Chabi Karmakar & Ors. v. State of West Bengal  

Date of Judgement/Order – 29.08.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and JB Pardiwala 

Case In Brief: 

• Sonali Karmakar and Samir Karmarkar (appellant No. 2) were married in March 2003 and had a son born on 4th September, 2004. 
• On 2^nd May, 2006, Sonali committed suicide by hanging herself in her matrimonial house. 
• An FIR was lodged by Sonali's brother on 7th May, 2006, alleging harassment by her in-laws related to dowry demands. 
• The Trial Court convicted the sister-in-law (appellant No. 1), husband (appellant No. 2), and mother-in-law under Sections 498A, 304B, and 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860(IPC). 
• The High Court upheld both the conviction and sentence of the appellants. 
• During the pendency of the appeal, the mother-in-law (appellant No. 3) passed away, and the case against her stands abated. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court set aside the conviction under Section 304B (dowry death) for all appellants due to insufficient evidence connecting the cruelty and harassment to dowry demands. 
• The Court acquitted appellant No. 1 (sister-in-law) of all charges, finding no credible evidence of her involvement in the crime. 
• The Court upheld the conviction of appellant No. 2 (husband) under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide) and 498A (cruelty) of the IPC. 
• The Court held that the unnatural death of the deceased within seven years of marriage, occurring in the matrimonial home, is insufficient to secure a conviction under Section 304B and 498A of the IPC. The prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty related to dowry demands shortly before her death. 
• The court said that the trial court and High Court committed an error while raising a presumption of dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1982. 
• Appellant No. 2 was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000 for each count, with sentences to run concurrently. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 304B of Indian Penal Code,1860 deals with Dowry death. 

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. 

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 

[Original Judgement] 

Manilal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors 

Date of Judgement/Order – 10.09.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices BR Gavai and KV Viswanathan 

Case In Brief: 

• On 11th September 2017, Rajasthan authorities issued an advertisement for the post of Teacher Grade III Level II in the Scheduled Area (TSP). 
• The notification prescribed Graduation with minimum 45% marks and One year Bachelor of Education (B.Ed) as a qualification. 
• Candidates who had taken admission in B.Ed course after 31st August, 2009, were required to secure minimum 50 percent marks at graduation level. 
• The appellant, who had taken B.Ed admission on 23rd October, 2009, was denied appointment for not meeting the 50% requirement in graduation. 
• The appellant contended that other candidates from the same batch who were admitted to B.Ed before the cut-off date were granted appointments without the 50% requirement. 
• The appellant's writ petition and subsequent appeal were dismissed by the High Court. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court held that there cannot be discrimination amongst a homogeneous class of candidates based on their date of admission to the same course in the same academic session. 
• The Court observed that it would be improper to discriminate inter se among a homogenous group of students admitted for the academic session 2009-10. 
• The Court relied on the Rajasthan High Court's judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Ankul Singhal,2021 which was approved by the Supreme Court. 
• The Court noted the NCTE notification dated 13th November, 2019, which stated that the minimum percentage of marks in graduation shall not be applicable to those who had taken admission to B.Ed prior to 29th July, 2011. 
• The Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and directed the authorities to treat the appellant's appointment as regular. 
• The Court ordered the reinstatement of the appellant with consequential benefits, excluding back wages for the period not worked, but including pay fitment. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Article 14 of Constitution of India,1950 deals with Equality before law. 
• The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. 

[Original Judgement] 

Mubarak Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh

Date of Judgement/Order – 05.09.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Hrishikesh Roy and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia 

Case In Brief:

• The case was registered against the accused under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
• He was in custody since he was arrested on 1st December 2017. 
• Thus, he was in continuous custody for a period of 7 years. 
• The accused in this case applied for the grant of bail.   

Verdict 

• The Court held that the continuous detention for a prolonged period of seven years would undermine the right of expeditious trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI). 
• The Court held that since the State failed to ensure early conclusion of trial a case for grant of bail is made out by the petitioner who is incarcerated in connection with the death of his wife. 
• Thus, the Court released the accused on bail.    

Relevant Provision: 

• Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – No person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty.  

