Sonu Chaudhary v. State NCT of Delhi (2024) 

Date of Judgement/Order – 06.11.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma 

Case In Brief: 

• In the present case, a criminal incident that occurred at Baithak Restaurant in Delhi.  
• The complainant Rajat Dhyani (PW-1) was running the Baithak Restaurant when the accused Sonu Choudary came to the establishment.  
• The accused requested a jug of water with the intention of consuming alcohol.  
• When Rajat Dhyani refused to provide the water, the situation escalated.  
• The accused allegedly pulled out a blade and inflicted injuries on Rajat Dhyani's thigh, shoulder, and back.  
• When Rajat called his friend Imran Khan (PW-3) for help, the accused allegedly attacked Imran as well, causing an injury to his stomach with the blade.  
• Upon receiving information about the incident, the Investigating Officer arrived at the scene and found two injured people.  
• The accused was apprehended on the spot.  
• A medical examination was conducted, which confirmed Rajat's injuries.  
• During the trial, while Rajat Dhyani supported the prosecution's case, Imran Khan turned hostile and did not support the prosecution's version of events.  
• The injuries sustained by Rajat were later classified as simple in nature by the doctors.  
• Initially, the accused was charged under two sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):  
  • Section 324 (voluntarily causing hurt)  
  • Section 452 (house-trespass after preparation for hurt)  
• The trial court convicted the accused for the charged offence and the High Court confirmed the order the of the High Court.  
• Aggrieved by the decision of the lower courts the appellant filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court. 

Verdict  

• The Supreme Court observed that:  
  • Regarding Section 324 of IPC (Voluntarily Causing Hurt):  
    • The Court confirmed the conviction under Section 324 IPC.:  
    • The prosecution successfully proved the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt  
  • Regarding Section 452 of IPC (House-trespass):  
    • The Court found significant flaws in the conviction under this section.  
    • Both lower courts failed to properly consider the essential ingredients of Section 452.  
  • The Supreme Court pointed out that a restaurant cannot be classified as:  
    • A place used for human dwelling  
    • A place of worship  
    • A place for custody of property  
  • The prosecution failed to establish the basic requirements of criminal trespass (Section 441) and house trespass (Section 442). Therefore, the conviction under Section 452 was legally unsustainable.   
• The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 324 of IPC with two years simple imprisonment, fine of Rs. 1,00,000 and an additional six month imprisonment in default of fine payment.  
• The Supreme Court also set aside the conviction under Section 452 of IPC.  
• Since the accused had already served two years in prison, the Court ordered immediate release if not required in any other case and direction to pay the fine if not already paid.  
• The Supreme Court also issued process direction for the Trial Court to:  
  •  Verify the status of sentence completion  
  •  Check fine payment status  
  •  Take appropriate legal action for any pending aspects of the sentence 

Relevant Provision: 

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 452 – Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting and person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 

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Kallakuri Pattabhiramaswamy (dead) through LR’s v. Kallakuri Kamaraju & Ors (2024) 

Date of Judgement/Order – 21.11.2024  

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice CT Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Karol  

Case In Brief: 

