List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Ashutosh Srivastava held that there is no provision whereby a decree against a company can be executed against the employee/representative/ director of a firm.    

• The Allahabad High Court held this in the case of Dhanush Vir Singh v. Dr. Ila Sharma.  

What is the Background of Dhanush Vir Singh v. Dr. Ila Sharma Case? 

• In the present case the revisionist was the Vice- President of Benett Coleman. 
• He was duly authorized to enter into a lease agreement with one Ram Dev Bhaguna for rent for the period of 9 years.  
• The tenancy was terminated by the landlord and a request was made to the company to vacate the premises. It was not vacated, and the suit was filed was ejectment and recovery of mesne profits. 
• The Company on the other hand filed an application dated 10th September 2018 stating that it is willing to handover the possession, but the lessor is not taking the possession. 
• Accordingly, the keys were submitted to the Court. It is admitted that vacant possession of tenanted premises was handed over to the opposite party. 
• The earlier suit filed by the landlord was proceeded and there was an ex parte decree passed.  
• The decree holder filed an execution case against the judgment debtor. This case was filed against Sri Vijay Sahi, the then General Manager of M/S Benett Coleman and Co. Ltd.   
• The Executing Court held that the execution case cannot proceed against the Managing Director of the Company as he was neither party to the proceedings nor party to the lease agreement signed between the parties. 
• The decree holder filed an application praying for arrest or detention of the revisionist under Section 55 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). 
• The Additional District Judge allowed the application of the decree holder and issued a warrant of arrest against the revisionist. 
• Hence, the revision proceedings were instituted in the Allahabad High Court.    

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court had to answer the question whether the Directors/Authorized Representatives of a Limited Company can be arrested or detained in civil prison for execution of a money decree against the company. 
• The Court after perusing the different provisions of CPC held that there is no provision in CPC that provides for execution of money decree against the judgment debtor by effecting arrest or detention of it’s employee, director or general manager. 
• Order XXI Rule 50 of CPC provides for execution of a decree against a firm from the assets of the partners of the said firm but there is no provision with respect to Director/employee/Representative of a company. 
• The Court held that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. The decree admittedly is against the Company and the executing court cannot execute the decree against anyone other than judgment debtor or against from the assets/properties of anyone other than the judgment debtor. 
• One of the grounds put forward by the decree holder in this case was lifting of corporate veil. However, the Court held that no ground for invoking the above principle has been made out in this case.  
• Thus, the High Court in this case held that money decree cannot be executed against the revisionist by virtue of being the Vice President of the Company
• The Court held that the decree holder may take recourse to the specific provisions of Order XXI Rule 41 of CPC and accordingly amend the Execution Application. 

What is the Law Regarding Execution of Money Decree under CPC? 

Section 51 of CPC: 

• Section 51 of CPC provides ways to execute a decree. 
• Section 51 provides that the Court may on application of decree holder order execution of the decree by following ways: 
  • by delivery of any property specifically decreed;  
  • by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property;  
  • by arrest and detention in prison; 
  • by appointing a receiver; or 
  • in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require. 
• Proviso to Section 51 provides that where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after giving the judgment-debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to prison, the Court, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied- 
  • That the judgment-debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree-  
    • is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or  
    • has, after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed, or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, or 
  • That the judgment-debtor has, or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same, or  
  • That the decree is for a sum for which the judgment-debtor was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account. 

Section 55 of CPC

• Section 55 of CPC provides for execution of decree by arrest or detention. 
• Section 55 (1) provides that a judgment-debtor may be arrested in execution of a decree at any hour and on any day, and shall, as soon as practicable, be brought before the Court, and his detention may be in the civil prison of the district in which the Court ordering the detention is situate, or, where such civil prison does not afford suitable accommodation, in any other place which the State Government may appoint for the detention of persons ordered by the Courts of such district to be detained. 
• There are four provisos attached to Section 55 (1): 
  • Firstly, that, for the purpose of making an arrest under this section, no dwelling-house shall be entered after sunset and before sunrise; 
  • Secondly, that no outer door of a dwelling-house shall be broken open unless such dwelling-house is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor and he refuses or in any way prevents access thereto, but when the officer authorized to make the arrest has duly gained access to any dwelling-house, he may break open the door of any room in which he has reason to believe the judgment-debtor is to be found; 
  • Thirdly, that, if the room is in the actual occupancy of a woman who is not the judgment-debtor and who according to the customs of the country does not appear in public, the officer authorised to make the arrest shall give notice to her that she is at liberty to withdraw, and, after allowing a reasonable time for her to withdraw and giving her reasonable facility for withdrawing, may enter the room for the purpose of making the arrest; 
  • Fourthly, that, where the decree in execution of which a judgment-debtor is arrested, is a decree for the payment of money and the judgment-debtor pays the amount of the decree and the costs of the arrest to the officer arresting him, such officer shall at once release him. 
• Section 55 (2) provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any person or class of persons whose arrest might be attended with danger or inconvenience to the public shall not be liable to arrest in execution of a decree otherwise than in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf. 
• Section 55 (3) provides that  where a judgment-debtor is arrested in execution of a decree for the payment of money and brought before the Court, the Court shall inform him that he may apply to be declared an insolvent, and that he may be discharged, if he has not committed any act of bad faith regarding the subject of the application and if he complies with provisions of the law of insolvency for the time being in force. 
• Section 55 (4) provides that where a judgment-debtor express his intention to apply to be declared an insolvent and furnishes security, to the satisfaction of the Court, that he will within one month so apply, and that he will appear, when called upon, in any proceeding upon the application or upon the decree in execution of which he was arrested, the Court may release him from arrest, and, if he fails so to apply and to appear, the Court may either direct the security to be realised or commit him to the civil prison in execution of the decree. 

Order XXI of CPC

• Order XXI Rule 10 provides for the application of execution to be made by the decree holder. 
  • It provides that where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf, or if the decree has been sent under the provisions hereinbefore contained to another Court then to such Court or to the proper officer thereof. 
• Order XXI Rule 11 A provides that where application is made for arrest or detention of the judgment debtor it should state the grounds on which arrest is applied for. 
• Order XXI Rule 30 provides that every decree for the payment of money, including a decree for the payment of money as the alternative to some other relief, may be executed by the detention in the civil prison of the judgment-debtor, or by the attachment and sale of his property, or by both. 
• Order XXI Rule 37 provides that where application for execution of decree of payment of decree by arrest instead of issuing the warrant of arrest the Court may issue a notice calling upon him to appear before the Court and show cause why he should not be arrested. Where no appearance has been made in obedience of notice the Court may issue a warrant for arrest of the judgment debtor. 
• Order XXI Rule 38 provides that every warrant for arrest shall direct the officer entrusted to bring before the court the person liable with all convenient speed. 
• Order XXI Rule 40 provides for proceedings on appearance of judgment debtor in obedience to notice or after arrest.  
  • Clause (1) provides that when a person is brought or appears before Court on notice or arrest, the Court shall proceed to hear him and take all evidence in support of application for execution and shall give the judgment debtor opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to civil prison. 
  • Clause (2) provides that pending the conclusion of the inquiry under sub-rule (1) the Court may, in its discretion, order the judgment-debtor to be detained in the custody of an officer of the Court or release him on his furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance when required. 
  • Clause (3) provides that upon the conclusion of the inquiry under sub-rule (1) the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 51 and to the other provisions of the Code, make an order for the detention of the judgment-debtor in the civil prison and shall in that event cause him to be arrested if he is not already under arrest: 
  • Provided that in order to give the judgment-debtor an opportunity of satisfying the decree, the Court may, before making the order of detention, leave the judgment-debtor in the custody of an officer of the Court for a specified period not exceeding fifteen days or release him on his furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance at the expiration of the specified period if the decree be not sooner satisfied. 
  • Clause (4) provides that a judgment-debtor released under this rule may be re-arrested. 
  • Clause (5) provides when the Court does not make an order of detention under sub-rule (3), it shall disallow the application and, if the judgment-debtor is under arrest, direct his release. 

