Introduction

• This case deals with the condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act of 1963).
• The case clearly stated that sufficient cause for condonation of delay must be reasonable and should not be discriminated against merely because they are not a private party.

Facts

• The State of Jammu and Kashmir's appeal, stemming from a decision to increase compensation for land acquisition for a public purpose to almost 14 lakhs rupees, was dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred.
• The dismissal occurred because the application for condonation of the 4-day delay, which sought to revise the order by 800% and raised significant questions about valuation principles, was rejected.

Issues Involved

• What are the factors that should be kept in mind while condoning the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation act?
• Whether the appeal dismissed was valid?

Observation

• While discussing Section 5 of the Act of 1963 for extension of prescribed limitation period the Court observed that “the expression 'sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice”.
• It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
• The Supreme Court laid following principles that are supposed to be kept in mind while granting condonation if delay:
  • Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal, late.
  • Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
  • "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?
    • The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
  • When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
  • There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
  • It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Conclusion

• The Court finally held that there was sufficient cause for the delay and set aside the decision of the High Court to dismiss the appeal.

Notes

The Limitation Act, 1963

Section 5 - Extension of prescribed period in certain cases —Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation —The fact that the appellant or the applicant was missed by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.