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Kushal Rao v. The State of Bombay, 1958 AIR 22

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 06-Jun-2024

Introduction

  • This landmark judgment deals with evidentiary value of dying declaration.
  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that there is no absolute rule of law, or even a rule of prudence that a dying declaration unless corroborated by other independent evidence is not fit to be acted upon and made the basis of a conviction.

Facts

  • There were two rival factions, and the incident occurred due to a quarrel between them.
  • The case of prosecution was that Khushal (Appellant) along with other persons attacked Baboolal (victim) with sword and spears and inflicted injuries on various parts of his body.
  • This resulted in death of the victim and the incident occurred in a narrow lane of Nagpur at 9 pm.
  • Three dying declarations were recorded in quick succession first by attending doctor in the hospital, second by Sub Inspector of Police and third by Magistrate of First Class.
  • The Additional Sessions Judge convicted the Appellant and one Tukaram under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with Section 34 of IPC.
  • The High Court acquitted Tukaram on the grounds that there was suspicion in his identity but convicted the appellant on the grounds that dying declaration had been corroborated by the fact that the appellant had been absconding.

Issues Involved

  • Whether the Appellant can be convicted for the offence of murder under Section 302 of IPC on the basis of dying declaration under Section 32(1) of IEA without any other corroborating evidence?

Observations

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case discussed the law on the evidentiary value of the dying declaration provided for under section 32(1) of IEA.
  • The Court held that the provision has been added as a matter of sheer necessity by way of an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is no evidence.
  • The law laid down was that it is neither rule of law nor rule of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration by other independent evidence.
  • The following points were laid down by the Hon’ble Court regarding the evidentiary value of dying declaration:
    • This is not an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.
    • Each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made.
    • It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence.
    • Dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence.
    • Dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions -and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character.
    • In order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation.
    • These circumstances would include: the amount of light at the site of incident if the crime committed at night, possibility of tutoring, the inconsistencies in dying declaration if several opportunities were given to make the declarations, capacity of the man to remember the facts has not been impaired at the time of making the statement.
  • The Hon’ble Court held in this case that the three dying declarations consistently named the Appellant and Tukaram as persons who assaulted him, and the statement was also consistent with the injuries.
  • Therefore, the dying declaration here did not suffer from any infirmities and hence could be relied upon without corroboration.

Conclusion

  • The Court held that the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that the court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that the particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities.
  • Thus, once the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration.
  • Finally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case convicted the Appellant under Section 302 of IPC.