How is a Decree Against a Company Executed? 

Rule 50 of Order XXI of CPC: 

• Order XXI Rule 50 of CPC provides for execution of decree against firm. 
  • Clause (1) provides that where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted-  
    • against any property of the partnership;  
    • against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner;  
    • against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear:  
      Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932). 
  • Clause (2) provides that where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. 
  • Clause (3) provides that where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub-rule (2) the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. 
  • Clause (4) provides that save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not lease, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless he has been served with a summons to appear and answer. 
  • Clause (5) provides that nothing in this rule shall apply to a decree passed against a Hindu Undivided Family by virtue of the provision of rule 10 of Order XXX. 

V.K. Uppal v. Akshay International Pvt. Ltd. (2010): 

• The Delhi High Court in this case laid down the law regarding the execution of a decree against a company. The Court laid down the law as follows: 
  • Though Order XXI Rule 50 of CPC provides for execution of decree against the firm from the assets of the partners but there is no provision with respect to directors of the company. 
  • The Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. 
  • If the decree is against the company, the executing Court cannot execute the decree against anyone other than the judgment debtor company or against the assets of anyone other than the judgment debtor company. 
  • The identity of a director or shareholder of a company is distinct from the company (Solomon v. Solomon (1897)) 
    • Over time the principle laid down in Solomon v. Solomon (1897) has been watered down as the concept of lifting of corporate veil evolved. In cases of fraud and improper conduct the corporate veil can be lifted (Singer India Ltd. V. Chander Mohan Chadha (2004)) but the case regarding the same has to be made out. 

Source: Bombay High Court

Why in News?

The Bombay High Court recently in Aniket Arun Dhatrak (died) v. Shalaka Aniket Dhatrak ruled that the right to seek a divorce is a personal right and cannot be inherited by family members after the individual’s death.

• This decision came as the court dismissed an appeal from the deceased man’s family, who sought to continue divorce proceedings against his wife following his death during the Covid-19 pandemic.

What was the Background of Aniket Arun Dhatrak (died) v. Shalaka Aniket Dhatrak Case?

• Aniket and Shalaka filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent on 14th October 2020.
• As per their agreement, Aniket paid Shalaka Rs. 2,50,000 out of the agreed Rs. 5,00,000 alimony amounts when filing the petition.
• Aniket died during the COVID-19 pandemic on 15^th April 2021, before the second motion for divorce could be filed.
• On 28^th April 2021, Shalaka submitted a statement withdrawing her consent for divorce and requested the petition be disposed of.
• Aniket's mother and brothers (the appellants) applied to be brought on record as his legal heirs to continue the divorce proceedings.
• Shalaka opposed this application, stating the cause of action did not survive after Aniket's death.
• The Family Court refused permission for the appellants to come on record as legal heirs and disposed of the divorce petition as requested by Shalaka.
• The appellants appealed this decision to the Bombay High Court.
• The key issue was whether the right to sue for divorce by mutual consent survives to the deceased husband's family members when he dies before the second motion is filed.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court observed that the submission of a second motion under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is a condition precedent for passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
• The court acquires jurisdiction to undertake further inquiry only upon the joint motion of both parties, as stipulated in Section 13-B(2). This process is not automatic and cannot be initiated by one party alone.
• The right to seek divorce is a personal right that does not survive to legal heirs, as per the principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona.
• In the absence of a second joint motion, the petition for divorce by mutual consent stands abated upon the death of one party before the filing of the second motion.
• Mutual consent of both parties is a jurisdictional fact for the court to pass a decree under Section 13-B.
• Legal heirs of a deceased spouse do not have the right to be brought on record to pursue divorce proceedings initiated by mutual consent under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act.
• The 18-month period specified in Section 13-B (2) is intended to ensure quick disposal of cases, not to specify a time period for withdrawal of consent.
• The court's jurisdiction to undertake more inquiry and pass a decree depends on the joint motion of both parties, not just the filing of the initial petition.
• The personal nature of the right to seek divorce precludes its continuation by legal heirs after the death of one party to the proceedings.
  • The court finds no illegality in the Family Court's order and consequently dismisses the appeal.

