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Important Personalities

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

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 14-Jun-2024

Who is Justice Ujjal Bhuyan?

  • Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was born on 02nd August 1964 in Guwahati to Suchendra Nath Bhuyan, who was a highly esteemed Senior Advocate and former Advocate General of Assam.

How was the Career Journey of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan?

  • Justice Ujjal Bhuyan enrolled with the Bar Council of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh on 20th March 1991.
  • He practiced law at the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court in Guwahati and appeared before its Benches in Agartala, Shillong, Kohima, and Itanagar.
  • His’s remarkable legal acumen led him to hold several prominent positions, such as- the Standing Counsel of the Income Tax Department and later Senior Standing Counsel of the Income Tax Department, the Additional Government Advocate of Meghalaya in the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court from April 2002 to October 2006, the Special Counsel of the Forest Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, from December 2005 to April 2009 and the Standing Counsel of the Gauhati High Court.
  • He was appointed as the Additional Advocate General of Assam on 21st July 2011.
  • He was appointed as the Additional Judge of Gauhati High Court on 17th October 2011.
  • Justice Bhuyan was transferred to the High Court of Bombay and took the oath as a Judge on 03-10-2019.
  • He was transferred to the High Court for the State of Telangana and assumed office as a Judge on 22nd October 2021.
  • Justice Bhuyan was appointed as the Chief Justice of the High Court for the State of Telangana.
  • On 05th July 2023, the Supreme Court Collegium had recommended the appointment of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan to the Supreme Court of India and on 14th July 2023, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was sworn in as a new Judge of Supreme Court of India.

Notable Cases

Recent Judgments

  • Rajendra s/o Ramdas Kohle v. State of Maharashtra (2024)
    • This judgment authored by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan talked about the principles related to dying declaration under Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA).
    • The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the earlier authorities on the dying declaration and laid down the principles governing dying declaration:
      • it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated;
      • each case must be determined on its own facts, keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made;
      • it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence;
      • a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence. It has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing weighing of evidence;
      • a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character;
      • in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has to keep in view various circumstances including the condition of the person concerned to make such a statement; that it has been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.
  • Ekene Godwin & Anr v. State of Tamil Nadu (2024)
    • In this judgment the Court held that recording only the examination in chief of witnesses without recording their cross-examination is contrary to the law, in this regard the Court cited Section 138 of IEA.
    • In this respect, the Court noted that though in warrant cases, cross-examination of witnesses can be postponed, that is also an exception to the ordinary practice of law.
  • M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya and Anr (2024)
    • This case is related to adverse possession.
    • In this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principles related to adverse possession. The principles laid down are:
      • The plaintiff must plead and prove that he was claiming possession adverse to the true owner;
      • The plaintiff must plead and establish that the factum of his long and continuous possession was known to the true owner;
      • The plaintiff must also plead and establish when he came into possession;
      • The plaintiff must establish that his possession was open and undisturbed.
  • Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand (2024)
    • The Court in this case discussed whether the provision regarding interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NIA) is mandatory or directory.
    • The Court in this case held that the word “may” used in Section 143A of the NIA should not be read as “shall” and hence the Court held that this provision is discretionary and not mandatory.
    • The Court held that this provision provides for passing of drastic order of payment of interim compensation even before adjudication of guilt is done.
    • It was observed that if the word “may” is read as “shall” it will result in drastic consequences.
  • Shadakshari v. State of Karnataka and anr. (2024)
    • The Court dealt with Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
    • The issue discussed here was whether sanction is required to prosecute accused-public servant who faces accusation amongst others of creating fake documents by misusing his official position as a Village Accountant?
    • The Court held that “Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant while in service. The scope of operation of the section is restricted to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty”.
  • Central Bureau of Intelligence v. Kapil Wadhawan and Anr (2024)
    • The case pertains to default bail granted under Section 167 (2) of CrPC.
    • The issue at hand here was whether accused could avail default bail under Section 167 (2) on the ground that the investigation is pending against other accused even though final report with regard to the accused under Section 173 (2) of CrPC has been filed.
    • The Court observed that default bail will be granted only when the chargesheet is not filed and the investigation is still pending, however, if the chargesheet is filed the said right ceases.
    • The Court finally observed that the default bail cannot be granted only in the ground that investigation qua the other accused persons is pending.
  • Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India (2024):
    • In the Bilkis Bano case the Supreme Court laid down the law on remission under Section 432 of the CrPC.
    • The principles regarding the law of remission were summarized as follows:
      • The application for remission under Section 432 of the CrPC could be only before the Government of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant was convicted (appropriate Government) and not before any other Government within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant may have been transferred on conviction or where the offence has occurred.
      • A consideration for remission must be by way of an application under Section 432 of the CrPC which has to be made by the convict or on his behalf. In the first instance whether there is compliance of Section 433A of the CrPC must be noted inasmuch as a person serving a life sentence cannot seek remission unless fourteen years of imprisonment has been completed.
      • The guidelines under Section 432(2) regarding the opinion sought from the Presiding Judge of the Court which convicted the applicant must be complied with mandatorily. While doing so it is necessary to follow the requirements of the said Section which are highlighted by us, namely,
        • the opinion must state as to whether the application for remission should be granted or refused and for either of the said opinions, the reasons must be stated;
        • the reasons must have a bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case;
        • the opinion must have a nexus to the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists;
        • the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, must also forward along with the statement of such opinion granting or refusing remission, a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.
      • The policy of remission applicable would therefore be the Policy of the State which is the appropriate Government and which has the jurisdiction to consider that application. The policy of remission applicable at the time of the conviction could apply and only if for any reason, the said policy cannot be made applicable a more benevolent policy, if in vogue, could apply.
      • While considering an application for remission, there cannot be any abuse of discretion.
      • There has also to be consultation in accordance with Section 435 of the CrPC wherever the same is necessitated.
      • The Jail Advisory Committee which has to consider the application for remission may not have the District Judge as a Member inasmuch as the District Judge, being a Judicial Officer may coincidently be the very judge who may have to render an opinion independently in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 432 of the CrPC.
      • Reasons for grant or refusal of remission should be clearly delineated in the order by passing a speaking order.
      • When an application for remission is granted under the provisions of the Constitution, the following among other tests may apply to consider its legality by way of judicial review of the same.
        • that the order has been passed without application of mind;
        • that the order is mala fide;
        • that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations;
        • that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration;
        • that the order suffers from arbitrariness.

Landmark Judgments

  • NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2023)
    • In this case the Supreme Court held that it is permissible for the legislature to remove a defect in an earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court in exercise of its powers of judicial review.
    • The court said the defect can be removed both prospectively and retrospectively by a legislative process and previous actions can also be validated.
    • However, where a legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires.
  • XYZ v. State of Gujarat (2023)
    • The Supreme Court in this case allowed a 25 year old woman to terminate her pregnancy when it was nearing 28 weeks.
    • The Court observed that “In the context of abortion, the right of dignity entails recognizing the competence and authority of every woman to take reproductive decisions, including the decision to terminate the pregnancy.”
  • Yashodhan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023)
    • This case related to additional prosecution under Section 319 of CrPC.
    • The Supreme Court in this case held that a person summoned under Section 319 CrPC need not be given opportunity of hearing before being added as an accused.
  • V. Vasanta Mogli v. State of Telangana (2023)
    • The High Court of Telengana through Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that Telangana Eunuchs Act, 1329 Fasli (Telangana Eunuchs Act) was ultra vires and unconstitutional.
    • The Court held that it was not only violative of Article 14 but also clearly violated Article 21 of the Constitution.
  • Vanpic Ports Private Limited vs The Deputy Director (2022)
    • The Telangana High Court in this case interpreted Section 5 and Section 8 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA).
    • the Court held that on the anvil of both provisions, it was to be examined whether ATPMLA had erred in abdicating its adjudicatory functions, whilst relegating the appellant to Special Court for seeking release of attached properties after having found the attachment to be illegal.