Yashodeep Bisanrao Vadode v. State of Maharashtra & Anr 

Date of Judgement/Order – 21.10.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Kumar 

Case In Brief: 

• In this case Renuka(deceased) was married to Rajesh Jagan Karote on 11th December, 2008, following Hindu customs and rituals. 
• According to the prosecution, starting from January 2010, Rajesh and his relatives began demanding dowry from Renuka for purchasing a residential flat. 
• Renuka allegedly faced both physical and mental torture related to these dowry demands. 
• The appellant in this case, Yashodeep Vadode, was married to Savita (Rajesh's sister) on 26th October, 2010. 
• 16th On April 2011, around 9:00 PM, Yashodeep Vadode informed Renuka's father that she had been admitted to Sion Hospital in Mumbai. 
• By the time Renuka's father reached the hospital with his wife, children, and other relatives, Renuka had already passed away. 
• Upon examining Renuka's body, her father noticed an abrasion on her forehead and ligature marks on her neck. 
• Suspecting unnatural death, Renuka's father filed a complaint  
• Two separate Sessions Cases emerged from this single complaint 
• The appellant was one of the accused where he was charged under Sections 498-A (dowry harassment), 304-B (dowry death), 306 (abetment of suicide), and 406 (criminal breach of trust) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
• Following his conviction the appellant was terminated from his position as Laboratory Attendant at Balbheem College, Beed, through an order passed by the Trial Court. 
• The Appellant challenged the order before the High court which also confirmed the order of the trial court. 
• The appellant challenged the basis of the High Court's finding that there was "specific material evidence" against him. 
• He questioned how he could be held liable for harassment and cruelty "till her last breath" given the short duration of his relationship with the family. 

Verdict

• The Supreme made the following observations: 
  • On Essential Elements of Section 498-A IPC: 
    • The Court outlined the essential ingredients required to establish an offense under Section 498-A: 
    • The victim must be a married lady (or widow) 
    • She must have been subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives 
    • Such injury could be either physical or mental 
    • The cruelty must involve either: 
      • Harassment for dowry demands, or 
      • Willful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury
  • On Quality of Evidence: 
    • The Court conducted a "microscopic examination" and found no specific evidence against the appellant 
    • None of the prosecution witnesses had specifically testified about any act of cruelty by the appellant 
    • There were no prior complaints filed against the appellant before the FIR in question  
  • On Perverse Findings: 
    • The Court found the conviction of the appellant to be "absolutely perverse" 
    • There was a complete absence of evidence connecting him to the offense 
    • Being the husband of a convicted accused (Savita) was not sufficient grounds for his own conviction 
• The Supreme Court emphasized the need for careful examination in such cases 
  • Courts must prevent innocent persons from suffering ignominy 
  • There must be specific evidence rather than general allegations for conviction 
• The Supreme Court emphasized that mere relationship to other accused persons cannot be the basis for conviction 
  • Specific evidence of participation in the crime is necessary 
  • The prosecution must prove each element of the offense against each accused individually 
• These observations led the Supreme Court to ultimately set aside both the High Court and trial court judgments regarding the appellant's conviction under Section 498-A IPC. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 498 A of Indian Penal Code, 1860: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— 

• Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 

[Original Judgement]

Janardan Das & Ors. v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla & Ors

Date of Judgement/Order – 26.09.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Vikram Nath, Pankaj Mithal, and Prasann B. Varale 

Case In Brief: 