[Original Judgement] 

CN Shantha Kumar v. MS Srinivas 

Date of Judgement/Order – 05.09.2024  

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Hrishikesh Roy and Justice SVN Bhati 

Case In Brief: 

• In this case there were proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NIA) and trial Court convicted the appellant. 
• The Trial Court’s judgment was reversed in appeal and the accused was acquitted. 
• There was a petition for revision filed before the High Court wherein the High Court reversed the Appellate Court’s acquittal and ordered conviction for the appellant. 
• It is the above finding which is under challenge in this case before the Supreme Court.

Verdict: 

• The Court held that Section 401 (3) clearly says that the High Court does not have the authority to convert the finding of acquittal to one of conviction while exercising the power of revision. 
• Thus, the Court held that the decision of the High Court is unsustainable. 
• If the High Court was convinced about a wrongful acquittal, the High Court in Revision could not have ordered for conviction

Relevant Provision:

• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 401 (3) : Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 

[Original Judgement] 

Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs and Ors. v. Bhim Singh and Anr. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.09.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra 

Case In Brief: 

• On 18^th May 2005 the parties enter in a sell Agreement.  
• The total consideration for the property in dispute was set at Rs. 18 lakhs.  
• The respondents (buyers) paid an advance of Rs. 9.77 lakhs to the appellants (sellers).  
• Despite receiving a notice requesting execution of the sale deed, the appellants failed to execute the same.  
• The respondents instituted a suit for specific performance against the appellants to enforce the agreement to sell.  
• After the initial court decision, the respondents filed an appeal seeking specific performance of the agreement.  
• Following the appellate court's decree, the respondents filed an execution application on 20th March 2012, seeking execution and registration of the sale deed.  
• While the execution application was pending, the appellants challenged the appellate court's decree by filing a Second Appeal before the High Court.  
• After the dismissal of the Second Appeal, the respondents filed an application before the Execution Court on 24th March 2014, seeking permission to deposit the balance consideration.  
• The appellants, opposing this application, submitted an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract on the grounds that the decree holders had failed to make the deposit within the stipulated two-month period.  
• There are two issues before the Court:  
  • Whether the Execution Court had jurisdiction to deal with the application(s) for   
    • (a) Recission of contract and   
    • (b) Extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration?  
  • If the Execution Court had the Jurisdiction whether those applications ought to have been decided as one in the suit (i.e. Original Side)?   
    • If yes, then whether in the facts of the case, on that of the case, that ground alone, the impugned order warrants interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI). 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court affirmed that an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of contract or extension of time, must be decided in the original suit where the decree was passed, not in Execution Proceedings.  
• The Court held that the expression "may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made" as used in Section 28 of the 1963 Act must be accorded an expansive meaning to include the court of first instance, even if the decree under execution was passed by an appellate court.  
• The Court stated that an application under Section 28 of the 1963 Act can be entertained and decided by the Execution Court, provided it is the Court which passed the decree in terms of Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (CPC).  
• The Court reiterated that the power to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the 1963 Act is discretionary in nature and is to be exercised to do complete justice to the parties.  
• The Court observed that the Execution Court does not cease to have the power to extend time even if the decree directed payment of balance price by a certain date.  
• The Court held that while exercising discretion under Section 28, the Court must consider whether the default was intentional or if there was a bona fide reason for the delay.  
• The Court noted that if there appears to be no fault on the part of the decree holder, the Court may refuse to rescind the contract and may extend the time for deposit of the defaulted amount.  
• The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and is to be exercised to advance the cause of justice, not merely because it is lawful to do so.  
• The Court stated that for the purpose of doing complete justice, it may not interfere with an order even if it suffers from some legal error.  
• The Court observed that substantial justice had been done to the parties in this case, and interfering with the impugned order on technical grounds would cause grave injustice to the decree holders.

Relevant Provision:

SRA: 

Section 28: Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed.—(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require.  

(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court—  

(a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and  

(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or the lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract.  

(3) If the purchase or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely: 

(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor;  

(b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease.  

(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.  

(5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court. 

CPC 

Section 37: Definition of Court which passed a decree— 

The expression “Court which passed a decree,” or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include, —  

(a) where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court of first instance, and 

(b) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit.  