What is Divorce by Mutual Consent?

• About:
  • Divorce by mutual consent falls under no fault theory where the parties do not have to prove fault on the part of another person.
  • Under Hindu Law divorce by mutual consent was added by Section 13B which was included by way of Amendment by the Marriage law (Amendment) Act, 1976 and it came into force from 25^th May 1976.
• Application for Divorce:
  • Both parties to the marriage may jointly file a petition for divorce before the competent court, requesting the dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent.
• Consent:
  • The consent of both parties must be voluntary and unequivocal, indicating their mutual agreement to dissolve the marriage and settle all related issues amicably.
• Settlement of Disputes:
  • The parties must present a settlement agreement addressing all issues such as alimony, division of property, and custody of children, which must be accepted by both parties.
• Cooling-off Period:
  • In certain jurisdictions, there may be a mandatory cooling-off period during which the parties may reconsider their decision to divorce.
• Court Proceedings:
  • Upon fulfilling the requisite conditions and presenting the settlement agreement, the court will review the petition and, if satisfied, grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
• Final Decree:
  • The divorce is finalized upon the court issuing a decree of divorce, which legally terminates the marriage

What are the Legal Provisions Involved in this Case?

Section 13 B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

• For divorce by mutual consent, two petitions must be jointly filed by the parties.
• As per Section 13B (1):
  • A joint petition for dissolution of marriage shall be presented before the District Court.
  • Whether the marriage was solemnized before or after commencement of Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976.
  • The parties should have been living separately for a period of one year or more.
  • The petition should provide that they have not been able to live together, and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
• Section 13 B (2) provides for second motion:
  • When should it be filed?
    • Not earlier than six months after the presentation of the first motion and not later than eighteen months after the said.
    • If the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime.
  • How is the decree of divorce passed?
    • After hearing the parties and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit
    • That the marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true
    • Pass a decree declaring marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of decree
• The purpose of prescribing the above procedure is to give parties some period of togetherness before separation.
• Marriage is a very important part of any individual’s life and therefore before the marriage is dissolved by mutual consent the parties must be given some reasonable time to reflect on their move to dissolve the marriage.

What are the Major Case Laws Referred?

• Yallawwa v. Shantavva (1997):
  • This Supreme Court case dealt with whether a wife could file an application to set aside an ex parte divorce decree after the husband's death.
  • The court held that divorce proceedings abate upon the death of a spouse if no decree has been passed.
• Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991):
  • This Supreme Court case is crucial in interpreting Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  • It held that mutual consent should exist at the time of the decree, not just at the time of filing the petition.
• Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011):
  • This Supreme Court case reaffirmed the principles laid down in Sureshta Devi Case.
  • It clarified that consent can be withdrawn even beyond the 18-month period mentioned in Section 13-B(2).
  • After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and
  • The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree
• Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya (2009):
  • This three-judge bench decision of the Supreme Court approved the ratio laid down in Sureshta Devi Case.
  • It emphasized that mutual consent is a jurisdictional fact for granting divorce under Section 13-B.
  • The court has to be satisfied about the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Seven judges bench upheld the sub-classifications among the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes so that benefits of reservation can reach to the weaker of the weakest sections of the society. The bench includes Chief Justice of India (CJI) Dr D.Y. Chandrachud and Justices B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, Bela M. Trivedi, Pankaj Mithal, Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma.

• The Supreme Court with 6:1 majority gave this verdict in the case of State of Punjab And Ors. v. Davinder Singh And Ors.

What is the Background of State of Punjab And Ors. v. Davinder Singh And Ors. Case?

• E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2005):
  • In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act 2000, which had sub-classified Scheduled Castes into four groups.
  • The Court held that Scheduled Castes form a homogeneous class by themselves and cannot be further sub-divided or sub-classified.
• Origin:
  • The case originated from Punjab's attempts to give preference to Balmiki and Mazhabi Sikh communities within SC reservations.
  • The State Legislature of Punjab enacted Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006.
  • It stipulated that 50% of the vacancies within the Scheduled Castes quota in direct recruitment shall be offered to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, if available, as a first preference from amongst the Scheduled Castes.
  • The Punjab and Haryana High Court declared this unconstitutional.
• Haryana Government Notification 1994:
  • On 9^th November 1994, the Government of Haryana issued a notification classifying the Scheduled Castes in the state into two categories - Blocks A and B - for reservation purposes.
  • The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed this notification.
• Tamil Nadu Arunthathiyars Act 2009:
  • The Act stipulated that 16% of the seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes in educational institutions shall be offered to the Arunthathiyars.
  • The constitutional validity of this Act was challenged before the Supreme Court.
• State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2020):
  • On 27^th August 2020, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the judgment in Chinnaiah case requires to be revisited by a larger Bench of seven Judges.
  • The Court observed that Chinnaiah failed to consider significant aspects bearing on the issue of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes.
  • This referral in the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2020) led to the current constitutional examination of whether sub-classification of Scheduled Castes for affirmative action, including reservation, is valid.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Issue 1: Whether sub-classification of a reserved class is permissible under Articles 14, 15 and 16?
• Held: Yes, Sub-classification within beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) must be rooted in a rational basis indicative of social backwardness. The criterion for such sub-classification should reflect inter-se social backwardness among the groups, which may be determined based on the same or different social identities.
• Issue 2: Whether the Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous or a heterogenous grouping?
• Held: The logical corollary of the identification of castes or groups as Scheduled Castes is not that this creates a homogenous unit.
• Issue 3: Whether Article 341 creates a homogenous class through the operation of the deeming fiction?
• Held: Even if Article 341 creates a deeming fiction, the provision does not create an integrated class that cannot be further sub-classified. The provision only puts certain castes or groups or parts of them into a group called the Scheduled Castes.
• Issue 4: Whether there any limits on the scope of sub-classification?
• Held: Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for reservation purposes is subject to constitutional limits.
  • The State may choose between two models: a preference model, where certain sub-castes are prioritized for reserved seats, or an exclusive model, where seats are reserved specifically for sub-castes.

What were the Majority’s Opinion?

• CJI D Y Chandrachud and Justice Manoj Misra:
  • Article 14 allows sub-classification within a class if it's not homogeneous for the law's purpose.
  • Sub-classification is not limited to Other Backward Classes but applies to beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4).
  • Article 341(1) does not create a fiction that Scheduled Castes are a homogenous class.
  • The Chinnaiah judgment prohibiting sub-classification of Scheduled Castes is overruled.
  • States must collect data on inadequate representation in state services as an indicator of backwardness.
  • Article 335 doesn't limit power under Articles 16(1) and 16(4) but reaffirms considering SC/ST claims in public services.
• Justice B R Gavai:
  • The State must justify that the group receiving more beneficial treatment is inadequately represented compared to other castes in the Scheduled Castes list.
  • Such justification by the State must be based on empirical data showing the sub-class is inadequately represented.
  • The State cannot reserve 100% of seats available for Scheduled Castes in favor of a sub-class to the exclusion of others in the list.
  • Sub-classification is only allowed if there is a reservation for the sub-class and larger class.
• Justice Vikram Nath:
  • Justice Vikram Nath concurs with the views of the CJI and Justice B.R. Gavai.
• Justice Pankaj Mithal:
  • Justice Pankaj Mithal agrees with the opinions of CJI and Justice B.R. Gavai that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes (SCs) is constitutionally permissible.
  • He concurs with Justice B R Gavai's view that the 'creamy layer' principle should be applied to SCs and STs.
  • Recommendations:
    • Re-evaluation of Reservation Policies: He suggests a fresh look at reservation policies and potential new methods for uplifting disadvantaged groups, without dismantling the existing system until a new approach is ready.
    • Limitation of Reservation: Reservations should be confined to the first generation of beneficiaries. Subsequent generations should not automatically receive these benefits if the family has achieved a higher status.
    • Periodic Review: There should be regular assessments to exclude individuals or families who have progressed and no longer need reservation benefits.
• Justice Satish Chandra Sharma:
  • He concurs with the opinions of CJI and Justice B.R. Gavai that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is constitutionally permissible.
  • Justice S C Sharma aligns with Justice B R Gavai’s perspective that the ‘creamy layer’ principle

Who gave Dissenting Opinion in Sub-Classification Case?

