Introduction

• This case deals with the co relation with the provision of Limitation Act with that of Arbitration & Conciliation Act (ArC). 

Facts 

• In this case, the appellant filed an application for setting aside of arbitral award passed on 24th August 2016 after expiry of 3-month period of appeal referred in Section 34 (3) of ArC Act. 
• The 30 days extendable period was also expired as given under proviso of Section 34 (3) of the act. 
• The courts were closed due to winter vacation, so the appellant filed for condonation of delay along with setting aside of arbitral award before the trial court. 
• The trial court dismissed the application based on the ground that appeal can only be preferred within 120 days as per Section 34 of ArC Act and not after that. 
• The appellate then filed an appeal before the Karnataka High Court stating that the copy of award was lost by them, and a new copy was obtained on 29th December 2016. 
• dismissed the said appeal by observing that the expression “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 of the Limitation Act cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation and therefore, any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceeding, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period. 
• Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. 

Issue Involved  

• Whether the benefit of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would be available to the appellant if the last day of condonable period of 30 days falls on a holiday or during a court vacation? 

Observations 

• The Supreme Court observed that the Arbitration Act being a special law and provides a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. 
• The period of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration Act shall prevail and shall be applicable and to that extent the Limitation Act shall be excluded.  
• It was observed and held that an application challenging an award filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act would not be an application “in accordance with” sub-section (3) as required under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act. 
• It was also observed by the court making inferences of Section 10 of General Clauses act that benefit of exclusion of period during which the Court is closed shall be available when the application for setting aside award is filed within “prescribed period of limitation” and shall not be available in respect of period extendable by Court in exercise of its discretion. 

Conclusion 

• The Supreme Court dismissed the present appeal and confirmed the Trail court and the High Court judgement.