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 13-Jan-2025

H.Guruswamy & Ors v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased By Lrs

“It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.” 

Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of H.Guruswamy & Ors v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs. made strong observations particularly emphasized the importance of limitation periods and criticized the High Court's casual approach in condoning such a long delay without proper justification.  

What was the Background of the H.Guruswamy & Ors v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs Case?

  • The case concerns a property situated at Byrasandra, Bangalore, Karnataka, originally measuring 45 yards (East to West) and 55 yards (North to South). 
  • One Venkatappa purchased this property in 1916. He later sold a portion and retained a balance measuring 45 yards (East to West) and 27.5 yards (North to South). 
  • Through a registered family partition, the property was divided between Venkatappa and his brother Muniga @ Chikonu: 
    • Venkatappa received 29 Ankanas with 1/3rd share 
    • Chikonu received 10 Ankanas of house with 2/3rd share 
  • Venkatappa filed for injunction against his family members, which he subsequently withdrew on 14th June1965. 
  • C.R. Narayana Reddy filed for specific performance against the appellants regarding the land with house in Byrasandra Village. 
  • A. Krishnaiah (deceased Respondent No.1) impleaded himself as Defendant No. 14 claiming purchase from Defendants No.3 to 13. 
  • A. Krishnaiah filed a suit seeking similar reliefs against the appellants, which was dismissed on merits on 08th December 1975. 
  • A. Krishnaiah then filed another suit for possession and other reliefs. 
  • The suit was initially dismissed for default in 1983 but restored in 1984 through a Petition. 
  • Defendant No.4 (Nagaraja) in the suit passed away on 04th December.1999. Despite opportunities given on various occasions the Respondents failed to bring his legal heirs on record. 
  • Smt. Jayalakshmi G., wife of deceased Respondent No. 1, claimed medical issues including hospitalization and angioplasty as reasons for delay. 
  • Multiple applications were filed by the Respondents under Order 22 Rule 4, Order 32 Rule 1 & 2, and Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (CPC) to set aside abatement and bring legal heirs on record. 
  • After dismissal of these applications, the Respondents filed Writ Petition before the Karnataka High Court, which was dismissed. 
  • Finally, the Respondents filed an application for recall the case before the Trial Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Supreme Court made the following observations: 
    • On Timeline and Delay:  
      • Noted the suit was 48 years old (from 1977) and still at evidence recording stage. 
      • Highlighted the 6-year (2200 days) delay in filing recall application. 
      • Second instance of suit dismissal due to respondents' negligence. 
    • On High Court's Decision:  
      • The High Court overlooked critical aspects of the case. 
      • Exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints. 
      • Incorrectly applied concepts of "liberal approach" and "substantial justice." 
    • On Limitation Principles:  
      • Limitation rules aren't meant to destroy rights but prevent dilatory tactics. 
      • Length of delay is crucial in considering condonation. 
      • Parties cannot fix their own period of limitation. 
      • Courts must first ascertain bona fide before considering merits. 
      • Limitation is not merely technical but based on sound public policy and equity. 
  • Based on the above observations the Supreme Court 
    • Set aside the High Court's order. 
    • Restored Trial Court's order. 
    • Emphasized that courts shouldn't keep 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over litigants indefinitely. 
  • The Supreme Court's strong observations particularly emphasized the importance of limitation periods and criticized the High Court's casual approach in condoning such a long delay without proper justification. 

What is the Law on Condonation of Delay? 

  • The Limitation Act, 1963 (LA), enacted on 5th October 1963, and effective from 1st January 1964, aims to prescribe the time periods within which existing rights can be enforced in courts of law. 
  • The Act is based on the Latin maxim "vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subveniunt," which means that the law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights. 
  • However, the Act recognizes that there may be circumstances beyond a litigant's control that prevent them from filing a suit or appeal within the prescribed time limit. 
  • This is where the concept of "condonation of delay" comes into play. 

What is Condonation of Delay? 

  • About: 
    • Condonation of delay is a discretionary remedy exercised by courts wherein, upon an application made by a party who wishes to have an appeal or application admitted after the prescribed period, the court may condone (overlook) the delay if the party provides a “sufficient cause” that hindered them from filing the appeal or application on time. 
    • If the court is satisfied with the sufficient cause, it may condone the delay and admit the appeal or application as if no delay had occurred, allowing the matter to proceed on merits rather than being dismissed solely on technical grounds. 
  • Section 5 of LA: 
    • Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enunciates the principle of condonation of delay. It states: 
      • “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of CPC, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period”. 
      • The Explanation to Section 5 further clarifies that if the appellant or applicant missed any order, practice, or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period, it may constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. 
  • Interpreting "Sufficient Cause": 
    • The term "sufficient cause" has not been defined in LA allowing courts broad discretion in its interpretation. 
  • Sufficient Cause to Grant Condonation of Delay: 
    • Significant changes in the law 
    • Serious illness of the applicant 
    • Imprisonment of the applicant 
    • The applicant being a pardanashin woman (living in seclusion) 
    • Delay in procuring copies from officials, provided the applicant-initiated efforts to obtain them vigilantly 
    • Delay caused by the action or inaction of the applicant's lawyer 
  • Applicability to Special Laws: 
    • The provisions of Section 5 of LA may not apply to special laws or statutes that have their own provisions for condonation of delay. 
    • For instance, the Supreme Court has held in several cases that Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act), which deals with setting aside an arbitral award, expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 of LA by using the phrase "but not thereafter." 

What are the Landmark Judgments on Condonation of Delay? 

  • Krishna v. Chattappan (1889): 
    • The Privy Council laid down two rules for interpreting "sufficient cause": 
      • The cause must be beyond the control of the invoking party, and 
      • The parties must not be lacking bona fide or shown to be negligent or inactive. 
  • Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962): 
    • The Supreme Court held that the delay requiring explanation is from the date the time was running out until the date of filing the appeal or application, and that a lack of diligence until the last date of limitation would not disqualify a person from applying for condonation of delay. 
  • State of W.P v. Howrah Municipality (1972): 
    • The Supreme Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice. 
  • New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra (1976): 
    • The Supreme Court held that the discretion conferred by Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be interpreted in a way that converts a discretionary remedy into a rigid rule, and the term "sufficient cause" cannot be defined by hard and fast rules. 
  • Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors (1987): 
    • The Supreme Court laid down guidelines for administering the doctrine of condonation of delay, emphasizing that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations and that there is no presumption that the delay is caused deliberately. 
  • Vedabai alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others (2001): 
    • The Supreme Court stated that in exercising discretion under Section 5, courts should adopt a pragmatic approach, distinguishing between inordinate delays and relatively short delays, and keeping in mind that the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance.