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Civil Law

Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC

 18-Jul-2024

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra held that the terms of compromise should be reduced to writing and signed by the parties.        

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of Amro Devi & Othrs v. Julfi Ram (Deceased) Thr. LRs and Ors.  

What is the Background of Amro Devi & Othrs v. Julfi Ram (Deeceased) Thr. LRs and Ors. Case? 

  • The Respondents/Plaintiff based on an earlier compromise recorded between the parties before the Court, filed a fresh suit for possession and temporary injunction against the Appellants/Defendant.   
  • The Plaintiff contended that they were the owners in possession of half share in the suit land as per the compromise arrived between parties to the previous suit. 
  • The Appellant/Defendant countered the Plaintiff's contention and argued that the compromise made between the parties in an earlier suit cannot be recognized as there was no compromise decree passed by the Court because of non-compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC. 
  • The trial court rejected the suit in the absence of the existence and production of a written compromise between the parties duly signed by them 
  • The First Appellate Court, however, reversed the trial court's findings which was later approved by the High Court. 
  • Following this, the Appellant/Defendant approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Court restored the findings of the Trial Court and observed that it was impermissible under law to arrive at a compromise without existence or production of a written compromise duly signed by parties to the suit. 
  • The Court observed that a plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) clearly provides that a for a valid compromise there has to be a lawful agreement or compromise in writing signed by the parties which would then be required to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.  
  • In the absence of any such document in writing it cannot be said that a valid compromise has been entered into.  
  • Hence, the Court clarified here that a compromise decree can only be passed in accordance with Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC. 

What is Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC? 

  • Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC provides for compromise of suit. 
  • The purpose of this provision is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit the parties to amicably come to a settlement. 
  • The essential elements here are: 
    • It must be proved to the satisfaction of Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part 
    • By a lawful agreement, compromise  
    • The lawful agreement or compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties (Added by Act 104 of 1976) 
    • The Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded 
    • A decree shall be passed in accordance with the above agreement or compromise. 
    • It is not necessary that the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction should be same as subject matter of the suit.  
  • The proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 provides that: 
    • Where it is alleged by one party and denied by other that an agreement or compromise has been arrived at 
    • The above question shall be decided by the Court. 
    • However, no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question unless the Court thinks fit to grant such adjournment. 
  • Further, Explanation to the Section provides that an agreement or compromise: 
    • Void, or 
    • Voidable 
    • Under Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful. 
  • It is to be noted that Order XXIII Rule 3A provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the grounds that the compromise on which decree was based was not lawful.   

What are the Important Case Laws? 

  • Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 
    • The Court noted the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A and held the following: 
      • No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC. 
      • No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. 
      • No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. 
      • A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23. 
  • Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (2020) 
    • The scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. 
    • The Court held that by introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, the legislature has brought into force Order 23 Rule 3-A, which creates bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. 
    • The only remedy left with the party to avoid the consent decree is to approach the Court which recorded the compromise and no independent suit can be filed. 

Constitutional Law

Admission of Genuineness of Document not Violative of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India

 18-Jul-2024

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

  • Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Ashok Daga v. Directorate of Enforcement has held that calling an accused for admitting or denying the genuineness of the document would not amount to violation of his right against self-incrimination. 

What was the Background of the Ashok Daga v. Directorate of Enforcement Case? 

  • In the present suit an issue was raised that whether it is violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India (COI) if a person is produced to admit or deny the genuineness of the document under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). 
  • A Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court for the issue. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • It is stated by the court that Article 20(3) of COI talks about the right against self-incrimination and no person should be a witness against himself.  
  • The Supreme Court observed that the object of Section 294 of CrPC is to conduct the trial proceedings in a speedy manner by only using the evidence relevant for the trial and keeping aside the other irrelevant documents. 
    • The court added that non appearance of a person admitting or denying the genuineness of a document may lead to adverse decision against him. 
    • The Supreme Court held that to escalate the process of trial if an accused is asked to admit or deny the genuineness of the document would not amount to violation of Article 20(3) of COI. 

What is Section 330 of BNSS? 

  • About: 
    • Section 330 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 provides the documents whose formal proof is not required.  
    • It was covered under Section 294 of CrPC earlier.  
    • Two new proviso have been added under Section 330 of BNSS. 
  • Section 330 
    • Clause (1) states that here any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such documents and in no case later than thirty days after such supply:  
      • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be recorded in writing:  
      • Provided further that no expert shall be called to appear before the Court unless the report of such expert is disputed by any of the parties to the trial. 
    • Clause (2) states that the list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. 
    • Clause (3) states that where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed: 
    • It is provided that the court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved. 

What is the Right Against Self Incrimination? 

About 

  • It works on the legal maxim nemo teneteur prodre accussare seipsum – It states that a man cannot be compelled to state any self-incriminating statement. 
  • Self-incrimination is a legal principle under which a person cannot be compelled to provide information or testify against themselves in a criminal case. In various jurisdictions, including the US and India, the right against self-incrimination is enshrined as a constitutional or legal protection. 

Article 20 of the COI  

  • Protection in respect of conviction for offences 
    • Clause (1) states that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 
    • Clause (2) states that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 
    • Clause (3) states that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 

What are Landmark Judgments on Self incrimination? 

  • Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978): in this case the importance of the right against self-incrimination was affirmed in this case. The Court held that the right extends to both accused persons and witnesses, emphasizing that no one can be forced to incriminate themselves under any circumstances. 
  • Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019): In this case the Supreme Court has broadened the parameters of handwriting samples to include voice samples, adding that this would not violate the right against self-incrimination.  
    • It was also declared that a Magistrate can direct a person to compulsorily give voice samples during the investigation. 

Constitutional Law

Article 14

 18-Jul-2024

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently the Supreme Court has resolved a 22-year-old dispute over pay scales for education department officials in Uttar Pradesh, potentially impacting thousands of employees in case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors. The Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to settle the matter, balancing the interests of retired officials and the state government. This judgment clarifies the application of the doctrine of merger and res judicata in cases involving multiple rounds of litigation between the High Court and the Supreme Court. 

  • The Court's decision highlights the challenges in resolving long-pending pay parity disputes and offers guidance on how to approach such cases in the future. 
  • The ruling sets important precedents for handling delayed appeals by state governments and the limits of judicial intervention in matters of pay scale determination. 

What was the Background of State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors? 

  • In 2001, the pay scales of Headmasters of Junior High Schools were revised upwards, creating a disparity with Sub-Deputy Inspectors of Schools (SDI)/Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (ABSA) and Deputy Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (DBSA), who previously had higher pay scales. 
  • The affected officials filed a writ petition in 2002 seeking higher pay scales.  
    • The High Court ruled in their favor in 2002, directing higher pay scales to be granted from 2001. 
  • The state appealed to the Supreme Court.  
    • During the appeal, the state proposed a policy to rectify the anomaly by merging posts and granting higher pay scales from 2006 (notionally) and 2008 (actually). 
  • In 2010, the Supreme Court approved this proposal and dismissed the state's appeal, directing implementation. 
  • The state issued orders in 2011 implementing the proposal. 
  • However, some affected officials filed fresh writ petitions seeking benefits from 2001 instead of 2008. A Single Judge ruled in their favor in 2018. 
  • The state filed a delayed appeal against this 2018 order, which was dismissed by the High Court in 2023 due to the delay. 
  • The state has now appealed to the Supreme Court against the dismissal of its delayed appeal. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The court observed that Pay parity cannot be claimed as an indefeasible right unless the competent authority consciously decides to equate two posts, notwithstanding differences in nomenclature or qualifications. 
  • Incidental grant of identical pay scales to distinct posts, absent express equation, does not constitute an anomaly infringing Article 16 of the Constitution. 
  • Prescription of pay scales is a policy decision based on expert recommendations. The State's obligation is to ensure promotional posts are not remunerated lower than feeder cadres. 
  • Creation, merger, de-merger, or amalgamation of cadres for administrative efficiency falls within the State's prerogative. Judicial intervention is warranted only upon blatant violation of Articles 14 and 16. 
  • The Court invoked Article 142 to do complete justice, considering the protracted nature of litigation and its impact on retired respondents. 
  • The Court upheld the 2011 Government Order granting restructured benefits, applying it notionally from 01st January 2006 and from 01st December 2008. 
  • The Court directed non-recovery of excess payments made to respondents, in line with the principle established in State of Punjab v. Rafique Masih. 
  • The judgment emphasized the need for finality in prolonged pay parity disputes, recognizing their potential to become infructuous due to delays. 

What is Article 14 ? 

  • Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 affirms the fundamental right of “equality before the law” and “equal protection of law” to all persons. 
  • The first expression “equality before law” is of England origin and the second expression “equal protection of law” has been taken from the American Constitution. 
  • Equality is a cardinal principle enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India as its primary objective. 
  • It is a system of treating all human beings with fairness and impartiality. 
  • It also establishes a system of non-discrimination based on grounds mentioned in Article 15 of the Constitution of India. 

What are Exceptions of Article 14?  

The above rule of equality is not absolute, and there are several exceptions to it. For instance, foreign Diplomats  

  • Constitutional validity can extend to laws applicable to a single individual or entity, if special circumstances warrant such classification. 
  • There's a presumption of constitutionality for enacted laws. The burden of proving unconstitutionality lies with the challenger. 
  • This presumption may be rebutted if a law arbitrarily singles out an individual or class without rational differentiation. 
  • Courts presume legislative understanding of societal needs and experience-based problem-solving through laws. 
  • To uphold constitutionality, courts may consider common knowledge, reports, historical context, and conceivable factual scenarios. 
  • Legislatures may address varying degrees of harm, focusing on the most pressing issues. 
  • While good faith is presumed, courts won't automatically assume unknown reasons justify discriminatory legislation. 
  • Classification can be based on various factors like geography, occupation, or objectives. 
  • Perfect scientific or mathematical equality isn't required; similarity of treatment suffices. 
  • Article 14's equal protection applies to both substantive and procedural law. 

What is Reasonable Classification Under Article 14? 

  • Article 14 forbids class legislation, but it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions by the legislature to achieve specific ends. 
  • If the classification satisfies the test laid down in propositions, the law will be declared constitutional. 
  • The question of whether a classification is reasonable, and proper or not, must, however, be judged more on common sense than on legal subtletees. 
  • It does not forbid reasonable classification for legislation. The classification, however, should not be arbitrary.  
  • It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made.  
  • Thus the only limitation of the power of the State is that the classification should not be unreasonable and arbitrary. Classification to be reasonable must fulfil the following two conditions (conditions were demarcated in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 
    • The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things that are grouped from others left out of the group; and 
    • The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 
  • The differentia which is the basis of the classification, and the object of the Act are two distinct things. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act which makes the classification. 

What is Doctrine of Arbitrariness? 

  • Fairness and Arbitrariness are antithetical to each other, both concepts cannot be present in a single box. 
  • Hence, the court of law attempted to bring an evolution in the list of reasonable classification by excluding the decision containing arbitrariness. 
  • This doctrine was coined in the case of E.P Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973), where the bench termed equality as a dynamic concept and the ambit of reasonable classification cannot be altered by the usage of arbitrariness. 
  • The doctrine was later applied to the cases of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) and R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority (1979) into which courts opined that arbitrariness refers to deprivation of equality.