List of Current Affairs

Home / List of Current Affairs

Civil Law

Interim Maintenance under Section 151 of CPC

 05-Sep-2024

Source: Madras High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Madras High Court in the matter of ABC v. XYZ has held that Muslim women have the right to claim interim maintenance under section 151 of Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (CPC) who has filed for divorce under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 (DMM). 

What was the Background of the ABC v. XYZ Case? 

  • In the present case, the petitioner is the husband, and the respondent is the wife. 
  • The respondent left the petitioner as he used to treat her unfairly and used to physically and verbally assault him. 
    • Later she again came back to the petitioner when he assured her that he will not repeat the same again. 
  • The petitioner after some time again abused her and their daughter. It was in the form of physical, verbal, emotional and economical abuse. He said he will take their daughter with him back to his hometown for which the respondent denied, which enraged the husband, who beat her black and blue and took the daughter away to Belgaum. 
  • The respondent suffered at the hands of the husband, she decided to initiate proceedings under Section 2(viii) of the DMM Act. 
  • The respondent filed the case for maintenance against the petitioner as she had no means to earn as she lost her job and is middle of financial crises while her husband earns a handsome salary, and she also wanted maintenance for her daughter’s education. 
  • The petitioner denied all the allegations and stated that it was the respondent who used to slap the petitioner and abuse him. 
  • The case was presented before the Trial Court and the court awarded maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month so as to enable the wife/respondent to live with dignity and comfort and granted Rs.10,000/- as litigation costs. 
  • Aggrieved by the decision the present revision petition was filed by the petitioner/husband before the Madras High court. 
  • The petition was filed to challenge the applicability of Section 151 of the CPC by the Trial court in granting interim maintenance to the respondent. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Madras High Court stated that when the relationship between the parties is admitted and based on the merits of the case the court may grant maintenance to the wife and children on prima facie satisfaction of the court empowered under Section 151 of CPC. 
    • The Court relied on the case of Hajee Mahomed Abdul Rahman v. Tajunnissa Begum and Anr (1952). 
  • The High Court further added that the purpose of granting maintenance is to provide equal opportunities to both the parties. 
    • If the court does not possess such power, it would be against justice, equity and good conscience. 
  • The Madras High Court also noted that it is the duty of the husband to maintain the daughter and the wife as per pristine Islamic law as well as, under DMM Act. 
  • The High Court also pointed out Section 2 (ii) of the DMM Act which states that a husband not maintaining his wife for a period of two years is a ground for divorce. 
  • This entails that it is an obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. 
  • The Madras High Court also added that as per Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 the wife can claim several reliefs. 
  • Based on the above observations the Madras High Court rejected the present petition and confirmed the order of the Trail court. 

What is Section 151 of CPC? 

About: 

  • This section delas with the inherent power of the High Court. 
  • It entails the provision regarding the power of the high court to overcome the difficulties arising out of the procedural rules. 
  • This power is to be exercised by the court when  no explicit provision is provided. 

Applicability of Section 151 of CPC:  

  • The court must use the inherent power to provide equity, justice and good conscience. 
  • When no alternate remedy is left then court may invoke the power inherited under section 151 of CPC. 
  • The section does not provide any substantial right to the parties but merely aids to overcome the procedural disparities that arose during the course of justice. 

Section 151 of CPC:  

  • It states saving of inherent powers of Court. — 
    • Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. 

Case Laws based on Section 151 of CPC: 

  • Hajee Mahomed Abdul Rahman v. Tajunnissa Begum and Anr (1952): 
    • In this case it was held that when the relationship between the parties is admitted, the Court has the inherent power to grant interim maintenance. 
  • Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (1985): 
    • The Court in this case held that whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorized in expressed terms be also done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. 
  • Ram Chand v. Kanhayalal (1966): 
    • The Supreme Court held that the inherent powers under Section 151 of CPC can also be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of court. 
  • Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. Sushila (1965):  
    • The Supreme Court while expressing its view on the nature of inherent powers of the court, observed that CPC is a special piece of legislation to deal with procedural situations of proceeding of trials of civil nature. 
    • Under the Code itself, some hidden powers are conformed on the courts according to the emerging situations during the proceedings and courts can exercise them in absence of expressed provisions.  
    • Where there are express provisions in the Code, the Courts are barred from invoking such powers. 
  • Abdul Rahim Attar v. Atul Ambalal Barot (2005):  
    • The court held that inherent powers cannot be used to nullify the expressed provision provided under any statute.

