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Triveniben & Ors. v. State of Gujarat (1989)
«08-Jan-2025
Introduction
- This is a landmark judgment relating to commutation of death sentence on the ground of delay in execution of death sentence.
- This bench delivering the judgment comprised of Justice GL Oza, Justice Murari Mohan Dutt, Justice KN Singh, Justice K Jagannatha Shetty and Justice LM Sharma.
Facts
- The accused were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) for murder and were sentenced to death by the Trial Court.
- The High Court confirmed their conviction and the death sentence.
- When the appeals were filed in the Supreme Court the same were dismissed by the Supreme Court.
- Thereafter mercy petitions were submitted to the President and / or Governor and the same were rejected.
- The accused filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court seeking to commute death sentence to life imprisonment.
- It was their case that prolonged delay in execution resulted in mental torture during confinement.
- It was claimed by them that the delay in execution made the execution dehumanizing and unconstitutional.
Issues Involved
- Whether prolonged delay in execution of the sentence of death rendered it inexecutable and entitled the accused to demand the alternate sentence of imprisonment for life
- What would be the starting point for computing this delay?
- What could be the circumstances which should be considered along with the time that had been taken before the sentenced is executed?
Observation
- The Court made the following observations regarding the delay:
- Filing of mercy petitions and review petitions, even repeatedly, is a legitimate legal remedy available to the convicted person.
- A prolonged delay due to such filings does not automatically justify intervention unless the delay is undue and excessive.
- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to examine the issue of execution arises only when there has been an undue and prolonged delay after the final verdict.
- Time spent on filing review petitions or repeated mercy petitions by the convicted person will not be considered when assessing undue delay.
- Only the delay caused by the disposal of mercy petitions or delays attributed to the actions or inactions of the Executive are material for consideration.
- The Court made further the following observations on the type of delay:
- It was observed that the delay relied upon by the accused consists of two parts:
- The first part covers the time taken in the judicial proceedings. It is the time that the parties have spent for trial, ; appeal, further appeal and review.
- The second part takes into fold the time utilized by the executive in the exercise of its prerogative clemency
- It was observed that the Court cannot factor in the time spent on judicial proceedings up to the final judgment.
- Further, time taken for petitions filed under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution after the final judgment cannot be considered.
- The Court can only examine:
- Whether there was an undue and prolonged delay in disposing of mercy petitions.
- Whether the State exhibited dilatory conduct.
- Whether the delay occurred without valid reasons.
- It was further held that the delay cannot be assessed in isolation and must be considered alongside the heinous and egregious nature of the crime committed.
- It was observed that the delay relied upon by the accused consists of two parts:
- Regarding the starting point for computing the delay the Court held that starting point should be from the date the judgment by the Apex Court was pronounced.
Conclusion
- This is a landmark judgment that sheds light on the mental trauma that a person under death sentence goes through on account of delay in execution of death sentence.
- The Court held that the above can indeed be a ground on which a death sentence can be commuted.