• Parties to the Dispute: 
  • The dispute is between two branches of the same family, specifically stepbrothers. 
  • The appellant-defendant (represented by legal representatives) is the son of Kallakuri Swamy from his second wife, Smt. Veerabhadramma. 
  • The respondent-plaintiffs are the sons of Kallakuri Swamy from his first wife. 
• Disputed Property: 
  • The property in question comprises 3.55 acres of land distributed across multiple survey numbers located in Teki, West Khandrika, and Angara villages. 
• Partition Deed of 1933: 
  • The property was allotted to Smt. Veerabhadramma for her lifetime enjoyment under a partition deed dated August 25, 1933. 
  • The deed stipulated that after her death, the property would be divided equally between the two branches of the family. 
• Passing of Smt. Veerabhadramma: 
  • Smt. Veerabhadramma passed away on February 6, 1973. 
  • A dispute arose regarding the division of the property, leading to Original Suit No. 50 of 1984. 
• Claims by the Respondent-Plaintiffs: 
  • They sought partition and possession of their half-share in the property as per the 1933 partition deed. 
  • They argued that the appellant-defendants were evading the partition. 
• Defense by the Appellant-Defendants: 
  • They claimed that Smt. Veerabhadramma executed a registered Will on December 30, 1968, bequeathing the disputed property to one of the defendants (her daughter-in-law). 
  • They contended that her rights under the 1933 partition deed had become absolute due to Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, enabling her to execute the Will. 
• Trial Court Findings (1990): 
  • The Trial Court held that Veerabhadramma had only a life interest in the property under the 1933 partition deed. 
  • It ruled that her rights did not convert into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA), as the property was not granted in recognition of a pre-existing right. 
  • Consequently, the Trial Court declared the Will invalid and upheld the partition deed’s terms, granting equal shares to the respondent-plaintiffs. 
• High Court Findings: 
  • The High Court distinguished between absolute rights under Section 14(1) and restricted life interest under Section 14(2) of the HSA. 
  • It held that while Veerabhadramma had an absolute right over 2.09 acres of the property, the remaining 3.55 acres were given to her as a life interest without absolute ownership. 
  • It concluded that the property in dispute (3.55 acres) reverted to the sons (respondent-plaintiffs and appellant-defendant) upon her death. 
• Appeal to the Supreme Court: 
  • The appellant-defendants challenged the High Court’s ruling, maintaining that Veerabhadramma’s rights over the disputed property were absolute, enabling her to execute the Will. 

Verdict: 

• The Court here observed that in the case of V. Tulsamma v. V Sesha Reddy (1977), the Court held that “The claim of a Hindu widow to be maintained is not an empty formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession or indulgence, grace or gratis or generosity but is a valuable spiritual and moral right which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of the husband and wife.” 
• Further in the case of Raghubir Singh v. Gulab Singh (1998) the Court held that “The right to maintenance of the Hindu widow existed under Shastric Hindu laws long before the statutory enactments came into force.” 
• Thus, it was held that the right of maintenance is sufficient for property given in lieu thereof to transform into absolute ownership by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the HSA. 
• The Court held that in the present facts as held by the Courts below the second wife had absolute interest only with respect to 2.09 cents of land and life interest with respect to 3.55 cents of land. 
• The Court did not find any reason to take any other view.  
• Thus, the appeal in this case failed.  

Relevant Provision: 

• Hindu Succession Act, 1956- Section 14  
  • (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.―In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act 
  • (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.  

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Aligarh Muslim University Through Its Registrar Faizan Mustafa v. Naresh Agarwal (2024) 

Date of Judgement/Order – 08.11.2024 

Bench Strength – 7 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justices Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant, JB Pardiwala, Dipankar Datta, Manoj Misra and SC Sharma 

Case in Brief: 

• The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College was established in Aligarh in 1877, initially affiliated with Calcutta University and later Allahabad University. 
• In 1920, the imperial legislature passed the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) Act, formally establishing and incorporating the university, which transformed the existing college into a full-fledged university. 
• The AMU underwent significant legislative changes through two key amendments in 1951 and 1965, which modified the university's administrative structure, religious instruction provisions, and governance mechanisms. 
• These amendments fundamentally altered the university's original administrative setup, including removing the requirement for Court members to be exclusively Muslims and transferring substantial powers from the Court to the Executive Council. 
• Constitutional challenges were initiated under Article 32, primarily arguing that the amendments violated Article 30(1), which guarantees religious minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions. 
• The petitioners contended that AMU was originally established by Muslims, a religious minority, and therefore they should retain the right to administer the institution under Article 30(1). 
• The Union of India countered this argument, asserting that the Muslim minority did not establish the university - Parliament did through the 1920 Act - and thus they could not claim administrative rights. 
• The core legal dispute centers on interpreting the phrase "establish and administer" in Article 30(1), specifically whether AMU qualifies as a minority educational institution with the constitutional right to self-administration. 
• The case raises fundamental questions about the definition of a minority educational institution, the meaning of "establishment" in constitutional context, and the extent of minority rights in educational institutions. 

