Rita Dwivedi v. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.,

Date of Judgement/Order – 12.02.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Aniruddha Bose, Sanjay Kumar

Case In Brief:

• The petitioner, one of three sisters, filed a Habeas Corpus petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.
• The petitioner sought the production of respondent No. 9, 'Vibha Dwivedi', alleging that respondent No. 9 had been illegally detained by the fourth respondent, 'Smt. Archana Sharma', and her husband, 'Sh. Sachinder Sharma' (respondent No. 5), who had taken her to Canada.
• The petitioner contended that the detention of respondent No. 9 was illegal and sought intervention from the court to secure her release.
• The high court denied the petition hence an appeal was filed before supreme court.

Verdict:

• The court noted that there is no inherent legal right for an elder sister to exercise guardianship over her sister unless there is a specific order from a court of competent jurisdiction.
• Given the circumstances of the case, the court concluded that a Habeas Corpus petition was not the appropriate legal remedy for the petitioner's grievance.
• The court advised the petitioner to approach the appropriate court if she wished to seek guardianship over respondent No. 9, provided that the facts warranted such action.
• The court found no justification to overturn the judgment of the High Court under review in the petition.
• Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Legal Provision:

• Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 196=59 (COI): Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without—

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard,

makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.

[Original Order]

Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka

Date of Judgement/Order – 02.02.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S Oka, Pankaj Mittal

Case In Brief:

• The case stems from a property dispute between the deceased, Shivanna, and his brother, Ramanna (Accused No.9).
• On 25^th September 1999, the accused allegedly assembled to kill Shivanna and his family, resulting in Shivanna's death and injuries to his wife and daughter.
• Eyewitnesses testified to the events, with primary evidence coming from Shivanna's wife and daughter.
• The prosecution presented evidence of unlawful assembly and shared intent to commit murder, leading to convictions under Section 302 in aid to Section 149 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• The High Court upheld the conviction her appellants approached the Supreme Court.

Verdict:

• The court held that plain reading of facts is enough to rope in all appellants under Section 302 IPC in aid with Section 149 IPC.
• Despite the defence's challenge to the medical evidence, the court prioritized eyewitness accounts, affirming that a chopper was the sole weapon used in the crime.
• The court, exercising appellate restraint, declined to intervene unless lower court findings were deemed perverse, which was not the case here.
• Consequently, the court dismissed all three appeals, deeming them lacking in substance.
• Bail for the appellants was revoked, and they were ordered to surrender immediately to serve their remaining sentence.
• In sum, the court found no legal errors in the lower courts' judgments, thereby upholding their decisions based on the available evidence and legal principles.

Legal Provision:

• Section 149 of IPC: Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object. —
  • If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
• 302. Punishment for murder.—
  • Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

[Original Judgment]

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Judgement/Order – 15.02.2024

Bench Strength – 5 Judges

Composition of Bench – Chief Justice of India (CJI) D Y Chandrachud and Justices Sanjiv Khanna, B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra

Case In Brief:

• Background of the Challenge:
  • The petitioners-initiated proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI), contesting the validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme and provisions within the Finance Act 2017.
  • These challenged amendments impacted various laws, including the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (RBI Act), the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act), the Companies Act, 2013 and the Finance Act, 2017.
• Amendments to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934:
  • Previously, Section 31 of the RBI Act, 1934 restricted the issuance of financial instruments for payment solely to the RBI or entities authorized by it.
  • The Finance Act, 2017 altered this by introducing Section 31(3), enabling the Central Government to authorize scheduled banks to issue electoral bonds.
• Evolution of Corporate Contributions Regulation:
  • Initially, the Companies Act, 1956 lacked provisions regulating corporate contributions to political parties.
  • The Companies Act 2013, mirroring Section 293A, increased the cap to 7.5% of average net profits and mandated Board resolutions for contributions, alongside disclosure requirements.
  • Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013 substantively incorporated the provisions of Section 293-A of the 1956 Act, as amended in 1985.
  • Section 182 enables a company to contribute any amount directly or indirectly to any political party.
  • The provision bars a Government company and a company which has been in existence for less than three financial years from contributing to a political party.
  • The Finance Act, 2017 further altered corporate funding regulations, removing caps and modifying disclosure obligations while adding restrictions on contribution methods.
  • The first proviso to Section 182(1) which prescribed a cap on corporate funding was omitted by Finance Act, 2017.
• Tax Exemption for Political Parties:
  • The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1978 introduced Section 13A to the IT Act, 1961 exempting political parties' income from contributions and investments from income tax.
    • To qualify for exemption, political parties had to maintain proper accounts, record voluntary contributions exceeding twenty thousand rupees, and undergo annual auditing.
• Incentivizing Contributions:
  • The Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 added Sections 80GGB and 80GGC to the IT Act, making contributions to political parties tax-deductible.
    • This move aimed to encourage contributions through transparent channels like cheques.
• Transparency Measures:
  • The Finance Act, 2017 amended Section 13A, allowing political parties to receive contributions via electoral bonds without disclosure.
    • However, parties had to report contributions exceeding twenty thousand rupees to the Election Commission of India (ECI).
• RBI and ECI Concerns
  • The RBI expressed concerns over electoral bonds, citing potential currency misuse and money laundering risks.
  • The ECI criticized the lack of transparency and recommended reintroducing caps on corporate funding to prevent misuse. Despite objections, the Electoral Bond Scheme was implemented in 2018, subject to ongoing constitutional challenges.