• The case involves a property dispute in Baripada, Odisha, originally owned by Late Surendranath Banerjee.  
• After Surendranath's death on 3rd July 1980, the property was inherited equally by his five heirs:  
  • Two sons: Binayendra Banerjee (Defendant No. 1) and late Soumendra Nath Banerjee  
  • Three daughters: Smt. Rekha Mukherjee, Smt. Sikha Das, and Smt. Monila Pal (Defendant Nos. 6-8)  
• On 14th April, 1993, there was an oral agreement between all co-owners and Defendant Nos. 9-11 (appellants) to sell the property for ₹4,20,000.  
•  On 6th June, 1993, the plaintiffs (who operated a petrol pump on the property under a dealership with Hindustan Petroleum) entered into another agreement with only Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to purchase the property for ₹5,70,000, paying ₹70,000 as earnest money.  
• Key points about the 6th June agreement:  
  • Only two brothers signed it, not the three sisters  
  • It stipulated that the sisters would come within three months to execute the sale deed  
  • The sale deed was to be executed before 30th September 1993  
• There was an unregistered General Power of Attorney (GPA) from 30th December, 1982, which allegedly gave Defendant No. 1 authority to act for his sisters.  
• However, a registered partition deed from 17th February, 1988, had limited Defendant No. 1's authority to only collecting rent.  
• On 27th September, 1993, all five co-owners (including the three sisters) executed a registered sale deed in favor of Defendant Nos. 9-11 for ₹4,20,000.  
• Following this, the plaintiffs filed a suit (T.S. No. 103 of 1994) seeking:  
  • Specific performance of their 6th June, 1993 agreement  
  • Alternatively, specific performance for the shares of Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra  
• The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed this decision and granted specific performance, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.  

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court observed that in contracts involving multiple parties with distinct interests, particularly when some parties are absent or non-signatories, the onus lies on the plaintiff to ensure all necessary consents and participations are secured to demonstrate readiness and willingness.  
• The Court held that mere reliance on co-owners (Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra) to procure their sisters for execution cannot absolve the plaintiffs of their responsibility to demonstrate readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.  
• The Court found that the plaintiffs' failure to contact the sisters, who are co-owners of a 3/5th share in the suit property, and their passive approach in not taking any proactive steps to secure their consent within the stipulated three-month period, demonstrated a lack of continuous readiness and willingness.  
• Regarding the General Power of Attorney (GPA), the Court observed that it was effectively revoked by the subsequent registered partition deed of 1988, which specifically limited Defendant No. 1's authority to rent collection, with no power to sell the property on behalf of the sisters.  
• The Court observed that in contracts involving multiple owners of property, all co-owners must either personally execute the agreement to sell or duly authorize an agent through a valid and subsisting power of attorney, noting that an agent's authority must be clear and unambiguous.  
• The Court observed that since the plaintiffs were cognizant that Defendant Nos. 6-8 were not parties to the agreement and their participation was necessary for a valid sale, they cannot claim belief in Defendant No. 1's authority to bind the sisters without their explicit consent.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 16 of Specific Relief Act, 1963: Personal bars to relief.— 
  • Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person— 2 
    • (a) who has obtained substituted performance of contract under section 20; or 
    • (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract;  
    • (c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.  
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c), —  
    • (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;  
    • (ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. 

[Original Judgement]

Rama Devi v. State of Bihar and Others (2024) 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.10.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice R. Mahadevan 

Case In Brief:

• The First Information Report (FIR) was lodged under Section 302, 307, 34, 120B, 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.  
• On June 13, 1998, at around 6:30 PM, Brij Bihari Prasad, who was in judicial custody, was taking a walk outside his wardroom at IGIMS hospital with several companions and his armed bodyguard Lakshmeshwar Sahu. 
• Two vehicles (a Sumo and an Ambassador) entered the hospital premises from the Bailey Road side gate and stopped near Brij Bihari Prasad.  
• Six men emerged from the vehicles - Mantu Tiwari (with sten gun), Vijay Kumar Shukla, Rajan Tiwari, Shri Prakash Shukla, Satish Pandey, and Bhupendra Nath Dubey (all with pistols). 
•  Bhupendra Nath Dubey initiated the attack, followed by Mantu Tiwari and Shri Prakash Shukla shooting at Brij Bihari Prasad, while Satish Pandey, Vijay Kumar Shukla, and Rajan Tiwari targeted Lakshmeshwar Sahu. 
• The attack resulted in the deaths of both Brij Bihari Prasad and his bodyguard Lakshmeshwar Sahu, with one bystander, Rabindra Bhagat, getting wounded in the crossfire. 

