List of Current Affairs

Source: Jharkhand High Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary held that mere age of the document is not conclusive proof of it’s due execution.

• The Jharkhand High Court held this in the case of Sanjeeda Begam v. Md. Eqbal.

What is the Background of Sanjeeda Begam v. Md. Eqbal Case?

• Suit property consists of structures over plot no. 1393 and plot no. 1397.
• The ingress and egress to plot no. 1393 is through plot no. 1397 and there is no other passage. This passage was purchased by Fateh Mohammed through registered sale deed.
• Plaintiffs claim title through Fateh Mohammad.
• The defendants assert that the property was transferred by one Suleman Kristan to Gulam Mohammad.
• The petition in this case was filed under Section 71A of the Scheduled Area Regulation Act.
• It is the case of the plaintiff that the basis of the title is Hukumnana executed on 7^th January 1950 by the ex- landlord and the rent receipts issued by the landlord.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court noted that the plaintiff claim title on the basis of settlement in 1950 by the ex-landlord followed by possession. The defendant however claim title on the basis of sale deed executed by Suleman Christan and Abhiram Oraon.
• The High Court held that the trial Court was right in not accepting the Hukamnama as a document of title.
• The Court held that mere age of the document is not a conclusive proof of it’s due execution.
• For raising a rebuttable presumption under Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) at least prima facie proof is required to show that the document is thirty years old.
• The Court further noted that the provision uses the expression “may presume” and hence it is the discretion of the Court to raise or not raise a presumption.

What are the Essentials of Section 92 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)?

• Section 92 of BSA provides for presumption as to documents that are thirty years old. This provision was earlier found under Section 90 of IEA.
• Section 92 provides:
  • Any document proved or purporting to be thirty years old
  • Produced from any custody the Court considers in a particular case to be proper
  • The Court may presume
    • That the signature or handwriting is of the person of whom it purports to be
    • In case the document is executed or attested that it was duly attested and executed by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.
• It is to be noted that the provision uses the phrase “may presume”.
  • “may presume” is found in Section 2(h) of BSA.
  • Section 2(h) provides that whenever it is provided by this Adhiniyam that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it;

Comparison Between Section 90 of IEA and Section 92 of BSA?

• Changes in Section 92 of BSA:
  • Prima facie, it looks like the Explanation to Section 90 of IEA does not find place in Section 92 of BSA. However, the explanation to Section 92 of BSA provides that the explanation to Section 80 of BSA applies to this Section as well.
  • Explanation to Section 80 of BSA states: “For the purposes of this section and section 92, document is said to be in proper custody if it is in the place in which, and looked after by the person with whom such document is required to be kept; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render that origin probable.”
  • The above would hence be useful while interpreting Section 92 of BSA.

What are the Case Laws on Section 90 of IEA (Section 92 of BSA)?

• Sri Lakni Baruan And Others v. Sri Padma Kanta Kalita & Othrs. (1996)
  • The Court in this case held that this Section is based on necessity and convenience because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of a document that is 30 years old.
  • Section 90 of IEA does away with the strict rule of proof of private documents.
  • It is to be noted that if the document produced from the proper custody is a copy admitted under Section 65 as secondary evidence and it was thirty years old the signature authenticating the copy might be proved to be genuine. But this would not be sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of original under Section 90.
  • Thus, the position is clear that presumption under Section 90 of IEA does not apply to a copy or certified copy even though thirty years old.
  • Lastly, the Court also held that it is the discretion of the Court to raise or not to raise the presumption under Section 90 of IEA.
• Ashutosh Samanta (d) By LR’s & Ors v. SM. Ranjan Bala Dasi & Ors. (2023)
  • The issue before the Court was whether Section 90 of IEA would be applicable in case of wills.
  • The Supreme Court in this case cited the judgment of Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh (2009) wherein it was held that presumption regarding documents 30 years old does not apply to a will.
  • The Court hence held in this case that wills cannot be proved only on the basis of their age rather it has to be proved in terms of Section 63 (c) of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of IEA.

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News?

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the matter of Maruti Traders v. Itron India Pvt Ltd has held that terms of the contract will supersede the principle of equity and fairness in commercial matters.

What was the Background of the Maruti Traders v. Itron India Pvt Ltd Case?

