Source: The Hindu 

Introduction 

In India, the judicial system faces a critical challenge that reduce the effectiveness: the increasingly short tenures of Chief Justices in High Courts. When judges are appointed to these crucial leadership positions, they often have such brief terms that they barely have time to understand the complexities of their roles before their tenure ends. This systemic issue threatens the institutional strength and potential for meaningful judicial reform. 

Is the Issue of Short Judicial Tenures Hindering the Effectiveness of Chief Justices in High Courts? 

• Justice Rajiv Shakdher of the Himachal Pradesh High Court retired after just 24 days, barely settling into his role before his farewell. 
• Justice Manmohan, after being sworn in as Delhi High Court's Chief Justice on September 29, was quickly appointed to the Supreme Court by December 3. 
• Most recently appointed Chief Justices have extremely brief tenures:  
  • Justice Tashi Rabstan will serve only six months, Justice Suresh Kumar Kait eight months, and Justice K.R. Shriram one year. 
• The Chief Justice role involves complex administrative responsibilities, including managing institutional finances, recommending judges, and addressing staff welfare. 
• High Courts across different regions have unique challenges, making it difficult for Chief Justices to fully understand their institutions within short time frames. 
• Supreme Court Justice L. Nageswara Rao has argued that judges need at least 7-10 years to truly comprehend court functioning. 
• Most Chief Justices require 1.5 to 2 years just to understand their court's operations, by which time they are nearing retirement. 
• Among the recently appointed Chief Justices, only Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao in Jharkhand will serve a relatively longer four-year tenure. 
• Despite widespread recognition of this problem, little substantive action has been taken to address the issue of short judicial tenures. 

What was the Condition in British Era About Judicial Stability ? 

• During British colonial rule, the judicial system was remarkably different. 
• Chief Justices were appointed for much longer periods, allowing them to develop deep institutional knowledge and implement meaningful reforms. 
• A Case Study - Madras High Court: 
  • Founded in 1862, the Madras High Court provides a clear example of this difference:  
    • During 85 years of British rule (until 1947), the court had only 11 Chief Justices 
    • Each Chief Justice served an average of nearly eight years 
    • This allowed for stable, consistent leadership and institutional development 
• Contrast with Post-Independence Period: 
  • In the 65 years after independence:  
    • The same court had 24 Chief Justices 
    • Average tenure dropped dramatically to just 2.75 years 
    • Even removing two long-serving justices, the average fell to barely over two years 
• Key Observations: 
  • Judicial tasks have become more complex 
  • Tenure periods have simultaneously become shorter 
  • Brief tenures prevent meaningful institutional understanding and reform 
  • Judges barely comprehend their roles before their terms end 
• The judicial system needs collaborative intervention. Stakeholders, including the Bar Council, must jointly develop solutions to address this systemic problem before it critically states the effectiveness of India's judicial institutions. 

What are the Constitutional Provisions Governing the Appointment, Removal, and Tenure of Judges in India? 

• Article 124(2) and Article 217(1) of Constitution of India, 1950 govern the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts respectively, stating that they are appointed by the President of India. 
• Article 124(4) and Article 217(1)(b) provide the conditions for removal of judges, requiring impeachment through a special majority in Parliament. 
• Article 217(1)(a) specifies the retirement age for High Court judges as 62 years. 
• Article 222 empowers the President to transfer judges from one High Court to another, which can impact their tenure. 
• Article 124(7) and Article 220 provide provisions for retired judges potentially serving in other judicial or administrative capacities. 
• The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (Article 102(2) and Article 191(2)) provides additional context about judicial independence and tenure. 
• Article 50 of the Directive Principles of State Policy emphasizes the separation of judiciary from the executive, indirectly supporting judicial tenure protections. 
• Article 323A and Article 323B deal with administrative tribunals and their judicial appointments, providing supplementary to judicial tenure provisions. 
• Article 124(5) allows the President to request the Supreme Court to investigate the fitness of a judge, which can potentially impact tenure. 

What is the Constitutional Process for the Impeachment of Judges in India? 

• The impeachment of Supreme Court and High Court judges is governed by Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) of the Indian Constitution,1950. 
• Grounds for impeachment include proven misbehavior, incapacity, violation of constitutional oath, moral turpitude, or serious misconduct that undermines judicial integrity. 
• The process begins with a signed petition by at least 100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha members, addressed to the Speaker or Rajya Sabha Chairman. 
• A preliminary investigation is conducted to determine if there is prima facie evidence of misconduct warranting further action. 
• An investigative committee, typically comprising the Chief Justice of India and two senior-most Supreme Court judges, is formed to examine the allegations. 
• The impeachment requires a special parliamentary procedure: an absolute majority of the total membership and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. 
• The voting must occur after a 14-day notice period, ensuring due deliberation and process. 
• If both houses of Parliament pass the resolution, the President can remove the judge, with no right of appeal against such removal. 
• The entire process is designed to protect judicial independence while providing a mechanism to remove judges who seriously compromise their constitutional responsibilities. 

Conclusion:  

The problem of short judicial tenures requires collaborative effort from all stakeholders in the legal system. Without meaningful action, the judiciary risks becoming increasingly inefficient, with leadership unable to implement necessary improvements or develop a deep understanding of their courts' unique challenges. By recognizing this issue and working together, legal professionals can develop solutions that strengthen India's judicial institutions and ensure more effective administration of justice.