Verdict:

• There were several evidences and witnesses put forward by the Court in order to establish the offences alleged. 
• The Court analyzed the consequence of delay in forwarding the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate. 
• The Court held that mere delay itself is not sufficient to discard the case of the prosecution. 
• As held in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan (2016) where there is a delay in forwarding the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate it must be demonstrated that the delay has prejudiced the case of the prosecution. 
• Further, there were several witnesses in this case that had turned hostile. 
• The Court has reiterated that where the witnesses have turned hostile the whole testimony of the witness should not be discarded rather the creditworthy portions of the testimony should be considered for the purpose of evidence in the case.  
• Hence, the Court in this case convicted the accused persons. 

Relevant Provisions: 

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Punishment for murder.— 

• Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Attempt to murder.— 

• Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. 

Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Punishment of criminal conspiracy.-- 

• (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. 
• (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both. 

[Original Judgement]

Jitendra & Ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh 

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.10.2024  

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra 

Case In Brief:

• All the five accused were convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 147 and 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
• The judgment of the Sessions Court that convicted the accused persons held that upon exhortation of Ramesh Chandra, Pappu slit the throat of the deceased which led to his death. 
• The Appellants in this case had come to the Court for suspension of conviction under Section 389 (1) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). 
• Hence, the matter was before the Supreme Court. 

Verdict:

• The Court held that even if the version produced before the Sessions Court is found to be entirely true the appellants had kept PW3 and the others at bay so as to facilitate the crime of murder by Pappu. 
• Thus, the appellants have an arguable case as to whether they could at all be convicted under Section 302 IPC. 
• The Court held that these are prima facie observations and are not intended to influence the High Court. 
• Further, the Court held that mere pendency of the other trial where the appellant is an accused cannot be regarded as sufficient for denying the benefit of suspension of sentence in this case. 
• Thus, the Court held that appellants have made out sufficient ground for suspension of sentence and release on bail.

Relevant Provision:

Section 389 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail 

• Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. 
• Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release; 
• Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail. 

[Original Judgement]

Shivkumar Ramsundar Saket v. State of Maharashtra 

Date of Judgement/Order – 26.09.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice BR Gavai, Justice PK Mishra, and Justice KV Vishwanathan 

Case In Brief:

• In 2007, Shiv Kumar Saket, who worked as a day watchman for the Munot couple in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, along with five others (including two friends and three former employees), planned and executed a robbery and murder at the Munots' residence. 
• On December 2, 2007, the group entered the Munots' bungalow, tied up the night guard, and brutally murdered the couple - Ramesh Munot was stabbed multiple times, while his wife Chitra was tied to a chair and had her throat slit. 
• The perpetrators stole valuables worth Rs. 9 lakhs, including jewelry and foreign currency, before attempting to escape the city. 
• In 2013, the trial court convicted all six accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment for various offenses including murder, dacoity, and conspiracy. 
• Following an appeal by the Maharashtra government seeking enhanced punishment, the Bombay High Court in 2022 singled out Saket and upgraded his sentence to death penalty, citing his betrayal of trust as an aggravating factor. 
• The Supreme Court, while upholding Saket's conviction, disagreed with the High Court's death sentence and restored the trial court's life imprisonment sentence, noting that his role was similar to other accused and the case didn't qualify as "rarest of rare." 
• The case ultimately established that the High Court shouldn't have interfered with the trial court's sentencing without finding its observation about "rarest of rare" to be perverse or impossible. 