Explanation.—The Court of first instance does not cease to have jurisdiction to execute a decree merely on the ground that after the institution of the suit wherein the decree was passed or after the passing of the decree, any area has been transferred from the jurisdiction of that Court to the jurisdiction of any other Court; but, in every such case, such other Court shall also have jurisdiction to execute the decree, if at the time of making the application for execution of the decree it would have jurisdiction to try the said suit. 

[Original Judgement] 

Nitya Nand v. State of U.P. & Anr

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.09.2024  

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief:

• The informant, Sarwan Kumar had lodged a First Information Report (FIR) before the police station where he stated that on 8th September 1992 when he and his father (Satya Narain) as well as uncle as per their daily routine came to Ganga ghat after easing themselves for taking bath the incident occurred.   
• Shree Dev and his four sons Munna Lal, Raju, Nitya Nand and Uchchav @ Pappu armed with kanta, knives and country made pistol confronted Satya Narain.  
• The accused persons caught hold of Satya Narain and started assaulting him.  
• On hearing the cries of his father, the informant, Sarwan Kumar and others came to save him.  
• It was then that Nitya Nand fired from his country made pistol whereafter all the accused persons made their escape.  
• When the informant reached the spot Satya Narain (father of informant) had already succumbed to injuries.  
• On the completion of investigation charges were framed against the accused persons under Section 147 and Section 302 read with Section 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).  
• The Trial Court convicted the accused Shree Dev and also persons Munna Lal, Raju and Uchchav @ Pappu under Section 148 and Section 302 read with Section 149 of IPC.  
• An appeal was filed before the High Court. The High Court, while upholding the conviction dismissed the appeal.  
• Consequently, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the conviction of Allahabad High Court. 

Verdict: 

• The question for consideration before the Court was whether the prosecution could establish the culpability of the appellant in murder of Satya Narain beyond reasonable doubt.  
• The Appellant was charged by virtue of Section 148 and Section 149 of IPC.  
• Section 149 of IPC lays down that every member of unlawful assembly shall be guilty of the offence committed in prosecution of common object.  
  • Section 149 of IPC provides that  if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of committing of that offence, is a member of the said assembly; is guilty of that offence.   
• Thus, if it is a case of murder each member of unlawful assembly would be guilty of committing the offence under Section 302 of IPC.  
• Thus, the question which is required to be answered is whether the accused was a member of unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took part in the crime or not.  
• The Court held that as was held in Yunis @ Kariya v. State of M.P. (2002), no overt act is required to be imputed to a particular person when the charge is under Section 149 of IPC.  
• The presence of the accused as a part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction.  
• Hence, the Supreme Court held that the trial Court was justified in confirming the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 of IPC.

Relevant Provision:

Section 189: Unlawful Assembly under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) 

(1) An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is—  

(a) to overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or  

(b) to resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or  

(c) to commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or  

(d) by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or  

(e) by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.  

Explanation.—An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.  

(2) Whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly and such member shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.  

(3) Whoever joins or continues in an unlawful assembly, knowing that such unlawful assembly has been commanded in the manner prescribed by law to disperse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or composition from that fixed by law. Unlawfully taking coining instrument from mint. Unlawful assembly.  

(4) Whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.  

(5) Whoever knowingly joins or continues in any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, after such assembly has been lawfully commanded to disperse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.  

Explanation.—If the assembly is an unlawful assembly within the meaning of sub-section (1), the offender shall be punishable under sub-section (3).  

(6) Whoever hires or engages, or employs, or promotes, or connives at the hiring, engagement or employment of any person to join or become a member of any unlawful assembly, shall be punishable as a member of such unlawful assembly, and for any offence which may be committed by any such person as a member of such unlawful assembly in pursuance of such hiring, engagement or employment, in the same manner as if he had been a member of such unlawful assembly, or himself had committed such offence.  

(7) Whoever harbours, receives or assembles, in any house or premises in his occupation or charge, or under his control any persons knowing that such persons have been hired, engaged or employed, or are about to be hired, engaged or employed, to join or become members of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.  

(8) Whoever is engaged, or hired, or offers or attempts to be hired or engaged, to do or assist in doing any of the acts specified in sub-section (1), shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.  

(9) Whoever, being so engaged or hired as referred to in sub-section (8), goes armed, or engages or offers to go armed, with any deadly weapon or with anything which used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 

[Original Judgement]