Verdict:

• Conclusions of the Court:
  • The Electoral Bond Scheme, certain sections of the Representation of the People Act 1951, the Companies Act, and amendments therein, violate Article 19(1)(a) and are unconstitutional.
  • The removal of the proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act, allowing unlimited corporate contributions to political parties, is arbitrary and breaches Article 14.
• Directive for Disclosure:
  • The Court mandated the disclosure of information regarding political party contributions under the Electoral Bond Scheme to uphold its ruling.
  • SC said that Political parties are required to provide detailed particulars of donors, bond amounts, and credits received against each bond.
• Issuance of Directives:
  • The Court issued directives including the cessation of Electoral Bond issuance, submission of purchase details by SBI, disclosure of political party recipients, publication by ECI, and return/refund of unencashed bonds.
  • The court said that the issuing bank shall herewith stop the issuance of Electoral Bonds.

Legal Provision:

• Article 14 of COI: Equality before law
  • The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
• Article 19 of COI: Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.—

(1) All citizens shall have the right—

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;

(c) to form associations or unions or co-operative societies;

(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;

(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;

(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.

(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.

(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.

(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,—

(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or

(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.

[Original Judgment]

Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington (India) Limited

Date of Judgement/Order – 14.02.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices B.R. Gavai and Sanjay Karol

Case In Brief:

• The appellants in this case were Directors in the Respondent Company and had resigned from such Directorship on 9^th December,2013 and 12^th March, 2014 respectively.
• The appellants were arrayed as accused in a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) in relation to three cheques bearing nos. 002535 for Rs.7,10,085/-, 002777 for Rs.1,85,09,054 and 002791 for Rs.10,00,000/- all dated 22^nd March 2014, by the Company respondent.
• With the dishonouring of the cheque on presentation on account of insufficient funds the respondent after serving statutory notice dated 11^th April 2014 preferred a complaint.
• The appellants preferred a quashing of the complaint petition before the High Court of Madras but was turned down by the High Court.
• It is against the decision of the High Court rejecting the quashing petition that the appellants preferred the criminal appeal before the Supreme Court.
• Setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

Verdict:

• The Court observed that the director could be held liable for the dishonor of the cheque after his retirement only when it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have been done with the connivance or consent or may be attributable to a director.
• The Court took note of proviso 1 to Section 141 of the NI Act to arrive at the aforesaid findings which states that every person who at the time of the offence was responsible for the affairs/conduct of the business of the company, shall be held liable and proceeded against under Section 138 of the NI Act with exception thereto being that such an act, if done without his knowledge or after him having taken all necessary precautions, would not be held liable.

Legal Provision:

• Section 138 of NI Act: Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account -

Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both.

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

• Section 141 of NI Act: Offences by companies—

(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

[Original Judgment]

Lucknow Nagar Nigam & Ors. v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Date of Judgement/Order – 22.02.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan

Case In Brief:

• In this case, the subject property is an Enemy Property located on Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Lucknow, owned by the Raja of Mahmudabad, who migrated to Pakistan in the year 1947.
• A portion of the property is currently occupied and utilized for profit-generating purposes by the respondent (assessee).
• in the fiscal year 1998-1999, it came to the Municipal Corporation’s attention that the assessee was operating a commercial establishment within the premises.
• Consequently, the appellant (Municipal Corporation) conducted an assessment based on Capital Value and issued a notice to the assessee regarding the assessed Annual Value.
• Thereafter, a writ petition has been filed before the High Court of Allahabad by the respondent.
• The High Court of Allahabad has allowed the petition, thereby holding that the assessee is exempt from payment of property tax under the provisions of the UP Municipal Corporation Adhiniyam, 1959.
• The present civil appeal has been filed by the appellant before the Supreme Court which was later allowed by the Court.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court observed that having regard to the salutary principles of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI), we cannot construe the taking possession of the enemy property for the purpose of administration of the same by the Custodian, as an instance of transfer of ownership from the true owner to the Custodian and thereby to the Union.
• It was further held that the expression person in Article 300A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property.

Legal Provision:

• Enemy Property
  • As per the Enemy Property Act, 1968, enemy property is any property for the time being belonging to or held or managed on behalf of an enemy, an enemy subject or an enemy firm.
  • The expression enemy property shall mean and include and shall be deemed to have always meant and included all rights, titles and interest in, or any benefit arising out of, such property.
• Article 300A of the COI
  • Originally, Part III of the COI established the right to property as one of the fundamental rights.
  • However, the Right to Property ceased to be a fundamental right with the 44^th Constitution Amendment in 1978.
  • It was made a Constitutional right under Article 300A of the COI.
  • Article 300A requires the State to follow due procedure and authority of law to deprive a person of his or her private property.

[Original Judgment]