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court, through a bench comprising Justices BR Gavai, PK Mishra, and KV Vishwanathan, found no reason to interfere with the conviction of the accused as both the Trial Court and High Court had correctly appreciated the evidence on record. 
• However, regarding Saket's death sentence, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the High Court was not justified in imposing capital punishment. 
• The Court emphasized that the Trial Judge had already made a considered conclusion that this case did not fit into the category of 'rarest of rare cases', and unless this finding was proven to be perverse or impossible, the High Court should not have interfered. 
• A crucial observation was that Saket's role in the crime was similar to all other accused persons, and therefore his case could not have been segregated for imposing the death penalty. 
• The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning of using "betrayal of trust" as an aggravating factor sufficient to warrant death penalty for Saket alone. 
• With respect to evidence, the Court noted the contradictions in witness testimony, particularly that of PW.4-Sumitkumar Shrishamji Tiwari, who had "substantially improved his version" according to the Investigating Officer's evidence. 
• The Court also considered the argument regarding the recovery of a ladies watch, concluding that since such watches were commonly found in the market, this evidence alone wasn't sufficient to singularly implicate Saket. 
• Based on these observations; while maintaining the conviction, the Supreme Court set aside the death penalty and restored the Trial Court's original sentence of life imprisonment for Saket. 

Relevant Provisions:

Section 300 of Indian Penal Code,1860: Murder.—

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or 

• 2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or 
• 3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or 
• 4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 

Section 391 of Indian Penal Code, 1860: Dacoity.— 

• When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit “dacoity” 

120A of Indian Penal Code, 1860: Definition of criminal conspiracy.— 

• When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done 
  • (1) an illegal act, or 
  • (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. 
  • Provisos provide that —It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. 

[Original Judgement]

 Shivkumar Ramsundar Saket v. State of Maharashtra 

Date of Judgement/Order – 18.10.2024 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench: 50th CJI Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Justic J B Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra 

Case In Brief: 

• An NGO called Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to address the issue of child marriage in India. 
• The petition's main concern was that despite the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 (PCMA), child marriage rates remain alarmingly high in India. 
• Under PCMA, child marriage is defined as a marriage where either party is a child - girls below 18 years and boys below 21 years of age. 
• According to the 2019-2021 National Family Health Survey-5, 23.3% of girls under 18 and 17.7% of boys under 21 are married before the legal age. 
• There has been a significant decline in child marriage rates in India - from 47% in 2006 to 23.3% in 2019-2021, following the global trend of reduction. 
• The petitioner sought stronger enforcement mechanisms, awareness programs, appointment of Child Marriage Prohibition Officers, and comprehensive support systems for child brides. 
• The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, ruled that child marriages violate constitutional rights under Article 21, including rights to self-determination, choice, autonomy, sexuality, health, and education. 

Verdict:

• The Court acknowledged gaps in the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA) when viewed against Constitutional guarantees for children but refrained from making declarations without a specific Constitutional challenge. 
• The Court noted confusion regarding the interface between personal laws and PCMA, with the Union Ministry of Women & Child Development suggesting that PCMA should prevail over personal laws. 
• The Court observed that the PCMA is silent on the validity of marriages and noted that the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amending) Bill 2021, which addresses this issue, is pending before Parliament. 
• The Court highlighted that while PCMA prohibits child marriages, it doesn't address betrothals, which can also violate children's rights to free choice, autonomy, agency, and childhood. 
• The Court suggested that Parliament consider outlawing child betrothals, which might be used to evade PCMA penalties, noting that international law like CEDAW stipulates against minor betrothals. 
• The judgment directed its transmission to Secretaries of all concerned Ministries including Home Affairs, Women and Child Development, Panchayati Raj, Education, Information and Broadcasting, and Rural Development. 
• The Ministry of Women and Child Development was specifically directed to circulate the judgment to Chief Secretaries/Administrators of all States and Union Territories, NALSA, and NCPCR within four weeks. 
• The Court maintained that while betrothed children may be protected under the JJ Act, targeted remedies are needed for eliminating the practice of child betrothal. 

Relevant Provision:

Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Protection of life and personal liberty 

• No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 

Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part 

• (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
• (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. 
• (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
• (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.

[Original Judgement]