Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justices Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan held that “if subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora's Box where all the cases that were subsequently overruled, would approach this Court and would seek a relief based on the new interpretation of law”.

• The Supreme Court gave this judgment in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal & Ors.

What was the Background of Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal & Ors. Case?

• The appeals were filed against orders of the High Court of Delhi, which had declared acquisition proceedings to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
• The acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for various public projects like residential schemes, industrial areas, flyovers, and the Delhi Metro.
• However, in some cases, compensation was not paid, or possession was not taken within the prescribed time frame.
• The enactment of the 2013 Act and subsequent court judgments led to the High Court declaring these acquisition proceedings as lapsed.
• The government authorities filed appeals, review petitions, and miscellaneous applications against these orders, seeking condonation of delay on various grounds, including suppression of facts by landowners, subsequent changes in the interpretation of Section 24(2) by the Supreme Court, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

What were the Court’s Observations?

The Supreme Court analyzed the various grounds for condonation of delay and passed the following directions:

• Allegations of suppression of facts by landowners:
  • In cases where allegations of suppression of material facts by landowners were made, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court orders and revived the relevant writ petitions.
  • The High Court was directed to conduct a fact-finding inquiry to determine the rightful claimant for compensation.
• Public interest and justice:
  • Considering the significant harm to public infrastructure projects and the minimal comparative impact on landowners, the court condoned the delay in the larger public interest.
• COVID-19 pandemic:
  • The court condoned the delay in cases where the limitation period expired between 15^th March 2020, and 28^th February 2022, due to the pandemic.
• Cases involving non-payment of compensation or non-taking of possession:
  • For cases where compensation was not paid or possession was not taken, the court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
  • It extended the time limit for initiating fresh acquisition proceedings, dispensed with certain procedural requirements of the 2013 Act, and provided guidelines for determining compensation and rehabilitation measures.

What is the Law on Condonation of Delay?

• The Limitation Act, 1963, enacted on 5^th October 1963, and effective from 1st January 1964, aims to prescribe the time periods within which existing rights can be enforced in courts of law.
• The Act is based on the Latin maxim "vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subveniunt," which means that the law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights.
• However, the Act recognizes that there may be circumstances beyond a litigant's control that prevent them from filing a suit or appeal within the prescribed time limit.
• This is where the concept of "condonation of delay" comes into play.

What is Condonation of Delay?

• About:
  • Condonation of delay is a discretionary remedy exercised by courts wherein, upon an application made by a party who wishes to have an appeal or application admitted after the prescribed period, the court may condone (overlook) the delay if the party provides a “sufficient cause” that hindered them from filing the appeal or application on time.
  • If the court is satisfied with the sufficient cause, it may condone the delay and admit the appeal or application as if no delay had occurred, allowing the matter to proceed on merits rather than being dismissed solely on technical grounds.
• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enunciates the principle of condonation of delay. It states:
  • “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period”.
  • The Explanation to Section 5 further clarifies that if the appellant or applicant missed any order, practice, or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period, it may constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.
• Interpreting "Sufficient Cause":
  • The term "sufficient cause" has not been defined in the Limitation Act, 1963 allowing courts broad discretion in its interpretation.
• Sufficient Cause to Grant Condonation of Delay:
  • Significant changes in the law
  • Serious illness of the applicant
  • Imprisonment of the applicant
  • The applicant being a pardanashin woman (living in seclusion)
  • Delay in procuring copies from officials, provided the applicant initiated efforts to obtain them vigilantly
  • Delay caused by the action or inaction of the applicant's lawyer
• Applicability to Special Laws:
  • The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 may not apply to special laws or statutes that have their own provisions for condonation of delay.
  • For instance, the Supreme Court has held in several cases that Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act), which deals with setting aside an arbitral award, expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by using the phrase "but not thereafter."

What are the Landmark Judgments on Condonation of Delay?

• Krishna v. Chattappan (1889):
  • The Privy Council laid down two rules for interpreting "sufficient cause":
    • the cause must be beyond the control of the invoking party, and
    • the parties must not be lacking bona fide or shown to be negligent or inactive.
• Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962):
  • The Supreme Court held that the delay requiring explanation is from the date the time was running out until the date of filing the appeal or application, and that a lack of diligence until the last date of limitation would not disqualify a person from applying for condonation of delay.
• State of W.P v. Howrah Municipality (1972):
  • The Supreme Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice.
• New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra (1976):
  • The Supreme Court held that the discretion conferred by Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be interpreted in a way that converts a discretionary remedy into a rigid rule, and the term "sufficient cause" cannot be defined by hard and fast rules.
• Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors (1987):
  • The Supreme Court laid down guidelines for administering the doctrine of condonation of delay, emphasizing that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations and that there is no presumption that the delay is caused deliberately.
• Vedabai alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others (2001):
  • The Supreme Court stated that in exercising discretion under Section 5, courts should adopt a pragmatic approach, distinguishing between inordinate delays and relatively short delays, and keeping in mind that the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance.