Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

The Supreme Court (SC) has stated that any confession made by a person, before his arrest and prior to him being accused of any offence would be directly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) and there is no possibility of applying the exception under Section 27 in the case Rajesh v. State of MP.

What is the Background of Rajesh v. State of MP Case?

• A 15-year-old boy was killed brutally in July, 2013.
  • A Neighbour (Om Prakash), along with his brother (Raja Yadav), and his son (Rajesh @ Rakesh Yadav), stood trial in Sessions Case for Ajit Pal’s murder and connected offences.
• Additional Sessions Judge convicted all three of them on different counts:
  • Om Prakash Yadav was held guilty under Section 364A read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). He was sentenced to life imprisonment along with default imprisonment of two months, if he failed to pay a fine of ₹2,000.
• The other two accused were held guilty of offences under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC; Section 364A read with Section 120B of IPC and Section 201 IPC.
  • They were sentenced to death under Sections 302 and 364A and to two months default imprisonment each, if they individually failed to pay the fine amounts of ₹1,000/- and ₹1,000/- respectively.
  • Also, for Section 201 they were sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment and payment of fine of ₹500/- coupled with one month’s default imprisonment.
• An appeal was made to the High Court (HC) and the sentences were confirmed.
• Assailing the HC’s verdict, the three convicts approached the SC by way of appeal.
  • The SC inspected the circumstances during the recording of Rajesh Yadav's (appellant) confession and noted that the police had recorded his statement without formally arresting him.
  • Therefore, the appellant cannot be legally categorized as "charged with a crime" at that point in time.
  • The discovery of the deceased's body was made based on this confession admissible under Section 27 of IEA.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The SC remarked that for a confession to be considered admissible under Section 27 of IEA, it must satisfy two key requirements:
  • The person making the confession must be accused of any offence.
  • The confession must be made while the accused are in the custody of the police.
• Following landmark cases were referred by the SC:
  • Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (1947): Privy Council had emphasized that the crucial conditions to invoke Section 27 of IEA are being "accused of any offense" and being in "police custody".
  • State of Karnataka v. David Rozario (2002): The SC reinforced that information admissible under Section 27 of IEA becomes inadmissible if it does not come from a person in the 'custody of a police officer' or comes from a person 'not in the custody of a police officer.'
  • Ashish Jain v. Makrand Singh (2019): SC highlighted that an involuntary confessional statement of the accused is not admissible under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950.
  • Bodhraj alias Bodha v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2002): SC held that information, which would otherwise be admissible, becomes inadmissible under Section 26 of the IEA as it did not come from a person in the ‘custody of a police officer’ or rather, came from a person not in the ‘custody of a police officer”.
    • It was further noted that this doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search was made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true.
• The SC therefore applied these principles and conclude that “the purported discovery of the dead body, the murder weapon, and the other material objects, even if it was at the behest of Rajesh Yadav, cannot be proved against him, as he was not ‘accused of any offence’ and was not in ‘police custody’ at the point of time he allegedly.
  • Needless to state, this lapse on the part of the police is fatal to the prosecution’s case, as it essentially turned upon the ‘recoveries’ made at the behest of the appellants, purportedly under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”

What are the Legal Provisions of IEA Involved?

Confession made to Police Officer

• Word Confession is nowhere defined under the IEA, but Sir James Stephen has stated it as “An admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed a crime”.
• Section 25 mentions that “No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.”
• Section 26 further mentions that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
• Section 27 provides exception to the abovementioned Sections:
  • Section 27 - How much of information received from accused may be proved – Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered inconsequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
  • Requirements for application of Section 27:
    • The fact must have been discovered as a consequence of information received from the accused.
    • The person giving the information must be the accused in the case.
    • He must be in custody of a police officer.
    • Only that portion can be proved which distinctly relates to the relevant fact and is discovered subsequently.
    • The fact discovered must be related to the crime committed.
• Once a recovery of the "weapon or object" has been made based on the "information" related to the "fact discovered", under Section 27, only the portion of the information that specifically pertains to the "fact discovered" is admissible in court.
  • Any confession by the accused regarding their prior use of the "weapon or object" during the commission of the offence is not admissible, unless their mere possession or concealment of the "weapon or object" itself constitutes a separate offense.