Prem Lal Anand & Ors v. Narendra Kumar & Ors. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 07.08.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice CT Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Karol 

Case In Brief: 

• The claimant-appellant No.1 along with his wife were travelling by motorcycle and as they were crossing the village Meharauli they were faced with two rashly driven tractors. 
• As a result there was an accident of the claimant that resulted in several injuries including a broken jaw and fractures in his leg. 
• The Appellant’s wife died on spot as a result of the accident. 
• The claimant and his deceased wife were engaged in business jointly earning Rs. 5,000/- from their business concern, M/s Sonali Fabrics. 
• It was urged that due to the death of his wife the entire business which was earning profits of Rs. 60,000 in the year 1994 and Rs. 50,000 in the year 1993 was lost. 
• The claimant had a claim of Rs. 12,00,000 before the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 
• The claimant-appellant (s) approached the High Court for enhancing the amount of compensation. 
• The claimants- appellant (s) have approached the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court.  

Verdict: 

• The Court discussed the concept of composite and contributory compensation. 
• The record reveals in this case that the tractor had maintained slow speed prompting the appellant no. 1 to overtake. 
• The driver of another tractor was rash and negligent in his act not only did he overspeed but also came from the wrong side, resulting in collusion. 
• Merely because a person is overtaking that does not mean that he is acting in a rash and negligent manner. 
• The Court thus, held that in the given facts when it is proved that the offending vehicle was driven rashly and negligently, merely because he overtook would not make him liable for contributory negligence. 
• Hence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in the given case.  

Relevant Provision: 

• Law of Tort – Tort of Negligence - Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations, who ordinarily by reason of conduct of human affairs would do or be obligated to, or by doing something which a prudent or reasonable man would not do 

[Original Judgement] 

The State of Rajasthan & Ors v. Bhupendra Singh 

Date of Judgement/Order – 08.08.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah 

Case In Brief: 

• The respondent was an Inspector and was later appointed as the Assistant Registrar and was to be considered for promotion to Deputy Re 
• He was accused of permitting the construction of the godown without obtaining technical opinion. 
• Consequently, he was reverted back to the post of inspector. 
• In 1979 a departmental enquiry was initiated against him and his appeal seeking promotion was dismissed. 
• He was placed under suspension in contemplation of the departmental enquiry for having committed various irregularities. 
• The suspension order was challenged before a single judge which was prospectively stayed. 
• In 1985 he was removed from the post as a result of fresh enquiry. 
• In 1993 the single judge of High Court quashed the order of removal and found him fit for promotion with consequential benefits. 
• This was affirmed by a Division Bench and it is this order which was challenged before the Supreme Court.

Verdict:

• The Court cited the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao (1963), where it was held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) is not like an appeal. 
• The Court further held that where there is some evidence which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. 
• While exercising powers under Article 226 of the COI it is not permissible for the Court to reappraise the facts. 
• However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. 
• Thus, the Court held that there should be no interference in this case.

Relevant Provision:

• Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Power of High Courts to issue writs: 
  1. Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. 
  2. The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 
  3. Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without--(a)furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and  (b)giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. 
  4. The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32. 

[Original Judgement] 

Daulat Singh v. State of MP 

Date of Judgement/Order – 30.07.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 judges  

Composition of Bench – Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra 

Case In Brief: 

• In the present case, the petitioner was convicted of the offence under Section 7(i) and (iii) and consequently, in terms of Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954(PFA). 
• The same when appealed before the Additional session judge the appeal was dismissed. 
• The petitioner then appealed before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the same was dismissed there too. 
• The petitioner sought an application before the High Court for exempting him from surrendering as he was suffering from hepatitis as per Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 
• The High Court dismissed the application by stating Rule 48 of Chapter 10 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Rules, 2008. 
• The petitioner after rejection of the application filed a Special leave petition before the Supreme Court stating that 
  • It is a well settled principle of law that the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power, may consider it appropriate to grant exemption from surrendering having regard to the nature and circumstances of a particular case. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court referred to the case of Vivek Rai & Anr. v. High Court of Jharkhand (2015), where it was held that: 
  • It would be miscarriage of justice if Section 482 of CrPC was read in a manner extending liberty to a convict to urge a high court to exercise its inherent power to grant exemption from surrender prior to entertainment of a revision petition. 
• The supreme court held that the ground of hepatitis for exemption from surrendering was not maintainable as there was no laboratory report attached with the application. 
• The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the Special Leave Petition. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 482: Saving of inherent powers of High Court 
  • Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 
• Rule 48 of the 2008 Rules reads as follows:  
  • A memorandum of appeal or revision petition against conviction, except in cases where the sentence has been suspended by the Court below, shall contain a declaration to the effect that the convicted person is in custody or has surrendered after the conviction.  
  • Where the sentence has been suspended, the factum of such suspension and its period shall be stated in the memorandum of appeal or revision petition, as also in the application under section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.  
  • An application under section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall, as far as possible, be in Format No. 11 and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the appellant/applicant or some other person acquainted with the facts of the case.” 

[Original Judgement]

Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India 

Date of Judgement/Order – 13.08.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 judges  

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S Oka, Justice Augustine George Masih 

Case In Brief: 

• In the present case, the appellant was prosecuted under Sections 121, 121A and 122 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Sections 13, 18, 18A and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).  
• The appellant was referred to as respondent no.2 in the chargesheet.  
• It was stated in the chargesheet that the witnesses made the following statements:  
  • That the appellant’s wife used to own the building named Ahmad Palace and that the appellant had clandestinely shown that premises on the first floor of the said building were given for rent to one Athar Parwez – accused no. 1.  
  • That, the premises was used to conduct objectionable activities of an organization called Popular Front of India (PFI).  
  • That, the discussion allegedly involved the expansion of PFI, training of its members, Muslim empowerment, and plans to target individuals who made derogatory remarks about Islam.  
  • That the sum of Rs. 25,000 transferred to the appellant's son's account from the co accused.  
  • That the appellant was found removing certain goods from the premises right before the raid of the police.  
• The appellant along with the co accused applied for bail before the Special court which was rejected.  
• When an appeal was filed by the appellant and the co- accused before the Patna  High Court, the High Court granted bail to the other co-accused but rejected the bail of the appellant. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme court in this case observed that the statement given by the witness in the charge sheet and before the magistrate differs from each other and has various discrepancies.  
• The Supreme Court also mentioned that the statement by the witness did not include the name of the appellant for her involvement in the alleged offence.  
•  It was also noted that there were no inferences that shows that the appellant gave any direction for attacks mentioned in the chargesheet.  
• It was also noted that the amount transferred to the bank account of the appellant son was the advance payment of the rent.  
• It was also noted by the Supreme Court that the goods removed before the police raid had no connection with the attacks as the nature of the goods were not specified in the charge sheet.  
• The Supreme court held that there was no evidence to show that the alleged crime was having involvement of the appellant.  
• The Court held that it is settled law that bail is the rule and jail is an exception.  
• Even in cases where the relevant statutes provide for stringent conditions for grant of bail the above rule shall apply.  
• The Court held that denying bail in deserving cases would be violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI). 
• Therefore, the Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Article 21: Protection of Life and Personal Liberty 
  • No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 

[Original Judgement]

Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India and Ors 

Date of Judgement/Order – 23.07.2024 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Surya Kant and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief: 

• The appellant filed a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court challenging the delimitation exercise conducted by the Delimitation Commission. 
• The delimitation exercise resulted in the reservation of Bardoli Legislative Assembly Constituency, Gujarat for the Scheduled Caste community. 
• The Delimitation Commission reserved the constituency in exercise of its powers under the Delimitation Act, 2002. 
• The Delimitation Commission issued Order No. 33, dated 12th December 2006, which received the assent of the President of India. 
• The appellant's writ petition sought to challenge the validity of the Delimitation Commission's order. 
• The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition at the threshold, citing Article 329(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950. 
• Article 329(a) of the Constitution states that the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies shall not be called in question in any court. 
• The delimitation exercise in question was undertaken in the year 2006. 
• The appellant appealed against the Gujarat High Court's judgment dated 21th September 2012 to the Supreme Court. 
• The appeal before the Supreme Court pertains to the interpretation of Article 329(a) and the scope of judicial review in matters related to delimitation exercises. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court held that constitutional courts are not precluded from examining the validity of Delimitation Commission orders against constitutional standards. 
• The Court stated that if an order is found to be manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable with constitutional values, appropriate remedies can be granted. 
• It was observed that while courts should be guided by settled principles regarding judicial review in delimitation matters, they retain the power to check the validity of such orders. 
• The Court reasoned that completely barring judicial intervention would leave citizens without a forum to address their grievances regarding delimitation exercises. 
• The bench rejected the High Court's view that delimitation orders issued under the Delimitation Act are entirely immune from judicial review under Article 226. 
• The Court clarified that Article 329, while restricting judicial scrutiny of laws relating to delimitation, cannot be construed as imposing a blanket ban on judicial review of all delimitation actions. 
• Reference was made to the DMK v. State of Tamil Nadu case (2020), where it was held that constitutional courts can intervene to facilitate elections or in cases of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power. 
•  The Court distinguished the present case from the Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission judgment, clarifying that the latter restricted judicial intervention primarily to avoid unnecessary delays in the election process. 
• It was held that Courts can undertake judicial review within a limited sphere at an appropriate stage of the delimitation process. 
• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that there is an absolute bar on challenging delimitation orders, affirming the scope for judicial review in such matters. 

Relevant Provision: 

Article 329 deals with Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. 

• It states that notwithstanding anything in this Constitution 
• Article 329 (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 327 or article 328, shall not be called in question in any court;  
• Article 329 (b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. 

[Original Judgement]