Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently a bench of Justices Bela M Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal held that “Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence”.

• The court gave this observation in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs and Ors v. Special Deputy Collector.

What was the Background of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs and Ors v. Special Deputy Collector Case?

• The case revolves around land acquisition in Gandluru village, Andhra Pradesh, in 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project.
• Sixteen claimants contested compensation, but some died during proceedings, with no substitution of heirs.
• After over five years, only heirs of one deceased claimant sought to appeal, facing a 5659-day delay.
• They cited lack of awareness due to living away. Other claimants or their heirs did not contest.
• The High Court, citing undue delay, dismissed the appeal.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The court held that there is no occasion for the court to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded.
  • First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal.
  • Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision of the reference court.
  • Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision, they could have applied for procedural review which they never did.
• Thus, there was apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter. Accordingly, the court’s opinion, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

What are Principles Laid Down by Court for Condoning Delay under Limitation Act?

On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

• Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
• A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
• The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
• In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
• Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
• Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
• Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
• Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

What are Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

• Section 3: Bar of limitation:
  • Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
  • For the purposes of this Act —
    • a suit is instituted —
      • in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
      • in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
      • in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;
    • any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted —
      • in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
      • in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;
    • an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.
• Section 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:
  • Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
  • Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was missed by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.