Justice Bela M Trivedi gave a lone dissenting opinion in the SC/ST sub-classification case.

• Constitutional Framework:
  • The Presidential List specifying "Scheduled Castes" under Article 341 assumes finality upon publication of the notification.
  • Only Parliament can include or exclude castes from the Scheduled Castes list notified under Article 341(1).
  • States have no legislative competence to sub-classify or regroup castes enumerated as Scheduled Castes in the Article 341 notification.
• Homogenous Nature of Scheduled Castes
  • Though drawn from different castes/tribes, Scheduled Castes attain special status by virtue of the Presidential notification under Article 341.
  • The history and background of "Scheduled Castes" make them a homogenous class that cannot be tinkered with by states.
• Limits on State Powers
  • States cannot vary the Presidential List or tinker with Article 341 under the guise of reservation or affirmative action.
  • Any state action sub-classifying Scheduled Castes would be unconstitutional.
• Limits of Article 142 Powers
  • Article 142 cannot be used to build a new edifice by ignoring express constitutional provisions.
  • The Supreme Court cannot validate state actions violating the Constitution, even if well-intentioned.
• Conclusion
  • The law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case is correct and should be upheld.
  • States have no power to sub-classify Scheduled Castes notified under Article 341.

What are the Major Amendments Related to Reservation?

What are the Key Cases on Reservation in India?

• State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)
  • The Supreme Court ruled that caste-based reservations in educational institutions violated Article 29(2) of the Constitution.
• B. Venkataramana v. State of Madras (1951)
  • Declared caste-based reservations in public services unconstitutional under Articles 16(1) and 16(2).
• M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963)
  • The Supreme Court set a 50% cap on reservations and ruled that excessive reservations violated Article 15(4).
• T. Devadasan v. Union of India (1964)
  • The Court invalidated the carry-forward rule for unfilled reserved vacancies, asserting it violated equal opportunity principles.
• State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976)
  • Upheld relaxation in qualifying marks for SC/ST candidates, shifting the interpretation towards substantive equality.
• Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992)
  • The landmark decision upheld OBC reservations but ruled against reservations in promotions. Also reiterated the 50% cap on total reservations.
• Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995)
  • Introduced the catch-up rule for general category candidates in promotions.
• Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab (1996)
  • Emphasized balancing reservations with administrative efficiency, reinforcing the catch-up rule.
• S. Vinod Kumar v. Union of India (1996)
  • Held that relaxation in qualifying marks for promotions for SC/ST candidates violated the equality principle.
• M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006)
  • Upheld constitutional amendments allowing reservations in promotions with consequential seniority, provided they don't impact administrative efficiency.
• Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008)
  • Upheld the 27% reservation for OBCs in higher education but excluded the creamy layer from its ambit.
• BK Pavitra (II) v. State of Karnataka (2019)
  • Upheld consequential seniority for SC/ST employees in promotions, reinforcing the principle of substantive equality.
• Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018)
  • The Supreme Court reiterated the need to exclude the creamy layer among SC/ST for reservation benefits.
• Maratha Quota Case (Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister, Maharashtra) (2021)
  • The Supreme Court struck down Maharashtra's law granting reservations to the Maratha community, ruling it breached the 50% cap set by Indra Sawhney.
• Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India (2022)
  • The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the reservation system, reinforcing the principle of substantive equality.

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of A v. B has held that a major son shall be entitled for maintenance till the time he completes his education and becomes financially independent. 

What was the Background of the A v. B Case?  