Overview of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 

    • The Act was brought forth to improve and ameliorate the social condition of Muslim women. 
    • This act was brought in to curb out the hardships over the Muslim women against while granting divorce. 
    • Earlier the marriage of the Muslim women used to dissolve ipso facto on renunciation. This act prevented such hardships on women. 
    • This act consists of six sections in total. 
    • Section 2 of this act explicitly provides nine grounds for divorce which are made keeping in mind the harassments and hardships the Muslim wives suffer which are as follows: 
      • When the husband's whereabouts have not been known for four years. 
      • When the husband has neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for two years. 
      • When the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for seven years or upwards. 
      • When the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital obligations for three years. 
      • When the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so. 
      • When the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from virulent venereal disease 
      • When she, having been given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years. 
      • When the husband treats her with cruelty. 
      • On any other ground which is recognized as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law

Civil Law

Right to Maintenance of Widowed Daughter-in-law

 05-Sep-2024

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justices Saumitra Dayal Singh and Donadi Ramesh held that merely because the daughter-in-law was not living in the matrimonial home this would not disentitle her from maintenance.         

What is the Background of Shree Rajpati v. Smt. Bhuri Devi Case? 

  • The husband of the respondent was working as a daily wage employee of the Irrigation Department. 
  • The husband was murdered, and the respondent did not remarry. 
  • She claims she had no source of survival and pleaded that an amount of Rs. 80, 000 was paid to the appellant, who is the father of the husband of respondent.  
  • She has further alleged that the appellant has misappropriated the amount paid to him and that he has sufficient agricultural holdings. 
  • Thus, a claim for maintenance was made by the respondent against the appellant. 
  • It is the case of the appellant that no amount was received by him towards the terminal dues arising from the death of his son. 
  • It is also claimed by the appellant that he made a term deposit of Rs. 20,000 in favor of the respondent and that she has refused to live in the matrimonial home and works as a house help.  
  • It is also his case that the respondent is gainfully employed at a place. 
  • The decision of Lower Courts: 
    • The Learned Trial Court awarded monthly maintenance of Rs. 3,000 per month to the respondent. 
    • Upon appeal filed against the above order interim order was passed providing for payment of interim maintenance at the rate Rs. 1,000/ per month.   
  • Thus, the matter reached the High Court.   

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The High Court observed that there is no evidence that the appellant had misappropriated the amount of Rs. 80,000. 
  • Also, there is no doubt about the claim that the appellant had made a fixed deposit of Rs. 20,000 in favor of respondent. 
  • Further, the claim of the appellant was that the respondent had remarried or was gainfully employed at a particular place is unbelievable.   
  • Thus, the Court held that the respondent was entitled to the claim of maintenance under Section 19 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA). 
  • For calculating the amount of maintenance, the principle contained in Section 23 of HAMA should be considered. 
  • The fact that the widowed daughter in law was living separately from the father in law shall not disentitle her to claim maintenance from her father in law. 
  • In the societal context in which law must be applied, it is not uncommon for widowed ladies to live with her parents, for varied reasons and circumstances. 
  • Merely because the lady may have made that choice may neither lead us to the conclusion that she had separated from her matrimonial home without reasonable cause nor that she would have sufficient means to survive on her own. 
  • The Court here refused to interfere with the interim order passed by the Court.

What is Maintenance?

  • The maintenance generally covers the expenses for essentials for the substance of life. However, it is not merely a right for survival of the claimant. 
  • The term 'Maintenance' has also been defined under Section 3(b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
  • It includes provision for food, clothing, shelter, and basic needs such as education and medical expenses 
  • The provision for maintenance is contained in several Legislations:
Legislation Provision
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 125 to 128
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 24, Section 25
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 Section 18 to Section 28 (Chapter III)
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 20
The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 Section 4 to Section 18 (Chapter II)

What are the Provisions Governing Maintenance Granted to Widowed Daughter-in –Law? 

  • Section 19 provides for maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law. 
  • Section 19 (1) provides that a Hindu wife shall be entitled to maintenance from her father-in-law after the death of her husband. 
  • The Proviso however adds a rider and provides that maintenance shall be granted only if: 
    • She is unable to maintain herself from her own earnings or her own property, or 
    • Where she has no property of her own, she is unable to obtain maintenance from: 
      • Estate of her husband or her father or mother, or 
      • her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.  
  • Section 19 (2) provides that the obligation under Sub section (1) shall cease if: 
    • The father- in- law has no means to do so from any coparcenary property in his possession out of which daughter-in-law has not obtained any share. 
    • On remarriage of the daughter-in-law.

What are the Case Laws on Maintenance Granted to the Widowed Daughter-in-Law? 

