological father) had died in 1953, making it impossible for him to have given consent for the adoption as claimed in the deed. 
  • The Court observed that there was no pleading or proof that the biological mother (plaintiff no. 3) had given defendant no. 2 in adoption, which is an essential ingredient of a valid adoption under Section 11(vi) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA). 
  • The Court held that mere registration of an adoption deed cannot give rise to a presumption under Section 16 of the HAMA, unless the document is signed by both the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption. 
  • The Court observed that since the adoption deed was not signed by the biological mother (who was alive at the time), the presumption under Section 16 could not be applied. 
  • The Court concluded that the burden to prove valid adoption was on the defendants, which they failed to satisfy, and thus defendant no. 2 could not claim exclusive rights to the property based on adoption. 
  • The Court partially modified the first Appellate Court's order, declaring that plaintiffs nos. 1 and 2 and defendant no. 2 were entitled to 1/3rd share each in the suit properties. 

What is Section 16 of the HAMA ? 

  • Section 16 of the HAMA creates a rebuttable presumption that an adoption is valid when evidenced by a registered document signed by both the person giving it to and the person taking the child in adoption.  
  • This presumption stands unless and until contrary evidence disproves the validity of the adoption. The provision requires dual signatures on the registered document to trigger this legal presumption.  
  • The section effectively balances formal documentation with the ability to challenge adoptions through contradictory evidence if necessary.  
  • This presumption mechanism helps courts efficiently handle adoption cases while maintaining avenues for addressing potentially improper adoptions.