Introduction 

• Nervous shock represents an evolving branch of tort law that deals with psychological injury sustained through sensory perception, primarily visual or acoustic.  
• This area of law has undergone significant development since its inception, moving from a restrictive approach that required physical impact to a more nuanced understanding of psychological harm.  
• The legal framework surrounding nervous shock has been shaped through various landmark cases that have established key principles and precedents. 
• The development of nervous shock law demonstrates the law's capacity to evolve in response to improved understanding of psychological injury while maintaining practical limitations through reasonable foreseeability and proximity requirements. 
• As our understanding of mental health continues to advance, this area of law may see further refinements to better address the complex nature of psychological injuries in modern society. 

Historical Development 

• The early approach to nervous shock claims was notably restrictive, as demonstrated in Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas (1888).  
  • In this case, the Privy Council held that damages arising from mere sudden terror without physical injury were too remote to be recoverable. However, this restrictive view was later challenged and modified through subsequent cases. 

Key Legal Principles 

Recognition of Psychological Harm 

• The landmark case of Dulieu v. White (1901) marked a significant shift in the legal approach to nervous shock.  
  • The court established that nervous shock accompanied by definite illness constitutes a physical injury, comparable to traditional physical injuries like broken bones.  
  • This decision effectively overturned the previous position that required actual bodily impact. 

Evolution of the Duty of Care 

• Through cases like Hambrook v. Stokes Bros (1925), courts began expanding the scope of duty of care beyond direct victims.  
  • The case established that defendants could be liable for shock suffered by individuals witnessing harm to their loved ones, though with certain limitations: 
    • The shock must result from what the victim personally witnessed or realized through their own senses. 
    • The damage must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence. 

Primary and Secondary Victims 

• Page v. Smith (1995) introduced a crucial distinction between primary and secondary victims, establishing different criteria for each: 
  • Primary Victims: 
    • Direct involvement in the incident. 
    • No requirement to prove foreseeability of psychiatric injury. 
    • Taken as found ("egg-shell skull" rule applies). 
  • Secondary Victims: 
    • Must meet control mechanisms. 
    • Psychiatric injury must be foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude. 
    • Must have close ties of love and affection with the primary victim. 
    • Proximity requirements in time and space. 

Limitations and Control Mechanisms 

• Courts have developed various control mechanisms to limit liability, including: 
  • Proximity requirements (both temporal and spatial). 
  • Relationship requirements between primary and secondary victims. 
  • The need for shock results in recognized psychiatric illness. 
  • Reasonable foreseeability test. 

Important Case Developments 

• King v. Phillips (1953): 
  • This case refined the foreseeability test and demonstrated the courts' approach to proximity.  
  • The mother's claim was rejected despite her child being involved in an accident, as she was 70-80 yards away and the incident (a slow-moving taxi) was not deemed sufficient to create foreseeable shock. 
• McLoughlin v. O'Brian (1982): 
  • This case further developed the law regarding secondary victims, establishing that even delayed arrival at an accident scene could support a claim if other criteria were met, including: 
    • Close ties of love and affection 
    • Close proximity in time and space to the incident 
    • Direct perception of the aftermath 

Conclusion 

The law of nervous shock has evolved significantly from its initial restrictive approach to a more nuanced framework that recognizes psychological harm while maintaining practical limitations. The current approach balances competing interests: compensating genuine victims of psychological trauma while preventing unlimited liability. The distinction between primary and secondary victims, along with established control mechanisms, provides a structured framework for addressing nervous shock claims. However, the area remains dynamic, with courts continuing to refine and adapt principles to meet evolving understanding of psychological harm and contemporary social needs.