• In this case, the petitioner was authorized by the defendant to act as a non-exclusive dealer for domestic and bulk water meters and accessories in Chhattisgarh.
• All the terms related to price of the document and specifications related to manufacturing of meters were settled between the parties.
• The Petitioner claimed that there was an implied understanding between the parties that petitioner may charge a price to customers that included a profit margin over the Respondent's decided price.
• It was further argued by the petitioner that the Respondent granted dealership rights to others which resulted in the loss of Petitioner.
• It was also argued by the petitioner that the parties to whom the respondent has granted dealership rights were initially liaised with the petitioner, which is a breach of their contract.
• The Respondent contended that there is no such binding agreement between the parties that the respondent cannot directly sell the water meters in the market.
• The Respondent presented that Clause 2.01 of the Reseller Agreement allowed them to sell directly and appoint other resellers which did not constitute a breach.
• The dispute led to arbitral proceedings between the parties and the award was passed in favour of the respondent.
• Aggrieved by the award the petitioner filed the present petition before the Delhi High Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Delhi High Court observed the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C).
• The Court, after referring to various case laws, inferred that the scope of interference of the court in the decisions of the Arbitral tribunal must only be restricted to the provisions given under Section 34 of the A&C.
• The Delhi High Court further added that when there is any harm to the public policy, principles and statutes then only a court can interfere with the merits of the awards.
• The Delhi High Court held that the petitioner failed in proving the breach by the respondent as there was no such contract between the parties before the reseller agreement as per Section 10 and Section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) which could accord the petitioner’s claims.
• It was further held by the Delhi High Court that in commercial contracts equity shall not be applicable as it is governed strictly by the terms of the contracts and relief can only be granted based on the rights given under the statute.
• The Delhi High Court found the award correct and dismissed the petition.

What is Equity?

• It is a form of Justice under the principles of natural justice.
• Equity is a way of ensuring fairness and justice when required by applying good conscience.
• The concept of equity complements the ideas of reasonableness, challenging unfair actions, and the principles of natural justice.
• Equity majorly ensures the fairness of the due procedure and curbs unfair and unjust practices.
• Equity ensures specific performance of contracts, enforce equitable estoppel, and grant equitable relief in cases of undue influence in the cases of contractual disputes.
• Equity works on the legal maxim “equity suffer wrong without remedy” which means equity comes into role when there is any shortcoming with the law

What is the Difference Between Equity and Equality?

How Equity is a Secondary Source of Law?

• Equity is derived neither from customary laws nor from statutory laws. It is derived from the precedents based on conscience by the English laws. In the Courts of Chancery.
• Special Courts known as “Equity Courts” were set up in England to resolve the disputes by applying the principle of Equity where common law cannot be applied.
• It provides resolutions to the disputes where common law cannot fairly give the remedy.
• Equity is a set of uncodified rules to ensure fairness and justice.

What is the Principle of Fairness?

• Fairness is the means to justice.
• The principle of fairness ensures procedural fairness in due process of law to prevent any arbitrary or unfair practice.
• It ensures the third party pronouncing a decision or responsible for resolving the dispute between the parties must be impartial.
• The principle of fairness ensures that the rules or statutes should be applied in such a way that the result must be just, fair and equitable.
• The main objective of fairness is to meet the ends of justice by foolowing a fair procedure.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

Recently 7 Judges Bench of Supreme Court in a matter of State of Punjab and Ors. v Davinder Singh and Ors. allows States to sub-classify Scheduled Castes (SCs) to provide separate quotas for more backward groups within the SC category. But Justice Trivedi dissented, arguing that this sub-classification interferes with the Presidential list of SCs established under Article 341, which can only be modified by parliamentary law.

• She expressed concern that such sub-classification could introduce political factors into the SC-ST list, undermining its original intent to prevent political influence.

What was the Background of the State of Punjab and Ors. v Davinder Singh and Ors. ?

