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Triveniben & Ors. v. State of Gujarat (1989)

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 08-Jan-2025

Introduction 

  • This is a landmark judgment relating to commutation of death sentence on the ground of delay in execution of death sentence. 
  • This bench delivering the judgment comprised of Justice GL Oza, Justice Murari Mohan Dutt, Justice KN Singh, Justice K Jagannatha Shetty and Justice LM Sharma.     

Facts 

  • The accused were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) for murder and were sentenced to death by the Trial Court. 
  • The High Court confirmed their conviction and the death sentence. 
  • When the appeals were filed in the Supreme Court the same were dismissed by the Supreme Court. 
  • Thereafter mercy petitions were submitted to the President and / or Governor and the same were rejected. 
  • The accused filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court seeking to commute death sentence to life imprisonment. 
  • It was their case that prolonged delay in execution resulted in mental torture during confinement. 
  • It was claimed by them that the delay in execution made the execution dehumanizing and unconstitutional.  

Issues Involved  

  • Whether prolonged delay in execution of the sentence of death rendered it inexecutable and entitled the accused to demand the alternate sentence of imprisonment for life 
  • What would be the starting point for computing this delay? 
  • What could be the circumstances which should be considered along with the time that had been taken before the sentenced is executed? 

Observation  

  • The Court made the following observations regarding the delay: 
    • Filing of mercy petitions and review petitions, even repeatedly, is a legitimate legal remedy available to the convicted person. 
    • A prolonged delay due to such filings does not automatically justify intervention unless the delay is undue and excessive. 
    • The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to examine the issue of execution arises only when there has been an undue and prolonged delay after the final verdict. 
    • Time spent on filing review petitions or repeated mercy petitions by the convicted person will not be considered when assessing undue delay. 
    • Only the delay caused by the disposal of mercy petitions or delays attributed to the actions or inactions of the Executive are material for consideration. 
  • The Court made further the following observations on the type of delay: 
    • It was observed that the delay relied upon by the accused consists of two parts:  
      • The first part covers the time taken in the judicial proceedings. It is the time that the parties have spent for trial, ; appeal, further appeal and review. 
      • The second part takes into fold the time utilized by the executive in the exercise of its prerogative clemency 
    • It was observed that the Court cannot factor in the time spent on judicial proceedings up to the final judgment. 
    • Further, time taken for petitions filed under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution after the final judgment cannot be considered. 
    • The Court can only examine: 
      • Whether there was an undue and prolonged delay in disposing of mercy petitions. 
      • Whether the State exhibited dilatory conduct. 
      • Whether the delay occurred without valid reasons. 
    • It was further held that the delay cannot be assessed in isolation and must be considered alongside the heinous and egregious nature of the crime committed. 
  • Regarding the starting point for computing the delay the Court held that starting point should be from the date the judgment by the Apex Court was pronounced. 

Conclusion 

  • This is a landmark judgment that sheds light on the mental trauma that a person under death sentence goes through on account of delay in execution of death sentence. 
  • The Court held that the above can indeed be a ground on which a death sentence can be commuted.

[Original Judgment]