• In this case the parties got married under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) and have a son. 
• The parties started living separately since the year 2004 the son lived with the mother. 
• The husband filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of the HMA on the grounds of cruelty before the Family Court. 
• During the pendency of Divorce petition wife filed an application under Section 24 of HMA for pendente lite maintenance for which Family Court ordered the Husband to pay the maintenance of Rs. 18000/- (wife & son). 
• The wife appealed the maintenance order for the enhancement of Rs. 20000/-. 
• The wife again filed an application before the Family Court on 28th February 2009 for enhancement of the interim maintenance to Rs. 1,45,000/- due to substantial changes. 
• On 14th July 2016, the Husband withdrew his divorce petition.  
• On 17th July 2015 during the pendency of the maintenance petition Husband filed before the Family Court an application where 
  • He voluntarily admitted to enhance the amount of maintenance to Rs. 65000/- (Rs. 50,000 to the Wife from the date of filing of enhancement application i.e. 28th February 2009 and Rs 15,000 to the son from July 2015). 
  • He further pleaded that as he has withdrawn the divorce petition the court cannot give maintenance under Section 24 & Section 26 of the HMA and the court has become functus officio. 
  • He also contended that under Section 26 no maintenance can be granted to the adult male child. 
• The Family Court ordered that  
  • Wife and son would be entitled to receive the interim maintenance from 28th February 2009 to 14th July 2016 of Rs. 1,15,000/-. 
  • The son would be entitled for maintenance from 15th July 2016 till he attains the age of 26 years and would be entitled for enhancements at regular intervals of 2 years starting from 28th May 2019. 
• Aggrieved by the decision of the Family Court both the parties appealed before the Delhi High court.  

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Delhi High Court observed that the withdrawal of divorce petition does not curtail the right of wife to be maintained under Section 24 of HMA. Such a decision would cause hardship to the wife. 
• Therefore, the Delhi High Court held that the Family court is competent to adjudicate the maintenance application even after withdrawal of the divorce petition by the husband. 
• The Delhi High Court further observed that as per Section 26 of the HMA the Family Court does not become functus officio if the Husband withdraws the divorce petition. 
• The Delhi High Court interpretated the context of Section 26 of HMA that the purpose of the provision of Section 26 is to ensure education of the child and it is unfeasible to sat that a child can completes his education at attaining majority and be able to maintain himself. 
• The scope of education interpreted as per Section 26 of HMA cannot be restricted till the age a child attains majority. 
• Therefore, the Delhi High Court held that a major son shall be entitled for the maintenance till he completes his education and becomes financially independent. 

What is Maintenance? 

About: 

• It is financial support aided by the father or the husband towards his children or wife respectively. 
• The maintenance is also known as alimony, which refers to the payment against the expenses and all the necessities of the dependents. 
• The maintenance shall be granted irrespective of the parties living together or not and irrespective if the divorce has been granted or not as per Hindu Laws. 

Maintenance Provisions Under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: 

• Section 24: Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings 
  • This provision states that where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable.  
  • Provided that the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during the proceeding, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the wife or the husband, as the case may be. 
• Section 26: Custody of children 
  • This provision states that in any proceeding under this Act, the court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible, and may, after the decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make from time to time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceeding for obtaining such decree were still pending, and the court may also from time to time revoke, suspend or vary any such orders and provisions previously made. 
  • Provided that the application with respect to the maintenance and education of the minor children, pending the proceeding for obtaining such decree, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the respondent.

Difference Between Section 24 of HMA & Section 25 of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): 

Case Laws: 

• Urvashi Aggarwal and Others v. Inderpaul Aggarwal (2021): In this case the court observed that a father cannot be absolved of his responsibilities to meet the education expenses of his son because the son has attained majority. Even though the child may be a major, he may not be financially independent and capable of sustaining himself. 
• Sapna Paul v. Rohin Paul (2024): In this case the court held that the obligation of a father towards his child does not end when the child attains majority, even though he is still pursuing his studies. 
• Rajnesh v. Neha (2021): In this case, the court stated that the maintenance amount should consider the child’s food, clothing, residence, extra coaching or any other vocational training courses to complement the basic education.