List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan held that the Court can dismiss a suit as time barred even when specific issue regarding limitation is not framed. 

•  The Supreme Court held this in the case of R Nagraj (Dead) through Lrs v. Rajmani and others (2025). 

What was the Background of R Nagraj (Dead) through Lrs v. Rajmani and others (2025) Case?  

• The appeal is against a judgment of the Madras High Court dated 17th February 2020, which set aside lower court decisions and remitted the matter back to the trial court. 
• The case originated from a joint Hindu family consisting of Rangappa Gowdar and his sons, Dasappa Gowdar and Samiappan. 
• Initially, Samiappan's wife (Sunderammal) and daughter (Vennila) filed suit O.S.No.851 of 1965 seeking maintenance against Samiappan, his father Rangappa Gowdar, and brother Dasappa Gowdar. 
• The maintenance suit was decreed on 26th August 1965, and suit properties were attached in execution proceedings. 
• During the pendency of execution, Rangappa Gowdar and Dasappa Gowdar died, and their legal heirs were brought on record. 
• Through court auction, the suit 'A' schedule property was purchased by Karivarada Gowdar, with sale confirmed on 25th September 1970. 
• When Samiappan tried to encroach on the property, Karivarada Gowdar filed and won a suit for permanent injunction. 
• The property subsequently changed hands multiple times, eventually being purchased by Appellant Nos. 1 and 2. 
• Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (daughters and wife of Dasappa Gowdar) filed suit O.S.No.257 of 1982 seeking to set aside the earlier decree, partition the properties, and obtain an injunction against the subsequent purchasers. 
• The trial court dismissed this suit on 08th September 1994, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge on 28th January 1997. 
• However, the High Court allowed their second appeal on 17th February 2020, remitting the matter back to the trial court specifically to determine if the suit was barred by limitation. 
• The current appeal before the Supreme Court challenges the High Court's judgment, with interim stay granted on the High Court's order. 
• Several respondents have passed away during the proceedings, with their legal representatives brought on record, while some proforma parties have been deleted from the array of parties.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter back to the trial court on the issue of limitation, despite concurrent findings by lower courts. 
• The Trial Court had ruled that the action to set aside the decree should have been taken within three years as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) but the suit was filed after 17 years. 
• The First Appellate Court affirmed this view, stating that the plaintiffs had "slept over for 17 years" against the mandate of Section 59 of the Limitation Act. 
• The Court clarified that the purpose of the Limitation Act is not to destroy vested rights but to prevent indefinite litigation by prescribing time periods for initiating actions. 
• While limitation is generally a mixed question of fact and law, when an action is initiated many years after the right to sue accrued without explanation for the delay, limitation becomes a question of law. 
• Even without specific pleadings regarding limitation, every civil court has a duty to determine whether a case has been initiated within the prescribed time, as mandated by Section 3 of the Limitation Act. 
• Although the trial court did not frame a specific issue on "limitation," this could be encompassed within the broader issues, and this procedural omission was not fatal to the judgment. 
• The evidence clearly showed that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were aware of the earlier proceedings and decree, as they were parties in the execution proceedings. 
• The Court emphasized that limitation is a matter of statute and must be strictly enforced, especially when earlier transactions were within the knowledge of the parties. 
• Protection of bona fide purchasers is a significant consideration, and disturbing their rights after such a long period would create uncertainty in property transactions. 
• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the decisions of the trial court and First Appellate Court dismissing the suit.

What is Section 3 of Limitation Act ? 

• Section 3 of Limitation Act provides for Bar of Limitation. 
• Constituents of Section 3: 
  • Courts must dismiss suits, appeals, and applications filed after the prescribed limitation period. 
  • This dismissal is mandatory even if the opposing party does not raise limitation as a defense. 
  • The provision is subject to exceptions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Act. 
  • This creates a statutory duty for courts to consider limitation on their own, regardless of whether parties raise the issue. 
  • The provision establishes limitation as a matter of law that cannot be waived by parties. 
  • Courts must apply this rule automatically to prevent stale claims from being entertained. 
• V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another (2005) 
  • The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. 
  • If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation, a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation. 

Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua  has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Section 34 petitions under the Arbitration Act, and delay beyond the prescribed period cannot be condoned. 

• The Himachal Pradesh High Court held this in the matter of National Highway Authority of India. v. Jagroop Singh & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of National Highway Authority of India. v. Jagroop Singh & Ors Case ? 

• The National Highway Authority of India received an arbitral award against them on 3rd January, 2022, and received a copy of this award on 20th August, 2022. 
• The National Highway Authority of India filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to challenge the award. 
• The petition was filed on 19th January, 2023, which was approximately 33 days beyond the maximum prescribed period of 120 days (3 months plus 30 days) allowed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. 
• The District Judge dismissed the petition on 13th June, 2024, ruling that it was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. 
• The National Highway Authority of India then filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act to the Himachal Pradesh High Court. 
• This appeal itself was filed with a delay of 258 days, for which they moved an application to condone the delay. 
• The offence in question related to matters between the National Highway Authority of India and Jagroop Singh & Others, though specific details of the underlying dispute were not mentioned in the case summary. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Himachal Pradesh High Court observed that under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 Act ,(A&C) , an application for setting aside an arbitral award must be made within three months, extendable by only thirty days upon showing sufficient cause, and "not thereafter." 
• The Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which generally allows courts to condone delay beyond the prescribed limitation period, does not apply to petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 
• The Court noted that the phrase "but not thereafter" in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be granted beyond the additional thirty days, as established in precedent cases including the Supreme Court's ruling in My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/s. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd (2025).  
• The Court determined that the District Judge correctly dismissed the original petition as it was filed approximately 33 days beyond the maximum allowable period of 120 days. 
• The Court further observed that the appellant had also failed to justify the 258-day delay in filing the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 
• Based on these observations regarding the statutory limitation periods for challenging an arbitral award and the specific provisions dealing with offences under the Arbitration Act, the Court dismissed both the application to condone delay and the appeal. 

What are the Legal Provisions Referred? 

About : 

• Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 - This provision deals with applications for setting aside arbitral awards. 
• Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act - This specific subsection establishes the limitation period for challenging an arbitral award, stipulating that it must be filed within three months, extendable by only 30 days upon showing sufficient cause, and "not thereafter." 
• Section 37 of the Arbitration Act - This section provides for appeals from certain orders, which was the provision under which the appellant filed their appeal to the High Court. 
• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - This provision generally allows courts to condone delays beyond prescribed limitation periods if sufficient cause is shown. The court held that this provision does not apply to Section 34 petitions under the Arbitration Act. 

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 

• Section 34(1) establishes that the only recourse against an arbitral award is through an application for setting it aside under the procedures outlined in subsections (2) and (3). 
• Section 34(3) imposes a strict time limitation of three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award for filing an application to set it aside. 
• The proviso to Section 34(3) allows the Court to entertain such applications for an additional period of thirty days (but not thereafter) if satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the initial three-month period. 
• Section 37(1)(c) specifically provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court from an order "setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34." 
• Section 37(3) prohibits a second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 37, though it preserves the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
• The phrase "but not thereafter" in the proviso to Section 34(3) creates an absolute bar on the Court's power to entertain applications beyond the extended period of 30 days, which was the critical legal point in this case. 
• The combined effect of these provisions establishes a strict limitation regime for challenging arbitral awards, with courts having no discretion to condone delays beyond the maximum period of 120 days (3 months plus 30 days). 

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963  

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides a general power to courts to admit appeals or applications after the prescribed limitation period has expired. 
• For this provision to apply, the appellant or applicant must satisfy the court that they had "sufficient cause" for not filing within the prescribed period. 
• The provision explicitly excludes applications under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 from its scope. 
• The Explanation to Section 5 clarifies that being misled by any order, practice, or judgment of the High Court in determining the limitation period may constitute "sufficient cause." 
• This section creates a discretionary power for courts to condone delays beyond statutory limitation periods in the interest of justice. 
• However, as held by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in this case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act due to the specific language "but not thereafter" in Section 34(3). 

 Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Ahsanuddin Amanullah. has held that the seriousness of the allegations involving fraud on a foreign company's subsidiary warranted a thorough investigation, and the rule of law mandates both the protection of foreign investments and the fair trial rights of the accused. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Hyeoksoo Son Authorized Representative for Daechang Seat Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Moon June Seok & Anr (2025). 

What was the Background of Hyeoksoo Son Authorized Representative For Daechang Seat Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Moon June Seok & Anr? 

• Daechang Seat Automotive Ltd., a subsidiary of a South Korean company manufacturing seat equipment for KIA cars, engaged the services of M/s. N.K. Associates as Chartered Accountants and Financial Advisors. 
• M/s. N.K. Associates informed the Company that it had wrongly claimed input tax credit amounting to Rs.9,73,96,225.80 payable to the Goods and Services Tax Department. 
• N.K. Associates advised that it was standard practice in India for tax amounts to be transferred to financial advisors who would then pay it to the concerned department. 
• The Company transferred funds totaling Rs.10,18,54,894.80 to N.K. Associates and Terminus for purported GST payments. 
• In October 2022, the Korean management discovered that the GST portal showed no mismatch of input tax credit, and the Company had excess credit available. 
• The Company learned that the amounts transferred were never paid to the GST Department by N.K. Associates or Terminus. 
• Further investigation revealed that Terminus and N.K. Associates shared the same registered address, with interconnected directors and partners. 
• An FIR was registered on 11th December 2022 for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 409, 418, 420, 120B read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
• Moon June Seok, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company and accused No.5, allegedly received Rs.1,80,00,000/- from accused No.1 Nikhil K.S. and was accused of being part of the conspiracy. 
• Respondent Moon June Seok was also allegedly responsible for appointing Ritesh Merugu (accused No.2) as Accounts Manager on the recommendation of accused No.1. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that the contours of exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC are well-established in various judgments, particularly in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal where seven circumstances for justified exercise were detailed. 
• Regarding the submission that reliance solely on co-accused statements is not justified, the Court found this incorrect as respondent No.1's own statement corroborated the statement of accused No.1. 
• The Court noted with surprise that the CFO of a company and an alleged chartered accountant both readily agreed to share financial details and books of accounts without formalizing their relationship in writing. 
• The Court determined that at this stage, it would not be just, reasonable, or proper to conclude there was no evidence against the respondent, especially considering the large amounts of money involved. 
• The Supreme Court observation that "the rule of law has a responsibility to protect the investments of foreign investors, while at the same time ensuring that any person accused of mishandling such funds is really and fully protected by the power of the phrase 'innocent till proven guilty'." 
• The Court deemed it appropriate to leave the determination of whether there was sufficient evidence against the respondent to the trial court rather than quashing proceedings at this stage. 
• The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and restored the proceedings to the file of the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru. 

What is the Concept of Rule of Law? 

• The rule of law is a fundamental legal principle derived from the French phrase 'le principe de legalite' (principle of legality), establishing that no one, including government officials, is above the law. 
• At its core, rule of law ensures that a nation is governed by law rather than arbitrary decisions, placing every person under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts irrespective of position or rank. 
• Professor A.V. Dicey, the main exponent of this concept, propounded three essential principles in his 1885 work 'Law and the Constitution': supremacy of law, equality before law, and predominance of legal spirit. 
• The supremacy of law principle rejects arbitrary governmental powers, ensuring punishment occurs only for breaches of established law, not administrative discretion. 
• Equality before law, the second pillar, emphasizes legal impartiality, providing that the same set of laws apply to all people regardless of status, with adjudication through the same courts. 
• The third principle, predominance of legal spirit, focuses on courts as independent enforcers of the rule of law, free from external influence and impartiality. 
• In India, the Constitution serves as the supreme law of the land, binding the Judiciary, Legislature, and Executive to act according to its principles. 
• Key constitutional provisions embodying the rule of law include Article 13 (enabling review of laws contrary to the Constitution) and Article 14 (guaranteeing equality before law). 
• The Supreme Court has reinforced the rule of law through landmark judgments, notably in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), where it was established as a basic feature of the Constitution. 
• The modern concept of rule of law extends beyond Dicey's original formulation to encompass human dignity, independent judiciary, effective governance, due process guarantees, and the encouragement of legitimate political criticism.