Verdict: 

• 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court, by a 4:3 majority, overruled the 1967 precedent established in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India, insofar as it held that an institution created through legislative incorporation cannot assert minority institutio status. 
• The Court clarified that Article 30(1) serves dual purposes: as an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision, guaranteeing minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions with greater administrative autonomy. 
• The status of being an "Institution of National Importance" does not negate or diminish an institution's minority character. "National" and "minority" are not mutually exclusive but can coexist within the same institution. 
• Educational institutions established before the Constitution's adoption are equally entitled to protection under Article 30. The minority character of such institutions cannot be automatically surrendered through statutory incorporation. 
• To qualify as a minority educational institution, the minority community must demonstrate: 
  • The original idea originated from the minority community 
  • The institution was predominantly established for the minority community's benefit 
  • Implementation steps were primarily taken by minority community members 
• The administrative setup must clearly affirm the minority character and demonstrate that the institution was established to protect and promote the minority community's interests. 
• State regulation of educational aspects or Parliamentary powers to declare institutions nationally important do not automatically override or eliminate the constitutional protections under Article 30(1). 
• The Court overruled the previous view that an institution cannot be considered minority-established if it derives its legal character through a statute. Statutory recognition does not inherently negate minority status. 
• The Court took a holistic approach in determining minority institution status, focusing on the institution's original purpose, implementation, and ongoing administrative character rather than procedural technicalities. 
• The Court rejected the notion that minority institutions are "safe havens" separate from the mainstream, asserting that minorities are integral to national institutions and centers of learning. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Constitution of India,1950 – 
  •  Article 30: Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. 
    • (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
    • (1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause. 
    • (2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the grounds that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. 

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State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (Since deceased) through Legal Representatives 

Date of Judgement/Order – 19.11.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Vikram Nath and Prasanna B Varale 

Case in Brief: 

• Amin Lal and Ashok Kumar filed a civil suit in 1981 claiming ownership of 18 Biswas Pukhta land near National Highway 10 in Bahadurgarh, Haryana, alleging unauthorized occupation by the State of Haryana and Public Works Department (PWD). 
• The State defended its position by claiming continuous possession of the land since 1879-80 and asserting adverse possession, arguing they had been using the land as a store for over a century. 
• The Trial Court initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants failed to prove adverse possession, with acts like placing bitumen drums and constructing a boundary wall insufficient to establish ownership. 
• The First Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court's decision, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit and suggesting the plaintiffs were attempting to manipulate revenue records to grab land. 
• The High Court then restored the Trial Court's decree, holding that the State cannot claim adverse possession against its own citizens and that the defendants' possession was permissive, not hostile. 
• The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment, dismissed the State's appeal, emphasizing that allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine citizens' constitutional rights and erode public trust in the government. 
• The Court specifically noted that the State's possession was conditional and based on the Misal Hakiyat of 1879-80, which described the possession as "Bikhar Bahali Kaza" (till the existence of an orchard), and thus could not constitute adverse possession. 
• The judgment reaffirmed that revenue records, when corroborated by sale deeds and mutation entries, can support ownership claims, and that the State must respect private property rights through legal procedures. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court observed that by claiming adverse possession, the State implicitly admitted the plaintiffs' title, and under Order VIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, allegations not specifically denied are deemed to be admitted. 
• The Court held that revenue records are public documents carrying a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, and while they do not automatically confer title, they can support ownership claims when corroborated by other evidence. 
• A fundamental principle affirmed was that the State cannot claim adverse possession over property belonging to its own citizens, as this would undermine the principles of a welfare state and erode citizens' constitutional rights. 
• The Court critically examined the acts relied upon by the State (placing bitumen drums, erecting temporary structures, constructing a boundary wall) and found they did not constitute adverse possession, which requires continuous, open, peaceful, and hostile possession for the statutory period. 
• The judgment noted that the State's possession, as evidenced by the Misal Hakiyat of 1879-80, was permissive and conditional, described as "Bikhar Bahali Kaza" (till the existence of an orchard), and therefore could not form the basis of an adverse possession claim. 
• The Supreme Court observed that the First Appellate Court's findings were flawed, as it erroneously placed the burden of proving ownership on the plaintiffs and disregarded jamabandi entries and revenue records without valid justification. 
• Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State cannot deprive citizens of their property without following proper legal procedures and must respect individual property rights. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Code of Civil Procedure,1908 
  • Order VIII Rule 5: Specific denial 
    • (1) Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability:  
      • Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission:  
      • Provided further that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied in the manner provided under Rule 3A of this Order, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. 
    • (2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved.  
    • (3) In exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a pleader.  
    • (4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. 

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