• The case originated from Punjab's attempt to give preference to certain communities within Scheduled Caste (SC) reservations.
• In 2006, the Punjab Legislature enacted the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act.
• Section 4(5) of this Act stipulated that 50% of vacancies within the SC quota in direct recruitment would be offered to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, if available, as first preference among SC candidates.
• The Punjab and Haryana High Court struck down this provision in 2010, relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2005).
• The E.V. Chinnaiah judgment had held that Scheduled Castes form a homogeneous class and cannot be further sub-divided or sub-classified.
• Similar attempts at sub-classification had been made by other states: a. In 1994, Haryana issued a notification classifying SCs into two categories (Blocks A and B) for reservation purposes. b. In 2009, Tamil Nadu passed the Arunthathiyars Act, allocating 16% of SC reserved seats in educational institutions to Arunthathiyars.
• These attempts at sub-classification were challenged in various courts, citing the E.V. Chinnaiah judgment.
• The matter reached the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh.
• On August 27, 2020, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the E.V. Chinnaiah judgment needed to be revisited by a larger bench.
• The Court observed that E.V. Chinnaiah failed to consider significant aspects related to sub-classification within Scheduled Castes.
• This referral in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh led to the formation of a seven-judge Constitution Bench to examine the validity of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for affirmative action and reservation.
• The seven-judge bench was tasked with considering two main aspects: a. Whether sub-classification within reserved castes should be allowed. b. The correctness of the E.V. Chinnaiah decision, which held that SCs notified under Article 341 formed one homogenous group that could not be further sub-categorized.
• The case attracted significant attention due to its potential impact on reservation policies and the interpretation of constitutional provisions related to Scheduled Castes.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Justice Bela Trivedi in her dissent, stated that the Presidential list of Scheduled Castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States.
  • The Presidential List of Scheduled Castes notified under Article 341 of the Constitution assumes finality upon publication and cannot be altered by the States.
  • Only Parliament, by law, has the authority to include or exclude any caste, race, tribe, or group thereof from the Scheduled Castes list specified in the Presidential notification under Article 341(1).
• The rule of plain meaning or literal interpretation, being the primary rule, must be adhered to while construing constitutional provisions, albeit with a broad and generous approach.
  • Scheduled Castes, despite originating from diverse castes, races, or tribes, attain a homogeneous class status by virtue of the Presidential notification under Article 341, which cannot be fragmented by State action.
• States lack legislative competence to enact laws providing reservation or preferential treatment to particular castes by subdividing, sub-classifying, or regrouping the Scheduled Castes enumerated in the Presidential notification.
  • Any attempt by States to vary the Presidential List or manipulate Article 341 under the guise of providing reservation or affirmative action for weaker sections is ultra vires the Constitution.
• The precedent established in E.V. Chinnaiah by a Constitution Bench, having considered all previous judgments including Indra Sawhney, should not have been doubted and referred to a larger bench without cogent reasons, in adherence to the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis.
• The Supreme Court's power under Article 142 cannot be invoked to validate State actions that contravene express constitutional provisions, even if such actions are well-intentioned or affirmative in nature.
• Affirmative action and legal frameworks, while aiming for a more equitable society, must navigate complex legal principles to ensure fairness and constitutionality.
• The law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah by the Five-Judge Bench is deemed to be the correct interpretation of Article 341 and merits confirmation.

Who are Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes?

About

• The Constitution does not define who belongs to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
• Articles 341 and 342 however empower the President to draw up a list of these castes and tribes.
• Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are those castes or tribes as the President may by public notification specify.
• If such notification is in respect of a State, it can be done after consultation with the Governor of the State concerned.
• Any inclusion or exclusion from the Presidential notification of any caste, race, or tribe can be done by Parliament by law.
• If any question arises whether or not a particular tribe is a tribe within the meaning of this Article, one has to look at the public notification issued by the President under Article 341 (l).
• The Constitution provides the following special provisions for protecting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Legal Provision

• Article 341 of Indian Constitution deals with list of Scheduled Castes.
• Article 341(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be.
• Article 341(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

What is Article 142 of Indian Constitution?

• Article 142 deals with enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.
• The Supreme Court possesses the authority to issue any decree or order necessary to deliver complete justice in matters before it.
  • Such decrees or orders are enforceable throughout India's territory.
  • The enforcement method may be prescribed by parliamentary law or, in its absence, by presidential order.
• The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire territory of India to
  • a. Secure attendance of any person
  • b. Order discovery or production of documents
  • c. Investigate or punish contempt of itself
• These powers are subject to any relevant laws enacted by Parliament.
• The provision empowers the Supreme Court to take extraordinary measures to ensure justice is served in cases under consideration.
  • This article grants the Supreme Court broad discretionary powers to address unique situations that may not be covered by existing laws or procedures.
• The Supreme Court's authority under this article is expansive but not unlimited, as it remains subject to parliamentary legislation.

What are the Constitutional Provisions Governing Reservation in India ?

• Part XVI deals with reservation of SC and ST in Central and State legislatures.
• Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution enabled the State and Central Governments to reserve seats in government services for the members of the SC and ST.
• The Constitution was amended by the Constitution (77^th Amendment) Act, 1995 and a new clause (4A) was inserted in Article 16 to enable the government to provide reservation in promotion.
  • Later, clause (4A) was modified by the Constitution (85th Amendment) Act, 2001 to provide consequential seniority to SC and ST candidates promoted by giving reservation.
• Constitutional 81^st Amendment Act, 2000 inserted Article 16 (4B) which enables the state to fill the unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for SCs/STs in the succeeding year, thereby nullifying the ceiling of fifty percent reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.
• Article 330 and 332 provides for specific representation through reservation of seats for SCs and STs in the Parliament and in the State Legislative Assemblies respectively.
• Article 243D provides reservation of seats for SCs and STs in every Panchayat.
• Article 233T provides reservation of seats for SCs and STs in every Municipality.
• Article 335 of the constitution says that the claims of STs and STs shall be taken into consideration constituently with the maintenance of efficacy of the administration