Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan has clarified the distinction between Sections 34 (common intention) and 149 (common object) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr v. The State of Karnataka (2025). 

What was the Background of Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr v. The State of Karnataka Case? 

• This case involves a matrimonial dispute resulting in the death of Geetha, who was married to Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale (Appellant No. 1) for approximately 8 years at the time of the incident. 
• According to the prosecution, after one year of marriage, Geetha's husband and his family members began harassing her regarding dowry and household work. 
• On the date of the incident, around 8:00 p.m., while Geetha was at her matrimonial home, her mother-in-law (Appellant No. 2) allegedly poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. 
• Neighbours rushed to the scene and transported Geetha to the hospital, where she succumbed to her burn injuries after one week. The cause of death was determined to be septicemia. 
• Geetha's mother, Tippavva Chandru Patil, filed an FIR on 3rd January, 2013, which was registered as Crime No. 2 of 2013 at Mudalagi Police Station, Mudalagi Circle, District Belagavi, Karnataka. 
• The FIR alleged that the accused had treated Geetha cordially for one year after marriage, but subsequently ill-treated her physically and mentally, forcing her to wake up early to perform household chores and work in others' homes. 
• The FIR further alleged that the accused pressured Geetha to bring Rs. 5,000 from her maternal home, and when she failed to do so, they allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. 
• Following the FIR registration, the Tehsildar recorded Geetha's dying declaration (Exhibit-46) at the hospital within four hours of the incident. 
• The police charged the husband and mother-in-law for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302, and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
• The trial court acquitted both accused, finding that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 
• The State appealed to the High Court, which reversed the acquittal and sentenced both accused to life imprisonment with a fine. 
• The matter was then appealed to the Supreme Court by the husband and mother-in-law. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court examined the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar, in which Geetha stated that her mother-in-law Jaitunabi Sanavale poured kerosene on her and set her on fire during an argument regarding her children. 
• The Court noted that according to Geetha's statement, when she was going to the bathroom, her mother-in-law lit a matchstick and threw it on her, while her husband Vasant tried to extinguish the fire by splashing water on her. 
• The Court observed that the Tehsildar's testimony was not effectively challenged during cross-examination, and nothing substantial was elicited to disbelieve that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a dying declaration. 
• The Court examined Dr. Gopal Ramu Wagamude's  testimony, which confirmed Geetha's statement that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, and that Geetha had sustained 90% burn injuries. 
• The Court noted that there was no cross-examination of Dr. Wagamude to disbelieve the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before him. 
• The Court states that in neither the oral dying declaration to the doctor nor in the declaration to the Tehsildar did the husband figure as a participant in the crime. 
• The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning that the husband was guilty by virtue of Section 34 IPC (common intention) based on his alleged failure to take his wife to the hospital. 
• The Court explained that for Section 34 IPC to apply, there must be participation in the criminal act and sharing of common intention by all parties involved. 
• The Court clarified that Section 34 IPC requires a pre-arranged plan and presupposes prior concert, necessitating a meeting of minds between the parties. 
• The Court rejected the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, noting that while the crime occurred inside the house, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the husband shared common intention with his mother. 
• The Court observed that the husband's attempt to extinguish the fire by pouring water on his wife contradicted the allegation of common intention. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court correctly held the mother-in-law guilty of the offence but erred in convicting the husband under Section 34 IPC without sufficient evidence of his participation or common intention. 

What are the Differences Between Section 34 (Common Intention) and Section 149 (Common Object) of the IPC? 

• Section 34 IPC (Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) 
  • Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals with Common Intention. 
  • Intention Requirement: Requires common intention shared by all participants. Each person must individually share the intention. 
  • Participation Requirement: Actual participation in the criminal act is essential. Each person must contribute to the act, even if minimally. 
  • Physical Presence: Requires physical presence at the scene of crime, though not necessarily in the exact same room (could be standing guard outside, etc.). 
  • Individual Liability: Balances individual and group aspects - focuses on both the individual's role and the group's common purpose. 
  • Nature of Participation: Participation can be through any act, gesture, word, conduct (active or passive) that supports the common design. 
• Section 149 IPC (Common object of unlawful assembly) 
  • Section 190 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals with Common object 
  • Intention vs. Object: Focuses on common object of the assembly rather than individual intentions. 
  • Disregard of Individual Intention: Disregards the intention of individual members and concentrates on the common object of the assembly as a whole. 
  • Liability Without Participation: A person can be guilty even without direct participation in the act. 
  • Membership Requirement: Mere membership in the unlawful assembly at the time of offence is sufficient. 
  • Liability Despite Contrary Intention: A person might be found guilty even if the crime was committed contrary to their own individual intention. 
• The judgment specifically that Section 34 is more restricted than Section 149, as it requires both mental sharing (common intention) and physical participation in the criminal act, while Section 149 can make a person liable based solely on membership in an unlawful assembly with a common object. 

What are the Differences between Section 34 IPC and Section 120B IPC By the Supreme Court? 

• The Supreme Court's explanation in the key differences between Section 34 and Section 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code are: 
  • Requirement for action vs. agreement:  
    • Section 34 requires actual participation in a criminal act beyond mere agreement. 
    • Section 120B requires only an agreement to commit an illegal act (a "bare agreement" is sufficient). 
  • Participation requirement:  
    • Section 34 necessitates some form of participation in the criminal act itself. 
    • Section 120B does not require the person to participate in the actual commission of the crime. 
  • When liability is established:  
    • Under Section 34, liability arises only when a criminal act is done and the accused participated in it. 
    • Under Section 120B, liability for conspiracy to commit an offence arises as soon as the agreement is made, with no overt act necessary beyond the agreement itself. 
  • Nature of involvement:  
    • Section 34 focuses on participation at the execution/commission stage. 
    • Section 120B focuses on the planning/agreement stage prior to execution. 
• As the judgment states that under Section 34, IPC, a mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of Section 34, IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common intention and the accused himself has in some way or the other participated in the commission of the said act. 
• The court states that Section 34 requires moving beyond the planning stage to actual commission with participation, while conspiracy is complete at the agreement stage. 

How do the Supreme Court's Illustrations Clarify the Concept of Common Intention under Section 34 IPC? 

• The Supreme Court provided several illustrations to explain the concept of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with "acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention." 
• The illustrations mentioned in the judgment include: 
  • Two people beating a person simultaneously - where both perform similar acts at the same time with a common intention. 
  • Two jailers conspiring to starve a prisoner to death - where acts consist of successive omissions rather than simultaneous actions. 
  • Two people forging different parts of a document at different times - where acts occur with an interval between them. 
  • Two people conspiring to kill someone where one person identifies the victim and the other commits the actual killing - demonstrating how mere presence can be meaningful participation. 
  • A sentinel (guard) who deliberately allows a murderer to enter a room - showing how an omission can contribute to a crime as effectively as a direct action. 
  • Two people conspiring to commit theft where one distracts the shopkeeper while the other steals - illustrating how diverse acts can still constitute participation in the same crime. 
• These illustrations were used to demonstrate that participation in a criminal act under Section 34 IPC can take many forms - including actions, omissions, gestures, or conduct of any kind - as long as they support a common criminal design.