  • Abdul Khader v. Tasleem Jamela Agadi (2024):  
    • The Karnataka High Court in this case discussed if a daughter-in-law could claim maintenance under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 
    • The Court held that on close reading of Section 125 of CrPC it can be inferred that a daughter-in-law cannot claim maintenance against her parents-in-law. 
    • The Court observed that provisions of law envisage that a wife can lay a claim for maintenance. 
    • Thus, in the absence of any power vested to the Court under Section 125 of CrPC to entertain a petition the Court cannot allow relief to daughter-in-law under Section 125 of CrPC.    
  • Laxmi & Anr v. Shyam Pratap & Anr (2022):  
    • This judgment was delivered by the Delhi High Court wherein the widowed daughter-in-law claimed maintenance from her father-in-law. 
    • The Court held that the daughter-in-law should not claim maintenance from her father-in-law provided he has inherited some estate of her husband.  
    • The Court in this case denied maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law. 
  • Dhanna Sahu v. Smt. Sitabai Sahu (2023):  
    • The Chhattisgarh High Court in this case elaborated the law on maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law. 
    • The Court held that in order to grant maintenance under Section 19 of HAMA the first condition is that the maintenance can be claimed from the father-in-law by the widowed daughter-in-law to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings. 
    • The Court held that the maintenance shall be granted to widowed daughter-in-law only if the above condition is satisfied.

Civil Law

Section 28 of SRA

 05-Sep-2024

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

The Supreme Court recently ruled that an execution court can extend the time limit to pay the balance amount under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,(SRA) even though such applications are typically decided in the original suit. The Court upheld the execution court's decision, noting that the decree lacked specific terms for payment and the decree-holder's willingness to pay warranted the extension. 

  • Justices J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra held this in the matter of Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs & Ors. v. Bhim Singh & Anr.  

What was the Background of Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs & Ors. v. Bhim Singh & Anr. Case? 

  • On 18th May 2005 the parties enter in a sell Agreement. 
  • The total consideration for the property in dispute was set at Rs. 18 lakhs. 
  • The respondents (buyers) paid an advance of Rs. 9.77 lakhs to the appellants (sellers). 
  • Despite receiving a notice requesting execution of the sale deed, the appellants failed to execute the same. 
  • The respondents instituted a suit for specific performance against the appellants to enforce the agreement to sell. 
  • After the initial court decision, the respondents filed an appeal seeking specific performance of the agreement. 
  • Following the appellate court's decree, the respondents filed an execution application on 20th March 2012, seeking execution and registration of the sale deed. 
  • While the execution application was pending, the appellants challenged the appellate court's decree by filing a Second Appeal before the High Court. 
  • After the dismissal of the Second Appeal, the respondents filed an application before the Execution Court on 24th March 2014, seeking permission to deposit the balance consideration. 
  • The appellants, opposing this application, submitted an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract on the grounds that the decree holders had failed to make the deposit within the stipulated two-month period. 
  • There are two issues before the Court: 
    • Whether the Execution Court had jurisdiction to deal with the application(s) for  
      • (a) Recission of contract and  
      • (b) Extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration? 
    • If the Execution Court had the Jurisdiction whether those applications ought to have been decided as one in the suit (i.e. Original Side)?  
      • If yes, then whether in the facts of the case, on that of the case, that ground alone, the impugned order warrants interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Supreme Court affirmed that an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of contract or extension of time, must be decided in the original suit where the decree was passed, not in Execution Proceedings. 
  • The Court held that the expression "may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made" as used in Section 28 of the 1963 Act must be accorded an expansive meaning to include the court of first instance, even if the decree under execution was passed by an appellate court. 
  • The Court stated that an application under Section 28 of the 1963 Act can be entertained and decided by the Execution Court, provided it is the Court which passed the decree in terms of Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (CPC). 
  • The Court reiterated that the power to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the 1963 Act is discretionary in nature and is to be exercised to do complete justice to the parties. 
  • The Court observed that the Execution Court does not cease to have the power to extend time even if the decree directed payment of balance price by a certain date. 
  • The Court held that while exercising discretion under Section 28, the Court must consider whether the default was intentional or if there was a bona fide reason for the delay. 
  • The Court noted that if there appears to be no fault on the part of the decree holder, the Court may refuse to rescind the contract and may extend the time for deposit of the defaulted amount. 
  • The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and is to be exercised to advance the cause of justice, not merely because it is lawful to do so. 
  • The Court stated that for the purpose of doing complete justice, it may not interfere with an order even if it suffers from some legal error. 
  • The Court observed that substantial justice had been done to the parties in this case, and interfering with the impugned order on technical grounds would cause grave injustice to the decree holders. 

What is Section 28 SRA? 

About:

  • Section 28 of the SRA provides a mechanism for rescission of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property in cases where a decree for specific performance has been granted. 
  • It allows the vendor or lessor to apply for rescission in the same suit if the purchaser or lessee fails to pay the decreed amount within the specified time or any extended period granted by the court. 
  • The court has discretionary power to rescind the contract partially or wholly, and can order restoration of property possession, payment of rents and profits, and refund of earnest money as deemed appropriate. 
  • The section also provides for further relief to the purchaser or lessee if they pay within the specified time and prohibits separate suits for reliefs claimable under this section. 

Legal Provision of Section 28 SRA:  

  • The court has the power to rescind a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property after a decree for specific performance has been made, if the purchaser or lessee fails to pay the required sum within the specified time period. 
  • The vendor or lessor must apply for rescission in the same suit where the decree for specific performance was made, not in a separate proceeding. 
  • The court's power to rescind the contract is discretionary, allowing it to rescind either partially (for the defaulting party) or entirely, based on the justice of the case. 
  • Upon rescission, if the purchaser or lessee has obtained possession of the property, the court shall direct them to restore possession to the vendor or lessor. 
  • The court may order the purchaser or lessee to pay the vendor or lessor all rents and profits accrued from the property since they took possession until its restoration. 
  • If justice requires, the court may order a refund of any earnest money or deposit paid by the purchaser or lessee in connection with the contract. 
  • If the purchaser or lessee pays the required sum within the specified period, they may apply in the same suit for further relief they may be entitled to. 
  • Potential further relief for the purchaser or lessee includes the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor. 
  • Another form of further relief may be the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession of the property upon execution of the conveyance or lease. 
  • The statute explicitly prohibits the filing of separate suits for any relief claimable under this section by any party to the contract. 
  • The court has discretion in awarding costs for any proceedings under this section. 
  • The court retains the power to extend the time period for payment beyond what was initially specified in the decree. 
  • The provision applies equally to both sale and lease contracts for immovable property. 
  • The section provides a comprehensive framework for addressing defaults in specific performance decrees, balancing the rights of both parties to the contract. 
  • The court's power to rescind is triggered by non-payment, emphasizing the importance of timely performance of monetary obligations in such contracts. 

Scope of Section 28 of SRA: 

  • Section 28 applies specifically to contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property where a decree for specific performance has been granted. 
  • It empowers the court to rescind such contracts under certain circumstances, primarily when the purchaser or lessee fails to pay the required sum within the specified time. 
  • The court has the discretion to extend the time period for payment beyond what was initially specified in the decree. 
  • The provision requires that applications for rescission or time extension be made in the same suit where the decree for specific performance was originally granted. 
  • The court's power under this section is discretionary, allowing it to consider the justice of the case and the conduct of the parties. 
  • The court can rescind the contract either partially (affecting only the defaulting party) or entirely, based on the circumstances of the case. 
  • Upon rescission, the court can order the restoration of property possession to the vendor or lessor if the purchaser or lessee had obtained it under the contract. 
  • The court may direct payment of rents and profits accrued from the property and refund of earnest money or deposits, as justice requires. 
  • If payment is made within the specified or extended time, the court can grant further relief to the purchaser or lessee, including proper conveyance or delivery of possession. 
  • The section explicitly prohibits separate suits for any relief claimable under this section. 
  • The court has discretion in awarding costs for proceedings under this section. 
  • The scope of this section aims to balance the interests of both parties in cases of default in specific performance decrees. 

Section 37 of CPC,1908

    • The term "Court which passed a decree" is given a specific legal definition for the purposes of executing decrees. 
    • This definition applies unless there is anything contradictory in the subject or context. 
    • Where a decree to be executed was passed in appellate jurisdiction, the Court of first instance is deemed to be the Court which passed the decree. 
    • If the Court of first instance no longer exists or lacks jurisdiction to execute the decree, the Court that would have jurisdiction to try the suit at the time of applying for execution is considered the Court which passed the decree. 
    • A Court of first instance does not lose jurisdiction to execute a decree merely because an area has been transferred from its jurisdiction to another Court's jurisdiction after the suit was instituted or after the decree was passed. 
    • In cases where an area has been transferred, the Court to which the area has been transferred also gains jurisdiction to execute the decree. 
    • The new Court's jurisdiction to execute the decree is contingent on whether it would have had jurisdiction to try the original suit at the time the application for execution is made. 
    • This provision ensures continuity in the execution of decrees despite changes in court jurisdictions or the cessation of certain courts. 
    • It provides flexibility in determining which court can execute a decree, particularly in cases of appellate decisions or jurisdictional changes. 
    • The explanation clarifies that jurisdictional changes do not invalidate the original court's authority to execute its decrees, but rather expand the number of courts with such authority.